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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the corporate financing decisions of listed non-financial 
firms operating in the Asia Pacific countries, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Australia, for the period from 1993 to 2001. These four countries have different 
legal, corporate governance, financial and institutional environments and were 
affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis in different ways and to different degrees. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to shed light on the impact of these differences and the 
financial crisis on financing policies and practices of firms in this region. The 
empirical analysis consists of three main parts: (i) the determinants of capital 
structure (the use of debt versus equity); (ii) the determinants of debt maturity 
structure (the use of long-term debt versus short-term debt); and (iii) the tests of the 
extent to which the main capital structure theory (the pecking order theory) accounts 
for the financing behaviour of firms in this region. 
The results suggest that capital structure and debt maturity structure decisions 
of a firm are not only the product of its own characteristics as identified by the extant 
literature but also the function of the financial and legal environment in which it 
operates. The results also show that firms in this region do not behave as strictly as 
predicted by the pecking order theory. However, they reveal that financial deficit (the 
key factor in the pecking order theory) challenges the exclusive role of the 
conventional factors. The financial crisis of 1997 is also found to have had 
significant but diverse impacts on the firms' financing decisions across the region, 
especially in Thailand where the crisis originated. In addition, the pecking order 
behaviour tends to be more pronounced for the post-crisis period. 
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1.1 Background to the Research 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Findings from previous studies of corporate financing decisions remain 
inconclusive and there is a limited amount of empirical evidence on capital and debt 
maturity structure choices using international data in different economies. There is a 
considerable amount of empirical research on the determinants of capital and debt 
maturity structures in the US, UK and other developed countries but little research has 
been undertaken in other countries, especially in emerging markets. How far theories 
formulated for firms in developed countries can be applied to those in other regions, 
such as the Asia Pacific region, needs to be investigated further. This thesis therefore 
undertakes a study of corporate financing decisions by firms in the Asia Pacific region. 
Corporate financing decisions, such as the effect of capital and debt maturity 
structures on the valuation of a firm and optimal capital and debt maturity structures, 
have often been researched. Corporate financing decisions are required when firms need 
to fund new investments. A study on corporate financing decisions is important as it 
enhances our understanding of the manner in which firms are financed which can 
directly affect firms' value. Capital and debt maturity structures are among the most 
perplexing, and most frequently examined, issues in corporate finance and financial 
management. The important issue is always the relationship between capital or debt 
maturity structures and the firm's value. 
The starting point for research in this area is the seminal paper by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) which paved the way for the development of alternative theories and 
empiricarresearch. Their ittelevancfpropositiohs sUggest that; tinder a restrictive-set of -- ·· 
conditions in the world of perfect capital markets 1, a firm's financing policy should not 
affect its market value. No debt-to-equity ratio can be regarded as superior to another, 
and they imply that maturity of debt has no effect on a firm's value. However, perfect 
markets do not exist in reality, and it is naive to conclude that investment and financing 
decisions are unrelated. Several theories have subsequently been developed with the 
relaxation of the assumptions of Modigliani and Miller's (1958) theory. The first 
generation of research showed how firms' value may vary with changes in debt-equity 
mix when one or more aspects of the fundamental perfect market assumptions, such as 
taxes and bankruptcy and liquidation costs, are relaxed. Whether there are specific 
target capital or debt maturity structure ratios that firms try to achieve has also been 
investigated, and various attempts have been made to introduce other perspectives of 
financial markets into the theory, such as agency costs and the presence of asymmetric 
information, yielding a number of valuable insights. The role of corporate governance 
has also been studied and found to have a significant effect on firms' financing 
decisions. 
Assuming an optimal capital structure does exist, it is believed that a firm could 
maximize its value by selecting the appropriate proportion of debt and equity, provided 
the firm can identify its optimal capital structure. Managers have alternatives, and the 
combinations of financing sources chosen normally come with opportunity costs which 
can increase, or decrease, the value of firms, depending on how they choose to finance 
their investments. They can forego growth opportunities, but if they want to undertake 
new investment opportunities, they can either finance their projects from internal 
sources, such as retained earnings, or from external sources, such as borrowing through 
debt instruments or issuing new shares. According to the pecking order theory, internal 
. -finance--is ·always -preferable-to external· finance; andcamong··external-finance··debt--is-
1 Absence of transaction costs, taxes, infonnational asymmetries, financial distress and agency costs. 
2 
normally chosen before equity. This hierarchy order of finance is still under question as 
to whether such an order exists in practice. Assuming firms have first exhausted their 
internal finance, as suggested by the pecking order theory, the next available funding 
has to come from external sources with a combination of debt and equity. The essence 
of debt is that the firm has a commitment to make fixed payments in the future, 
including interest payments and the principal repayment. Once firms decide to issue 
debt, there is the question of whether short-term or long-term debt should be acquired, 
or what the appropriate proportion of long-term debt to short-term debt should be. 
1.2 Justification for the Research 
Most previous studies focus on US and UK firms, and it is therefore important to 
investigate further whether the capital and debt maturity structure choices of non-
financial firms in Asia Pacific countries are related to factors similar to those which 
appear to influence the financing decisions of US and UK firms. Results from a single 
country might not represent the average for other countries in different environments 
and economies. Due to limited empirical evidence based on firms in other countries, it 
is possible that the significant relationship between previously identified factors in the 
literature on firm leverage or debt maturity might possibly even be coincidental as the 
majority of the existing empirical studies only use data from the same, or a single, 
environment. This highlights a need to test the robustness of empirical findings outside 
the environment of previous research. The study of firms in Asia Pacific countries adds 
important international evidence to the current literature and a unique data set from 
financial statements of firms listed in Asia Pacific countries, namely Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, has been chosen for this research project. These four 
sample countries' were chosen as several• cfactors contribute -to-· the importance of this-
study. 
3 
Firstly, although all sample countries have been affected by the East Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, the degrees of the effects vary across sample countries. The 
crisis originated in Thailand and its effects spread to other countries. 2 Among the 
sample countries, Thailand and Malaysia were the countries most affected by the crisis 
(Kamin, 1999) while Singapore successfully averted the worst effects of the crisis and 
recovered quickly (Cha and Oh, 2000; Chowdhry and Goyal, 2000). There is evidence 
suggesting that Australia was less affected by the crisis, that Australia's economic 
fundamentals can hold Australia in a good shape and that Australia will retain the 
reputation as a country with responsible economic and financial management 
(Macfarlane, 1998a and 1998b; Grenville, 1999; Summers, 2001; Ellis and Lewis, 
2001 ). This is not unexpected because Australia was not subject to the fatal combination 
of large volatile capital flows and fragile domestic financial sectors that characterized 
other Asian countries. Australia has a more matured financial market as a consequence 
of the financial deregulation of the 1980s and the Wallis Inquiry in 1996. 
Claessens et al. ( 1999b) and Caprio and Kingebiel (2003) categorize Thailand and 
Malaysia as 'crisis-countries' and Australia and Singapore as 'non-crisis countries'. 
However, it is naive to assume that Australia and Singapore are not totally affected by 
the crisis because (i) the crisis increased uncertainty in the world financial markets; (ii) 
Asian countries are important markets for Australian and Singaporean firms; (iii) there 
are financial debt exposures to the crisis affected countries. 3 Therefore, based on 
Claessens et al.'s (1999b) and Caprio and Kingebiel's (2003) classification and the 
evidence from previous studies (Kamin, 1999; Cha and Oh, 2000; Chowdhry and 
Goyal, 2000, among others), in this thesis Thailand and Malaysia are grouped as 
2 Arsiraphongphisit et a!. (2000) note that the crisis had significant effects on financial policies and 
practices in Thailand and elsewhere in the Asia Pacific region. Caution should therefore be exercised 
when comparing policies and practices in Thailand during the crisis with those of other Asia Pacific 
countries. 
3 Ellis and Lewis (200 1) 
4 
countries most affected by the crisis while Singapore and Australia are grouped as 
countries least affected by the crisis.4 
Before the financial crisis, Thailand and Malaysia were among the fastest growing 
economies in the Pacific Rim. Attitudes toward financing decisions, such as leverage 
(especially dollar denominated debt), capital investment and dividends have been 
affected by the realities of the financial crisis. Little is, however, yet known about the 
financing decisions of firms in the Asia Pacific region, especially the effects of the East 
Asian financial crisis in 1997 on their decisions. Experiences from each sample country 
have important implications for policy makers in all other countries in the world. The 
study is divided into pre- and post-crisis periods, to investigate the effects of the 
financial crisis on the determinants of capital structure and debt maturity structure, and 
the adherence to related theories. This helps explain the differences in the observed 
financing pattern across the countries before and after the crisis period. This selection of 
sample countries allows investigations of the effects of the crisis at different levels, and 
these countries are of particular interest. 
Secondly, existing studies on corporate financing decisions not only reflect mostly 
on corporate environments in developed countries, but empirical studies of financing 
decisions of firms in Asia Pacific countries are also quite sparse while the existing 
literature on Asia Pacific markets does not compare results from one country with 
another in the same region over the same period of time. 5•6 Most previous studies are in 
a single country context. There are few studies that explicitly compare the capital 
structure and debt maturity structure of firms in different countries and under different 
4 However, it should be noted that this classification of countries most and least affected by the crisis is 
~npt ,fre~cof.su~jective judgment as each country ill affected by the ,crisis, both directly and indirectly up .to 
different degrees. 
5 With the exception of Wiwattanakantang (1999); Pandey et al. (2000); Booth et al. (200 1 ); Pandey 
(200 1) among others. 
6 See Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006) for a critical review of the market design often stock exchanges 
in the Asia Pacific region. 
5 
economies. 7 There is insufficient evidence to prove whether theories formulated in 
developed economies can be applied to firms outside these settings. Focusing on a 
cross-country context contributes to the literature by analysing the effect of differences 
in economic factors, corporate governance and institutional settings on firms' financing 
decisions. Insights into the determinants of corporate financing decisions enhance our 
knowledge of the relationship between corporate finance and financial, economic 
developments and monetary processes in the relevant countries. 
Thirdly, the sample countries operate at different levels of economic development, 
and in different legal, financial and institutional settings. Different economic conditions, 
corporate governance and institutional environments influence the relationship between 
managers, shareholders, creditors and investors. This may offer explanations for the 
different patterns of financing behaviour observed across countries and regions. Little is 
known of how observed differences in economic conditions, corporate governance and 
institutional environment affect corporate financing choices. These differences in the 
sample countries help one consider a number of important determinants not widely 
explored in the literature. Firms in developing countries may have different financing 
objectives compared to firms in developed countries for several reasons (Groth and 
Anderson, 1997): 
(i) Most firms in developing countries are smaller in size, or developing markets 
consist of a large number of private firms or family-oriented firms with 
different financing strategies from firms in developed markets; 
(ii) Due to a lower level of market development, firms in developing countries have 
access to limited types of financial instruments; 
-•-· ---· ·- _____ -.,. . -·· .. •c', ~--· 
7 Recent studies using international data include Raj an and Zingales ( 1995) on G-7 countries, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) on 30 developed/developing countries, Booth et al. (200 I) on I 0 
developing countries, Antoniou et al. (2002, 2006) on 3 major European countries, Fan et al. (2004) on 39 
developed/developing countries, and Deesomsak et al. (2004, 2005) on 4 Asia Pacific countries. 
6 
(iii) Firms in developing countries are more vulnerable to any shock to the market 
such as a financial crisis; 
(iv) Accounting and auditing standards in developing countries are not as effective 
and efficient as those in developed countries, leading to differences in the extent 
and contents of financial disclosure and the level of asymmetric information; 
(v) There are several factors that complicate the capital and debt maturity 
structures of firms in emerging markets compared to firms in developed 
countries, such as greater uncertainty about taxes and tax rates, higher 
perceived risk of realization of actual benefits of projects, relatively high cost 
of capital, volatility in equity markets and the absence of capital markets for 
long-term capital, particularly debt. 
This thesis adds to the current literature by examining a set of sample countries, 
which provides a diversity of institutional structures, corporate governance and financial 
institutions, to explain variations in financing structure and their determinants across 
countries. It is expected that the disparity in corporate governance and institutional 
environments will affect the relevance of the different potential determinants of capital 
and debt maturity structures and thus contribute to explaining variations of financing 
decisions across the sample countries. 
1.3 Aims and Summary of the Results 
The questions of interest are whether firms behave according to any particular 
financing pattern in order to reach the optimal financial structure as predicted by any 
capital structure theories and whether there are any factors in particular that determine 
the optimal structure which ultimately maximizes firms' value. The main objectives of 
~.; .-.; .-.,;:·:~<>- - :<=-- _,_-•. · ..:....... ·: .}_ ,.: . .._...:,._.-, __ -..:.-· _ _;.:::. _ _;_ __ _ 
this thesis are to identify the important determinants of capital and debt maturity 
structures and to test the adherence to the pecking order theory of firms in Asia Pacific 
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countries where the institutional settings differ from those in previous studies. The 
findings of this study reveal that financing decisions of firms in this region are not only 
products of their own characteristics but also of the financial and legal environment in 
which they operate. In addition, the financial crisis is found to have had significant 
impact on firm-specific, market and corporate governance determinants of both capital 
and debt maturity structures. The effects vary depending on the degrees to which the 
relevant countries were affected by the crisis. Moreover, the results show that the 
pecking order theory is active in practice and firms in this region do behave as predicted 
by the pecking order theory especially after the financial crisis. 
1.4 Contents of the Thesis 
The structure of the remainder of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 provides an 
overview of the corporate governance and institutional environments of the sample 
countries including financial orientation and stock markets, financial indicators and 
level of development, financial structure, legal origin, rule of law, legal protection, 
bankruptcy code, tax system, accounting practices and ownership structure. The 
implications of these aspects of corporate governance and institutional environment on 
corporate financing decisions are also discussed. This chapter also briefly outlines the 
1997 financial crisis and its possible impact on firms' financing decisions. 
Chapters 3 and 4 investigate firm-specific and country-specific determinants of 
capital and debt maturity structures for firms in the Asia Pacific region over the period 
of 1993 to 2001, respectively. These two chapters aim to empirically identify the factors 
that influence the capital and debt maturity structure decisions. In particular, they aim to 
examine whether factors that have been found to be significantly correlated to firms' 
leverage and long-term debfratios in certain co\lnfrieshave tne"same influence for' firms 
in Asia Pacific countries. In addition, the effects of the financial crisis on the 
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determinants of capital and debt maturity structures are examined. Country groupings 
are analysed according to how severely each market was hit by the crisis to examine 
whether there are any variations of behaviour between each country grouping. 
Chapter 5 focuses on testing the pecking order theory. The predictions of the 
pecking order theory are tested using several econometric techniques including linear 
regressions using ordinary least square (OLS), predictive logistic regressions and non-
linear quantile regressions. Financing deficit is nested in traditional trade-off models 
with other firm-specific variables in order to test whether the effect of financing deficit 
is wiped out by other conventional variables. In addition, country-specific variables are 
introduced into the analysis. As in previous chapters, this chapter also investigates the 
effects of the crisis and how it affects firms' financing behaviour. Chapter 6 concludes 
the thesis and discusses the implications of the results and potential areas for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
Economic Conditions, Corporate Governance and Institutional Environments in 
the Asia Pacific Region 
2.1 Introduction 
A number of theoretical and empirical studies indicate that a country's legal and 
financial institutions can affect external financing of firms in that country. 8 La Porta et 
al. ( 1999) suggest that the determinants of corporate financial decisions are likely to be 
different across countries because the structure of capital markets and corporate 
governance systems are different. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) suggest the use of 
international data because the severity of agency problems differs across countries due 
to the variations of shareholder protection. Firms in different countries are highly likely 
to be operating in different cultures, legal and economic environments leading to 
different levels of development of corporate governance systems. These differences can 
affect the determinants of capital and debt maturity structures. 
Empirically, several studies show the existence of a significant relationship 
between both institutional environments and corporate governance and financial 
structures. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that differences in institutional 
settings could be used to explain some differences in aggregate capital structure. 
Antoniou et al. (2002, 2006) pave the way to the new area of the literature in the capital 
structure and debt maturity structure that firms' financing decisions depend not only on 
firms' characteristics but also on the institutional environment which firms are operating 
in. They suggest that the importance of the factors varies depending on the changes in 
the level of financial market orientation, legal protection and corporate governance. 
8 See for example Rajan and Zingales (1995, 1998); Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996, 1998, 1999); 
La Porta et a!. (1997, 1998); Booth et a!. (200 I); Antoniou et a!. (2002, 2006); Beck et a!. (2002); 
Deesomsak et a!. (2004, 2005). 
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There are a few arguments on the effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
which may vary depending on different legal systems such as legal origin and legal 
protection. Different legal systems have different ways of achieving effective corporate 
governance. Firms in countries with strong legal protection or with concentrated 
ownership structures might operate in different ways to achieve effective corporate 
governance systems. Very few studies compare the implications of corporate 
governance systems on financing decisions across different countries. There has been 
little research into corporate governance in the Asia Pacific region. Therefore, this 
chapter presents a review of corporate governance systems in the Asia Pacific region, 
namely Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia and their implications on corporate 
financing decisions. 
The objective of this chapter is to review the literature on the differences between 
economic conditions, corporate governance and institutional environment across 
countries in the Asia Pacific region and to predict their impact on corporate financing 
decisions. The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section examines 
corporate governance and institutional environments in the Asia Pacific region 
including financial orientation and stock markets, financial indicators and level of 
market development, financial structure, legal structure, bankruptcy code, accounting 
practices, and ownership structure. The third section briefly discusses the financial crisis 
of 1997. The last section reviews and concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Corporate Governance and Institutional Environments 
Corporate governance can be defined in several different ways. However, the 
basic definition of corporate governance is the mechanism that is used to control and 
--direcf-fiims. It is tne method- of dealing with agencY 'problems -betweerf minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders within firms. Corporate governance not only 
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considers the rights and responsibility of shareholders but also of stakeholders. 
Corporate governance normally addresses the issue of how managers are influenced by 
banks, equity markets or other mechanisms and how they act toward those mechanisms 
to serve the interests of shareholders and maximize the value of firms (Khan, 2003). 
Corporate governance varies depending on the legal, regulatory and institutional 
environment where firms are operating in. 
Good corporate governance can provide incentives for managers to pursue 
objectives that are in the interests of both firms and stakeholders leading to the efficient 
use of resources and increased confidence of investors. Good corporate governance can 
also be used to minimize agency problems by protecting minority shareholders from 
being expropriated by managers or controlling shareholders. The expropriation can be 
effected through excessive salaries, perquisite consumption, special dividends, diverting 
resources toward (over-investment) or away (under-investment) from investment or by 
other means such as insiders stealing the profits, insiders selling the assets, insiders 
reducing firms' opportunities by recruiting unqualified family members or overpaying 
wages, dilution of outside investors through share issues to the insiders, or management 
paying off their personal debts.9 
For corporate governance to be effective, the decisions and actions of related 
parties such as shareholders, managers, creditors and potential investors should be 
coordinated in order to protect stakeholder rights. Moreover, punishment should be 
effected when the appropriate actions are not carried out. Effective and efficient 
corporate governance should be able to ensure that the goal of firms is to increase 
stakeholders' value and to allocate resources efficiently. 10 Weak corporate governance 
can result in a sub-optimal allocation of resources, highly risky investments, 
~ 9 Shleifer and Vishny (1997); La Porta et al. (2000); Johnson et al. (2000); Mitton (2002) 
10 Nam et al. (1999) identify three main requirements for effective corporate governance: transparency, 
equity and accountability. Transparency is concerned with the use of information which is needed for 
efficient coordination and motivation. Equity refers to the legal protection of stakeholders. Accountability 
provides adequate and appropriate incentives and discipline for management. 
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expropriation of minority shareholders and financial distress. Corporate governance in 
the Asia Pacific region has received much attention recently partly because of the 
financial crisis. Nam et al. (1999) suggest that the weak corporate governance in East 
Asia, which has developed due to unhealthy relationships between lenders and 
borrowers and poor bank supervision, was one of the causes of the financial crisis in 
1997. There is some evidence suggesting that financing decisions are related to 
corporate governance. Scott ( 1999) argues that the proportion of equity finance is highly 
correlated with the status of corporate governance. Before examining the determinants 
of capital and debt maturity structures in each country, it is crucial to look at the 
similarities and differences of corporate governance across countries in each region and 
to find out whether the underdeveloped corporate governance for countries in the Asia 
Pacific region has any significant influence on firms' financing decisions. 
2.2.1 Financial Orientation and Stock Markets 
There are two main streams of financial orientation, market-based systems and 
bank-based systems. In bank-oriented economies, banks play the key role of monitoring 
firms' performance. They can exploit scale economies in processing information, 
alleviate moral hazard problems via effective monitoring, form long-term relationships 
with firms in order to reduce asymmetric information leading to the increases in growth, 
and force firms to repay their debts more effectively (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine, 
2002). Firms rely on powerful bank relationships as their primary forms of external 
finance and tend to have close relationships with their primary banks. Bank-based 
systems are better than market-based systems at mobilizing savings and activating 
corporate control (Levine, 2002). Firms in bank-based economies should have high 
-levelS'Ofleverage because of the" gteatetavailability·ofaeorfimince 'from o·aflks but tllef 
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might not want to borrow beyond a certain point because of the costs of excessive bank 
debt. Examples of countries that adopt bank-based systems are Japan and Germany. 
In market-oriented economies, firms normally have several bank lenders and 
widely held publicly traded equity. 'Arms-length' banking relationships are expected. 
Examples of countries with market-based economies are the US and UK. Levine (2002) 
suggests that market-based systems do a better job than bank-based systems in 
allocating capital, providing risk management tools, and mitigating problems arising 
from excessively powerful banks; however, well-developed markets quickly and 
publicly reveal information which can lead to a decline in the incentives for investors to 
acquire information. All sample countries studied in this thesis have been classified as 
having market-based systems (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Recent research 
has argued that classifying countries into bank-based and market-based systems is not a 
very useful way to distinguish financial systems (La Porta et al., 2000 and Levine, 
2002). Rajan and Zingales (1995) do not find any systematic differences in the level of 
leverage between bank-based and market-based economies leading to a question 
whether the distinction of financial orientation has any effect on observed financing 
decisions. When considering the ownership structure of firms, firms in East Asia, 
namely Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, are classified as family-based systems where 
both ownership and management are controlled by a group of families holding the 
power in firms' decisions. The comparisons between three financial orientation systems 
are summarized in Table 2.1. The importance of equity markets is shown in Table 2.2. 
Singapore is ranked the highest while Thailand has the lowest score. This implies that 
Singaporean firms rely more on the equity market than the debt market compared with 
firms in other sample countries. Therefore, Thai firms should generally have the highest 
level-ofdebt, followed by Australian and Malaysian firms.- - ·- --· -- · - ---- -·--
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Table 2.2 : $1Dck markets 
Thailand Mala}'lia Singapore Australia Soun:e Definitions 
Financial Orientation Mll!ket-biiSed Mll!ket-biiSed Mlllket-bi!Sed Market-biiSed Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic See Table 2.1 
(1999) 
&. F amily-b11Sed &. Family-b11Sed &. Family-biiSed Kba:n (2003) 
lmpo11aJu:e ~f Equity Marlmt 143 2.53 28.8 24.0 Leu:z et al. (2003) The importlll\t of equity l'Nil'ket is meiiSumd by the 
me Ill\ l'flllk IICl'OSS 3 variables ( e111:h variable is mnked 
such that higher scores indicate a greater importmu:e of 
the stock l'Nil'ket) used in LaPorta et al. (1997) 
1) the mtio of the aggregate stock l'Nil'ket capitalization 
held by mmorities to gross natioMl product 
2) the number of listed domestic firms relative to the 
population 
3) the number of IPOs relative to the population 
Bank Development 5.0553 5.5927 8.0553 1.0101 DatiiStream The ratio ofbank IISsets to G DP 
S1Dc:k Marlmt Development 2.0826 5.1284 5.4&56 0.8061 DatiiStream The ratio of l'Nil'ket capitalization to G DP 
Level ofF.c:o~my Development Developing Developing Developed Developed FIll\ et al. (2004) Indicates whether the country is clllssifJSd liS 
developed or developing ~~~:col'rlirlg to the World Bank 
clllssiflCiltion biiSed on countries' gross natioMl 
income levels. 
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2.2.2 Level of Bank and Stock Market Development 
There are differences in the level of financial development across the sample 
countries. Table 2.2 shows that there are variations in the size of banking and capital 
markets in relation to the country's GDP (bank development and stock market 
development). In Malaysia and Australia banks and capital markets have roughly the 
same share of assets, but banks are much more important in Thailand and Singapore 
than stock markets. Financial development is important because it can accelerate 
economic growth by enhancing savings, channelling these savings into real investment, 
and allowing capital to flow to more productive uses leading to the improvement in the 
efficiency of resource allocations (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Singapore is a small country with an open trade policy and rapid growth. It has a 
sophisticated financial market and engages in significant global trading and was 
classified as a Newly Industrialized Economy (NIE) by the United Nations in 1990. The 
economy of Singapore has become more mature with rapid growth (Teen and Phan, 
2001). Chau and Gray (2002) show that total market capitalization of Singapore 
increased nearly ten times during 1990 to 1999. In 1999, it was ranked as the fourth 
largest economy in Asia. Kim et al. (2004) suggest that less developed market structures 
have more asymmetric information environments. Therefore, firms in Thailand and 
Malaysia should have higher level of asymmetric information than firms in Singapore 
and Australia. Malaysia was ranked as the largest debt and equity market in ASEAN in 
the mid 1990s (World Bank, 1999). Its financial activity or liquidity of stock market 
(measured by the ratio of market capitalization over GDP) is quite large. 
2.2.3 Financial Structure 
, - ---When· firms need to finance their ·investments, they can either (i) use their 
internally generated funds such as retained earnings (and funds from families and 
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friends) or (ii) obtain external finance in terms of debt or I and equity. Becket al. (2002) 
find that in most developed countries, firms use external financing to finance over 50% 
of their investment. However, firms in Malaysia use more external finance (57.61%) 
than firms in the US where higher levels of external finance are expected due to high 
rating in financial and legal development. There are also some variations in the level of 
external finance between Malaysia and Singapore. External finance includes bank 
finance, equity finance, operations finance and other finance. The most common source 
of external finance in Malaysia is 'Operations Finance' followed by 'Bank Finance' 
while 'Bank Finance' is the most common source of external finance in Singapore 
followed by 'Equity Finance' (see Table 2.3). It is also expected that firms in more 
developed countries should have better access to external finance. Titman et al. (200 1) 
examine financing patterns for Asian firms and find the opposite results, showing that 
Asian firms use more external than internal funds because the investment needs are 
more than their internally generated funds. This is supported by the higher use of 
external finance in Malaysia than in Singapore (as shown in Table 2.3). Singh and 
Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) also find that although there are variations in corporate 
financing patterns among developing countries, in general they use more external than 
internal funds to finance their growth. 
Table 23 : Fbwu:lalpatll!:ms 
Variabbls/Co1Ultry Thal1ud Malaysia Slllgapore Austnlla Source Dofbdtlons 
Fbwu:lllg Patll!:ms 
E:atemol Finance 57.61 39.07 Beck at ol. (2Dm) includes flnoncingftom bonks, equity, operations 
--------·----------- -······-···- -·-·-·-···-·- ···------·- ---··-··---··- -·--·--··--- one! a_t!l.!!_~-~£!_ ________ ·-----·--·----
Bonk Finance 16.27 24.07 - Becket ol. (2Dm) includes flnoncingftom domestic as welles 
-··-·---·---·--·---·-·-·--····------·····-····· -··-·····-·····- -········-·-······ ··········-··- ·-----------------·--· f<:"'~!>...~·-····--···---···--··--·····---····-·-·-·---··-··········--
-·.!:9.~~.£.L.--··--·--····--·--··-·-=·---- .J.D.88 7.13 _ ··-- ·-· Becketoi.(2Dm) --------------·-·-------
Operations Finonce 24.57 6.02 Beck at ol. (2Dm) the sum ofleasing ond supplier credit 
r--olb;;F;;;;;;;-;------ -------- --::-- -·i88- -·-jjj--· --::-- - ----Be~k et &. (2iiilz) ~iucles financing&;;;;, dov;-j;;p;;;~-;;t"!;;;:;k;;----
,"t~~~i~ii~~~j~~:~_ii;E_~~s~ 
Debt Maturity (me <lion) O.:U 0.04 0.06 0.12 Claenens et ol. (2!l011b) long term debt to mlllkel value of equity 
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Singh (2003) suggests that in the countries where the level of market development 
is low and stock market and banking systems are not fully developed, firms would rely 
on internal funds and external funds will be quite rarely used. If external funds are 
needed, firms will rely more on bank borrowing because the banking system is normally 
more developed relative to the stock market in developing countries. This is consistent 
with the preferences of the pecking order hypothesis. The effect of pecking order should 
be stronger in East Asia because East Asian firms have family-based ownership 
structure. Family owners generally do not want to lose their control by issuing equity 
and prefer debt to equity. Singh (2003) argues that the stock markets in most developing 
countries are small and immature. The imperfections of the stock market can lead to 
volatility in share prices. This can discourage risk-averse firms from getting funds from 
stock markets. In addition, because of the lack of clear cut bankruptcy laws and lack of 
enforcement, firms in developing markets prefer to be financed from banks than stock 
markets. 
Table 2.3 also shows the financial structure in 1996 for East Asian firms. 
Leverage was quite high in most East Asian countries. The high leverage created high 
currency risks when short-term foreign exchange borrowing became increasingly 
important in the 1990s especially in Thailand and Malaysia. This vulnerability is 
therefore considered as one of the factors that could have triggered the financial crisis in 
1997. This should induce firms with high earnings volatility to reduce level of leverage. 
Table 2.3 also shows that profitability or financial performance varies across 
countries. 11 Profitability was relatively lower in Singapore while Malaysia had higher 
real returns. Table 2.3 also shows that long-term debt was lower in Malaysia and 
Thailand. Claessens et al. (1998) find that short-term borrowing became increasingly 
important in ThaHand and OMalaysia. -
11 Claessens and Djankov (1999) suggest that ROA is a good measure for profitability because it is not 
influenced by the liability structure of firms and it also excludes interest payments, financial income, and 
other income or expenses. 
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2.2.4 Legal Structure 
Legal Origin 
Legal origin can play an important role in financing decisions. It has been found 
in the literature that firms in common law countries have greater access to external 
finance such as banks and equity (La Porta et al., 1997; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998). Common law includes the law of England and those laws 
influenced by English law. The common law spread to British colonies such as 
Malaysia and Singapore, including the US, Australia, and many other countries. 
However, in some cases although the basic origin of laws is clear, the laws have been 
amended with the influence of other laws. For example, Thailand's laws originated by 
common law but are somewhat influenced by French civil laws. Beck et al. (2002) find 
that firms in less developed financial systems and in civil law countries substitute less 
efficient forms of external finance for bank loans and equity leading to less long-term 
external finance in these countries. Therefore, we expect that firms in Thailand should 
have lower levels of long-term external finance than firms in the other sample countries. 
Claessens et al. (2000b) study the corporate risk around the world and find that firms in 
common law countries and market-based economies seem to be less risky. They also 
document that firms in common law countries can react faster to new developments and 
convey less uncertainty than civil law countries. They also find that firms in civil law 
countries tend to have more unstable cash flows, higher earnings volatility, higher firm 
leverage and mismatch between the maturity structure of assets and liabilities. 
Therefore, Thai firms should have the highest levels of risk and debt with the strongest 
influence of earnings volatility as the determinant of their capital structure relative to 
firms in the other sample countries. 
. . 
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RuleofLaw 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) show that the rule of law varies substantially across 
countries. La Porta et al. ( 1998) argue that the quality of law enforcement varies 
depending on the legal origin. The quality is highest in Scandinavian and German civil 
law countries followed by common law countries and lowest in French civil law 
countries. Table 2.4 shows the score for rule of law for each sample country. Thailand 
(mixed between Common law and Civil French law) scores the lowest for most of the 
items on rule of law. In general, this shows that rule of law in Australia is the strongest, 
followed by Singapore and Malaysia while Thailand has the lowest scores. Previous 
studies show that firms in countries with weak legal and financial systems find it more 
difficult to obtain external financing resulting in reduction in their growth and 
investment efficiency (Beck et al., 2002). Therefore, we expect the financing behaviour 
of firms in countries with weak systems to follow the pecking order theory as they tend 
to use more internally generated funds than external finance. Khan (2003) argues that 
when the level of market development is low and legal systems are inefficient, 
transaction costs are higher. This implies that in Thailand where rule of law is weak and 
the level of development is lower and not efficient, transaction costs should be higher 
than those of other sample countries. The high scores of rule of law and efficiency of 
judicial systems in Singapore and Australia indicate more developed legal structures 
and enforcement. 
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Tabla 2.4 : Ru of law 
ThailaDd Mab,rsia Sinppore Australia Source Definiiio:ns 
Ruleofl:.w 
······-··········E:"ir,;:;;;;·;;;;y:·~-r~;:;I·;~·t"~;·····························l············:;iis·············t················;····-···········l···············ia···············t··············"lii"···············I·"L;;i;~ri~-~-t"·;;I~·-c-i99ii) ... I.A·;~·~;;;;;~t··;;-r·ti;;··~;!f,;:;;;;·;;;;y:··~·;t·~PiiY:;£t};;; .. I;;;I·;~~;;;;;;;1··;;;;··ii ................ . 
Rule of Law 6.25 6.78 8 . .57 10 
afFects business, particularly fomign fmm' p:r:odm:ed by t:he country risk rating 
age:nc:y Business Intematio:rW. Corp. It 'may be taken to mpmsent innston' 
assessments of cond:itiom in the cOill\try in question'. A wrage between 1980 
and 1983. Scale f:r:om 0 to 1 0; with lower scores, lower efiu:is:nc:y lenls 
La Porta et al. ( 1998) I Assessment of t:he law and o:rder tradition in the c=try. This iluili:ator is 
p:r:odm:ed by t:he CCJU:ntry risk rating age:ncy Intematio:rW. Ccnmtry Risk (ICR). 
, Scale f:r:om 0 to 10; lower sc:oZII!S mflect less tradition for law and o:rder. 
Risk of exp:ropriation 
Risk of c:ontract l.'l!pudiation 
estahlil;hed institutiom making and implementing laws ami adjudicatmg disputes. 
It is SCOl.'l!d between 0 and 6 with :higher SCOleS iluili:ating soumJ. political 
institutioN and a st:r:o:ng court synem. Lower scores iluili:ate a tradition of 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................... ~.P.~.~ .. ~-~-~~~~~.!.~.~~ .. ~~-~-~ .. ~~ .. ~-~ .. ~~-~.!1=.-~.~ .............................................. .. 
7.42 
7.57 
7 .9.5 I 9.3 I 9.27 I La Portaet al. (1998) !Assessment of the risk of 'outright c:o:nfJSc:ation' or 'fo~ed nationalization'. 
This iluili:ation is p:rodm:ed by ICR. Scale f:r:o:m 0 to 10 with lower scores for 
....................... - ...................... - .................................................................................................................... ~ .. ~~'. .............................................................................................................................................................. .. 
7.43 8.86 8.71 La Porta et al. (1998) IICR's assessment oft:he 'risk of a modifu:ation in a contract taking t:he form of 
a repudiation, postpo:tll!ment, or scalinr; down' che to 'budget cutbacks, 
imti&elliza.tion presSUJ:e, a c~ in govemment, or a c~ in gowmment 
ecoDOmic and social priorities'. Awril(ll! of tb! months of April and October of 
the monthly index between 1982 and 199 5. Scale f:r:om 0 to 10, with lower 
. scores for :higher risks . 
.................. r~~·ob;t;I;;; ..................................................... I ................. : ................ 't ........... 2 ..6.2 ............. 1 ............. io3 ............. t ................. ~ ................. t .... Ei;~k··~i .. ~i·c2ii'ii'2') .... --~~=;=::=:a;:!:~t::=·~~·:·'f}:;;;Y:.t";;k;·;~·i'i~ .. 4:· 
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r•Je :Z.4 : R~ of law (continued) 
I 
Thailanol ~- Si:nppoze A....tra:Ua Souzo:e Defini& ... Corrup&n :. 
··-··c:~;;;t";;:;;:;:·--r······ .. ····-·················-·········-.......................... l············:s-:~a············r··-····-1·.3a·-·········r···-······a:22···········T··········a-:s2··-····--r~:·;·-p-~;t~-~·t··;;I:·c-i991irrA"~~-;;;~;;;~t~r"tb··~~ti;;;-~-~;;;;;;~·:-:r~-~~;;;~-p~~db-i 
the C01llltry risk ratmg egency Inte:m~~.tion&l. Co1lll.try Risk. Lower scores 
indicate that 'high I!IJWmment offiCials are likely to deiriiiiid special 
payments' and 'illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower 
levels of I!IJWmment' in the fonn of 'bribes connected with import and 
export licenses, e:xx:hmlge contmls, tax assessment, policy protection, or 
········c:~;;;t·;;:;;:;:·~;····································· .. ···········--·····-······I·-··········6:;B·············f-·····-·····4§········-····l··-· ........ o:s7 ............. f .. ·······-T4·:s· ............. l·······-r~·~·t··~··c-2Doii_)_······l·~;-~;~~1-~~i~~~~!~~!~~~~~~~;· 
corruption. This index reflects the extent to which corruption is perceived to 
exist amo~~g public offlCial.s and politici.ens, where corruption is defmed as 
the abuse of public office for private pin. The index proxies for the threat ofl 
-·-1~;-.;r-b, ro;;;;;;;-(i)·---·-·--·-·-·---·---~--·-1~5·-·---r-····-···6-·····--·-r···--·-ta-······--r--·-·-ia"··-···--r~~~:=~·~·i:3~;J:t:!::i===::~~;~==~~~·-· .. 
correspondents stationed in about 70 colllltries in 1980-1983. It is likely 
that the indices reflect those faced by foreign businessmen in a C01llltry, not 
correspondents stationed in about 70 co1lll.tries in 1980 - 1983. It is likely 
that the indices reflect those faced by foreign businessmen in a co1lll.try, not 
--i~;-.;it~ ;eti~;;i~ri~-j;;ifj;ie-;·c-3l"l---·-325-·---·i--·-······;-······---t---·-·1-a-·-····-···t···········--i·a····-.. ········i··~~~:=:~i:3~~~:.=:~=:==~o:y;::~=f::~:F~·······' 
correspondents stationed in about 70 co1lll.tries in 1980 - 1983. It is likely 
that the indices reflect those faced by foreign businessmen in a co1lll.try, not 
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correspondents stationed in about 70 countries in 1980 - 1983. It is likely 
that the indices reflect those faced by foreign businessmen in a co1lll.try, not 
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mostly people working for multination&l. fums and institutions. The scale is 
10 for no corruption to 0 for maximum corruption. 
Because of the weak rule of law in Thailand, it is expected that the level of 
expropriation of minority holders should be the highest in Thailand implying that the 
agency problem should be greatest and will significantly affect the financing decisions 
of Thai firms. La Porta et al. (1998) suggest that a strong legal enforcement should be 
able to substitute for weak rules because active and well-functioning courts should be 
able to step in to help mitigate expropriation problems. This is supported by the score of 
risk expropriation in Table 2.4. Becket al. (2002) suggest that law and order is stronger 
in more developed countries. Table 2.4 shows support for this finding indicating that 
Singapore and Australia have higher scores in law and order than Thailand and 
Malaysia because they are more developed. 
Financial obstacle scores are referred to as a proxy for the cost of marginal 
external financing. Beck et al. (2002) find that in more developed financial systems, 
firms with high financial obstacles are likely to use more external finance. For example, 
Malaysia has higher levels of external finance than Singapore (as shown in Table 2.3) as 
it has higher financial obstacles (as shown in Table 2.4). Moreover, Table 2.4 also 
shows the score of corruption for each country. The lower the score indicates high 
corruption in that country. Thailand has the highest level of corruption followed by 
Malaysia and Australia while Singapore shows the lowest level, or no corruption at all. 
Mauro (1995) suggests that corruption could lower investment. If investment is reduced, 
the need for external finance should be smaller as well. However, for Singapore, the 
opposite result is found. Table 2.4 shows that Singapore has virtually no corruption but, 
as shown in Table 2.3, Singaporean firms use less external finance than Malaysian firms 
who generally have more corruption. 
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Legal Protection 
Legal protection consists of the contents of law and the quality of its enforcement. 
There are several studies showing that legal protection can affect firms' financing 
decisions. La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that legal protection helps develop financial 
intermediaries and explain the differences among countries better than financial 
orientation. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the absence of strong legal protection in 
many emerging economies can increase the level of agency costs of debt which affect 
the firm's financing decisions. There is also evidence that firms' value is positively 
related to legal protection. 12 
Legal protection provides several benefits to firms (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000, 
2002). First, it can be used as the protection or guarantee of rights in the views of 
investors. Without strong protective rights, investors will not be able to get paid which 
makes it more difficult for firms to raise external finance. Investors can be very 
sensitive to, and dependent on, protection of their rights and law enforcement because 
they are more vulnerable to expropriation than insiders who have lower risk of being 
mistreated. When laws are protective of outside investors and are well enforced, 
investors are more willing to finance firms leading to greater value in the financial 
markets because they recognize that better legal protection can help them to get more of 
firms' profits in terms of interest or dividends. This implies that, for countries with 
weak investor rights, firms might tend to use internally generated funds rather than 
external funds because outside investors are not willing to finance firms due to poor 
protection. Therefore, the pecking order theory is expected to perform better in 
countries with poor protection. 
12 Johnson et al. (2000); La Porta et al. (2002); Lemmon and Lins (2003) 
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Second, legal protection helps to attract more external financiers especially in 
terms of equity. When investors are well protected, they tend to pay more for their 
investment in firms which makes it more attractive for firms to issue equity. In addition, 
investor protection also encourages the development of financial markets. Therefore, 
firms in countries with strong legal protection should have higher levels of equity than 
firms in countries with weak legal protection leading to lower levels of debt. Table 2.5 
presents legal protection scores for the sample countries. Because Malaysia and 
Singapore show strong legal protection while Thailand shows weak shareholder 
protection, the level of equity should be higher for Malaysian and Singaporean firms 
than for Thai firms or in other words the level of debt should be higher in Thailand. 
Third, legal protection helps firms to reduce expropriation problems because it makes 
expropriation less efficient. Johnson et al. (2000) suggest that expropriation can be 
weak as long as growth lasts because managers have no incentive to steal or expropriate 
wealth from minority shareholders. When growth declines, such as during the crisis, the 
lack of good corporate governance becomes more important. 
Variations across countries in terms of the degree of protection against 
stakeholders can result from one or more of several factors. First, legal origin can have 
some influences on legal protection. La Porta et al. (1998) find that common law 
countries generally have the strongest legal protections of shareholders and creditors 
while French civil law countries have the weakest and German and Scandinavian civil 
law countries fall between because common law countries have less political influence. 
Firms in common law countries should be able to raise more external finance on 
cheaper terms than firms in civil law countries because they have better protection for 
minority shareholders. This implies that Thai firms should have the least external 
finance coni pared with othef~sa:mple countries. 
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·; Tahle 2.5 : Leplpmil!dion 
Variahle./Countr,y 'l'haiLmd Malqs:ia SDq;apore 
il Shareholder Rights (Anti-dhecwr rights) 2 4 4 
Awotral:ia Souzce 
4 La Porta et al. (1998) 
Defini& ... 
An index agre;at~ tlu! sl:weholder ri;hts we labeled as 'a11.tidire~tor 
rights'. TN! index ranges fmm 0 to 6 utd is formed by addi:ac!: 1 wlu!n 
( 1) tlu! colll\try allows sl:weholders to mail tlu!ir proxy vote to tlu! fmn 
(2) sl:weholders are !IIJt required to deposit tlu!ir shares pncr to tlu! 
(IUU!ralsl:weholden' meeti.ag, 
(3) cumulative votil'lg or pmportiol\al representation of minorities in 
tlu! board of ~tors is allowed, 
( 4) an opposed minorities mechanism is in place, 
(5) tlu! :mWmum p~age of sl:we ~apital that entitles a sl:weholder 
to ~an for an extracnlina:y sl:weholders' meetil'lg is h!ss thal!. or equal to 
10% ( tlll! sample medial!.), or 
( 6) sl:weholders have preemptive rights that can be waived o:nly by a 
sl:weholders' vote. 
-···a;;·~~:;;-.,;;·;;t;·--···--·····-·-··········-················--·-····r·-··-···N·~··········T····-·y;;~·-····t····--·y;;.···········t·· .. ·-·N~·········T-··~·::::~~~-~!::~)T-·l=~::r~~=!:~~=~;:t:,·:s·~7::t:~:· 
Equivalently, tl:Us vanable equals 1 whim tlll! law prolu'bits tlu! elcist~e 
ofboth multiple-vot~ utd !IIJnvo~ cmlma:y sl:wes utd dces =t 
allaw fimu to set a maximum llllJllber of votes per sl:weholder 
inespective of tlu! l!.llmber of slwes OWlll!d, utd D otlwwDe. 
Pmxy by mail allowed I No I No I No I Yes I La Porta et al. ( 1998) I Equals Y e• if tlll! ~ompany law or ~"""""!Cal ~ode allcw .. l:wellolden 
to mail tlu!ir pmxy vote to tlll! firm, utd No ctlll!rwUe . 
...... ~··;;;;i .. b"l;;~i~d:b';;r~;·;;;;i·;;;g· .. ··· .. ·· .. ·······-···········-r·· .. ···-:y;;·· .. ·····l··-···· .. :y;; .......... l ........ :y~·······- .. l .......... v·;;·· .. ······-r·· .. "L~:P;;;t~-~'t··~·:·('i'99a)······ .. I·E:q:;J; .. v;~-·;r·ii;;.--~~;p~y:J;;-;;;·;;;;;;;;~·~-;;&;-;L;;;·;;;;:;t·~·r;;;; ... ' 
to require that sl:weholden deposit tlu!ir shares pncr to a general 
sl:weholden meeti.ag, tl:uu preve:nt~ tlu!m fit:Jm se~ those sl:wes 
for a llllJllber of daY", utd No otm.rwUe . 
• il··-· .. c:~i;:~··:;;;;t;;jJ·:p:;;;:p;;;t~~-;j;;;;;;i·~i~ .. t ........... v~;······· .. ·-r--···-·· .. iii;;-···-·····t····· .. ····iii;;··· .. ···· .. t···········iii;;··· ....... t ..····"L~··Ji;;;t~-~-i .. ~·:'C'i'99sf ..... 'I'E:~-v;~-·;r·ii;; .. ;;;;;p~;-·L;;·~;·;;;;;;;;;;;-;:~T~;;d;·~··;~~;;;id;;; ... .. 
Opprened minority No Yes Yes Yes 
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to ~ast all tlu!ir votes for one ~utdidate st~ fer ele~tion to tlu! 
board of directors (cumulative vet~ or iftlu! ~ompa11.y law or 
~o,..~ial ~ode allcws a me~lwlism of pmportiol\al representation in 
tlu! board by whi<:h minority intere•h may name a pmportiol\all!.llmber 
of directors to tlu! boal'll, utd No otm.rwUe. 
LaPortaet al. (1998) I Equals Yes iftlu! ~cmpanylawor~"""""!Cal~ode gants minority 
sl:weholden eitm.r a judicial ve:nue to c:hallellge tlll! decisiom of 
management or of tlu! assembly or tlu! right to step Ollt of tlu! ~ompany 
lby ~ tlll! ~ompa11.y to po=hase tlu!ir sl:wes wb!n tlu!y cbje~t to 
~ertain :fimd.une:ntal ~1w1ces. sw:h as merge.., osset di>pcsitiom, utd 
c:ha:nges in tlll! articles of U..,.,rpc:ratio!L TN! vanable equals No 
otlll!rwise. Minority sl:weholden are defllll!d as those sl:weholden who 
OWl\ 1 D % of sl:we ~apital or less. 
TaloJ.. 2.:5: Leplpro'IRction(~ontinued.) 
1:' VariabL!•ICollllU,. SoUfte Definition. 
::, PJI!emptiw right to :new i5sues La Porta et al ( 1998) Equals Yes when the company law or c:omllll!lcial code l:l'WS 
sharoholdl!rs the fJrst opporhmi.ty to buy :new issues of stock, am this 
richt can be waived o:nly by a sl:weholdl!rs' ?Ote · equals No othezwise. 
, .................................................................................................................................................................. il':i ............ r ........... o'.'l ............ r ... · .. a:a:s:: .. ·······r·····-L'~·Fi~;t~·~·i'·:;i·ci'SiSiii) ........ l.:rb;··~·p~·;:;;;;;;t-;;;··~f';:;:;;;;;~hi;·~r·~i;;'~·~pit'ii·t~i'·;;,;:tith;;··~···· .. ·· 
Percentar:e of sl:we capital to c:all an 
.. : 1 extraalliliwy sharoholdl!r meetirlc 
0.20 
sharoholdl!r to call for an extraolliliwy shareholders • 1!12t!tirlc; it r~s 
fmm 1 to33%. 
Mandatory diri:le:nd [] [] [] [] L.a. Porta et al. (1998) ,I Equals the percentar:e of net U,ome that the company law or 
· c:ormnercial c:ode reqllizas f~m~:~ to di5tribute as diri:le:ru:b amD"'f: ozclina.ry 
stockholdl!rs.lt takes a value of22ro for c:OUJ:ltrie> without >W:ha 
restridion. 
Right to make pmposals at sharoholdl!r meetirlc Yes Yes Nam et al. (1999) 
...... :M~t";;;;y·~~b;;~;·~;;;;;;;~·;;r·;;t;;,~t;;c .. r .......... v~; ............ r .......... y:~; .......... l .............. ~ .............. r ............ _ ................ r ........... :N;;;:~t-~i·ci9.99) ........... + ............................................................................................................................................................... 1 
'f~~ii~~~~~~:~;~II~~~~j-~~;~~~~:-~~~:~~~~]:~i!~I~~~}~~~~~;~~~~~t~~~~~-~~;~~~~:i 
Mandatory disclosure ofnon-fmanc:ial Yes Yes Nam et al. (1999) 
:1..~':!~.:': .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 ............................................................................................................................................................. . 
Mandatory di5c:lasare of connected interests Yes - - - N am et al. ( 1999) -
··········-··-··············-·······-···-···········································-····-······-·····-····· ···········-·····-··-·-·· ............................... ····························-· ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ . 
Mandatory sharoholdl!r approval of major Yes Yes - N am et al. ( 1999) 
;'l~~~~!.ie .. ~·-·-.. --·-·--·---·-·-"-"-""'"_,_, __ , __ , __ , __ 
Allcw proxy by mail 
Credimr righilo I Bankrupuy 
No 
3 
No Nam et al. (1999) 
4 4 La Porta et al. ( 1998) An index arzteeatillg different creditor richts. The index ral:lf:I!S from 0 
to 4 am is formed by addirlc 1 when 
( 1) tlu! oOUJ:ltry impose• resm.:,ticns, >W:h as creditors' consent or 
minimum. cliri:le:ru:b to file for reolpJiiza.ticn; 
(2) secumd creditors are able to cain possession of their sec:uri.ty o:ru:e 
the reorpzriza.ticn petition has been appmwd (no mtomatic: stay); 
(3) secumd creditOD are ranked first in the distribution of the pmceeds 
that result from the disposition of the assets of a ba!!ltmpt firm; am 
Automatil: stay on assets 
( 4) the debtor does not retain the admmistration of its pmperty penclil:lf: 
the resolution of the reo:rpniza.tion . 
........... N~-·-...... r .. -·-·N; .......... l ........... N~ ........... T ......... v;·-.... -.. r-·~~·:~:;:~~·c:::~~:---l!~:~if2~t~=~::~~~::.~;~~=:.;;t~-' 
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Automatil: stay prevents secumd c:n!ditors ftom gairWig possession of 
their sec:uri.ty.lt equals Yes if>W:h a resm.:,tion does exi5t in the law. 
Whether the creditor is barred by the 'au.tomatil: stay' from taking 
c:oll.ection liCticn apinst the debtor's assets during the ba!!ltmptoy 
proc:eeclil:lf:s. 

Second, legal protection can also be related to the concentration of the corporate 
ownership structure. La Porta et al. (1998) find that concentration of ownership is 
negatively related to investor protection indicating that a very high ownership 
concentration may reflect poor investor protection. This can be supported by the 
evidence from Thai firms whose ownership structure is highly concentrated and 
shareholder protection is found to be low. In contrast, however, Malaysian firms' 
ownership structure is highly concentrated but their legal protection is high. 
Nam et al. ( 1999) find some significant differences across countries in term of 
corporate governance systems and legal protection in East Asia. Singapore and 
Malaysia provide higher standards of corporate governance and have also developed 
more sophisticated legal systems to protect the rights of investors. On the other hand, 
Thailand shows a low level of legal protection, weak enforcement, and ineffective 
regulation of financial sector. They also suggest that in general corporate governance in 
East Asia tends to be at a satisfactory level. Nevertheless, the key problem is in terms of 
enforcement or how to ensure the existing corporate governance mechanisms work 
properly. 
There are two main types of legal protection, shareholder rights and creditor 
rights, which vary across countries in this region. Shareholder rights encourage the 
development of equity markets. Therefore, firms in countries with strong shareholder 
rights should have higher levels of equity or lower levels of debt than firms in countries 
with weak shareholder rights. Shareholder rights can vary depending on countries' legal 
origins. La Porta et al. (1998) find that common law countries provide the best legal 
protection for shareholders while French civil law countries provide the worst. The 
differences in legal protection for shareholders are significant between common law and 
French" civil law countries. This suggests-that shareholders ;can operate' in significantly · 
different ways depending on the legal environments in each country. 
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Unlike shareholder rights, creditor rights encourage the development of lending. 
Therefore, firms in countries with high creditor rights should have higher levels of debt. 
The protection of creditors can be more complicated than the protection of shareholders 
for two main reasons. First, there are several types of creditors who have different 
interests. Protecting the rights of one group of creditors can end up harming the rights of 
other groups. Second, there are two strategies when firms default: liquidation and 
reorganization. In some countries, where liquidation procedure is perfect, the 
reorganization procedure can be ineffective and will never be used (La Porta et al., 
1998). Similar to shareholder rights, creditor rights also vary depending on several 
factors including legal origins (La Porta et al., 1998). Common law countries provide 
the strongest legal protection for creditors while French civil law countries provide the 
weakest. Creditor rights matter most when firms are in financial distress and close to the 
level of bankruptcy. More details of creditor rights will be explained in the section of 
bankruptcy codes. 
Table 2.5 shows the definitions and scores of shareholder and creditor rights. 
Creditors are more protected in Malaysia and Singapore and their laws protect 
shareholders and creditors equally. This is supported by high levels of external finance 
as shown earlier in Table 2.3. Shareholders seem to be better protected than creditors in 
Australia while shareholder protection is quite weak for Thailand. Thus, Australian 
firms are expected to have relatively higher levels of equity while Thai firms are more 
likely to have higher levels of debt. Shareholders are more protected than creditors in 
Australia while the opposite is seen in Thailand. Claessens et al. (2000b) find that firms 
with weak shareholder protection have higher cash flow volatility, higher firm leverage, 
lower liquidity risk, higher short-term debt and lower profitability. Therefore, we expect 
to 'find stronger effects of earnings ·'volatility and'·' weaket-'effects of· profitability as 
determinants of capital structure for firms in Thailand than firms in other countries 
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where shareholder protection is stronger. They also find that firms with weak creditor 
protection have higher liquidity and use less short-term debt. Australia is grouped as a 
weak creditor protection country; therefore, Australian firms are expected to have high 
liquidity and to use less short-term debt. 
In addition, creditor rights are also related to bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy 
literature, little is known on how much formal insolvency systems have actually been 
used, on how creditor rights can be related to the use of courts in resolving financial 
distress and on whether there are any specific creditor rights that matter more than 
another. Claessens and Klapper (2005) were the first to explore the relative importance 
of country characteristics as well as the effects of different forms of creditor rights. 
There are different types of creditor rights such as 'an automatic stay on assets', 
'priority of claims', 'management stay in reorganization' and 'timetable to render a 
bankruptcy judgement' .13 First, the reorganization procedure does not impose 'an 
automatic stay on the assets' of firms on filing the reorganization petition in Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore while such a restriction does exist in the law in Australia. 
Therefore, in Australia the insolvency law provides creditors with some bargaining 
power that may allow them to negotiate more easily on debt restructuring out of court. 
The absence of an automatic stay in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore may lead 
creditors to race to seize assets which will lead to an increase in the possibility of 
financial distress and bankruptcy. Therefore, financial distress and bankruptcy in these 
three countries should be at higher rates than in Australia. This leads to the prediction 
on the determinants of capital structure that firm size should have a stronger relationship 
to firm leverage in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore than in Australia because firm 
size is an inverse proxy for bankruptcy cost. 
13 La Porta et al. (1998); Claessens et al. (2003); Claessens and Klapper (2005) 
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Second, 'priority of claims' can help to reduce the possibility of financial distress 
and help to overcome creditor coordination problems during restructuring. According to 
La Porta et al. ( 1998), secured creditors are paid first in all sample countries except for 
Thailand where Claessens et al. (2003) find that costs of proceedings are paid first, 
followed by taxes, wage claims, and then secured creditors. Third, 'management stay in 
reorganization' can affect the conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders. 
Managers might or might not act on behalf of shareholders depending on the incentives 
which also vary depending on whether the insolvency law stipulates whether managers 
have to automatically leave during bankruptcy or not (Claessens and Klapper, 2005). 
Table 2.5 shows that in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore management does not have to 
remain in control of the company during reorganization or bankruptcy. 
Last, for 'timetable to render a bankruptcy judgement', the reorganisation 
procedure imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent, on filing for reorganisation in 
Malaysia and Singapore while there are no such restrictions in Thailand and Australia. 
The longer time to render bankruptcy judgements, the lower the payoff for the creditors 
because of the depreciation of the present value of the assets. Therefore, both Malaysia 
and Singapore have restrictions on the time allowed to render judgement. Malaysia 
allows a longer period than Singapore leading firms in Malaysia to use less formal 
bankruptcy and more negotiation out of court. Claessens and Klapper (2005) show that 
the presence of restrictions for going into reorganization provides creditors with more 
legal tools leading to more use of formal bankruptcy. Therefore, based on restrictive 
reorganization alone, firms in Thailand and Australia should use less formal bankruptcy 
because there is no such restriction. 
In sum, there are different types of creditor rights which vary across countries. 
Tliailafid, Malaysia and Singapore have quite' similar types of creditor rights' such as no 
automatic stays on assets and management stay m reorganization while opposite 
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restrictions are imposed in Australia. Malaysia and Singapore share restrictions for 
going into reorganization while there are no such restrictions in Thailand and Australia. 
Because there are similarities and differences in creditor rights across countries, 
creditors' behaviour and the use of bankruptcy are expected to be different across 
countries. The combinations of different types of creditors may help to predict the 
behaviour of creditors. For example, the longer the time it takes to render a bankruptcy 
and the lower the priority of claims for secured creditors, the less likely that creditors 
will use formal bankruptcy (Claessens et al., 2003). 
2.2.5 Bankruptcy Code 
The financial crisis in 1997 led a number of firms in this region to financial 
distress. Claessens et al. (2003) show that the majority of firms in their sample countries 
(including Thailand and Malaysia) filed for bankruptcy in the second half of 1998 due 
to the crisis. There are two ways of dealing with bankruptcy: the use of formal 
bankruptcy processes via courts and the use of out-of-court agreements (Claessens et al., 
2003). Financial distress can carry high costs including extensive legal fees. It can also 
destroy managers' reputation and reduce the firm's value. Therefore, firms with high 
relationship with their creditors will try to negotiate the bankruptcy out of court. 
Faccio and Sengupta (2006) study the corporate responses to financial distress in 
countries most affected by the financial crisis, Malaysia and Thailand. They suggest that 
in order to avoid formal bankruptcy, dismissal of management and liquidation of the 
firm, firms will try to respond to financial distress by restructuring assets or liabilities. 
They find that the latter was the most common type of response to financial distress 
during the crisis. However, they also find that the transactions of major asset sales have 
dropped substantially, during the crisis compared to pre-crisis period.- They ·also ·find··-·· 
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that for countries most affected by the crisis, the bankruptcy procedures are likely to 
result in very little liquidation. 
Bankruptcy law has several important effects such as obliging creditors to 
penalize management if firms experience financial distress providing incentives for 
management to stay out of it (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Bankruptcy may vary across 
countries depending on several factors such as financial orientation, ownership 
structure, rule of law and legal protection. First, in terms of financial orientation, firms 
in bank-oriented economies have close relationships with their primary banks; therefore, 
creditors might have less need to use formal bankruptcy to resolve financial distress and 
banks can also act as coordinators of financial restructuring. Claessens et al. (2003) 
suggest that firms in bank-oriented economies seem to recover quicker from financial 
distress without using formal bankruptcy. They also report that bank ownership and 
group affiliations such as in East Asian countries reduce the likelihood of formal 
bankruptcy procedures. Firms in market-oriented economies have arms-length banking 
relationship leading to greater incentives for their creditors to use formal bankruptcy in 
order to coordinate among several creditors. Therefore, firms in market-oriented 
economies might benefit more from bankruptcy laws. Their results confirm that 
bankruptcy use is greater in market-oriented economies because, in bank-oriented 
economies, banks have closer relationships and firms have less dispersed creditors 
leading to less need for the use of formal bankruptcy via courts. However, even though 
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are classified as market-oriented, they show that 
several firms in East Asia appear to have banks as their controlling shareholders; 
therefore, formal bankruptcy to resolve financial distress is less likely to be used. 
Second, bankruptcy can also vary depending on ownership structure of firms. 
Claessens et al. (2003)find that bankruptcy is less,likelyfor firms,withownership•links 
to family and banks. Therefore, it is expected that the number of formal bankruptcies in 
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East Asian countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore should be lower than in 
Australia. Third, differences in bankruptcy can be explained by the differences in rule of 
law and legal protection. Claessens et al. (2003) find that filing for formal bankruptcy 
procedure is positively related to a country's rule of law and creditor protection. 
Because Thailand has the weakest rule of law, it is expected that there will be fewer 
formal bankruptcies in Thailand compared with other countries where rule of law is 
stronger. 
Table 2.6 shows some details of numbers of bankruptcies in each sample country. 
Claessens and Klapper (2005) show that the ratio of the number of bankruptcies to the 
number of firms during 1990 to 1999 was highest in Singapore and lowest in Thailand. 
This supports the relationship between formal bankruptcy and a close relationship with 
creditors in Asia, especially in Thailand where ownership structure is highly 
concentrated with families as controlling shareholders with close relationships with 
their primary banks leading to more use of negotiation out of court and less formal 
bankruptcy procedure in Thailand. It is also shown that in Thailand, Singapore and 
Australia, there are liquidation and reorganization procedures. Between 1997 and 1998 
more than 40% of firms were financially distressed in Thailand and Malaysia and the 
largest number of bankruptcies occurred in Thailand and Malaysia due to the degree of 
severity of the crisis in each country. The processes of liquidation and restructuring are 
not expensive for Thailand and Singapore but are expensive for Malaysia. Although the 
process of liquidation is slow for Thailand and Malaysia, it is quick for Singapore. Both 
processes are efficient for all countries. In contrast to the process of liquidation, the 
process of restructuring is difficult for Thailand and Malaysia but easy for Singapore. 
The process is quick for Thailand and Singapore but slow in Malaysia. 
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Table 2.6 also shows firms facing illiquidity and I or insolvency (% of all firms in 
the sample). In Thailand and Malaysia nearly 50% of the sample firms are illiquid. 
However, a higher percentage of firms in Thailand are insolvent than firms in Malaysia. 
About 40% of Malaysian firms are still illiquid which is a very similar proportion to 
Thai firms. 
2.2.6 Tax System 
Tax systems can be important factors in determining an optimal capital structure 
because tax treatment of interest and dividend payments is different across countries. 
Fan et al. (2004) observe three main tax systems among the sample countries: (i) the 
classical tax system; (ii) the dividend relief tax system; and (iii) the dividend imputation 
tax system. 
The classical tax system is in place in Malaysia and Singapore. Dividend 
payments are taxed at both corporate and personal levels while interest payments are 
tax-deductible expenses at the personal level only. The dividend relief tax system is in 
place in Thailand. This system is different from the classical tax system in terms of 
dividend payment taxing. There are two forms in this system. Under the first form 
dividend payments are not taxed at the corporate level but are taxed at the same rate as 
interest payments at the personal level. Under the second form dividend payments are 
taxed at the corporate level but they are also taxed at a reduced rate at the personal level. 
The dividend imputation tax system is in place in Australia. Firms' interest payments 
are tax-deductible at the corporate tax rate. The domestic corporate tax rate they pay 
provides a tax credit to taxable resident shareholders that offsets the personal tax on 
dividend payments. However, the proportion of corporate tax available as a tax credit 
varies across countries where this system exists~ Australia is one of the countries where 
the full amount of the corporate tax paid can be distributed as a tax credit. Because tax 
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systems differ across countries, tax benefits of debt financing are expected to vary 
across different tax systems leading to the expectation of different effects of tax systems 
on capital structure. Fan et al. (2004) argue that debt will be used less in countries that 
adopt the dividend imputation tax system or dividend relief tax system than other 
countries that adopt the classical tax system. They also expect that the differences will 
be most significant for the countries that adopt the dividend imputation tax system. 
Therefore, the level of debt is expected to be lower for Australian firms than firms in the 
other sample countries. 
2.2. 7 Accounting Practices 
Graham and King (2000) suggest that there are international differences in 
accounting systems for each country which are of major concern to investors, 
accounting standards setters, stock exchanges and financial analysts. William and 
Tower (1998) suggest that difference in culture may help to explain international 
differences in accounting systems. Table 2. 7 shows that the market shares of Big-5 
auditors are quite high in developed countries implying that there is lesser presence of 
information intermediaries in the less developed countries relative to more developed 
countries in the sample. 14 Table 2.7 also presents other aspects of accounting practices 
such as transparency and disclosure, including auditors and voluntary disclosure, 
accounting standards, tax, price earnings information published, financial reporting, and 
earnings management. 
Greater transparency and disclosure keep corporate stakeholders better informed 
about the way a firm is being managed. Australia has the highest rating among the 
sample countries implying less asymmetric information problem. 
14 Now known as Big-4 auditors. 
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Price earnings information is published regularly and internationally for Thailand 
and Malaysia (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996). This suggests that there should 
be less asymmetric information for firms in this region. Fan and Wong (2002) report 
that accounting transparency of Asian firms is generally low due to agency problems 
and relationship-based transactions. Ball et al. (2000) examine the transparency of listed 
firms in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore among other countries and find a lack of 
transparency in reported earnings. They also conclude that adopting the International 
Accounting Standard alone cannot help to improve transparency. Disclosure quality can 
also be measured by the use ofBig-5 auditors. 
Mitton (2002) suggests that firms would have higher disclosure quality if their 
auditors were one of the Big-5 international accounting firms. Table 2. 7 shows the 
percentage of firms that hired Big-5 or Big-S-affiliated auditors by year from 1994 to 
1996 for Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Singaporean firms hired Big-5 auditors 
most frequently while Thai firms use the lowest percentage of hired Big-5 auditors 
implying better disclosure quality in Singapore and lower disclosure quality in 
Thailand. There is an increase in the percentage from 1994 to 1996 indicating 
improvement of disclosure quality in this region. 
Rahman (1998) finds that the majority of Malaysian firms neglect disclosure of 
lending and borrowing activities with associates and do not disclose amounts of foreign 
debts. There was no disclosure about accounting policy on foreign currency risk 
management and the commitments in support of off-balance sheet debt financing. 
Rahman (1998) also studies the disclosure of Thai firms and finds that only half of the 
sample firms disclosed the amount of related party lending and borrowing. Chau and 
Gray (2002) study corporate voluntary disclosure in Singapore and Hong Kong and find 
· that -Asian firrrts have fewer incentives for transparent'disclosure than firms in-Anglo:. < 
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American economies. 15 Their disclosure orientations are also influenced by cultural 
environment. The cultural environment in Singapore does not encourage voluntary 
disclosure because Singapore has been dominated by Chinese families. Since most 
Asian firms are also dominated by families, it can be assumed that the same situation in 
terms of culture applies to Thailand and Malaysia. Chinese society is characterized by 
high levels of collectivism and large power distance indicating that people tend to 
adhere to the rules and regulations. Therefore, voluntary disclosure is less likely in this 
region compared to firms in the UK and US. 
In addition to Chinese domination, firms in East Asia are also frequently family-
owned where managers tend to have little motivation to disclose information especially 
where the information is not required to be disclosed. Therefore, it could be expected 
that East Asian firms, dominated mostly by Chinese and families, would have less 
voluntary disclosure leading to more asymmetric information than firms in the UK, US 
or Australia. In terms of rating of accounting standards, Singapore, Malaysia and 
Australia are scored at similar levels while Thailand's score is lower. This implies that 
general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statements, 
accounting standards, stock data, and special items generated by Thai firms are of lower 
quality than those generated by firms in the other sample countries. Although Thailand 
is scored the lowest among sample countries, the accounting standard in Thailand is 
considered as adequate in terms of internationally acceptable quality (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1996; Aivazian et al., 2003). 
In terms of tax, Singaporean firms pay the least corporate tax (27%) while 
Australian firms pay the most (33%). This also predicts that non-debt tax shields should 
be negatively related to debt to a greater extent for Australian firms as well because 
non-debt· tax shields can be used· as a substitute for debt. For· financial repOrting; the·· 
15 Voluntary disclosure is defmed as disclosure in excess of mandatory requirements, representing the 
choice of the management to provide information that is relevant to the decision making of users of the 
annual report. 
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information is available in the literature for Singapore and Australia only. National 
accounting standards for Singapore and Australia are set by government bodies; 
however, private-sector bodies are also involved for Singapore (Ali and Hwang, 2000). 
Both countries are classified as British-American model countries and their level of 
alignment of financial and tax accounting is low (Alford et al., 1993; Ali and Hwang, 
2000). In terms of accrual indices, Australian firms have the highest use of accrual 
accounting which implies that their accounting system moves away from a cash method 
measure of performance at a higher rate than firms in other sample countries. 
There are several studies suggesting differences in financial reporting practices. 
For example, Alford et al. (1993) find differences across countries in the relative 
disclosure of information. Australia, the UK, US and France have relatively high 
information contents. Therefore, it is expected that Australian firms will have higher 
information content in their disclosures than Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean firms 
leading to less asymmetric information in Australia. In the literature, it has been 
suggested that financial reporting practices and disclosure can be affected by 
institutional environment and stage of development (Salter, 1998). 
In addition, Table 2.7 also presents the main firms' law and securities laws. For 
countries in ASEAN such as Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, securities laws regulate 
financial reporting. The purpose of company laws and securities laws is to ensure that 
firms provide sufficient financial information for the needs of users such as creditors 
and shareholders. According to Craig and Diga (1996) and Teen and Phan (2001), in 
Malaysia and Singapore, the 'true and fair view' is required by the Firms Act to present 
information to meet the needs of investors. In Thailand, it is also expected that investors 
and creditors are the principal users of the financial reports. There are several qualitative 
. objeCtives· such as relevance; Clarity,· neutrality and comparability. Representational 
faithfulness is also considered an important objective for Malaysia and Singapore. 
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Another common characteristic of financial reporting for Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore is the active participation of private sector organizations, especially 
professional accounting bodies and stock exchanges, in formulating and enforcing 
accounting regulations (Craig and Diga, 1996). Table 2.7 also presents the government 
agencies and private sector bodies that are involved in regulating financial reporting in 
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Firms' laws and securities laws are administered 
separately by government agencies. 
There are some differences in term of clusters which are influenced by company 
law requirements, securities market regulations, and accounting standards across sample 
countries. In term of firms' law requirements, Malaysia and Singapore are seen taking a 
British approach while Thailand takes a mixed country approach. Malaysia and 
Singapore are different from Thailand because both of them are former British colonies; 
therefore, they have adopted a Firms Act modelled on the UK Firms Act 1948 together 
with the Australian Uniform Firms' Act 1961. Therefore, even though Australia is not 
amongst the sample countries in Craig and Diga ( 1996), it can also be assumed that 
Australian law requirement is quite similar to that of Malaysian and Singaporean firms. 
Firms in these countries are required to keep the accounting records providing a 
sufficient and accurate explanation of their financial position. Thailand (non-British 
colony) is influenced by Civil and Commercial codes stipulating that true accounts must 
be maintained. Unlike other countries in Asia which have been colonized, there is no 
exogenous legal system in Thailand. Besides, instead of following the British Acts, 
Thailand created its commercial laws by selecting from Eastern and Western legal 
systems (Craig and Diga, 1996). The Securities Industry Acts of Malaysia and 
Singapore focus narrowly on stock broking business while the laws in Thailand include 
stockbrokers arid . firms 'who issUe -securities·. Another difference lies· in the accounting-" 
standards. Malaysian and Singaporean accounting standards are based on accounting 
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pronouncements of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). 16 
However, Thai accounting standards are a hybrid of IASC and US GAAP accounting 
standards. 
lAS requirements are less detailed than US F ASB standards and allow more 
discretion in adopting accounting policies (Teen and Phan, 2001). Therefore, the quality 
of financial disclosure in Singapore and Malaysia, where lAS standards are adopted, 
and in Thailand, where a combination of both standards is employed, should be weaker 
than in more developed economies such as the UK, US and Australia, where US 
accounting standards are in use. Rahman (1998) finds that, although Malaysia has 
adopted lAS standards, there is still a lack of appropriate enforcement efforts suggested 
by the mixed findings on compliance with the required accounting practices. Graham 
and King (2000) also find that accounting systems may vary in their faithfulness to 
factors such as conservatism of their accounting practices and find that the accounting 
system in Malaysia was less conservative than the accounting system in Thailand. 
Moreover, Table 2.7 gives information about earnings management in each 
sample country. Higher scores for the respective EM measures indicate more earnings 
management. Singaporean firms have the highest level of earnings management 
followed by Thai firms and Malaysian firms while Australian firms have the lowest 
level. This suggests that agency problems should be most severe for Singaporean firms 
and least severe for Australian firms. 
16 IASC and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) have devoted 
considerable effort to standardize and harmonize the accounting practices across countries (Graham and 
King, 2000). 
47 
2.2.8 Ownership Structure 
The major difference between firms in East Asia and in developed Western 
economies lies in ownership structure. La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that ownership 
structure is more important for emerging market countries than developed countries. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that the effect of ownership structure on capital 
structure is far from obvious. Ownership structure can affect financial structure because 
it has some implications on the extent of agency problems which affects the 
expropriation of minority shareholders and firms' value (Anderson et al., 2002; 
Lemmon and Lins, 2003). Ownership structure can play an important role in 
determining the extent of the agency problems as to whether there is any expropriation 
of minority shareholders. Managers' and shareholders' interests can be more aligned 
when managerial ownership increases leading to improvement in firms' performance. 
However, when managerial ownership continues to increase up to certain levels, 
managers' interests will begin to deviate from those of shareholders leading to greater 
agency costs of equity and decline in performance. 
There is also evidence that separation of cash flow ownership and control is 
negatively related to firms' value because it can influence the incentives of 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2003; Lemmon and Lins, 
2003). Lemmon and Lins' (2003) results are complementary to the results of Claessens 
et al. (2003) who find that Tobin's Q value in East Asia is negatively related to the 
separation of ownership and control. If the large shareholders of firms are banks, they 
might want to reduce the amount of funds from outside sources by forcing firms to 
borrow more from banks. Therefore, the relationship between ownership structure and 
capital structure might not be clear as it depends on who the large shareholders are. 
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Ownership structure has also been found to be related to costs of debt financing. 
Anderson et al. (2002) find that founding family ownership is related to a lower cost of 
debt financing. 17 Therefore, firms in countries with high concentrations of ownership 
structure should have lower costs of debt leading to higher levels of debt than firms in 
countries with low concentrations of ownership structure. Agency conflicts also occur 
more easily with founding family ownership because families can place their members 
in CEO positions. Anderson et al. (2002) also find that bondholders prefer firms with 
founding family ownership because they offer better protection. Therefore, founding 
family ownership can affect agency costs in two different ways: (i) it can reduce agency 
cost of equity because the interests of shareholders and managers are more aligned with 
the increase in managerial ownership; and (ii) founding family ownership tends to 
exacerbate agency cost of debt because founding families have powerful voices to force 
firms to meet their demands. Founding family ownership has been found to be 
beneficial to firms as well. It should lead to better performance because the large 
shareholders have incentives as well as the ability to monitor managers leading to less 
corruption. Families also generally have longer investment horizons that can mitigate 
short-sighted investment decisions by managers. 
La Porta et al. (1998) show that the ownership concentration differs across 
countries and it relates to legal origin. Highly concentrated ownership structures can 
also lead to poor investor protection. They find that poor investor protection found in 
French civil law was associated with highly concentrated ownership structures. Because 
ownership structure is related to investor protection, firms should adapt to the 
limitations of the legal system they are operating in. Ownership structure in large firms 
17 Founding family ownership is defined in Anderson et al. (2002) as families present in 30% of firms and 
holding 19% of the outstanding equity on average. It represents a large shareholder that has unique 
incentive structures and powerful and strong motives and voice to manage one particular fll1Tl. Founding 
families also worry more about firm survival and reputation; therefore, they are more likely to maximize 
firm value. 
49 
in Australia is relatively dispersed while East Asian firms are dominated by a small 
number of families and the environment is mainly a family-based relationship. 18 
In family-based systems, there are three main financing sources. The business is 
financed at first by internal funds. However, as firms grow, banks can play a more 
prominent role and then equity becomes more important at the later stages of the 
business. However, neither banks nor equity markets ultimately control the management 
of firms. Despite control by families, the main finance source in Asia is from banks 
rather than equity markets because equity markets require a more complex institutional 
and regulatory framework. Although banks play a more important role, leading firms to 
have higher levels of debt, the bank-based system has never taken hold. When firms in 
family-based systems are financed mostly by internal funds, the asymmetric information 
is not problematic because there is no effective separation between management and 
ownership. However, once the business grows and firms require external finance either 
from banks or capital markets, there are more conflicts of interest between owner-
managers and the financiers. Therefore, there is a greater chan ce of the failure of 
family-based systems when firms grow. 
However, family-based systems still work well, especially in Asia. Khan (2003) 
suggests that family-based systems can work well when there exist self-monitoring, and 
banking and security market regulation and an effective legal system such that misuse 
of finances is more difficult. Moreover, most commercial banks and financial firms in 
Thailand are controlled by groups of families. Therefore, firms can borrow from banks 
more easily due to the close relationships among families leading Thai firms to have 
higher levels of debt than firms in other countries especially Australia. 
18 Raj an and Zingales ( 1998); Claessens et al. (1998, l999a, 2000a); Nam et al. (1999); 
Wiwattanakantang (1999); Khan (2002, 2003); Claessens and Fan (2002); Zhang (2003) 
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Table 2.8 shows that around 50% of firms are owned by families. This confirms 
that firms in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are largely family-based. The top 15 
families control over 50% of firms in East Asia. The high concentration of ownership 
structure leads to an expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders 
(owner-managers). Because in Asia there is no strong bank-centred monitoring 
mechanism as there is in Japan and Germany, there is a lack of market mechanisms to 
discipline managers. A tight relationship among firms can lead to better performance 
because pooling of resources and information decreases transaction costs (Nam et al., 
1999). In addition, concentrated ownership structures might help to reduce asymmetric 
information and agency costs. In less developed markets such as Thailand, there is a 
high level of asymmetric information (Kim et al., 2004). The alignment of interests 
between shareholders and managers can help to avoid agency costs (known as 
managerial alignment in the literature) which are caused by asymmetric information. 
High managerial ownership can also help to reduce expropriation in some ways 
because the incentives for controlling insiders to divert resources from profitable 
investments can be reduced if insiders have higher proportional cash flow ownership 
(Lemmon and Lins, 2003). However, high concentration of ownership structures can 
cause problems as well. It can lead to a high possibility of expropriation of minority 
shareholders (known in the literature as the entrenchment effect). When management 
and controlling shareholders are the same group, the expropriation is easier to achieve 
(Johnson et al., 2000) but the problem seems to be less severe in Malaysia and 
Singapore than the rest of the region. The reports of these countries do not show 
widespread expropriation (Nam et al., 1999). 
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Claessens et al. (2000a) study ownership structure of East Asian firms and find 
that the use of pyramid structure and cross-holding in East Asian firms leads to 
controlling shareholders exercising control rights (measured by voting rights a 
shareholder is entitled to) far beyond their stock ownership stakes (cash flow rights). 
Table 2.8 shows the percentage of cash flow rights and control rights. Voting rights 
exceed cash flow rights indicating high control by controlling shareholders in East Asia. 
Zhang (2003) suggests that ownership structure might affect firms' profitability. 
Lemmon .. and Lins. ~2003) also ·find- worse stock · .. performance·· for· .. firms with larger 
disparity between ownership and control during the cns1s. A high concentration of 
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corporate ownership and control can allow the dominant families to make key decisions 
including the appointment of board members. As a consequence, there is a high 
possibility of conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. Nam et al. (1999) 
indicate that for firms in East Asia, the relationship started with firms largely financed 
by banks under government influence. There is a close relationship between and among 
firms and their banks which later developed to be a family-based system. 
In economies where ownership structure is concentrated with family ownership, 
corporate governance is likely to be weak (Scott, 1999). Although concentrated 
ownership in Asia can cause agency conflict and asymmetric information, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) suggest that there is a benefit from concentrated ownership in less 
developed countries where property rights are not well defined and investors are not 
well protected. This is also confirmed by La Porta et al. (1999) who find a significant 
relationship between the top three shareholders of the largest listed firms around the 
world and weak legal and institutional environments. Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) hypothesize that ownership concentration can be a very important corporate 
governance mechanism when legal protection is low because it provides incentives and 
power to monitor managers. 
N am et al. ( 1999) find that on average more than 60% of Thai firms are owned by 
individuals and family shareholders while banks and institutional investors do not 
normally own large block non-financial firms. Moreover, banks in Thailand play more 
of a role as creditors rather than investors. The country report shows that institutional 
investors such as domestic banks and other financial institutions own only around 13% 
of the 150 largest firms. Thai firms have not utilized credit instruments widely enough 
to support private industries. However, Thai banks provide subsidized credit to the 
public sector"'with interest rate control leading firms to rely more on borrowing than · ...
equity financing. In Thailand, cross-debt guarantees among business groups allow firms 
53 
to borrow even more easily and many financial and non-financial institutions are 
family-based. Thai banks are allowed to hold a controlling share in listed firms without 
any investment restrictions. There is also evidence that Thai banks invest heavily in 
unlisted firms. Nam et al. (1999) conclude that Malaysian firms do not have much 
experience in the involvement of credit invention. Moreover, conglomerates control is 
less severe than in Thailand. Only a few commercial banks are controlled by 
conglomerates. However, loans to related parties are prohibited by the central banks 
thus loans from banks are more difficult to get through close relationships with the 
banks. 
Nam et al. (1999) also find that there are some significant differences across 
countries in ownership structure: (i) pyramid structure, (ii) bank control and (iii) 
government involvement. First, there are the variations of pyramid structures across 
Asian economies. Wiwattanakantang (2001) find a positive relationship between 
performance and family ownership among Thai firms. This is due to low agency 
problems of Thai firms because they do not adopt pyramidal ownership structures. This 
is supported by Claessens and Fan (2002) who find that 80% of the controlling 
shareholders in Thailand do not employ cross-shareholding or pyramid structures. 
Second, in terms of bank control, Nam et al. (1999) also find that there are differences 
across countries in East Asia in the relationships between banks and firms. Claessens 
and Fan (2002) find that banking and affiliating with banks is common in this region. 
One benefit of firms being affiliated with banks is that the degree of information 
asymmetry between lenders and firms is smaller than that of firms with arms-length 
lending. There has been some empirical evidence supporting the positive side of firms 
depending on banks. For example, Ferri et al. (2001) find positive effects between bank 
·relation· and fiirn''s value dtiiihgthe crisis'in 1997 and 1998:~The relationship With banks 
reduced the degree of financial constraint thereby mitigating the problems of costly 
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bankruptcy. But Claessens and Fan (2002) suggest that bank affiliation can also lead to 
the problem of misallocation of capital. 
Teen and Phan (2001) and Mak and Li (2001) show that the proportion of shares 
owned by all blockholders is more than 60% in Singapore (as shown in Table 2.8). 19 La 
Porta et al. (1998) report that on average the three largest stockholders own 49% of the 
voting stock of the 10 largest firms in Singapore, 54% in Malaysia and 46% for 
Thailand compared with 20%, 22% and 22% for the US, UK and Japan, respectively. 
However, unlike other countries, banks in Singapore are not allowed to directly own 
significant proportions of shares in firms under the Banking Act of 1970 (Teen and 
Phan, 2001). According to the law, banks and funds are not permitted to hold shares in 
firms. Therefore, the relationship between firms and banks in Singapore should be 
lower than in Thailand because Thai firms can have their primary banks as shareholders 
allowing Thai firms to access borrowing from banks more easily with less collateral 
required than Singaporean firms. Therefore, the influence of collateral on firm leverage 
should be weaker in Thailand than in Singapore. Claessens et al. (2003) show that the 
percentage of firms with bank ownership is large in Malaysia and Thailand. They find 
that the principal shareholders in the majority of firms in East Asia are commercial 
firms and financial institutions and group affiliation is extensive. Because of their close 
relationships with banks, firms in Thailand and Malaysia might not be required to use 
collateral when they borrow or might be required to provide less collateral compared 
with firms in other countries. Thus, the effect of tangibility on firms' leverage should be 
weaker in Thailand and Malaysia. 
In Malaysia, firms are dominated by banks. There is an over-dependence on banks 
in Malaysia due to the over-protection of banks and the over regulation of capital 
markets leading to the Underdevelopment of several parties· such as non::.bank financial · 
19 Mak and Li (200 1) also find that blockholders ownership tends to be much higher in East Asian 
countries than other Western developed economies. 
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institutions, capital markets, risk management processes, risk intermediaries and trading 
and market making (World Bank, 1999). This leads to several expectations on financial 
decisions. First, Malaysian firms should have higher levels of debt, especially bank 
borrowing than firms in other countries. Suto (2003) examines capital structure in 
Malaysia before and after the crisis and finds an increase in debt ratio before the crisis 
due to bank dependency which is encouraged by the government leading to excessive 
investments before the crisis. Second, there should be less effect of collateral on firm 
leverage because firms should be able to borrow more easily without, or with less, 
collateral compared with firms in other countries. Third, there should be less effect of 
firm size on firm leverage in Malaysia because there should be less bankruptcy when 
firms are very dependent on banks. 
Third, there are differences in the involvement of government across countries. 
The country reports show that institutional investor participation is limited in the 
governance of firms. Banks cannot get involved too much in a business because the 
Banking Act limits the investments of the banks in other non-financial firms to a 
maximum of 20% of their total capital. Teen and Phan (200 1) and Mak and Li (200 1) 
find that in Singapore the government holds major ownership in the firms and it 
facilitates governance through government-linked corporations (GLCs). While in other 
countries all other blockholders are majority shareholders and blockholders play an 
important third party role in facilitating the takeovers of firms which are performing 
poorly, the government as a major shareholder in Singaporean firms is expected to play 
role of long-term investor instead. Nam et al. (1999) indicate that on average more than 
60% of ownership are blockholders which are government, firms or sometimes 
individuals. Mak and Li (200 1) suggest that Singapore should be described as a mix 
bdweenfamily~based ~ufd govei'Iiifleht~based economies. They also suggest a number,of 
reasons why GLCs might have weaker corporate governance compared to non-GLCs: 
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(i) GLCs must respond to some signals which are not related to firm's profit or value 
maximization but to the well-being of the nation; (ii) GLCs receive funding from 
government but they face less pressure in paying dividends leading to higher agency 
costs; (iii) the government is likely to be less active in monitoring GLCs' investment; 
and (iv) government is expected to be a long-term investor and is unlikely to support 
unsolicited takeover offers for GLCs. 
Government linkage in firms in Singapore offers several advantages to GLCs 
compared to non-GLCs in other countries (Teen and Phan, 2001; Mak and Li, 2001; 
Khan, 2003): (i) they are more protected from the weak market for corporate control; 
(ii) they can also have easier access to different sources of financing relative to non-
GLCs in other countries; (iii) because of close guidance from the government, 
Singaporean firms are performing better than firms in other family-based countries such 
as Thailand and Malaysia; and (iv) GLCs are guaranteed solvency because the 
government is perceived by the lenders to have a moral and legal responsibility for 
firms' liabilities (La Porta et al., 1998). Therefore, bankruptcy for firms in Singapore 
should be lower compared to firms in Thailand and Malaysia. This implies that firm size 
should have stronger effects on firm leverage in Thailand and Malaysia than in 
Singapore due to the lower level of solvency. In addition, because GLCs in Singapore 
have greater guarantees of solvency, banks and other financial institutions such as 
insurance firms are more willing to lend money to these firms. Therefore, borrowing 
should be at a higher level in Singapore than in other countries and a less important role 
for asset tangibility, liquidity, earnings volatility and firm size. 
In summary, the above review shows that the differences in corporate governance, 
legal and institutional environment across sample countries have implications on firms' 
·financing decisions because they affect the ability of firms to access different sources of· 
finance, asymmetric information level, agency cost problems, etc. 
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2.3 The East Asian Financial Crisis 
Firms' financing decisions may be influenced by unforeseeable economic events 
such as the financial crisis of 1997. The East Asian financial crisis started from 
Thailand after the government announced the change in exchange rate regime from 
fixed to floating rate on the 2"d of July 1997 spreading to Korea, Indonesia and 
Malaysia. The crisis has passed a lot of damages to other countries around the world. 
The effect of the crisis on individual countries varied considerably and revealed 
the vulnerability of the less developed economies in the region. The crisis has affected 
the capital markets of the region severely. In East Asian countries, stock markets' 
values fell more than 30% within 1 year. The East Asian capital markets saw an outflow 
of foreign investments and governments responded by changing their regulations related 
to capital flows. The sudden and unexpected financial crisis of these high growth 
economies has affected investors around the world. Investors have become more 
cautious and more concerned with the risk of firms they are investing in and have 
started looking for better investor protection. Raising capital has become more costly. 
Interest rates in affected countries have been increased in order to support the local 
currency resulting in lower use of debt in affected countries. 
Mishkin (1999) suggests that in the period preceding the Asian crisis asymmetric 
information problems worsened, and the deterioration of balance sheets eventually led 
to the crisis. Financial markets were no longer able to allocate funds efficiently. Firms 
became more concerned about their exposure to debts and creditors more stringent in 
their lending. In financial sectors characterised by weak regulation and supervision, the 
financial institutions operating in East Asia could not screen and monitor their loans 
properly. Therefore, it is expected that the effects of the financial crisis would have 
been felt more by firms ih eccihomies withcless developed·financiahystems, while firms 
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in economies with more developed financial systems would have been sheltered from 
the worse effects. 
Figure 2.1 presents monthly price index for the stock market in each sample 
country. It shows that price index decreased substantially after the 1997 financial crisis 
for countries most affected by the crisis (Malaysia and Thailand) while it continued to 
increase for Australia. On the other hand, price index of Singapore stock market appears 
stable over the period. This shows that Singaporean and Australian firms are not as 
severely affected by the crisis as firms in Malaysia and Thailand. 
Rgure 2.1: Monthly Price Index (1990 - 2002) 
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Chowdhry and Goyal (2000) review the theoretical explanations of the causes of 
the financial crisis and present their empirical and policy implications. Two theories that 
stand out as offering explanations of the crisis are moral hazard and self-fulfilling run 
on liquidity. Moral hazard happens when there are distortions due to adverse incentives 
or implicit guarantees given by the IMF and the government to financial institutions to 
make unsound loans without adequate supervision leading to overinvestment and 
overvaluation of assets. If moral hawd. is present, investors should be aware that the 
- .. --. ~ - ·. . - ".-· - ; .. 
analysis using share price alone might be misleading. It reflects the combination of 
imprudent investment and implicit guarantees. The aftermath solution would be to 
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remove the implicit guarantees. Self-fulfilling run on liquidity happens when there is 
mismatch of maturity and liquidity between deposits and loans especially with the 
sudden withdrawal of short-term debt leading banks to fail. The use of shorter-term 
debts has dual and opposite effects: (i) it enables creditors to make sounder fund 
allocation decisions due to more frequent monitoring; and (ii) it exposes firms to 
potential rollover difficulties, liquidity risk and uncertainty about the fluctuation of 
interest rates and inflation. If the main weakness that worsened the effects of the Asian 
financial crisis was a run by short-term debtholders, a deposit insurance system is 
required. 
In a highly uncertain and volatile environment, financial analysts' opmwns 
became paramount to financing decision making, and this may have partly contributed 
to the differing impact of the crisis across the affected countries. Financial analysts' 
opinions are important to financing decisions because the analysts' main roles are to 
collect, process and provide the information on firms to the market. As financial 
analysts may behave differently and irrationally in each country, the crisis is expected to 
have different effects across different countries in the region. Ang and Ma (200 1) 
suggest that there are in general five models regarding analyst behaviour: (i) normal 
model where analysts are assumed to be rational and expected to have no differences in 
their behaviour between crisis and normal period; (ii) panic and herding model where 
analysts are aware of the earnings downgrade and behave irrationally by downgrading 
their forecasts leading other analysts to downgrade even more or by assigning too much 
weight to the event leading them to report over-pessimistic forecasts; (iii) self-denial 
model where analysts hold on to the information they have with the hope that the effect 
will be reduced soon which lead them to produce over-optimistic forecasts; (iv) 
influence model where the ·analysts are under the influence of their clients either by · 
cross-shareholdings or other inter-corporate relationship leading them to forecast in the 
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favour of firms; and (v) pre-condition model where the analysts rely on the past 
conditions ofthe markets.20 
Ang and Ma (2001) also analyse the financial analysts' behaviour during the crisis 
in four Asian countries, including Thailand and Malaysia, and observe significant 
variations across countries in the reactions of financial analysts before and after the 
crisis. They find that analysts in Thailand behave in the same way as predicted by the 
influence model suggesting high agency costs. There was evidence of large 
disagreement among analysts in Thailand after the end of year suggesting high levels of 
asymmetric information in Thailand. The analysts reacted slowly to the event but they 
did finally present a true picture and seemed to be able to differentiate between the 
performance of top and bottom firms. The accuracy of forecasting from analysts in 
Thailand gradually improved. On the other hand, analysts in Malaysia appear to behave 
consistently with the self-denial model. They switched from being unbiased to over-
optimistic and took a considerably longer time to respond to the severity of the crisis. 
Analysts in Malaysia also appear to be unable to distinguish top from bottom 
performing firms. 
The 1997 Asian crisis not only highlighted the importance for firms and their 
lenders of carefully choosing the maturity-mix of debts but also reflects the inefficiency 
in corporate governance, the legal and institutional environments in this region, such as 
unsound and unsupervised lending decisions, and the lack of transparency in the system. 
Because banks play the main role in financing firms' investment and can potentially 
contribute to the financial crisis, the effects of the crisis should be larger in the financial 
sectors characterised by weak regulation and supervision because financial institutions 
could not screen and monitor their loans properly. It is therefore reasonable to expect 
20 See Ang and Ma (200 I) for detailed information on the predictions and implications of each analyst 
behaviour model. 
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that this economy-wide event may have had a significant impact on the financing 
decision of firms in the affected countries. 
The response of the governments to the financial crisis varied significantly across 
countries. Thailand has received help from the IMF to regain international credibility 
(Shivakumar, 1998). In general, Thailand has implemented several steps to economic 
recovery including a decrease in interest rates to stimulate renewed investment in the 
economy leading to lower borrowing costs. In order to solve the liquidity and debt 
crisis, special institutions were established to help financially troubled firms and the 
management of bad assets. Insolvent banks and finance firms were closed while weak 
but viable financial institutions were rehabilitated through recapitalization or mergers. 
Unlike Thailand, Malaysia did not accept IMF assistance because Malaysia's external 
borrowing was relatively low compared to other East Asian countries. According to 
Bank Negara Malaysia (1998), Malaysia has attempted to raise interest rates among 
other remedies? 1 However, it had the adverse effect of exacerbating the current phase of 
economic slow down leading to a decline in equity markets. As in Thailand, a new 
organization was formed after the crisis to review and reform corporate governance in 
Malaysia by setting out broad principles of good corporate governance and proposing a 
detailed code of best practice for firms as well as making 65 recommendations to 
strengthen laws, enhance disclosure and transparency, and promote effective 
enforcement. This suggests that corporate governance in Thailand and Malaysia should 
be improving after the crisis leading to better protection of stakeholders. During 1999 to 
2000, Malaysia was among the strongest economies as its recovery from the crisis was 
accompanied by reduced vulnerability of the financial system (Meesok et al., 2001 ). In 
addition, investors' confidence was improved by stronger growth and a gradual easing 
··'of capital controls. 
21 See Nesadurai (2000) for more information on three phases of Malaysia's responses to the crisis. 
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In contrast to other countries, investors' confidence has been enhanced by the 
1998 rating of the Business Environment Risk Intelligence in Singapore. Although not 
severely affected by the crisis, several policy measures have also been adopted by the 
Government in Singapore to minimise the impact of the crisis. Unlike other countries, 
Australia escaped the severe effects of the crisis and was one of only two countries to 
participate in the IMF second tier support arrangements for affected countries including 
Thailand (Downer, 1999). Due to the conditions described above, firms in the East 
Asian countries suffered difficulties in raising capital. This is likely to have implications 
on the financing decisions of firms operating in these countries. Arsiraphongphisit et al. 
(2000) indicate that the financial crisis has had significant effects on financial policies 
and practices in the Asia Pacific region, especially in Thailand. The financial structure 
was very fragile in 1997. They suggest that firms find themselves very exposed to the 
changes in economic environment following the crisis. Therefore, it is important to find 
out whether the financial crisis has had any impact on the firms' financing decisions and 
their determinants. Thus, we examine for any possible changes in the effect of the 
determinants of capital structure and debt maturity structure during the pre- and post-
crisis periods. 
2.4 Summary 
It has been shown that firms in the Asia Pacific regiOn, especially Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore, have different corporate governance from firms in more 
developed countries such as the US and UK. In the Asia Pacific region, there are 
similarities and differences in corporate governance and institutional environments 
which might suggest certain explanations of the differences in financial decisions across 
countries in the region. However, the information on Australia is not as readily-available 
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as countries in East Asia such as Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Therefore, in most 
cases, the comparisons have been made excluding Australia. 
There are several principal similarities and differences among the sample 
countries. First, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia are based on common law while 
Thailand is based on both common law and civil law systems. Thailand and Malaysia 
are developing countries while Singapore and Australia are more developed. East Asian 
firms tend to rely more on external finance than expected. Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore are grouped as having market-based and family-based relationships while 
Australia is a pure market-based economy with arms-length relationships with creditors. 
Rule of law in this region also varies across countries. Thailand is found to have the 
lowest score in most of the cases in terms of rule of law. For legal protection, there are 
also differences in scores between shareholder rights and creditor rights. Thailand 
shows the lowest shareholder rights score while Australia shows the lowest score for 
creditor rights. This shows that Australian laws are not creditor friendly; therefore, the 
level of debt of Australian firms should be lower than firms in other countries. 
Firms in this region rely more on informal bankruptcy procedures. In accounting 
practices, firms are required to disclose financial information at the satisfactory level 
compared with other more developed countries. Voluntary disclosure is less likely due 
to the culture and family-based systems in this region. Lastly, firms in this region, 
except in Australia, have high ownership concentrations leading to more agency 
problems. However, although in Malaysia and Thailand the controlling shareholders are 
families, in Singapore the government plays an important role, leading Singaporean 
firms to have more guarantees and protection for investors as well as easier access to 
capital markets. Because there are similarities and differences in corporate governance 
-and-'institutional environments across countries in the~ Asia Pacific region, it is expected 
that financing decisions for firms in this region may vary. The impact of corporate 
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governance and institutional environments relates more to the choices between internal 
and external finance rather than the proportion of external finance that the next chapters 
will be focusing on. Therefore, the differences in financing decisions in the next 
chapters might not be obvious and might not be detected by simple regressions, and 
country-specific variables are needed. 
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Chapter 3 • 
The Determinants of Capital Structure 
3.1 Introduction 
Nearly half a century ago, Modigliani and Miller (1958) were the first to point out 
that the value of a firm is independent of its capital structure under a number of certain 
assumptions because the value of the firm is determined by its real assets not by its 
sources of financing. Therefore, internally generated finance and external finance such 
as debt and equity can be a perfect substitute for each other assuming that the capital 
market is perfect and transactions costs, bankruptcy costs, taxation, information 
asymmetry and agency cost do not apply. Modigliani and Miller's (1958) seminal paper 
paved the way for the recent development of alternative theories and empirical research 
on capital structure decisions. If the propositions of Modigliani and Miller (1958) hold, 
the empirical results should be in the direction that differences in capital structure across 
countries are just an accident of history or a random product (Spremann and 
Gantenbein, 2002). However, this is far from reality. Once Modigliani and Miller's 
(1958) assumptions were relaxed, capital structure theories have evolved to 
acknowledge that capital structure decisions become relevant to the value of firms. 
Because of market imperfections, firms will try to reach an optimal capital structure. 
However, the puzzle about the choice of capital structure is still unsolved. Although 
there is consensus on a number of factors that make capital structure relevant to a firm's 
value, the dispute over other factors still goes on. 
There are several well-known capital structure theories in the literature that offer 
explanations on why and how debt and equity become relevant to the firm's value. It 
lias been suggested" 'that the choice of·debt ·and' equity 'depends 'On firm-specific 
* The main elements of this chapter have appeared in Deesomsak et al. (2004). 
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characteristics and country-specific factors. However, there are occasiOns when 
different capital structure theories predict different relations between firm leverage and 
firm-specific and country-specific factors. Empirically, the predictions of each theory on 
the relationship between firm leverage and each factor still overlap. Also one 
measurement can be a proxy for different variables. Therefore, it is difficult to 
distinguish the correlation of each factor with firm leverage. Briefly, there are two main 
capital structure theories that stand up in the literature; the trade-off theory and the 
pecking order theory. According to the trade-off theory, firms have a target capital 
structure which they try to move toward. Firms optimise their capital structure over time 
in order to reflect tax rates, asset type, business risk, profitability, the bankruptcy 
legislation and agency costs, etc. their objective being to minimise total capital costs. 
Agency costs of equity, conflicts between inside and outside investors, stand out as one 
of the major capital costs. Leverage can be used as a control instrument to mitigate the 
conflict; therefore, choice of debt and equity is important to firms. The pecking order 
theory postulates that firms have an order of financing preferences. Market 
imperfections, such as transaction costs and asymmetric information, play an important 
role in the choice of financing source for new investment and thus influence the overall 
financial structure. Due to asymmetric information, firms will undertake new 
investments by using internally generated funds first. If external funding is required, 
debt will be preferable than equity due to the smaller impact of asymmetric information. 
Therefore, the questions to be answered in this chapter are (i) whether corporate 
financial decisions differ significantly across countries in the Asia Pacific region; (ii) 
whether the factors that are correlated to firm leverage are similar across countries in 
this region; and (iii) whether the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 has had any 
significant impact on capital Sttucttire-decisions of fitms 'in this-region. GeneraHy,-.this 
chapter contributes to the existing literature and empirical studies in several areas. First, 
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it investigates the determinants of capital structure in Asia Pacific countries which 
operate under different economic development from the countries focused on by 
previous studies. Second, each sample country was hit by the financial crisis to differing 
degrees leading to potential different effects on the factors that determine firms' capital 
structure in each country. Third, most previous studies on capital structure consider the 
determinants of capital structure only in terms of firm-specific characteristics and fail to 
control for the possible effects of market-related conditions. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section views capital 
structure theories which are the basis of understanding capital structure in general. This 
section starts with a brief summary of well-known and influential theories of capital 
structure. Some of these theories can be combined or are referred to in the literature as 
one theory because they are based on similar assumptions. Most theories are found to be 
robust and can be used to explain observed patterns of capital structure. Section 3 
summarizes costs and benefits of debt and equity based on these theories. Section 4 
reviews hypotheses development of the determinants of capital structure and is followed 
by the methodology applied and variable identification while section 5 describes the 
data and their descriptive statistics. Then the next section presents empirical results 
which are divided into three sections: (i) firm-specific determinants; (ii) the effects of 
the crisis on firm-specific determinants; and (iii) country-specific determinants. The last 
section draws conclusions from the discussion. 
3.2 Capital Structure Theories: An Overview 
3.2.1 Traditional View 
Traditionally, it has been believed that the lowest weighted cost of capital 
· (WACG)wiB 'maximise firms'· market-value which-means-that-there is-an optimum·· 
relationship between debt and equity because debt is generally cheaper than equity as an 
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investment financing source. W ACC is important and is related to the firm value 
because the firm value is equal to the present value of the net cash flow discounted by 
W ACC. Therefore, the value of the firm can be increased by minimising W ACC which 
is used to discount its cash flow to the present value. In other words, if the cash flows to 
the firm are held constant, and WACC is minimised, the value of the firm will be 
maximised. Under this view, it was believed that the objective of capital structure is to 
minimise WACC and firms will try to use a specific capital structure that will minimise 
this cost. Therefore, firm value and costs of capital are related to capital structure. 
3.2.2 Irrelevancy Theory 
Unlike the traditional view, Modigliani and Miller (1958) assume that, under 
perfect market conditions, the value of the firm is independent of its capital structure. 
This implies that firms' financing decisions cannot change the total value of the firm 
which should be determined by its real assets, not by financing sources. Therefore, a 
firm's investment decisions can be separated from its financing decisions. The 
assumptions of the irrelevancy theorem are that capital markets are perfect and 
frictionless. There are no transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, taxes or agency costs. 
Securities can also be purchased and sold costlessly and instantaneously. Moreover, 
information is free of costs and is available for everyone, including public and corporate 
insiders. There is no information asymmetry or signalling opportunities. It is also 
assumed that investors behave rationally and that managers aim to maximise 
shareholder's wealth. Market operators are expected to be utility maximizers. In 
addition, firms may issue only risk-free debt or risky equity. Firms can borrow and lend 
unlimited amounts at the risk-free rate. It is also assumed that there is no growth and 
every"firm has-perpetual cash flows with equaHime,values and firms can bedivided,in--
homogenous risk classes. 
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Modigliani and Miller (1958) put forward three propositions: (i) the value of the 
firm; (ii) the behaviour of the equity cost of capital; and (iii) the cut-off rate for new 
investment. Proposition I is well-known as Modigliani and Miller's irrelevancy 
proposition. It states that the market value of any firm is independent of its capital 
structure. This proposition is based on an arbitrage argument where individuals can 
borrow and lend on their own account or do or undo anything the firm can do on their 
own. This is commonly referred to as homemade leverage. It says that a firm's value is 
a constant regardless of the proportion of debt and equity. Therefore, the firm's WACC 
is independent of its capital structure. According to this proposition, W ACC is constant 
and changing the capital structure cannot affect the firm's value. 
Proposition II states that the rate of return required by shareholders (rE) nses 
linearly or positively as the firm's debt to equity ratio increases and that risk increases 
with leverage. Since WACC and r0 (return on debt or cost of financing with debt) are 
constant from Proposition I, there is different rE (return on equity or cost of financing 
with equity) for different mixes of capital structure. Although rE increases when 
borrowing increases, the increase in rE is also offset by the higher risk. Therefore, the 
attempt to substitute debt for equity fails to reduce WACC. This implies that W ACC is 
still constant even when firms change their capital structure as claimed in Proposition I; 
therefore, firms are not better off with debt or equity. Proposition III follows directly 
from Proposition I and Proposition II. It states that a firm will only undertake 
investments whose returns are at least equal to W ACC. The cut-off rate equals the 
capitalization rate. 22 
22 However, according to Peyser (1999), without perfectly competitive product markets and constant 
r.~tums .to §Cale,jt i§ not,appropriate)o,as~ull1e th'!L cut:offrate>~n<l,capitalizat!on.rate.,l!f.t:~equ.!ll ,~;.-.en f9J . 
an all-equity fum. Because most product markets are somewhat oligopolistic, proper calculation of the 
cut-off rate is important for determining the level of capacity that maximizes the wealth of shareholders. 
The capitalization rate is applicable to total expected cash flow while cut-off rate is applicable to marginal 
expected cash flow at the optimal level of investments. 
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Stiglitz (1974) argues that the theoretical importance of the irrelevancy theorem is 
greater than that of the assumptions that underlie it. Modigliani and Miller's (1958) 
propositions are extended to a multi-period model which produces the same irrelevant 
results. However, Stiglitz (1974) also raises some limitations ofModigliani and Miller's 
(1958) propositions that irrelevancy depends on the existence of risk class which seems 
to imply objective rather than subjective probability distribution over the possible 
outcomes. Moreover, Modigliani and Miller's (1958) model is based on partial 
equilibrium rather than the general equilibrium analysis. It also is not clear whether the 
theorem holds only for competitive markets or not and how the possibility of firm 
bankruptcy affects the validity of the theorem. 
However, there are several reasons to believe that the capital structure is related to 
the firm's value. Some argue that the restrictive perfect market assumptions do not hold 
in the real world which means firms' financing decisions matter. Once one or more of 
the fundamental assumptions are relaxed, capital structure may become relevant. 
Besides, there is extensive literature introducing market imperfections and they show 
that capital structure matters and an optimal capital structure does exist. Moreover, 
firms may find that there are restrictions to their access to external financing; therefore, 
firms' value may vary with changes in the mix of debt and equity. Brealey and Myers 
(2000) argue that market imperfections make personal borrowing costly, risky and 
inconvenient for some types of investors. This can create a natural clientele who will be 
willing to pay a premium for shares of levered firms. Therefore, firms should borrow to 
take advantage of the premium. Because it is reasonable to expect that an optimal 
capital structure exists, other capital structure theories have been introduced. 
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3.2.3 The Trade-Off Theory 
The trade-off theory determines an optimal capital structure by relaxing the 
perfect market assumptions such as taxes, financial distress and agency cost. It 
presumes that a firm has a target debt-to-equity ratio and gradually moves toward it.23 
An optimal capital structure is determined by a trade off between the costs and benefits 
of debt financing. 24 Costs of debt include agency costs of debt, bankruptcy costs, and 
loss of non-debt tax shields. Benefits of debt include signalling benefit and tax 
deductibility of interest payment. At an optimal capital structure, the benefits of the last 
dollar of debt will just offset the costs of debt. It is preferable to increase the use of debt 
financing until the costs of debt become large enough to offset the benefits of debt and 
the optimal debt ratio will be at the point that W ACC is minimised. If firms continue 
borrowing, the overall cost of capital will increase and the firm's value will decrease. 
Tax 
The first attempt to take account of corporate taxes was Modigliani and Miller's 
(1963) 'correction' paper. In this seminal paper, they show that the firm's value is not 
independent of capital structure due to the benefit of tax deductibility of interest 
payment at the corporate level. They propose that the firm's value could be increased by 
the use of debt because interest payments can be deducted from taxable corporate 
income while dividend and retained earnings are not. Therefore, the return to 
debtholders escapes taxation at the corporate level. The addition of debt should add a 
tax-shield value to the firm. There is an increasing linear function of debt usage if the 
only imperfection is corporate income tax. However, this does not mean that firms 
should use 100% of debt because there are other forms of financing such as internally 
generated funds that can be cheaper than debt personal taxes are taken into account. 
-"" - ~-
23 Marsh (1982); Auerbach (1985); Kjellman and Hansen (1995); Tauren ( 1999) 
24 The trade-off model makes a similar prediction about dividends as well. In term of dividends, a firm 
will maximize its value by choosing the dividend payout that equates the costs and benefits of dividends. 
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There are also other limitations imposed by lenders and other costs of debt such as 
bankruptcy costs, the costs of holding excessive debt and agency costs that can make 
100% debt unfavourable. A 100% debt-financed firm is in fact technically bankrupt. 
According to Myers (2001), there are also other reasons why firms should not be 
100% debt-financed. It is not completely correct to think of debt as a fixed and 
perpetual payment as assumed by Modigliani and Miller ( 1963 ). In reality, a firm's 
ability to carry debt varies over time as profit and firm value change. Investors cannot 
be sure about the size and duration of future interest tax shields. In addition, borrowing 
incurs other costs such as bankruptcy costs. Firms also have different marginal tax rates 
and they can use interest tax shields only if there is a future profit to shield, which no 
firm can be certain about. A sequence of bad years might take away the firm's taxable 
income which could reduce any benefit from the interest tax shields. Because the firm 
may not always be profitable, the average effective future tax rate is less than the 
statutory rate. There are other types of tax such as personal tax that can affect capital 
structure because investors have the ability to defer capital gains and then pay taxes at a 
lower capital gains rate. 
Robicheck and Myers (1966) hypothesize that, in the absence of taxes, the value 
of the firm will not change but will decrease with high level of debt and, in the presence 
of taxes, an optimal degree of debt exists. Mackie-Mason (1990) predicts that firms with 
low marginal tax rates would be more likely to issue equity when compared to firms 
with more profits who face the full statutory tax rate giving support to the trade-off 
theory that tax paying firms favour debt. However, this does not imply that debt 
increases firm value. Swoboda and Zechner (1995) suggest that firms in countries with 
higher corporate tax and inflation rates have a comparative advantage in issuing debt. 
Therefore; these firms should"have higherlevels·ofdebtthan firms in-countries with low 
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corporate tax and inflation rates because firms in high tax environments can deduct 
more interest expenses. 
However, some empirical evidence raises doubts as to the benefits of debt due to 
corporate tax deductibility. Miller's (1963) evidence suggests a ·relative stability in the 
capital structure of US firms from 1926 - 1956 while corporate tax rose from 1 0% to 
52% during this period. This evidence casts doubt on the relationship between capital 
structure and corporate tax. If an optimal capital structure is the balance between tax 
advantages and costs of debt, it is puzzling as to why there was so little change in that 
period. Other empirical evidence also shows that profitable firms borrow the least which 
contradicts the trade-off model in term of tax benefits. Fama and French ( 1998) find no 
evidence that interest tax shields contribute to the market value. In practice, there are 
many established and profitable firms with superior credit ratings who have low debt 
ratios such as Microsoft and the major Pharmaceutical firms in the US (Myers, 2001). 
Graham (2000) examines the interest rate spread between corporate bonds and 
tax-exempt bonds and shows that firms could have doubled their tax benefits (about 
7.5% on average) by taking on more debt.25 However, those firms continue using 
conservative debt levels. This can occur because interest deductions reduce taxable 
income which will decrease the possibility that firms will be fully taxable and this in 
turn reduces the tax benefit. However, Myers (2001) argues that the estimates from 
Graham (2000) are not definitive. It is uncertain who the relevant marginal investors 
are. However, in practice, there is still a significant tax incentive for the firm to use 
debt. If firms can absolutely use debt to shield tax, in equilibrium there should be no 
firms paying taxes at all. This implies that there are still other factors apart from taxes 
that can affect capital structure. 
25 Graham (2000) estimates that the tax benefit of interest deductibility equals 9.7% of market value while 
it should have been 13.2% under trade-off model. 
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Miller ( 1977) later introduces personal income taxes under a number of 
assumptions: (i) all investors are taxed at the same rate; (ii) the objective of the firm is 
to maximise its value; (iii) there is no capital gains tax and bankruptcy risk; and (iv) 
firms pay all of their earnings in dividends. Miller (1977) proposes equilibrium of 
aggregate supply and demand for corporate debt where the tax advantage of debt at the 
firm level is exactly offset by the tax disadvantage of debt at the personal level (income 
tax paid by marginal investor). There might be an equilibrium capital structure that 
applies to the corporate sector as a whole but there should be no such optimal capital 
structure for any single firm. This equilibrium would lead different firms to have 
different debt levels depending on their tax status. Tax-exempt investors do not pay any 
tax on interest; therefore, their personal tax is zero. As a result, investors in high tax 
brackets will hold equity while tax-exempt investors will hold corporate bonds. If firms 
want to issue more debt, it has to attract investors in high tax brackets by offering a 
higher return. This process will continue until equilibrium is reached which is where the 
marginal corporate tax benefit exactly offsets the marginal cost of issuing debt at higher 
returns. Therefore, Miller's (1977) irrelevancy theorem turns back to the irrelevancy 
propositions of Modigliani and Miller (1958) that a firm's value is independent of its 
capital structure but for a different reason. Myers (200 1) also agrees that there is no net 
gain when both corporate and personal taxes are considered. However, Miller's (1977) 
model predictions are possible only if the effective tax rate on equity income is 
substantially lower than on interest. It should be low enough to offset the corporate tax 
shield. Masulis (1980) introduces different personal taxes across investors, where debt 
interest income is taxed at a higher rate than capital gains income and argues that 
Modigliani and Miller's (1963) conclusion is no longer definitive. In this case, 
corporate tax deductions are at least partially offset by additional personal tax. 
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Graham and Harvey (200 1) survey capital structure and find little evidence that 
firms directly consider personal taxes when deciding on financing decisions. Swoboda 
and Zechner (1995) argue that if there is a marginal investor with a personal income tax 
rate equal to the corporate tax rate, firms will be indifferent between debt and equity. 
However, if personal tax rate is less than corporate tax rate, then all firms would choose 
maximum leverage. If personal tax rate is higher than corporate tax rate, firms will be 
better off with all equity. Graham (1999) also focuses on how personal tax affects 
financing decisions. The personal tax on interest income is higher than the tax on equity 
income because long-term capital gains are taxed at a rate below statutory personal tax 
rates. Taxes on capital gains can be deferred until the gain is realized and can be 
avoided if equity shares are held until death. Therefore, Graham ( 1999) shows that 
personal taxes discourage the use of debt. It is also found that, controlling for personal 
taxes, debt usage is positively and significantly correlated with tax rates for the period 
of 1980- 1994. Graham's (1999) evidence shows that personal tax penalty reduced but 
did not eliminate the tax incentive to use debt. This result offers evidence against 
Miller's (1977) irrelevancy theorem. 
Borrowing is not the only way for firms to shield income against tax. DeAngelo 
and Masulis (1980) extend Miller's (1977) work by incorporating non-debt tax shields 
(NDTS) such as depreciation, investment tax credits, R&D expenditures, oil 
depreciation allowances, pension funds and loss carry forward as substitutes for debt in 
corporate financial structures. NDTS leads to a greater chance of having no taxable 
income, a lower expected corporate tax rate and a lower expected payoff from interest 
tax shields. In other words, NDTS decreases the probability of utilising the interest tax 
shield. Firms with large NDTS effectively exhaust the firm's tax-saving capacity. The 
more NDTS advantage fi.rms have, the higher the chance· that firms· will not be, able to -
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realise all the advantages including interest tax shields. Therefore, firms with large 
NDTS should have less debt. 
DeAngelo and Masulis ( 1980) suggest that in the presence of NDTS, personal tax 
bias against net income diminishes but does not eliminate the net corporate tax benefit 
of interest payment. The importance of NDTS could overturn the irrelevancy theorem of 
Miller (1977) without taking bankruptcy, agency or any other related costs of debt into 
consideration. However, Bradley et al. (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988) find that 
leverage seems to be positively related to NDTS. This can happen because the assets 
which generate such NDTS could also be used as collateral for additional debt. Firms 
with high tangible assets should have higher levels of secured debt. Because debt can 
offer advantages from corporate tax and disadvantages from personal taxes and NDTS, 
firms should try to minimise the present value of all taxes paid on corporate income. 
Firms should also take into consideration not only corporate tax but also personal tax, 
other taxes and NDTS. 
Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Costs 
Financial distress is likely to occur when firms have difficulties in paying back 
their debt or when promises to creditors are broken. The probability of financial distress 
increases with additional borrowings and it can lead to bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is the 
legal mechanism that allows creditors to take over when there are too many declines in 
the value of assets. Corporate bankruptcy normally occurs when shareholders exercise 
their right to default which is important because shareholders have limited liability and 
can walk away and leave the trouble to creditors. When firms are in trouble, limited 
shareholder liability encourages managers/shareholders to pursue their self-interests by 
. investing in more risky projects, leaving the potential risks to the creditors. There are 
-- - ,. • • - • - - - • - -·- - • .__ - < 
two types of financial distress, direct costs and indirect costs. Direct costs can be seen as 
out-of-pocket cash expenses which are directly related to the filing and the action of 
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bankruptcy including fees for lawyers, investment bankers, administrative fees and the 
value of managerial time spent in the process of bankruptcy (Haugen and Senbet, 1978). 
Indirect costs are the expenses or losses that result from bankruptcy but are not the cash 
expenses on the process of bankruptcy. Indirect costs include sales that are lost during 
and after the bankruptcy process which can happen because of the fear of impaired 
service and loss of trust, diversion of management time during bankruptcy and loss of 
important employees after bankruptcy. Indirect costs are basically costs· that arise 
because people perceive firms to be financially troubled. 
Warner (1977) and Pham and Chow (1989) find that direct bankruptcy costs 
appear to have only small effects on firm value. Graham and Harvey (200 1) show that 
cost of financial distress is not important while Haugen and Sen bet ( 1978) argue that the 
only bankruptcy costs relevant to the determination of a firm's optimal capital structure 
are the direct administrative costs of bankruptcy. Altman (1984) and Pham and Chow 
(1989) report larger importance of bankruptcy costs when indirect bankruptcy costs are 
considered and conclude that bankruptcy costs can be sufficient to influence firms' 
behaviour. Several studies support the theory that the risk of bankruptcy affects capital 
structure.26 They suggest that bankruptcy costs discourage the use of debt and that the 
costs of expected bankruptcy against benefits of tax shield can define an optimal capital 
structure. If firms have high financial distress costs, they should not rely completely on 
debt. Therefore, according to the trade-off model, firms should trade-off between 
benefits of debt and the potential costs of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy cost related models 
can be used to predict the relationship between firm leverage and firm size, earnings 
volatility and profitability. Warner (1977) and Ang et al. (1982) provide evidence that 
large firms tend to be more diversified and are less prone to bankruptcy; therefore, they 
·snould"liav<:niighetlevels ofdebt Warner (1977) finds that a firm with high volatility of· 
26 Kraus and Litzenberger (1973); Scott (1977); Haugen and Senbet (1978); Ang et al. (1982) 
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earnings would have a high risk of bankruptcy; therefore, they tend to have less debt. 
Expected bankruptcy costs rise when profitability declines; therefore, less profitable 
firms should have lower leverage. 
Agency Costs 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the first to emphasize the role of financial 
contracts in creating and controlling agency problems. Their seminal work has been 
extended mainly by Fama (1990), Fama and Jensen (1983), and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), among others. Agency costs occur because the interest of managers is not 
aligned with the interest of security holders such as debtholders and shareholders. 
Shareholders are interested in high dividend ratios and high share prices; debtholders 
are interested in interest payments and debt repayment and managers are interested in 
remuneration. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define two types of conflicts or agency 
costs, conflicts between shareholders and managers (agency costs of equity) and 
conflicts between debtholders and shareholders (agency costs of debt). 
Agency costs of equity normally occur when managers hold less than 1 00% of the 
residual claim and are maximised when managers do not hold any share in firms. A 
conflict between managers and shareholders arises because it is always assumed that 
managers can misreport output or extract private benefits partly at the expense of new 
shareholders, because they bear only a fraction of these costs (Levy, 2000). Agency 
costs of equity include the monitoring expenses of the shareholders, the bonding 
expenses of managers and the money value of the reduction in welfare of the 
shareholders due to the differences between the interests of managers and shareholders. 
Agency problems will be more severe when the level of asymmetric information is high 
because managers haye t~e capacity and incentive to tra~sfer wealth between parties. It 
can be expected that agency costs will be higher for smaller firms because their 
managers are likely to put their own interest first, especially in the early years when 
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survival is crucial. When firms need external equity, agency cost of equity might not be 
severe for firms with strong investment opportunities because managers and 
shareholders' interests coincide. If firms do not have strong investment opportunities, 
equity can generate agency costs of managerial discretion which can be limited by using 
debt. 
Agency costs of equity can occur in different circumstances. First, if the firm 
issues equity, the manager's fractional interest in the firm decreases. This will increase 
the incentive or induce managers to act in their own economic self-interest and pursue 
greater non-pecuniary benefits or perk consumption such as corporate jets or plush 
offices because they can share the costs of their actions with the new shareholders. 
Managers can reduce the cost of engaging in perk activities by selling a fraction of the 
company and can benefit fully from the activities. Self-interested managers have an 
incentive to reduce debt to a level which is less than the optimal level. Second, agency 
costs of equity can arise because managers may prefer short-term projects which 
produce quick returns and enhance their reputation quickly rather than long-term, 
profitable projects. Alternatively, managers might prefer less risky investments and 
lower leverage to reduce the probability of bankruptcy. The conflicts can also arise in 
terms of employment termination. Managers might wish to minimise the likelihood of 
employment termination which is likely to increase when there are changes in corporate 
control. Managers might resist take-over regardless of the effect on shareholders' 
wealth. 
Third, conflicts might occur when managers and shareholders disagree over a 
firm's operating decisions. Managers might prefer continuing operations even if 
shareholders are better off with liquidation (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Fourth, conflict 
might occur when --riiariageis prefef to- invest all available funds when shareholders- -
might want the fund to be allocated as dividends instead (Stulz, 1990). However, in an 
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efficient market, investors are aware of these behaviours which will be reflected in share 
prices in order to take account of the monitoring costs of external shareholders. When a 
fraction of a firm is sold, there will normally be a decrease in share price. If the share 
prices decrease, it implies that even if a fraction of a firm is sold, managers still bear the 
full cost of the perk activities. Managers might prefer to finance the new projects with 
debt instead of equity to avoid the decrease in share price. 
There are several ways to reduce agency costs of equity. First, agency costs of 
equity can be reduced by mechanisms of monitoring and control which can come 
through an independent auditor. Investors can discourage perk activities by using 
independent directors and the threat of take-over (Myers, 2001) but these mechanisms 
are costly. Perfect monitoring is unlikely to happen. Second, the good design of 
compensation packages to managers can help to reduce the differences between the 
interests of managers and shareholders but there is no perfect compensation package 
because managers will never bear the full costs unless they also own the firm. There is 
no way to observe managers' performance perfectly. Third, firms can issue more debt 
and let debtholders act as the auditors of the company. 27 Firms can use debt to 
overcome agency costs because managers will have less free cash flow to spend in their 
own interests and debt forces managers to confront directly and to be monitored by the 
public and also allows managers to hold a larger fraction of shares which make 
managers' interest closer those of other shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). 
Managers will begin to pay a larger share of the costs associated with non-value 
maximisation; therefore, they will be less likely to waste the firm's wealth. Grossman 
and Hart (1982) also agree that debt can create an incentive for managers to work harder 
and make better investment decisions. 
27 However, debt can also generate its own agency costs. 
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In terms of cash flow, if a fraction of the firm is sold, the cash flow to firms will 
be divided and goes to both managers and shareholders. If firms choose to issue debt 
instead of equity, managers will receive the full cash flow. Normally managers tend to 
work harder if they are the owners of firms because they bear the full costs of their 
action and get the full benefit of that action. Harris and Raviv (1990) also stress the use 
of debt to mitigate agency costs of equity. Debt allows investors to generate information 
to be used for monitoring managers and implementing efficient operating decisions 
because debtholders can use their legal rights to force managers to provide information 
to outsiders. However, the optimal amount of debt will depend on the trade-off between 
the value of information and opportunities for disciplining managers and the probability 
of monitoring costs. Although debt can help to reduce agency costs of equity, it does 
come with costs. Similarly, dividend is another way to reduce agency costs of equity 
because managers have to pay out more of the firm's excess cash. Easterbrook (1984) 
also makes similar claims on dividends. Therefore, the model predicts that highly 
profitable firms with a lot of free cash flow will have higher levels of debt or dividends 
than less profitable firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Smith and Warner (1979) 
argue that managers can still be disciplined by the use of convertible debt. However, 
Graham and Harvey (200 1) find little evidence that firms use convertible debts to 
reduce the conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
Agency costs of debt arise due to the conflicts between debtholders and 
shareholders. They only arise when there is a risk of default. If debt is free of default, 
debtholders have no interest in the firm's income, value or risk. However, if there is a 
chance of default, shareholders can gain at the expenses of debtholders. In this case, 
managers are assumed to maximize the wealth of shareholders and act in their interest. 
Conflictsoccur because' once firms· increase-the ainourtt~of·debt, it is the debtholders 
who will take on increasing amounts of the firm's business and operating risk while 
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shareholders and managers control the firm's investment and operating decisions. 
Managers have the incentive to use several strategies which will increase shareholders' 
and their own wealth on the behalf of debtholders who will bear the costs of the actions. 
Agency costs of debt also include the opportunity costs caused by the impact of debt on 
the investment decisions, the monitoring and bond expenditures by debtholders and 
managers or shareholders, and the costs associated with bankruptcy. The agency costs 
of debt are maximised when all the external funds are obtained from debt. 
There are four different types of agency costs of debt (Smith and Warner, 1979; 
Eriksson and Hede, 1999). First, managers will have an incentive to undertake risky 
projects, called 'bait-and-switch' strategy or 'asset substitution'. Managers can pretend 
to borrow for the safe project but actually go for the risky one which will offer the same 
expected return, but in a recession the outcome is less than the loan principal. 
Debtholders who believe that the project is safe will offer low interest rates on the loan. 
In a recession, it is the shareholders who will default and the debtholders who will have 
to take control of the empty firm. Shareholders' loss is limited to the value of their 
equity holdings. In case of a boom with the risky project, the firm will be able to repay 
the debtholders and then gain from the excess project return. Debtholders share the costs 
of bankruptcy but do not share the additional expected returns. Because the firm will 
take on a high risk/return project with a low interest rate, managers have the incentive to 
undertake risky projects. The second form of agency cost of debt is called 'milking 
property'. Like the first form, once the proportion of debt in the firm increases, 
debtholders' portions in business and operating risk increase. However, in this case, 
managers have an incentive to transfer the wealth from debtholders to shareholders by 
paying out the borrowed money as dividends to shareholders. Therefore, after the firm 
defaults, there is no money left for the· debtholders'when they take control of the·~firm- . 
because all the money has already gone to shareholders. This strategy normally happens 
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when firms are in financial distress and managers try to milk out all the money to the 
shareholders. The overall value of the firm does not change but the market value of the 
existing debt decreases. 
The third form of agency cost of debt happens when firms underinvest.28 
Normally the firm will invest up to the point where the expected return is equal to 
WACC. However, underinvestment happens when firms are close to bankruptcy. The 
greater the risk of default, the greater the benefits to existing debt from additional 
investment. If firms go for positive net present value, they will gain as a whole. 
However, shareholders have the feeling that they have to contribute with all the 
financing but share the gain with bondholders. Managers perceive that benefit will be 
used to pay off existing debtholders. Therefore, although positive net present value 
projects will be accepted by unlevered or all-equity firms and levered firms, they tend to 
be rejected for the levered firm that is close to bankruptcy. Underinvestment can also be 
caused by something else. When debt is risky, debtholders can share in the profitable 
future investments returns which extract some of the net present value. This transfers 
wealth from shareholders to debtholders. This can cause the shareholders to reject good 
investment opportunities. Therefore, the agency cost of debt is the combination of the 
value of forgone opportunities and the costs of enforcing contractual provisions. 
Another form of agency cost of debt happens when firms undertake negative net 
present value projects. Unlike the underinvestment problem, when firms are about to go 
bankrupt, firms might accept negative net present value projects because shareholders 
have limited liability. When taking the negative net present value project, the 
shareholders are using debtholders' future money in case of bankruptcy. Shareholders 
and managers have nothing to lose in case of either successful or failed projects because 
· firtns 'are''about to go bankrupt' anyway. BuHfsuccessful; the firm wiH no longer go .. 
28 Myers (1977) calls this fonn of agency cost 'underinvestment' or 'debt overhang' problem. 
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bankrupt so managers and shareholders are better off taking a chance with negative net 
present value projects while debtholders are better off rejecting it. 
Another type of agency cost is called 'claim dilution' (Smith and Warner, 1979). 
It happens because bonds are normally issued with the assumption that firms will not 
carry any more leverage. The existing debt will fall in value if the new debt has higher 
priority. Even if the newly issued debt does not have higher priority, the existing debt's 
value will still fall if the risk of bankruptcy increases. Moreover, managers might 'play 
for time' by hiding the problems of firms from the creditors in order to prevent the 
creditors forcing firms into immediate bankruptcy or reorganization (Myers, 2001 ). This 
lengthens the effective maturity of debt and makes it riskier for debtholders. Therefore, 
it is debtholders who will suffer while shareholders and managers gain. However, 
debtholders are aware of the above behaviour of managers and shareholders when firms 
are close to bankruptcy. Therefore, they will charge those firms with higher interest rate 
on their loan in order to protect themselves. The closer firms are to bankruptcy, the 
higher the interest rate debtholders will charge. 
There are also several ways to reduce agency costs of debt. One effective way is 
for debtholders to write debt covenants which will constrain the ability of firms to 
engage in inappropriate projects or activities?9 However, it is a trade off because 
writing debt covenants can be costly to negotiate but might be worth while compared 
with high agency costs of debt. An alternative way to reduce agency costs of debt is to 
issue secured debt which will be collateralized by firms' tangible assets because if they 
go bankrupt, debtholders will get the salvage value of the tangible assets. This can 
explain the empirical results that firms with high tangible assets tend to have high levels 
of debt. Jensen and Meckling ( 1976) also point out that convertible securities could be 
-used to 'mitigate the risk"'shifting incentives.--- ,· 
29 Eriksson and Hede (1999) discuss more in details about debt covenants. 
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Another way to reduce costs of debt is to reduce the level of debt. Once the level 
of debt is decreased, agency costs of debt are reduced because the amount that managers 
can transfer from debtholders to shareholders will be decreased. Myers (1977) suggests 
the use of short-term debt to reduce agency costs of debt. The greater the proportion of 
growth assets in firms, the greater the agency costs of debt because it is easier to change 
the firm's market value and risk to benefit shareholders to the cost of debtholders. In 
order to minimise this conflict, firms with high growth opportunities should have higher 
leverage and use greater amounts of short-term debt than firms with low growth 
opportunities. This suggests that short-term debt ratios might be positively related to 
growth rates. However, Graham and Harvey (2001) find little support for the idea that 
short-term debt is used to mitigate agency costs. Diamond (1989) suggests that 
reputation could help mitigate this agency cost of debt. The incentives to transfer the 
wealth from debtholders to shareholders will be greatest for firms with a reputation for 
selecting risky debts. Managers have an incentive to preserve their reputation by 
selecting relatively safe projects instead of risky projects. This implies that older firms 
will maintain their reputations by choosing safe projects while younger firms normally 
have lesser reputations and may choose risky projects. Later, if young firms survive, 
they will tend to choose safe projects. The agency theory predicts that the value of firms 
is maximised when total agency costs of debt and agency costs of equity are minimised. 
Therefore, an optimal capital structure exists when the marginal agency costs of debt 
financing equal the marginal agency costs of equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Nevertheless, agency costs of equity might be insignificant because there are other types 
of pressures controlling managers' behaviour. Other studies suggest some mechanisms 
that can be used to control the behaviour of managers including the managerial labour 
market, capital market and markefforco-rporaie 'control (Slileifer and Vishriy, -19'86): 
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In conclusion, according to the trade-off theory, an optimal capital structure exists 
when the firm tries to balance between the costs of debt (agency cost of debt, 
bankruptcy costs, personal taxes and NDTS) and the benefits of debt (corporate tax 
savings, agency cost of equity). It suggests that target debt ratios may vary from firm to 
firm. Firms with safe, tangible assets and plenty of taxable income should have high 
debt while unprofitable firms with risky, intangible assets should rely more on equity. 
The trade-off theory can be used to explain some observed patterns of capital structure. 
Firms with extra heavy debt should issue equity, constrain dividends or sell off assets in 
order to raise cash to rebalance capital structure at the target level. Although the trade-
off theory is widely utilised in corporate finance, it has been criticised because it cannot 
adequately explain some of the observed patterns of capital structure such as the 
findings from most empirical studies that profitable and successful firms tend to have 
lower level of debt and give up interest tax shields. It cannot explain why leverage 
increasing event such as stock repurchases and debt-for-equity exchange offers are 
always associated with large positive abnormal returns while leverage decreasing events 
are associated with share price decreases. According to the trade-off model, these events 
should both net out to zero abnormal return because some firms will be below their 
optimal capital structure when they issue debt while others are above the optimal level. 
These patterns can be well explained by the pecking order theory. 
3.2.4 Free Cash Flow Theory 
Like agency theory, the free cash flow theory assumes that there are conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and debtholders implying that managers might not always 
maximise the value of the firm. Free cash flow in this case is defined as the cash flow in 
· excess of the amount required to- fuh.d"~an·positive ··net prese~rit 'value projeCts. Tlie 
objective of this theory is to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than to 
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invest it in negative net present value projects or to waste it on inefficient work. Jensen 
(1986) points out that debt and dividends help the firm to reduce free cash flow when 
firms' operating cash flows are significantly greater than the profitable projects. 
Managers will be disciplined since there is less cash available to spend on perk 
activities. Debt can also reduce the freedom of decisions because the firm is forced to 
pay interest at certain times. Managers cannot do whatever they want to satisfy 
themselves. Because there will always be the risk of bankruptcy and default such that 
the firm will not be able to pay interest or repay the principal in time, managers have to 
work harder and organise the firm more efficiently. Therefore, highly profitable firms 
with a lot of free cash flow should have higher level of debt or dividends than less 
profitable firms. However, Graham and Harvey (2001) theory find very little evidence 
that firms discipline managers in the way that free cash flow theory suggests. 
3.2.5 Signalling Model 
The signalling model is based on the presence of asymmetric information. It is 
assumed that managers have more information than outsiders, such as investors, 
because managers always have access to information about firms that outsiders do not 
have. The seminal contributor for the signalling model with relation to capital structure 
is Ross (1977). In this model, managers use costly signals to differentiate their firms 
from weaker firms. This model is based on the idea of well-informed managers who 
have an incentive to convey information to poorly-informed outside investors in order 
to drive up share prices. Because outsiders cannot directly observe corporate 
characteristics in enough detail to calculate the value of all marketable securities, firms 
can adopt some financing strategies to signal positive information to investors, such as a 
highly levered capital structure. Investors tend to assign high vaiuations to high quaHty 
firms which are highly levered because it is costly for weak firms to mimic this 
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financing behaviour due to higher marginal expected bankruptcy costs. Since the 
probability of bankruptcy for any given debt level is higher for low quality firms than 
for high quality firms, investors will take high levels of debt as a signal of higher 
quality. It is costly for low quality firms to have high levels of debt because managers 
will be penalised if firms go bankrupt and low quality firms normally do not have 
enough cash flow to back them up. For high quality firms, an increase in leverage 
conveys good news about the optimistic future of firms while a decrease in leverage 
conveys bad news. 
In Ross' (1977) model, it is assumed that managers do not hold shares in the firm 
and management compensation is determined by a contingent contract which is related 
to the firm's value. Ross (1977) suggests three main implications: (i) like Modigliani 
and Miller's (1958) irrelevancy theorem, WACC is independent of the firm's financing 
decisions despite each firm having its own unique level of debt; (ii) the level of 
bankruptcy risk increases when firms increase the use of debt; and (iii) the firm's value 
is positively related to leverage; therefore, high quality firms should issue more debt. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that ownership structure, such as the proportion of 
equity held by the owner-managers, can be a signal of firm quality. Therefore, the value 
of the firm increases with the share of the firm owned by managers. Their model is 
consistent to Ross' (1977) model because it predicts that firms with more debt (meaning 
higher concentrations of insider ownership) will be of higher quality. Stiglitz (1974) 
also suggests that changes in financial policy might be an important signal for the real 
prospects of the firm. The use of debt can be used as the costless signal of a firm's 
value. However, Heinkel (1982) uses a similar approach to Ross (1977) but assumes 
that managers own firms instead and argues that high quality firms should have low 
,levels of debt which is exactly opposite to what is fourid by Ross (f911) because (}fthe-
different assumptions. 
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Noe ( 1988) shows that average quality of firms financing with debt is higher than 
average quality of firms financing with equity. The advantage of debt arises because it 
can keep unprofitable or weaker firms out of the market and can be used as a barrier to 
entry of inferior firms, thus improving the average quality of firms in the market. This 
gives the benefit to the remaining firms because if the market is unable to discriminate 
between them, it would value all of them at the average value. Therefore, undervalued 
firms will prefer debt to underpriced equity while overvalued firms will prefer equity. 
Apart from the studies discussed above, Masulis (1980), Brennan and Kraus (1987), 
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) all develop signalling models in which firms can 
reveal their types by the financing decisions. 
However, the signalling model does not predict the actual behaviour of firms well 
enough as it cannot explain some observed patters of capital structure. For example, 
profitability is mainly found to be negatively related to leverage. But according to the 
signalling model, profitable firms should be positively related to leverage if they want 
to signal their quality. It predicts that industries with high growth options and other 
intangible assets should employ more debt than mature, high tangible asset industries 
because they have more severe information asymmetry problems and thus have greater 
need to signal to the market. Although the signalling model can explain why particular 
firms use some particular instruments such as debt as signals, it generally fails to show 
why one instrument is better than another or why one instrument should be chosen 
instead of another. Eriksson and Hede ( 1999) comment that although the signalling 
model can explain some of the observed patterns and how these structures are financed, 
it cannot help firms to predict an optimal capital structure. 
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3.2.6 The Pecking Order Theory 
The pecking order theory is also based on the presence of asymmetric 
information. It is assumed that managers know more about firms' prospects, risks and 
values than outsiders. However, it does not take account of the effect of taxes, 
bankruptcy costs and agency costs. This theory assumes that firms have preferences in 
choosing ways to finance their projects. There are two views in the literature about why 
firms prefer internal finance to external finance. One view is by Donaldson ( 1961) and 
another by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). Donaldson (1961) first 
introduces the notion that firms follow a pecking order of corporate financing choice. 
Managers prefer internally generated funds to external funds when financing positive 
net present value projects. When internally generated funds are not sufficient for the 
new project, managers will sell off part of the investment in marketable securities and 
will be unlikely to cut down dividends and rather go for external funds if the funds are 
still not enough, except in the extreme case of financial distress. Internal finance is 
preferred to external finance because firms want to avoid floatation costs which usually 
come with external funds. Debt is preferred to equity because the floatation costs of 
debt are usually less than those of equity. 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf(1984) expand Donaldson's (1961) idea and 
call it the pecking order theory. They disagree with Donaldson's (1961) view that firms 
prefer internal equity to debt because of floatation costs. They argue that the net benefits 
of debt in terms of tax shields and financial distress risks are likely to outweigh 
floatation costs. In this view, internal funds are preferable because firms want to 
maximise the wealth of existing shareholders. The predictions are the same as those 
from Donaldson (1961) that firms prefer internal finance to external finance. Dividend 
payout ratios do not change too ofteil. Thei-e' will rarelfb~riiirincrease· or decrdi:se -nl 
dividend in response to fluctuations in current profits. Dividends are sticky so that 
91 
dividend cuts are not used to finance new projects and so that changes in cash 
requirements are not soaked up in short-run dividend changes. If internally generated 
cash flow is more than capital investment, the surplus will be used to pay off debt rather 
than repurchasing and retiring equity. If external funds are required, firms will issue the 
safest securities first by beginning with debt followed by convertible bonds, preferred 
stock and lastly common stock. Thus, the amount of debt will reflect the firm's 
cumulative need for external funds. In the pecking order theory, there is no optimal 
capital structure. Debt level tends to increase when there is a deficit and decrease when 
there is a surplus. 
There are two main assumptions in Myers (1984) and Myers and Majlufs (1984) 
model. First, managers will act in the interest of old shareholders and the positive net 
present value project can be rejected if the new shareholders get most of the gain and 
old shareholders suffer the loss. Second, old shareholders are believed to be passive so 
that only new shareholders will purchase new issues. It is shown that firms might refuse 
to issue stock when the stock is mispriced by the market. The mispricing problem 
occurs because of the asymmetric information between managers and investors. 
Because investors do not know the true value of either the existing assets or the new 
investment opportunities, they cannot precisely value the securities. When there is 
asymmetric information, firms' equity may be underpriced. The sales of new shares 
might not be in the interests of existing shareholders because it usually comes with a 
decrease in the market price of the existing shares. 30 If a manager's objective is to 
maximise the wealth of old shareholders, the project might not be accepted because the 
new shareholders will obtain a higher capitalised cash flow from this investment than 
old shareholders unless the transfer from old to new shareholders is more than offset by 
the net present value of the new projects (Eriksson and Hede; .1999). The underpricing 
30 The evidence by Marsh (1982) is consistent with this suggestion. 
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problem can be solved by issuing securities that are not much affected by pricing from 
the market such as internally generated funds. Myers and Majluf (1984) point out that 
high quality firms can reduce the cost of information asymmetry by using external 
financing only if internally generated fund is not sufficient. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that debt is preferable to equity because an issue 
of a risk free debt will not have any impact on the value of existing shares. Even though 
debt is risky, the impact of its issue is still less than the impact from an issue of new 
shares because the priority of claims with debt will make the value of a new risky debt 
less sensitive to the release of new information than the value of new shares. Debt is 
also preferable to equity because of tax advantage and high transaction costs of outside 
sources, especially equity. Moreover, debt increases unwanted monitoring while equity 
increases both monitoring and control dilution (Kjellman and Hansen, 1995). The 
pecking order theory also stresses the importance of financial slack to avoid the need to 
for urgent and expensive external fundraising because without it firms will be forced to 
raise new shares at low valuations (issue undervalued shares). Or firms will be forced to 
borrow and pass up positive net present value investment opportunities. However, 
financial slack has a cost. Surplus cash tempts managers to overinvest, thus a high debt 
ratio can help. 
Miller and Rock ( 1985) also develop a model in which internal financing 
dominates external financing. However, unlike Myers and Majluf (1984), Miller and 
Rock (1985) make no distinction between different types of external funds because all 
external funds signal to the market that internal sources are insufficient for the projects. 
This implies that Miller and Rock (1985) model is neither the pure pecking order nor 
pure trade-off model (Kjellman and Hansen, 1995). Krasker (1986) extends the model 
-developed by Myers ·and Majltif{l984)'oy introduCing ·a more ge.nenilised modei. and 
allowing for different sizes of equity issue. Krasker ( 1986) argues that the larger the 
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stock issue, the worse the signal to investors leading to a fall in firms' share prices. The 
results are consistent with Myers and Majlufs (1984) model and share prices will be a 
decreasing function of the issue size. Narayanan (1988) agrees with the pecking order 
theory in considering information asymmetric with assets-in-place and allowing for the 
possibility of risky debt. The conclusions are that the firm will issue less risky securities 
before the risky ones. Internal finance is preferable to debt and debt is preferable to 
equity. It is better for firms to build up financial reserves (such as by restricting 
dividends) so that they can have enough capital to supply the project from internal 
sources. Therefore, Narayanan (1988) concludes that when there is asymmetric 
information, all firms either issue debt or reject the project. 
Baskin (1989) uses a simple OLS regression model to show that there is a positive 
relationship between past growth and debt and a negative relationship between past 
profitability and debt which give support to the pecking order hypothesis but contradicts 
the trade-off model. Pinegar and Wilbricht' s ( 1989) survey of US firms shows that 
managers of their sample are more likely to follow a financing hierarchy than to 
maintain a target debt-equity mix. Heinkel and Zechner (1990) extend the work of 
Narayanan (1988) by allowing firms to choose an optimal capital structure before 
investment decisions. They conclude that the use of debt or hybrid securities such as 
preferred stock tends to cause underinvestment problems implying that firms have an 
optimal capital structure which consists of a mixture of debt and equity. This contradicts 
the pecking order theory because in the pecking order theory firms do not have an 
optimal capital structure. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers ( 1999) attempt to compare the trade-off theory with the 
pecking order theory by fitting the two models to their sample. The evidence supports 
both'·theories but they find that the· p·ecking<·order theoty'has~·greater· exphmat6i'fp6Wef 
than the trade-off theory. They conclude that the pecking order theory explains more of 
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the variation of financing decisions of firms and the pecking order theory is the best 
explanation of the financing behaviour of firms in their sample. Chirinko and Singha 
(2000) disagree with Shyarn-Sunder and Myers (1999) and state that the test by Shyarn-
Sunder and Myers (1999) generate misleading inferences. It is suggested that alternative 
tests are required to identify the determinants of capital structure. Fama and French's 
(2002) results also confirm the predictions of the pecking order theory and contradict 
the trade-off theory. They show that short-term variation in investment and earnings is 
mostly absorbed by debt which is consistent with the prediction of the pecking order 
theory. 
The pecking order model can gtve an explanation of the observed patterns 
(Eriksson and Hede, 1999). First, the model can be used to explain why share prices 
might fall on the announcement of equity issue. It is sometimes found that leverage 
increasing events such as stock repurchases and debt-for-equity exchange offers are 
associated with large positive abnormal returns while leverage decreasing events are 
associated with share price decreases. The announcements of leverage increasing events 
suggest that corporate managers are confident enough of the firm's future earnings 
power that they can increase corporate debt levels without losing the firm's ability to 
fund its investment internally. Therefore, leverage-increasing events are taken positively 
by the stock market. Second, it can explain why firms are reluctant to issue equity. It is 
found that firms issue debt securities frequently while seasoned equity issues are rare. 
Third, the model can explain why firms build up financial slack by restricting dividend 
payments when there are few investment opportunities. It can also explain why the most 
profitable firms have the lowest level of debt which is exactly opposite to the 
predictions of the trade-off and signalling theories. 
Eriksson arid Hede (l999Y argi£ tliaftlie pe~cl(inrorder the.ory does riot provide· a 
formula for calculating an optimal capital structure. Myers (2001) comments that the 
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pecking order theory cannot explain why financing strategies are not developed to avoid 
the financing consequences of managers' superior information. Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) argue that the pecking order theory cannot provide a good explanation for why 
temporary fluctuations in the market to book ratio have a permanent impact on observed 
capital structure. Moreover, there are a number of studies that cast doubt on the pecking 
order theory. Brennan and Kraus (1987) contest the results presented by Myers and 
Majluf (1984) by arguing that Myers and Majlufs (1984) model only incorporates 
equity and riskless debt. They examine financial strategies such as the combination of 
an equity issue and a debt retirement which is believed to be able to resolve information 
asymmetry problems. They suggest that issuing equity is a negative signal but issuing 
equity and repurchasing debt with a portion of the issue can be a positive signal. This 
contradicts the pecking order prediction that equity is the last resort of financing. 
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) and Noe (1988) present similar arguments to 
Brennan and Kraus (1987) and conclude that firms do not necessarily issue debt straight 
over equity and the underinvestment problem can be resolved by using other types of 
financial options. They also contradict the prediction of the pecking order theory that 
equity is the financing last resort. 
Myers ( 1977) suggests that firms should not use debt to finance growth 
opportunity because debt might lead firms to pass up some positive net present value 
projects leading to underinvestment problems. This suggestion implies that firms with 
high growth opportunities will not follow the pecking order theory by issuing debt 
before equity. The suggestion by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) of NDTS might lead 
firms to prefer debt to internally generated funds. If firms have little NDTS that can be 
used as substitutes for debt, they may prefer to use debt before internally generated 
- -funds"in-'Otder·to ·gain the tax shield advantages· of debt~ ·viswanath"(1'993}show~nliat 
long-term strategic considerations may make a firm prefer external funding to internally 
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generated funds in the short term. Helwege and Liang (1996) disagree with the evidence 
that supports the pecking order theory for firms that were involved in IPO's during 
1984. Their finding yields little support to the pecking order theory and is more 
consistent with the idea of an optimal capital structure. There is the evidence that firms 
go for external financing even when there is a surplus. They also find that among firms 
that raise external funds, riskier firms are unlikely to issue equity while the pecking 
order theory predicts that as firms' risk increases, firms will move down the pecking 
order. This can be explained with the argument that if a firm can issue riskless debt, 
asymmetric information has no effect on the pricing of its debt. However, if firms can 
issue only risky debt, this is not advantageous compared to equity. 
The pecking order theory has some limitations when compared with the trade-off 
theory in its ability to explain how taxes and bankruptcy costs influence the capital 
structure of a firm. It also ignores agency problems. There is one main problem with the 
assumption in the case of the obligation for UK firms to issue new shares to existing 
shareholders through a rights issue. The rights issue discredits the pecking order model 
of Myers and Majluf (1984) because there will be no cost to the old shareholders if they 
are the investors who purchase the underpricing equity. According to the rights issue, 
there is no cost associated with equity even when asymmetric information exists. Like 
all theories of capital structure, the pecking order theory works better in some contexts 
than in others. 
3.2. 7 Managerial Behaviour Theory 
According to managerial behaviour theory, debt can be favourable and 
unfavourable at the same time. Firms might prefer to use debt rather than equity for 
several ~easons. Managers can adopt ex~ess debt in ~rder to inflate voting power (Stul£,. 
1988). High debt can also be used to reduce the possibility of take-over attempts by 
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signalling a commitment to sell assets or restructure (Berger et al., 1997). Capital 
structure can also be affected by the fear of dismissal of managers (Zwiebel, 1996). If 
wage rates for managers are positively related to firms' profit, they have an incentive to 
increase profit even when the decision is not to maximise the firms' value. Berkovitch 
et al. (2000) show that managerial compensation is positively correlated with leverage 
and expected cash flow. Managers of firms with risky debt outstanding are promised 
lower severance payments than managers of firms that do not have risky debt. 
Therefore, firms have to ensure that the levels of incentive to managers to pursue the 
goals of the firm are appropriate. 
Equity is sometimes preferable to debt. Zwiebel (1996) shows that high market 
valuations and good investment opportunities might allow managers to issue equity but 
also allow them to become entrenched and it is likely that they will resist raising debt 
which is sometimes necessary to rebalance the optimal level of capital structure. In this 
case, managers are not attempting to exploit new investors but instead exploit existing 
investors or shareholders by not rebalancing their capital structure. Managers may 
prefer to use less debt than an optimal capital structure because they want to reduce the 
firms' risk to protect their undiversified human or due to pressure from the commitment 
to dispose of large amounts of cash or to pursue their private objectives by controlling 
corporate resources rather than by paying interest (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Some 
firms might want to issue equity so that they can build empires (Jung et al., 1996). Debt 
can be less favoured than equity because when firms issue external equity, management 
and shareholder's interests coincide. Berger et al. (1997) find that managers prefer to 
use debt conservatively and they will only lever up after perceiving a threat to job 
security. 
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3.2.8 Market Timing Theory 
Market timing theory as developed by Baker and Wurgler (2002) refers to the 
practice of issuing firms' shares instead of debt when market value is high relative to 
book value and past market value (at high share prices) and repurchasing equity when 
market value is low (at low share prices). It is assumed that timing the market will 
benefit ongoing shareholders at the expense of entering and existing shareholders. 
Therefore, it can be implied that managers are more concerned about ongoing 
shareholders. There is also no optimal capital structure because it depends on the market 
valuations by investors. There are two versions of market timing theory (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002). The first version is based on the dynamic version of Myers and Majluf 
(1984) with rational managers and investors. Lucas and McDonald (1990) extend Myers 
and Majlufs (1984) theory by allowing a dynamic setting where managers with private 
information about the firm's value cannot issue debt and delay equity issues until their 
share price rises to or above its true value. This shows the influence of timing the 
market. Korajczyk et al. (1991) find that firms tend to announce equity after the 
information releases which are believed to reduce asymmetric information. Bayless and 
Chaplinsky (1996) argue that the window of opportunity in which capital can be raised 
at favourable terms results in observed periods of extreme equity issue as firms time 
their equity issues. Equity issues normally occur around the periods of smaller 
announcement effects. They show that in general the price reaction to equity issue 
announcements is less negative during the announcement periods. The second version 
of market timing theory involves irrational investors and mispricing. In this version, 
managers believe that investors are irrational; therefore, they are likely to issue equity 
when they believe that the shares are overvalued and repurchase equity or issue debt 
-\Vlien shines are undervalued.-n1erefore, capital structUre depends on the perception of 
m1spncmg. 
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In Baker and Wurgler (2002), market to book value ratio is a proxy for market 
valuation. Their main finding is that unlevered (levered) firms are those that raise funds 
when market valuations are high (low). They find persistent effects for at least a decade 
on capital structure because firms are likely to issue more equity than debt when their 
market valuations are high. They conclude that capital structure is the cumulative 
outcome of past attempts of managers to time the market. According to the survey by 
Graham and Harvey (2001), managers admit that they follow market timing theory. 
They find little evidence that executives are concerned about asymmetric information 
but find that two thirds of CFOs agree that the amount of undervalued or overvalued 
shares is important to consider in issuing equity. Equity market prices are also regarded 
as nearly the most important factors in issuing equity decisions. This survey gives 
support to market timing theory and it shows that managers believe that they can time 
the market. 
According to Myers (200 1 ), all capital structure theories gtve a general 
explanation of financing strategy and they are not designed to be general. Each of them 
can explain some observed capital structure patterns well but not others because they 
are conditional theories of capital structure. Therefore, sometimes it is possible that 
researchers can find statistically significant results that are consistent with more than 
one theory. However, it does not mean that one theory is better than another, because it 
depends on the circumstances. 
3.3 Benefits and Costs of Debt and Equity 
It is likely that firms do not follow any particular capital structure theories when 
they determine their capital structure because each theory has its flaws and they cannot 
be usecfto explain .the observed patterns completely. Therefore~. iris 'only fair tO't::xpect 
firms to follow a financing strategy that combines different capital structure theories 
100 
together. What can be concluded from the theories in the previous section is that debt 
and equity have their costs and benefits. Different theories use debt and equity to 
mitigate different problems in their own ways. Therefore, this section summarizes costs 
and benefits of debt and equity based on capital structure theories presented in the 
previous section. 
3.3.1 Benefits and Costs of Debt 
Debt offers many advantages for firms if they retain debt at the appropriate level. 
Based on agency theory, debt can be used to mitigate the agency costs of equity because 
it forces managers to confront and to be monitored by the public as well as allowing 
investors to generate useful information for implementing efficient operating decisions 
including liquidation (Easterbrook, 1984; Harris and Raviv, 1990; Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996). Outstanding debt effectively limits management's ability to reduce 
firm value through perquisite consumption and to solve the overinvestment problem 
because it reduces the amount of free cash flow so that firms cannot invest when they 
should not (Jensen, 1986; Grossman and Hart, 1982; Stulz, 1990). Debt can reduce the 
risk of managers investing in unrelated diversification strategies which do not create 
value for the firm. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that debt limits managers' ability to 
expropriate minority shareholders due to managers' reputation and career concerns. 
Debt can also be served as a device to discipline managers because the default allows 
creditors to force the firm into liquidation which will harm managers themselves. 
Managers have to be sure that the investments they make will earn at least enough 
return to cover interest payments. The costs of not doing so are bankruptcy and loss of 
their job. 
Higher debt allows managers to hold 'a latger· fraCtion of its common stock so-it 
brings managers' interests closer to those of other shareholders. Debt can be an 
1010· .· t 
. -· 
incentive for managers to work harder, make better investment decisions, restore 
investment efficiency, improve the firm-level operating performance and reduce overall 
investment expenses (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Brealey and Myers, 2000). Debt can be 
used to force managers to liquidate inefficient operations (Williamson, 1988; Harris and 
Raviv, 1990). According to tax-based model, debt has tax advantages so firms can use 
debt to reduce the negative valuation effects of operating in a high-tax environment 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Graham, 2000). Firms are allowed to deduct interest 
expenses from taxable income when borrowing money; therefore, their taxes reduce. 
However, if they issue equity, they are not allowed to deduct payments to equity such as 
dividends from their taxable income. Therefore, the amount of tax benefit depends on 
the tax rate and the interest payment. 
According to the signalling theory, the announcement of a new equity issue is 
usually bad news for investors who believe that it signals lower future profit or higher 
risk; therefore, in this case debt seems to be preferable. In the world of asymmetric 
information, the use of debt by profitable firms can keep the inferior firms out of the 
market even when the market is unable to distinguish firms of different quality. This can 
help to increase the average quality of firms remaining in the market (Ross, 1977; 
Narayanan, 1988). The elimination of inferior firms increases the overall average 
quality of firms remaining in the market. This benefits the remaining firms because if 
the market cannot distinguish firms, it will value all of them at the average value. In this 
case, debt can help to minimize the information advantages of the corporate managers. 
If investors are uncertain about the quality of managers and the efficiency of business 
strategy, debt can be used to generate information about these aspects (Harris and 
Raviv, 1990). Following managerial behaviour theory, managers might want to choose 
aeht 't() cre(iibly constrain' their own future" empire builoiiig:Eiifferiched managers -have -
to trade off between their empire building ambitions and the need to ensure sufficient 
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efficiency to prevent control challenges such as take-over through the threat of 
bankruptcy and the associated loss of managerial entrenchment (Zwiebel, 1996). 
Because of the threat of losing their job in the firm, debt prevents managers from 
adopting value-decreasing decisions (Jensen, 1986). In terms of claim, debt has a prior 
claim on assets and earnings while equity is the residual claim. 
Although debt seems to offer firms a lot of advantages, excess debt can be 
dangerous. According to agency theory, debt can increase the incentive for stockholders 
to make risky investments that shift wealth from debtholders but do not maximise the 
firm's value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Debt can facilitate expropriation by giving 
the controlling shareholders more control over firms' resources. Firms with heavy debt 
may have to pass up their value-increasing projects because they cannot pay back their 
debt which leads to underinvestment problems. High levels of debt can also be 
interpreted as financial constraints as high-levered firms might be constrained from 
pursuing valuable investments. As a result, high debt can influence the allocation of 
investment within a firm. Debt can lead to costly financial distress if firms cannot 
effectively manage their debt levels. When the level of debt increases, the risk of 
bankruptcy increases and at a certain point it will be higher than the benefits of debt 
which will cause depreciation to the firm's value. The excessive use of debt may 
endanger the survival of firms because too high a level of debt increases the risk of 
financial distress especially in periods of economic downturn. 
Transaction costs are another cost of debt. They can discourage the use of debt 
especially in financially distressed firms which restructure their debt out of court. Debt 
can be disadvantageous if present borrowing requires additional financing and the cost 
of it is uncertain. Based on the managerial behaviour theory, excess debt might be 
... costly -b~~aus~ it loses its ability to constrain managers fiorri 'l.lridertak.lng bad and risKy 
projects which can be called the asset substitution problem (Zwiebel, 1996). Debt also 
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reduces the freedom of decision making because firms have a commitment to pay 
interest at certain times. 
3.3.2 Benefits and Costs of Equity 
Although debt offers different kinds of advantages to firms, in some 
circumstances equity might be preferable. Equity financing plays an important role in 
reducing conflicts of interest between different stockholders in the firm. Equity 
financing might be able to mitigate the incentive problems caused by debt financing. 
Equity financing from stock markets can provide firms with liquidity and opportunities 
to diversify their portfolios (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996). Another 
advantage of funding from stock markets over debt financing is that stock trading has an 
important informational role. Equity markets aggregate information about the firm's 
prospects which will be observed publicly by potential investors and creditors. Investors 
will prefer to issue equity because equity markets facilitate the monitoring of firms by 
making it less costly for investors to monitor firms. 
Equity issues also come with some costs. The pecking order theory postulates that 
equity should be the financing source of last resort for several reasons. First, equity 
issues come with asymmetric information problems, floatation costs and transaction 
costs. So they are not the safest option to choose. Second, equity issues require 
additional disclosure of financial information. They can bring in unwanted monitoring 
and unwanted control dilutions to managers and existing shareholders. Third, 
mispricing problems are more severe with equity issues than debt issues. Equity can be 
interpreted as a signal to the market that the stocks are overvalued and it is expected that 
earnings might decline in the future; therefore, investors tend to discount share prices 
accordingly.·Announcement·of·new ·equity issues or ·debt''decreasing"'events'always 
appear to signal bad news and can lead to a decline in share price. Signalling theory also 
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suggests that debt issues can be perceived as firms being confident in repaying back 
their debt while equity issues signal the opposite. 
Because debt and equity can have both positive and negative effects on the firm's 
value, managers need to keep these in mind when they determine their debt-equity 
choice. The trade off between the positive and negative effects of debt and equity may 
lead to an optimal capital structure. 
3.4 Methodology, Hypotheses Development and Variable Identification 
3.4.1 Firm-Specific Determinants 
Previous studies such as Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that capital structure 
is cross-sectionally correlated with a number of factors. The analysis in this chapter is 
aimed to find out whether the relationships between leverage and factors, identified in 
previous studies, hold generally in the Asia Pacific region and across countries or not 
and whether the relationship holds in the same directions or not. Previous studies use 
different estimation techniques and find the results to be robust to the technique 
adopted.31 Therefore, in this chapter the cross-sectional regressions are estimated firstly 
by using the ordinary least square (OLS) regressions and the results are reported with 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. In order to assess the determinants of 
capital structure for the sample countries, individual firms' leverage ratios are modelled 
as a function of several firm-specific factors in a cross-sectional framework. 
31 Rajan· and Ziligales (1995) estimate their regressions using- maximum likelihood; a., censored TobiL 
model and OLS. They argue that their OLS results are very similar to the results using alternative 
techniques. Bevan and Danbolt (2002) perform both censored Tobit analysis and OLS estimation and also 
find that the results are extremely robust to the estimation technique adopted. Pandey (200 I) applies 
pooled time-series and cross-sectional OLS, cross-sectional OLS, and fixed effects model and concludes 
that with some differences the results are generally robust to the estimation methods and the time periods. 
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The following relationship is estimated using OLS for each country32: 
N 
Y;,l = ao +I rkF~,i,l-a + 8i,l 
k=l 
(3, 1) 
where, i refers to the individual firms, Y;, 1 is firm's i leverage ratio at time t, 
measured at the accounting year-end; FFk,i,t-a is a vector of k firm i's specific factors, 
averaged over the previous a years to reflect the medium to long term nature of the 
decision. For the full sample period, the average of eight-year data of independent 
variables from 1993 to 2000 is used against dependent variables at 2001. The average of 
the data for each variable is used in order to smooth the independent variables to reduce 
the measurement error caused by random fluctuation or noise over the period in the 
variables and to account for slow adjustments.33 Because there tends to be the potential 
for reverse causality between independent and dependent variables in cross-sectional 
analysis and normally the financing decisions made in this period is the carry over from 
the previous period decision, the independent variables are lagged one period in order to 
isolate the analysis from this causality and to provide a more robust test of the theory.34 
In addition to the cross-sectional analysis, all firms in the sample countries over 
the sample period are pooled creating one unbalanced panel dataset for the purpose of 
pooled time-series and cross-sectional analysis. There are several advantages that make 
panel data analysis more suitable to this line of financial research than cross-sectional 
analysis.35 First, the panel data set should be utilized in this study because it captures the 
dynamic of financing decisions of firms. The role, nature and strength of the factors that 
32 The empirical version of equation (3 .1) controls for industry effects; however, no statistically 
significant effect was found. 
33 Bradley et al. (1984) use 20year average; Bennett and Donelly (1993); Rajan and Zingales (1995) and ---
Pandey (2001) use 4 year average; Chkir and Cosset (2001) use 5 year average; Titman and Wessels 
( 1988), Hirota ( 1999), Bevan and Dan bolt (2002) use 3 year average. 
34 The one period Jagged independent variables are also adopted in Raj an and Zingales ( 1995), Pandey 
(2001) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002) among other papers. 
35 Hsiao (1986) and Baltagi ( 1995) 
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influence firms' financing decision change over time. Therefore, a cross-sectional 
analysis may not be sufficient in the dynamic analysis of the determinants of the 
financial structure. Second, multicollinearity is one of the major problems with the 
analysis that employ financial data because financial data are expected to be correlated 
to each other by nature. Due to a larger number of data points, panel data allow an 
increase in the degrees of freedom and reduce the collinearity among explanatory 
variables. Thus, the efficiency of econometric estimates is improved. Third, panel data 
allows the investigation of problems that cannot be addressed by either cross-section or 
time-series datasets because it exploits time-series variation in the observations. Fourth, 
panel data allows us to consider a firm-specific time-invariant effect. This technique 
enables us to eliminate the potential biases in the resulting estimates due to correlation 
between unobservable individual effects and the explanatory variables. Fifth, they allow 
us to control for individual heterogeneity that characterizes firms. The estimation results 
could be biased in time-series or cross-section studies because they do not control for 
heterogeneity. Finally, they provide a means of reducing the missing value problem. 
Therefore, individual firm's capital structure is modelled as a function of several firm-
specific factors in a pooled cross-sectional and time-series framework. More 
specifically, the following relationship is estimated using OLS for each country36: 
N 
~.1 = ao +I rkF~,i,l +at + Jli,l 
k=l 
(3.2) 
where, Y;, 1 is firm's i leverage ratio at timet, measured at the accounting year-end; 
FFk,;, 1 is a vector of k firm i's specific factors. a1 captures firm-invariant time-specific 
effects. a1 is the same for all firms at a given point in time but varies through time. a1 1s 
needed to control for both observable and unobservable aggregate effects. 
36 All model specifications include year and industry dummies, but their coefficients are not reported. 
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Because each sample country was affected by the financial crisis to different 
degrees, the pooled time-series and cross-sectional analysis is further investigated by 
dividing the sample into two country groupings: (i) the countries least affected by the 
crisis, namely Singapore and Australia; and (ii) the countries most affected by the crisis, 
namely Thailand and Malaysia. This country grouping not only takes account of the 
severity of the effect from the crisis but also of market development in each country. 
The markets in the countries least affected by the crisis are more developed than the 
markets in countries most affected by the crisis. 
As stated earlier, one of the main objectives of this chapter is to investigate the 
possible effect of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis on the determinants of capital 
structure. In order to achieve this, equation (3 .1) is further estimated over two sub-
samples in cross-sectional framework: (i) a pre-crisis period, where the dependent 
variable is the leverage ratio of 1996 and the explanatory variables are the average of 
the data over 1993 to 1995 and (ii) a post-crisis period, where the dependent variable is 
the leverage ratio of 2001 and the explanatory variables are the average of data over 
1998 to 2000. Since this crisis started in mid 1997, the data of this year are excluded in 
the sub-sample analysis.37 Similarly, in pooled time-series and cross-sectional 
framework, equation (3.2) is re-estimated over two sub-samples where the pre-crisis 
period covers 1993 to 1996 and the post-crisis period covers 1998 to 2001. Wald-
statistics are estimated to examine whether there have been any significant changes in 
the role of the explanatory variables due to the financial crisis. 
Previous papers have uncovered several firm-specific factors that can be 
correlated with firm leverage. 38 The consensus from previous papers is that firm 
leverage is positively correlated with tangibility, non-debt tax shields, investment 
37 Gul (1999) also excludes the period of crash in order to evaluate the impact of the crash. 
38 The main literature can be found in Harris and Raviv (1991) and Prasad et al. (2003). 
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research and development expenditure, the probability of bankruptcy and uniqueness of 
product (Harris and Raviv, 1990). The choice of factors and the hypothesis formulation 
are motivated by theoretical and empirical concerns. Therefore, the vector of firm-
specific variables incorporates tangibility, profitability, firm size, growth opportunity, 
non-debt tax shields, liquidity, earnings volatility and share price performance. 39 Their 
expected relationships with firm leverage are presented as followed. 
Leverage 
Due to the availability of data and the consistency across sample countries, 
leverage (LEV), the main dependent variable, is measured as the ratio of total debt to 
total capital where total capital is the combination of total debt, market value of equity 
and book value of preference shares.40 Several studies, including Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002), show that the determinants of capital structure 
are sensitive to the measure of leverage. Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that there are 
difficulties involved in measuring both leverage and the explanatory variables which 
one should be aware of when the results are interpreted. Bevan and Danbolt (2002) also 
confirm, by using more recent data than that of Rajan and Zingales (1995), that there is 
a high degree of definitional dependence in the determinants of leverage. In addition to 
different leverage measures, choice of value of debt or equity can play an important role 
for the determinants of capital structure. The value of equity and debt can be one of the 
factors that make the capital structure decision from one firm differ from another one. 
Levels of optimal leverage can vary depending on whether book or market value is 
used. Although there are different views on the use of book or market value of equity 
and debt, most studies tend to use both book and market value of equity and book value 
of debt fo_r ease. In this chapter, leverage ~atio based on market value of equity will be 
39 Other topics such as ownership structure, which has been found to have a direct relationship with 
capital structure, are not covered because data is not available for our sample countries and because it is 
the subject of a substantial literature in its own right. 
40 This measure is among one of leverage measures in Raj an and Zingales (1995). 
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used because it gtves more theoretically consistent results in line with 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Suto (2003) among others. 
Tangibility 
Tangibility (TANG) is defined as the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets. The 
type of assets held in a firm plays a significant role in determining the firm's capital 
structure. Tangibility can be negatively related to leverage due to several considerations. 
Agency costs of equity increase for firms that have low levels of collaterizable assets 
(Grossman and Hart, 1982) because the monitoring costs of shareholders of firms with 
fewer collaterizable assets will be higher than the costs of firms that have more 
collaterizable assets. Therefore, a firm with limited tangible assets should have high 
debt to reduce the agency costs of equity because debt allows the firm to be more 
stringently monitored by creditors such as bondholders and financial intermediaries. 
High-tangible-asset firms tend to have high fixed operating costs which raise operating 
risk and probability of bankruptcy (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Pandey, 2001), so they 
should have low leverage. Gallego and Loayza (2000) also support a negative 
relationship and show that a rise in asset tangibility appears to shift the financial 
structure of the firm toward higher equity and lower debt in Chile. The pecking order 
theory also predicts negative influence of tangibility on firm leverage. 
According to agency based theory, firms with high leverage tend to underinvest 
and thus transfer wealth away from debtholders to shareholders. If debt can be secured 
against assets, firms as borrowers are restricted to using the loan for specific projects 
and creditors have guarantees of repayment depending on the value of the assets. 41 
Lenders may themselves demand security in terms of tangible assets from firms with 
high leverage.42 Firms that are unable to provide collateral for loans with tangible assets 
. ' '~ --. . - - . ,- ' . . -· -
will have to pay higher interest which is an incentive for those firms to issue equity 
41 Jensen and Meckling ( 1976); Myers (1977); Titman and Wessels (1988) 
42 Scott (1977); Williamson (1988); Harris and Raviv ( 1990) 
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instead of debt. Assets that serve as collateral provide a guarantee over debts and reduce 
the risk of investment from the banks. Therefore, tangible assets have a positive 
relationship with leverage because they can serve as collateral which leads to higher 
debt capacity and helps to reduce the risk of agency costs of debt of the lenders (such as 
risk shifting). However, the extent of the relationship between tangibility and firm 
leverage seems to depend on the relationship between firms and lenders as well. When 
firms have close relationships with lenders, they can provide less collateral relative to 
firms with more distant relationships because of the substitution between relationship 
and physical collaterals. 
Myers ( 1977) argues that shareholders see firms' value from the future earnings 
from investment but debtholders cannot rely on these investments and tend to see firms' 
value in terms of tangible assets instead. The more tangible assets firms have, the more 
willing the lenders to lend to them. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that secured debt 
could be advantageous. Their model demonstrates that there might be costs associated 
with issuing securities when there is asymmetric information which can be avoided by 
issuing debt with the secured tangible assets. Michaelas et al. (1999) focus on small 
firms and provide evidence in support of a positive relationship. Since small firms tend 
to have higher agency and asymmetric information problems, they need high levels of 
tangible assets in order to provide collateral as security for bank loans. According to 
Antoniou et al. (2002), intangible assets are more difficult to monitor; therefore, lenders 
can require greater restrictions on firms with relatively more intangible assets. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that the liquidation value of the firm's assets 
would be higher with tangible assets. This will decrease the probability of mispricing in 
the event of bankruptcy which makes lenders more willing to supply the loans. Eriksson 
and Hede c 1999) argue that firms with tangible asset structures experience a 'lower · 
business risk and therefore lower financial distress costs. Hirota (1999) also argues that 
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the costs of financial distress depend on the types of assets firms hold. If firms have 
high levels of tangible assets, they tend to have smaller costs of financial distress than 
firms with intangible assets such as R&D or advertising expenses. This is because 
tangible assets have higher resale values than intangible assets and the value of 
intangible assets will disappear in financial distress. Therefore, firms with high tangible 
assets tend to have high levels of debt. It is likely that in the case of bankruptcy, 
intangible assets such as goodwill will rapidly disappear which diminishes the firm's 
net value and in the end will accelerate the probability of bankruptcy. Firms with high 
levels of tangible assets can borrow at lower interest rates (Scott, 1977; Williamson, 
1988). These encourage those firms to use more debt. Therefore, a positive relationship 
between tangibility of assets and leverage is expected. 
Profitability 
Profitability (PROF) is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest, tax and 
depreciation to total assets. Although different capital structure theories predict different 
correlations between profitability and firm leverage, profitability is always found to 
play an important role in firms' financial structure decisions. The pecking order theory 
postulates that managers prefer to finance projects with internal rather than external 
funds because of the asymmetric information between managers and outside investors. 
Donaldson (1961) argues that as a result of transaction costs, firms will prefer to use 
internally generated funds from retained earnings first, then from debt and finally from 
issuing equity. Profitability can be expected to be negatively related to firm leverage 
because firms might prefer not to raise external equity in order to avoid the dilution of 
their ownership structure. This can be more obvious for firms with highly concentrated 
ownership structure, such as family businesses. In terms of bankruptcy costs, high 
' '.,. -. . . . . - _,_ . 
profitability is associated with high risk; thus, profitability should be negatively related 
to leverage. Kjellman and Hansen (1995) and Myers (200 1) argue that highly profitable 
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firms are in less danger of bankruptcy and can have high level of debt without risking 
financial distress. Therefore, the relationship between firm leverage and profitability 
should be positive. 
Due to tax deductibility benefit, firms with high profits should use more debt to 
obtain attractive tax shields because they have high incomes to shield and need greater 
tax shelters. But interest tax shields might not be important if the profitable firms have 
high levels of other tax shields such as depreciation. Jensen (1986) argues that the 
relationship can be positive if the market for corporate control is effective in forcing 
firms to commit to pay out cash by using more debt because managers cannot avoid the 
disciplinary role of debt and lenders should be more willing to lend to profitable firms. 
If the control is ineffective, opposite signs will be expected because firms will still 
avoid the disciplinary role of debt. The disciplinary role of debt can be explained using 
the free cash flow theory. The interests of managers are not always in alignment with 
the interests of security holders. Managers are likely to waste free cash flow, which is 
the excess of cash earnings over profitable investments, on perquisites and bad 
investments. Debt can help reduce the agency cost of free cash flow because it can 
ensure that managers are disciplined to make efficient decisions and do not pursue their 
own interests. 
Ross (1977) argues from the signalling theory that if current profits are a good 
indication of future profits, firms should use debt as a signal to the market which 
predicts a positive relationship between profitability and leverage. Or, if there is 
asymmetric information, profitable firms may signal quality by raising debt. According 
to Heinkel (1982), high value firms issue more debt. In order to imitate high value 
firms, a lower value firm must issue more underpriced debt and reduce the amount of 
oveq)riced equity. Similarly, in ordero to Imitate the low value firms, high value firms-
should issue less overpriced debt and more underpriced equity. The market should be 
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reluctant to offer funding to those firms who are currently unprofitable (Prasad et al., 
2003). 
Because both negative and positive influences of profitability and firm leverage 
are supported by theoretical and empirical evidence, the controversy as to which capital 
structure theories firms follow still remains unresolved. Based on the results found by 
the majority of empirical studies, an inverse relationship between profitability and 
leverage is expected. 
Firm Size 
Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural log of total assets. Firm size is found 
to play an important part in firms' financial policies because there are economies of 
scale in issuing securities. Larger firms may have more access to financial markets. 
According to the pecking order theory, firm size should be negatively related to 
leverage if it is a proxy for information because there is less asymmetric information 
between insiders and the capital markets for large firms which leads to less incentive to 
raise debt. Large firms should have more capacity for issuing informationally sensitive 
securities such as equity and therefore should have low levels of debt. Titman and 
Wessels (1988) suggest that the cost of issuing equity and debt is related to firm size. 
Costs of issuing equity are greater for smaller firms. Marsh (1982) also argues that 
small firms, due to their limited access to the equity capital market, tend to rely heavily 
on bank loans; therefore, they become more levered than larger firms. Titman and 
Wessels (1988) and Ooi (1999) also argue that accessibility to the equity market and 
economies of scales with respect to issuing costs can influence the firm's debt equity 
choice. 
According to the trade-off theory, in terms of financial distress, firm size should 
be positively related to debt. Bankruptcy codes play an important role in determining 
the choice of capital structure because lower expected bankruptcy costs enable firms to 
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take up more debt. Warner (1977) and Ang et al. (1982) show that bankruptcy costs are 
found to be relatively smaller for larger firms than for smaller firms. There are 
economies of scale associated with bankruptcy. Firm size is expected to be negatively 
related to expected bankruptcy costs and risk. Thus, the expected relationship between 
firm size and leverage is positive. Previous studies also show that larger firms tend to be 
more diversified so they have lower financial distress costs because the diversified 
activities can reduce the risk ofbankruptcy.43 Large firms normally fail less and are less 
likely to be liquidated because large firms' bankruptcy could have a destabilizing effect 
on the whole economic system and could be socially unacceptable (Colombo, 2001). 
Smaller firms tend to have lower leverage because smaller firms are more likely to be 
liquidated when they are in financial distress. 
Colombo (200 1) also suggests that firm size is related to political measures in 
determining the level of capital structure. As big firms are politically protected by 
concern about their employment level, they can have higher levels of debt with lower 
bankruptcy costs than smaller firms. Based on agency theory, the conflicts between 
shareholders and debtholders (agency costs of debt) may be severe for smaller firms 
(Michaelas et al., 1999; Smith and Warner, 1979). Debt capacity tends to be higher and 
the monitoring costs should be smaller for large firms because they tend to provide 
more information to lenders. In addition, smaller firms are expected to be less 
profitable; therefore, they tend to have less taxable income and less need for tax shields. 
Smaller firms tend to face lower marginal tax rates and expect to have lower profit than 
larger firms; therefore, they need less interest deductible tax shields and should use less 
debt. In addition, cash flow of large firms is less volatile which increases the probability 
that the firm can use tax shields from interest payment (Hovakimian et al., 2001 ). 
43 Rajan and Zingales (1995); Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); Gul (1999); Ozkan (2001) 
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Furthermore, small firms tend to earn higher risk-adjusted returns meaning they have 
higher systematic risk; therefore, they should have less debt. 
Other empirical studies (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Graham, 2000) also show that 
large firms have less restrictions and greater opportunities for accessing credit markets 
such as non-bank debt financing due to higher credit rating and pay lower interest rates 
as well as having lower informational costs. The easier accessibility to capital markets 
for larger firms provides greater flexibility to large firms to raise funds on short notice 
compared with smaller firms. Antoniou et al. (2002) argue that larger firms have lower 
information asymmetry; therefore, they tend to have easier access to debt markets and to 
be able to borrow at lower cost. Besides, small firms tend to use more equity than debt 
because they do not enter into contracts that are publicly visible and some small firms 
do not have audited financial statements so they cannot convey their quality to outsiders 
by raising debt (Berger and Udell, 1998). However, Barclay et al. (1995) show that the 
relationship between firm size and firm leverage is sensitive to the chosen method of 
estimation. Because the previous evidence appears stronger in support of the argument 
postulated by the trade-off theory, firm size is expected to have a positive effect on 
leverage. 
Growth Opportunity 
Growth opportunity (GROW) is measured by market to book ratio which is the 
book value of total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of total assets. This proxy is normally used as the proxy for 
growth or investment opportunity because the market to book ratio measures the 
expectation from the market on the value of growth and investment opportunity of 
firms. Barclay and Smith (1999) find that market to book ratios produce similar results 
- .- -- - - :. :• ~ . - - ---
to those obtained with other proxies for growth opportunities. If the market believes that 
there is a high possibility of the firm achieving a positive net present value, the market 
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will value the firm higher which leads to an increase in market to book ratio. In theory, 
the relationship between leverage and growth opportunity is expected to be negative. 
Due to asymmetric information, firms with high growth opportunity should have less 
debt to reduce underinvestment problems because highly levered firms are more likely 
to pass up profitable investment opportunities.44 According to financial distress cost, 
firms might not want to commit themselves to debt because growth opportunities, which 
are largely intangible, cannot provide revenue immediately. Growth opportunities as 
intangible assets provide limited collateral or liquidation value to the firm leading to 
higher financial distress costs. Intangible assets are likely to be lost if financial distress 
takes place. Firms with high growth or high market to book values tend to have higher 
costs of financial distress which can force firms to reduce the level of debt (Raj an and 
Zingales, 1995; Hirota, 1999). 
Based on agency costs, empirical studies show that firms with high growth 
opportunities tend to have higher agency costs of debt because they have more 
flexibility in their choice of investments creating an incentive to invest suboptimally or 
they may accept risky projects which will expropriate wealth from bondholders to 
shareholders (Myers, 1977). Because agency costs of debt are high, firms with high 
growth opportunities will be reluctant to issue debt. It is also possible that the 
relationship between market-to-book ratio and firm leverage can come from perceived 
mispricing. Market timing theory predicts that firms attempt to time the market by 
issuing equity when their share price is perceived to be high.45 For example, firms tend 
to issue equity only when their share prices are high relative to book value (Korajczk et 
al., 1991; Raj an and Zingales, 1995). High growth firms should have less debt. The free 
cash flow theory also predicts a negative relationship. Because firms with high 
44 Jensen and Meckling ( 1976); Myers ( 1977); Stulz ( 1990) 
45 If the negative relationship between market-to-book ratio and firm leverage is caused by the attempt of 
firms to time the market, the relationship should be found to be temporary only because firms will change 
to lever up instead once book value is higher relative to market value. 
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investments relative to earnings have less need to use debt to discipline managers from 
using the excess earnings for their own interest, they can have low leverage. 
The relationship between growth opportunities and firm leverage also depends on 
the relationship between firms and lenders (Antoniou et al. 2002). The closer 
relationship between lenders and firms indicates less information asymmetry which can 
lead to higher debt capacity. However, if firms do not have close relationships with 
lenders, lenders are not likely to be fully informed about the quality and possibility of 
positive net present value investment. Therefore, lenders can require higher risk 
premiums which will convince firms to use less debt. As a consequence, a negative 
relationship between growth opportunity and firm leverage should be stronger in firms 
with arms-length relationships with their lenders than in firms with closer relationships. 
Firms with historically high growth may not require external funds because they have 
enough internal funds for the new projects. 
However, a positive relationship between firm leverage and growth opportunity is 
possible. Miguel and Pindado (200 1) argue that firms with high growth opportunities 
might have higher debt capacity because growth opportunity can guarantee to lenders 
that they will fulfil their financial obligations. Moreover, if investment exceeds retained 
earnings, a positive relationship between growth opportunities and leverage is expected 
b~sed on the pecking order theory. Thies and Klock (1992) and Michaelas et al. (1999) 
argue that fast growing firms are likely to have insufficient internally generated funds to 
finance all of their growth opportunities. However, they are reluctant to issue equity due 
to asymmetric information problems and high floatation costs; therefore, high growth 
firms tend to issue more debt. 
In sum, the influence of growth opportunity on firm leverage is mixed. This 
suggests that the overall direction. is still.h6t established. The confliCting relatiorfship 
might be due to the fact that the measure for growth opportunity picks up the positive 
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relationship between firm leverage and tangibility instead (Prasad et al., 2003). The 
reason tangibility and growth opportunity has an indirect relationship in this way is that 
firms borrow against fixed assets when they are required to meet an increase in sales 
that can help increase growth. However, if tangibility is controlled, the relationship 
between growth opportunity and debt should be clearer. Because the evidence for a 
negative relationship is stronger in the literature, an inverse relationship between growth 
opportunity and leverage is expected. 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) is defined as the ratio of depreciation to total assets. 
Firms can use NDTS such as depreciation, investment tax credit and tax credit for 
pension funds to reduce corporate tax payments (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). 
Therefore, firms that have higher NDTS are likely to use less debt because NDTS can 
be the substitute for debt. The greater the level of NDTS, the lower the tax benefit of 
additional debt. Most empirical studies also show support to the negative relationship 
between NDTS and debt. Miguel and Pindado (200 1) show that NDTS has a higher 
explanatory power for Spanish firms than US firms due to the fact that Spanish firms 
have more NDTS than US firms. MacKie-Mason (1990) argues that the substitute effect 
between NDTS and interest deductibility might not be the same for every firm. For 
example, firms with high profitability with high taxable income can have high NDTS 
and high levels of debt at the same time. Firms that face tax exhaustion are likely to 
issue less debt because the associated interest deduction is cancelled out by NDTS. 
Therefore, the negative relationship between NDTS and leverage should be stronger for 
firms with the experience of tax exhaustion. 
A positive relationship between NDTS and leve~age is possible because firm~ ,can 
borrow at low interest rates if their debts can be secured with tangible assets and firms 
may have higher debt capacity if they have high levels of tangible assets. Scott (1977) 
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suggests that firms with substantial NDTS invariably have considerable collateral assets 
which can be used to secure debt; therefore, firms can borrow at lower interest rates. 
Bradley et al. (1984) suggest that firms with high levels of tangible assets can generate 
high levels of depreciation and tax credits and tend to have higher levels of debt. NDTS 
is the instrumental variable for the securability of the firm's assets. That means more 
securable assets come with high NDTS and lead to higher levels of debt. On the other 
hand, some empirical work, such as Titman and Wessels (1988), shows that NDTS has 
no relationship with leverage. The correlation between NDTS and firm leverage seems 
to be mixed because both negative and positive influence of non-debt tax shields can be 
predicted depending on the theories. Prasad et al. (2003) add that the estimated 
relationship between NDTS and firm leverage varies depending upon the way in which 
the tax shield is measured. Although a mixed relationship has been found between 
NDTS and debt, most previous empirical studies show support for a negative 
relationship. Therefore, when tangibility is controlled, a negative relationship between 
NDTS and leverage is expected. 
Liquidity 
Liquidity (LJQ) is defined as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. A 
negative relationship is expected because firms can use liquid assets to finance their 
investment giving support to the pecking order theory. Liquid assets can be the evidence 
of agency costs of debt due to the fact that these assets can be manipulated by 
shareholders at the expense of debtholders (Prowse, 1990; Ozkan, 2001). On the other 
hand, positive relationships between liquidity and leverage can be possible. Liquidity 
can increase firm value in liquidation leading to an increase in debt capacity (Shleifer 
~d Vishny, 199~). fifl!ls wi~h high liquidity ratios mightbe able to support high debt 
ratios because of greater ability to meet short-term obligations when they are due. 
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Liquidity is expected to be negatively related to debt because the explanations that 
support negative relationships are stronger. 
Earnings Volatility 
Earnings volatility (VOL) is defined as the absolute difference between the annual 
percentage change in earnings before interest and taxes and the average of this change 
over the sample period. According to trade-off theory, higher earnings volatility or risk 
increases the probability of financial distress because firms with high earnings volatility 
might not be able to meet their debt commitments leading to lower debt capacity. 
Lenders always count on firm's future earnings as the means of protection. If firms have 
high risk and earnings are volatile, debt capacity might decrease. Bradley et al. (1984) 
find that the relationship depends on the costs of bankruptcy. Their results show that the 
relationship would be monotonically negative when bankruptcy costs are high and will 
be U-shaped when bankruptcy costs are low. 
Antoniou et al. (2002) suggest that correlations between earnings volatility and 
firm leverage might vary depending on the relationship between firms and lenders. The 
close relationship between lenders and firms can reduce the possibility of firms failing 
to meet the commitment from debt. Therefore, firms with close relationships with 
lenders are expected to show less concerned on earnings volatility while firms with 
arms-length relationships with lenders should be more concerned about earnings 
volatility because the cost of failing to meet the debt commitment is higher. According 
to Fama and French (2002), the complex version of the pecking order theory also 
predicts a negative relationship between earnings volatility and debt. Firms try to 
balance current and future financing costs. Therefore, in order to lower the chance of 
}ssuing new riskys~curiti~s or forgoing profitable investments when net cash flows are 
low, firms with more volatile cash flows are likely to have less leverage. 
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On the other hand, agency theory predicts a positive relationship between earnings 
volatility and leverage. Higher earnings volatility may encourage the use of debt 
because large gains accrue to shareholders first whereas large losses are shared by both 
shareholders and debtholders (Boyle and Eckhold, 1997). Although the theories predict 
both positive and negative relationships between earnings volatility and debt, earlier 
studies find negative relationships. Therefore, an inverse relationship between earnings 
volatility and leverage is expected. 
Share Price Performance 
Share price performance (SP P) is defined as the first difference of the logs of 
annual share prices, matched to the month of firms' fiscal year-end. Share price 
performance can also be related to financing decisions. Past history of share prices and 
market conditions have been shown to have an impact on firm's capital structure 
(Marsh, 1982). When there is information asymmetry between managers and outside 
investors, investors will require discount with equity issues. Firms will issue equity only 
when the cost of discount is less than the benefit of issuing equity. However, if equity is 
issued right after an increase in share price when share prices are overvalued, the 
discount cost will be very little for existing shareholders. Therefore, this leads firms to 
prefer equity to debt when share prices increase. This is supported by the market timing 
theory. Therefore, share price performance is expected to be inversely related to 
leverage. 
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3.4.2 Country-Specific Determinants 
In addition to firm-specific variables, country-specific factors have not been much 
considered to have any significant relationship with firms' capital structure with the 
exception of work by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Antoniou et al. 
(2002). Because firms in the sample countries are operating under different economic 
conditions, legal and corporate governance environments as presented in Chapter 2, it is 
likely that those differences may affect firms' financing decisions. In order to test the 
effect of country-specific determinants, equation (3.2) is augmented by including 
country dummies where equal to 1 for Thailand (THDUM), Malaysia (MLDUM) and 
Singapore (SPDUM) respectively, and 0 otherwise. These country dummies are 
intended to capture differences in leverage that are not detected by other variables 
between the sample countries. These country dummies are then replaced by country-
specific variables one at a time to avoid potential multicollinearity problems due to high 
correlations between these variables. The inclusion of country-specific variables also 
helps to control for fluctuations in the market. 
The country-specific explanatory variables used in this chapter are classified into 
two groups: (i) market-wide determinants, which include economic development, bank 
development, stock market development, inflation, level of interest rates, term structure 
of interest rates, and equity premiums; and (ii) legal and corporate governance 
determinants, which include quality of legal enforcement, legal protection, ownership 
concentration and information intermediary activity. As suggested by Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1999), significant changes in the legal system of countries from year 
to year are quite rare. The indicators of the institutional environment such as creditor 
rights and shareholder rights also do not vary over time. Therefore, the indicator 
calculated or collected by previous studies should be suitable to incorporate 'in the 
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model.46 In addition, as in the analysis of firm-specific determinants, the sample 
countries are divided into two country groupings: (i) the countries least affected by the 
crisis and (ii) those most affected by the crisis. Moreover, like the investigation of firm-
specific determinants, the sample period is divided into (i) a pre-crisis period covering 
the period of 1993 to 1996 and (ii) a post-crisis period covering the period of 1998 to 
2001. Due to the nature of the data, country groupings and sub-sample periods will be 
applied only for market-wide determinants. 
Economic Development 
Firms in developed countries such as Singapore and Australia where their stock 
markets are matured should have higher levels of equity. In order to be certain that this 
is the case, a developing economy dummy variable is included. It takes a value of 1 if 
the country is classified as a developing economy according to the World Bank 
classification based on countries' gross national income levels and 0 otherwise (EDEV). 
The inclusion of this dummy variable might help to pick up an element of financial 
development that is not captured by other country-specific variables. Therefore, a 
positive relationship between economic development dummy and leverage is expected. 
Bank Development 
Financial intermediaries or banking sectors directly influence the financial 
structure of firms as they are the main sources for firms' financing. The prime function 
of such intermediaries is to monitor firms. They have greater incentives to use collected 
information to discipline borrowers than other smaller investors due to the free-rider 
problem. When the banking system is developed, firms are more likely to have higher 
46 
.It _should be noted. thaUhe Jegal and corporate .governance factors are. not time-varying. They--are-
indicators calculated or collected by previous empirical studies and other organizations as averages of 
particular periods in those studies. Therefore, we might not be able to detect some of the time-varying 
effects due to this limitation. It should also be noted that these factors may be affected by the effect of the 
crisis. Due to data unavailability, no time-varying data can be applied; therefore, cautions must be made 
when interpreting the results. 
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debt capacity; therefore, the relationship between bank development and leverage is 
expected to be positive. Bank development (BKDEV) is measured by the ratio of bank 
assets to GDP. 
Stock Market Development 
As in Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), stock market development 
(MKDEV) is measured by the ratio of market capitalization to GDP. Ifthe stock market 
is active or fully developed, firms are more likely to raise their capitals through equity 
markets. Therefore, stock market development is expected to be inversely related to 
leverage. 
Inflation 
Inflation (INF) is measured as changes in the consumer price index. In practice, 
inflation seems to affect firms' capital structure significantly. According to Graham and 
Harvey (200 1 ), one-third of the CFOs of US manufacturing firms take into 
consideration factors such as inflation when they make financing decisions. Moreover, 
because debt contracts are normally written in nominal terms, the rate of inflation might 
affect the risk level of debt financing in real terms (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1996). Prasad et al. (2003) argue that inflation reduces the real cost of employing debt 
via the erosion of the repayment of the principal. However, several studies argue in 
favour of a negative relationship because high and volatile inflation rates may prevent 
borrowing. Boyd et al. (200 1) argue that as inflation increases, the financial sector will 
make fewer loans. In economies with high inflation, lenders will lend less and allocate 
capital less effectively. Therefore, there is less money available to borrow which implies 
a negative relationship between inflation and leverage. Booth et al. (200 1) suggest that 
· the negative correlation implies thai 'firms borrow against ~eal· but ·not ·inflationary 
growth prospects. Beck et al. (2002) find that as inflation increases, it is less likely that 
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firms will obtain external financing and the proportion of investment financed by 
external funding declines. Firms in high inflation countries are less likely to access bank 
loans and tend to use a smaller proportion of loans in their financing mix. On the other 
hand, firms in high inflation areas will be more likely to issue equity because equity 
provides better protection for investors. Therefore, a negative relationship between 
inflation and debt is expected. 
The Level of Interest Rates 
The level of interest rate (!NT) is defined as the lending rate, the maximum rate 
charged by commercial banks as recorded by the IMF International Financial Statistics 
and reported by Datastream, matched to the month of firms' fiscal year-end. 
Nejadmalayeri (2002) indicates that in an efficient and integrated market setting such as 
in Modigliani and Miller (1958), macroeconomic factors such as the fluctuation of 
interest rates can affect equally both value of debt and equity. Therefore, there is no 
benefit in trying to reach an optimal capital structure. Merton ( 197 4) suggests that in the 
presence of frictions such as taxes and bankruptcy costs, changes in interest rates could 
affect capital structure. Managers have incentives to try to change the mix between debt 
and equity according to the movement in interest rate. Interest rate movements influence 
costs of debt and equity differently therefore affecting an optimal capital structure. The 
interest rate issue is interesting because despite numerous theoretical indications on the 
pertinence of interest rates in financing decisions, there is still no or little direct 
evidence as to whether interest rate in fact influences capital structure decisions or not.47 
47 Nejadmalayeri (2002) points out that the relationship between interest rate and firm leverage varies 
~depending on· whether one uses •actual measures of interest rates;· their -transformation;~such as the-real-T--
bill yield, real term spread, yield curve volatility and inflation or their principle components. 
Nejadmalayeri (2002) fmds that as the real Treasury Bill yield rises, the value of future interest 
deductions and the inverse likelihood of defaults increase, leading firms to find external debt fmancing. 
On the other hand, when the real Treasury bond yield rises, the value of future interest deductions and the 
inverse likelihood of default decrease, making external debt financing less likely. 
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When interest rates become more volatile, firms tend to issue less debt because 
higher interest rate volatility erodes the value of interest tax shields. In practice, interest 
rates seem to have some significant influences on firms' capital structure. One-third of 
CFOs of US manufacturing firms take into consideration factors, such as interest rates, 
when they make financing decisions (Graham and Harvey, 2001). Thies and Klock 
(1992) suggest that interest rate could be related to debt. Interest rate can be used as a 
proxy for long-term expected inflation which implies that firms will shift from equity to 
debt when interest rate increases. When interest rate includes a premium for expected 
inflation, the repayment of principal is a tax-deductible interest expense. Ooi (1999) 
suggests the opposite relationship. Firms are more likely to use debt when the costs of 
borrowing are low. Therefore, if interest rates increase, the costs of borrowing increase 
and, as a result, firms tend to use less debt. Because in reality firms should be more 
concerned with costs of borrowing, a negative relationship is expected. 
Term Structure of Interest Rates 
Term structure of interest rates (TERM) is defined as the month-end yield on long-
term (10 years or more) government bonds, minus the short-term lending interest rate 
matched to the month of firm's fiscal year-end. Normally when firms determine their 
capital structure, they tend to be more concerned with the costs of getting the fund 
which arise mainly from interest expenses. High interest rates increase the cost of 
borrowing, so firms will prefer equity to debt if interest rates are high. Term structure of 
interest rates plays a significant role for capital structure when firms raise debt capital 
by issuing bonds where interest rate is in a long-term maturity (Antoniou et al., 2002). 
Therefore, a negative relationship is expected between term structure of interest rates 
and firm leverage. 
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Equity Premium 
Equity premium (EQP R) is measured by the cost of equity relative to the return on 
risk free investment matched to the month of firms' fiscal year-end. There is little 
evidence on how the equity premium correlates to firm leverage. Antoniou et al. (2002) 
were among the first to investigate the relationship between equity premium and firm 
leverage. In theory, equity premium should be directly related to debt because equity 
premium measures the cost of equity compared with risk-free rate. There are two 
themes relating to the equity premium (Antoniou et al., 2002): (i) high equity premium 
means high cost of equity; therefore, firms will prefer debt to equity if they need 
external finance; and (ii) in line with the market timing theory, firms tend to issue 
equity when share price is high or overvalued. If equity premium is high due to 
overvaluation of the stocks from the market, firms will prefer equity to debt implying a 
negative relationship. Therefore, the relationship varies depending on the source of 
change in equity premium leading to two hypotheses for the relationship between equity 
premium and debt: (i) equity premium is positively related to debt if equity premium 
represents the cost of equity and (ii) equity premium is negatively related to debt if 
equity premium is high due to the overvaluation of the stocks from the market. 
Quality of Legal Enforcement 
The quality of legal enforcement is determined by the efficiency and integrity of 
the legal system. It has been suggested that when the legal system has less integrity, 
debt would be used more than equity because the structure of debt limits the potential of 
expropriation of creditor rights (Fan et al. 2004). Efficiency of the legal system I 
integrity can be proxied by level of corruption which is inversely related to integrity. 
The pr()~Y Jor integrity is the corruption index (CORR), prepared by Transparency 
International, which is an index ranging from 0 to 10. 
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Legal Protection 
There are two types of legal protection; creditor rights ( CRR) and shareholder 
rights (SHR) calculated from La Porta et al. (1998). Better creditor rights encourage the 
development of markets for loan capital leading to the prediction of a positive 
relationship between creditor rights and leverage for countries with high scores of 
creditor rights. When shareholders are protected, the ability of firms to raise capital 
through equity markets increases. Therefore, in countries where the shareholder rights 
score is high, a high level of equity issues is expected leading to a prediction of a 
negative relationship between shareholder rights and leverage. 
Ownership Concentration 
Ownership by the three largest shareholders of the ten largest non-financial 
domestic firms from La Porta et al. (1998) is used as a proxy for ownership 
concentration (OWN). When ownership structure is highly concentrated, managers-
owners are more concerned about control dilution. Therefore, they hesitate to raise 
capital by issuing equity leading to the prediction of a positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and leverage. 
Information Intermediary Activity (Auditors and Analysts) 
As in Fan et al. (2004), big-5 auditors' market share (AUD) and the average 
number of equity analysts following a firm (ANA) are used as measures of the level of 
information intermediary activity. The existence of asymmetric information is likely to 
move capital structure toward more debt. Because capital structure is likely to be 
determined by corporate information, the institutions that collect and disseminate 
information play a significant role in determining debt and equity mix. Auditors play an 
important role in enhancing the credibility of public information by certifying the firm's 
accounts and mitigating the importance of private information. 
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Fan and Wang (2002) argue that the credibility of accounting information in 
emerging markets is due to the agency problems and the protection of information. 
There is evidence showing that the level of use of high quality external auditors is high 
for firms with more severe agency problems supporting the important role of auditors. 
Choi and Wong (2002) present evidence that reputable auditors are more likely to be 
employed by larger firms especially in weak legal enforcement countries supporting the 
crucial role of auditors. Firms in countries with stronger legal enforcement have higher 
Big-5 auditors' market shares than countries with weak legal enforcement. This 
confirms that auditor role contains important information about country's legal 
enforcement. Fan et al. (2004) suggest that markets that are characterized by a strong 
audit function should have lower debt than markets with a weaker audit role leading to a 
negative relationship between the role of auditors and equity analysts and leverage. 
The definitions of the indicators of the above firm-specific and country-specific 
variables are shown in Table 3.1. The summary of theories and expected relations 
between firm leverage and firm-specific and country-specific determinants are shown in 
Table 3.2. 
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Tallie 3.1 : huUcators ofvariallles 
Panel A :Leverage and Finn-Sped& DellmnJnan11 
De1Bnninan11 Indil:atDn Source 
LEV Debt to total capital = Datastream 
Total dab! I (Total dabt+MV of equity + B V of prefere!ICe share) 
Ttmgibility TANG Total flliBd assets I Total assets Dalasi ream 
Profitability PROF Eamillgs before interest, tax and dapreciation I Total assets Date.stream 
Finn Size ············s'iz'E.········· N~t~·-~·~·-~-r·;~·;t;·· ········································································ Datastream 
"G~;t};"6j;p"~"i1"iiciiy"""""""""""""""""" GROW Mullet-to-book retia De.tastreem 
= (Totali!Bsets -Book value of equity+ Mullet value of equity) I 
Non-Debt Tax Shield NDTS Depreciation I Total assets Datastream 
Liquidity ··········U"Q·········· c;-;;;~1··;;~;;rc;;;;:;;~i-·~ili!i;;······-·· ·······························································-········-····· · ········-o~;;;;;;;:·-····-
Eamillgs Volatility VOL Absolute value off{EB!T ,- EBIT ,,)] - I!Yel:'llge of[(EBIT ,- EBIT,,)J Datastream 
EBITn EBITH 
s·J;;;··ii;:;;;;··p;;:r~·;;;;;;················· ·········· ·········sii·i'······· · rJ;;;··n;;··diff;;;;~--~·ru;;·~;;·g;;··~r-;;:;;:;;;I·;~·p;:;;;~;··<~i~J;;;·d:·;~··i"i~-········ ········o~;;;;;;;·-······· 
!IUlnlh of fllltiS' fiscal yeu end) 
Panel B : Market-Wide De1Brminan11 
De1Bnninan11 Indil:atDn Source 
Economic DevelopliVlnl EDEV Dummy equal to I for developing economy and 0 otherwise Date.stream 
a~"I>~k;P";;;;;~i································· ······ ····aioEv····· ·M"~~Iili"Y·a~·;;~;;··/"aoii·(~lc·t;;;d"·i"~·;};;;"·nu;~ii;~r-r~;··n;~;;I·y;~· ·········o~i;·i·;;;m;·········· 
end) 
sl~dij;iiaiii,;i·"D~J;;·j;;;nl········-····-· -MKDEV- ·M~-~Iili"Y·M"~ii,;i··~~pii·~~~;;:;~ToD"i' .. (~tcb;;d"·i"~·-iJ;;;-;;;;oirtJ;.[,"f"f~;· o~i;·1;;;m;· 
··················-························································-········· ............................. .r.~~ . .Y.!'.~ .. e.~......................................................................................................................... . ................................... . 
Inflation INF Chenges in monthly consumer price indax (matched to the month of Datastream 
·······-··································································-········· ·······-········-········--.r.~: .. ~~ . .Y.!'.~ .. e.~L ................................................................................................................ ···················-·····-·················· 
LIM! oflnterest Rate !NT Monthly lllnding mte (matched to the month of fllltiS' fJScal yeu end) Date.stream 
r~·;:;:;;··si·~~~-·~ri~liiii;;··~;e;········· ·····"TF.RM······· "G;:;;·~-~~-s~;;d·v:;;;-.i·(k;J;t;:!~m;f::·M·~~~ili"Y·J;;~-·~;~··c~ic·J;;;d···· ··o~1;;1;;~········· 
to the month of fllltiS' fiscal yeu end) 
·F.q;;ily-i'i;·ri;;;·······-········-············-·············· ·······E:Q:Pif····· M~~ihi:Y"·~k;;;··;:ei~·=·ru:sii-rre;·;a!·~···t·m;i·~J;;;·d:·;~··i"hii··;:;;;;~;h··~-r···-········ ·········-o~i;i;:e;;;·-······· 
fllltiS' fiecal yeu end) 
Panel C : Legal and ColJIOill1B Gow:nwu:e Detenninan11 
De1Bnninanu Thailand Mala:yJia Singapore A111tralia Definition Source 
• Thailand : Risk free mte = repurchase mte (I month) 
A ustmlia : Risk fiee rate = pernment bond yield (short term) 
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Table J.2 : Elpecmd relation between finn Jewrage and llnn-iped& and country-ipecl& demnnlnanu 
Panel A : Firm-Sped& Demnninanu 
Variable• 
Tanglbility 
Po•itive Negative 
Ageru:y theory : Ageru:y cost of debt Agency !Mary : Ageru:y cost of equity 
Trade-off theory: Fil'laru:illl distmss f Busilless risk Trade-off theory: Non-debt tax shield 
Collater&l f Liquidity and msale value f Peckillg onler theory 
···-···-···--···-···-·····-···-··--··-··--······--~~~-t_r.i:.~~t.i'.l:n..t.~r_t!e.l:1l.S.~ .. ~~~---····· .................... ~~-~-t.s_···-····-···-···--··· ···-····-···-···--···-···-
Pmfitebility Trade-off theory: TflX PeclWlg onler theory 
Fme cash flow theory Trade-off theory: Bankruptcy costs 
MD.tly ilund I 
Elpecmd 
Relation 
Positive 
Negative 
-···-···-·····-········--··-···- ···-···-·····-···· ~~-~J.le..O..r.l................................................................. Dilution of ownemhip structure Trade-off theory : Benluuptcy costs 1 TflX -··-··-· Peckii;g"·ii·idBrtheozy··-···-··--···-···-····- ····· ··-···-··- ··-··- ···-··-·PosiiiV9·-· -··· Firm Size 
Ageru:y theory : Agency cost of debt Information asymmetry I Access to the market I 
Restrictions to the market I Access to the market &anomies of scales 
···-·····-···--············ ........ ·········-···············-···-·······································-· ······--···--------·--····-···-·-······· -···--···············-···-···-··········-··········-···-·····-----·····-···-···--·---··· ·-------···--·-······-···-···· 
Growth Opportunity Trade-off theory: Tmget capitelslr~~~:ture Agency theory: Agency cost of debt Negative 
Signalling theory Trade-off theory: Fil'laru:iel distress/ Tax 
PeclWlg onler theory PeclWlg onler theory (as proxy for profilebility) 
M11rket timing theory 
Free cash flow theory 
··--·-···-······················-··········-···-·····-· ············-···············-·····-···-···--···························-···································--··· ~-s.~~ . .i:':'l.:()~~!o..~ .............................. ···-···-····-···-·· ·-·--·-·····-··-··--···-···-· ~.o..~~.I?.~~~--:!' .. a.x...S.~.ll:l ............. ~':'~!!~.L:!'.~_ili.t.r._ ................................................................. :!'.~.:.o..r.r..~~.rr .. : ..!~ .................................................. ···-··- ........... ~!~~~---········· 
Liquidity Ability to wet short-term obligation Agency !Mary : Ageru:y cost of debt Negativ9 
PeclWlg onier theory 
········-·-················-···-··-·····--·-· -········-··--············-··-···-·········· ··-··-···--··-· .. -· .. ··-··-··--···-··---·· ~-~~-.ll!"~.!.! .. ~~ti'.l:n._~111! .. _ .... _____ ·--·-······-···-·-·-· 
F.amil1gJI Volatility Agency theory Trade-off theory: Fil'laru:iel distress Negativ9 
·s·hliN-iiif~-P~·rib·m;···-·· -· ·························-·······-··· ..... -··-··-· -···· ............ ·······-···· ~;~f~'ih:~··-···-·····-··-··--···-···-····-··-··--··· . ·····-···N;·g;;;-;ve··-·-· 
Panel B : Marlllllt-W"ule Demnninanu 
Variable• Podtive Negative MD•tly ilund I 
Elpecmd 
Relation 
¥.:c.!!.:':":'~.!?~.~P.'.n.:.l_l! ....... ~~!~1-.~_f..!~-~~----·--·--···-···-···--···-··--···-···-····- ~----··--·-··-·---·--···-···-···--···-···--···-···-····-··-···--···-··- ········- ····-·---~O..S.!~ .. -···-·· 
Bank DevelopmBnl Developwnt ofbllllkil1g system Positive 
·s~-~~k-M;;;b·i··········-··········-···-·· ············-···-··················-···-··········-·····-···-···-·····-······················-···-···--···· D"iiWiD!lmiili.lir·lla~i·;;;;k;;·;:;··-·····-··-····-··-······-···-·· -···-···N;g;:i;ve··-···-· 
.12~1EP .. lll!'l.l~ ........ _________________ -·····-···-···--···-···-·····-···-···-·················-···-···--········-·····-···-·····-···-···-······ ·········-···-···--···-···-·····-···-···--···-···-·····-···-···--···-···-·····-···-·····-···-- -···-···-·····---···-···-· 
Inflation Reel cost of debt Fewer loans Positive 
-···-···---·----····--·----·-···-·····-···-·····-···· ··-·····-····················-·····- ····················-···-···-··········-···--· ................... ·····--···-···-·····-···-···-·····-----··· ·····-·····-···-·····-···- ·········-···--······ 
Leveloflntemt R.ete Trade-off theory: TflX (related to inflation) .. ~~~~--~!~~~~ Negativ9 
"fe~siriiCi";;i;i-~rTiiiei~i· :·····-···-···--··-········-···-···--········-··········-···-·····························-··-···-·· Cost ofbonowiq: ·-··-···N;g;:;-;;;···-···-· 
Rates 
Equity Pramium M~~rket timing theory : Mispricing 
Panel C : Legal and Corporam Gowerna~~Ce Derennlnanu 
Variablet 
Information Intermediary 
Activity 
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Cost ofBquity 
Negative 
Level of asymmetric information 
Negative/ 
Positive 
MD•tly ilund I 
Elpecmd 
Relation 
Negative 
3.5 Data, Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
3.5.1 Data 
The annual corporate data used for the empirical analysis in this chapter were 
obtained mainly from Datastream with some exceptions for variables for Australia and 
Thailand for which specific crucial data are not available from DataStream. For 
Thailand, risk-free rate data was requested from the Bank of Thailand. For Australia, 
total bank assets and market capitalization were obtained from Reserve Bank of 
Australia. Datastream contains balance sheet and profit and loss statement information. 
Balance sheet data are interesting because, as Krugman (1999) argues, deteriorating 
balance sheets can play a crucial role during and after a financial crisis. 
The main sample criterion was to exclude financial firms such as banks and 
insurance firms from the sample because their financial characteristics and use of 
leverage are substantially different from non-financial firms. Financial firms are heavily 
regulated and have special capital structure.48 Their leverage can be influenced by other 
factors such as deposit insurance and cannot be compared with that of non-financial 
firms. Moreover, some regulations, such as minimum capital requirements, may affect 
the capital structures of financial firms. In order to mitigate survivor bias, firms are 
included in the analysis even if data is not available for every year. 
The data was obtained from 1993 to 2001. For Thailand, the total sample is 294 
firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) resulting initially in 2,646 
observations. For Malaysia, the total sample is 669 firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange giving 6,021 observations initially. For Singapore, the total sample is 
345 firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore resulting initially in 3,105 
observations. For Australia, the total sample is 219 firms listed on the Australia Stock 
Exclfafige (ASX) resulting' in f,971 dbse'fvations initially. However, not all -orthese 
48 Raj an and Zingales ( 1995); Berger et a!. ( 1997); Fan and So (2000); Pandey (200 1 ); Hovakimian et a!. 
(2001) 
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could be used, due to missing data and outliers resulting from data errors and extreme 
values. Moreover, it should be noted that the sample size varies from year to year and 
from measure to measure due to the availability of data and existence of the company in 
that year. 
3.5.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
Figure 3.1 presents the annual average leverage ratio of the sample countries over 
the period of 1993 to 2001. It shows that the extent to which firms are levered is not 
similar across Asia Pacific countries where Thai firms are heavily levered while 
Australian firms had the lowest leverage ratios. It can be assumed at this point that 
maybe the cost of borrowing in Australia is quite high relative to the cost of borrowing 
in other countries. In addition, this implies that debt has been an important financing 
source for Thai firms. This is consistent with Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) 
who find that Thailand usually had high debt ratios. 
Figure 3.1 
Average leverage ratios (Total debt I Total capital) 
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The differences in levels of leverage ratios across sample countries can be 
explained by the differences in corporate governance in each country. Shareholder 
rights encourage the development of equity markets. Legal protection of shareholders is 
highest in Australia and lowest in Thailand. On the other hand, because creditor rights 
encourage the development of lending, firms in countries with strong creditor protection 
should have higher levels of debt relative to firms in weak creditor protection countries. 
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are classified as having high creditor rights while 
Australia scores the lowest. Therefore, Australian firms have the lowest level of debt 
while Thai firms have the highest compared to firms in other sample countries. In 
addition, one of the reasons that Thailand has the highest level of debt is because 
Thailand's laws are mixed between civil and common laws. This is consistent to what is 
found by Beck et al. (2002) that firms in civil law countries substitute less efficient 
forms of external finance for bank loans. 
In addition, when compared shareholder and creditor rights (as shown in Table 
2.5), shareholders and creditors are protected equally by laws in Malaysia and in 
Singapore. On the other hand, creditors are more protected than shareholders m 
Thailand while shareholders are more protected than creditors in Australia. Because 
creditors are less protected in Australia, Australian firms would find it easier to get 
funding from stock market (equity issues). Creditors in Australia would hesitate to lend 
to firms because their protection is low and there is no guarantee that they will get their 
money back at the end of the contract. Also consistent to tax treatment, firms in 
countries that adopt dividend imputation tax system (such as Australia) is found to have 
lower level of leverage giving support to Fan et al. (2004). 
Figure 3.1 also shows that the average leverage ratios in Thailand and Malaysia 
in'creased suostaritiiilly -a:ftet tfie- fihaiicia:l' crisis: This emphasises" the importance of 
investigating possible implications of the crisis on corporate financing decisions. After 
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the financial crisis, firms in countries most affected by the crisis would find it difficult 
to raise finance through stock market. Therefore, the only channel would be to issue 
debt leading to higher use of debt issues after the crisis. On the other hand, Australia is 
not as severely affected by the crisis; therefore, their source of finance is stable over 
time. 
Averages of firm-specific and market-wide variables over the sample period are 
presented in Table 3.3. Panel A presents the averages of the variables by individual 
country. According to Bevan and Danbolt (2002), if book values provide fair estimation 
of replacement values or the value of assets in place, GROW substantially in excess of 1 
indicates that firms on average have valuable investment opportunities. For Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore, the market-to-book ratios (GROW) range from 1.4 to 2 
indicating that the market values of the firms in the sample on average equal 1.4 to 2 
times the book value of total assets in each country which means book values do not 
adequately reflect the market value of these firms. However, for Australia, GROW is at 
around -9 indicating that the market underestimates the value of total assets 
substantially (- 9 times). Australian firms should bear this in mind when they make 
decisions on the mix of debt and equity using market values. 
Net fixed assets on average account for approximately 30 - 40% of book value of 
total assets for firms in all sample countries. The means of PROF show that average 
return on assets for Thai firms is higher than that for firms in other countries. For 
NDTS, it shows that depreciation accounts for approximately 3 - 4 % of book value of 
total assets for all sample countries. LIQ is highest in Australia. This is consistent with 
the prediction based on legal protection in Chapter 2. Claessens et al. (2003) find that 
firms in countries with weak creditor rights have higher liquidity. 
136 
Table 3.3 : Awerap offirm.-llped& aJid lllllrlllet-wille variable. 
Panel A: Bycounuy 
Variable Thailand I Mala.71la I Si:ngapore I A111tralia 
) 0) (2) ! <J) I 0) ! (2) ! <J) I 0) ! (2) ! <J) I 0) i (2) ! <J) 
Full Sample I Pre-Crisis ! Foot-Crisis Full Sample . Pre-Crisis ! Poo1-Criais Full Sample i Pre-Crisis ! Poo1-Criais Full Sample I Pre-Crisb ! Poot-Crisb 
(19!1l _ 2001) ~. (1!193 _ 19!16) i (19!18 _ 2001) (19!13 _ 2001) I om_ 19!16) i (19!18 _ 2001) (19!13 _ 2001) ~ (19!13 _ 1!1!16) i (19!18 _ 2001) (1!1!13 _ 2001) 1. (19!13 _ 19!16) 1 (1!1!18 _ 2001) 
. . 
.... LEV_ 0.4436 ! 0.2794 I 051544 *** 0.21597 I 0.12015 I 0.3582 *** 02412 i 0.1594 ! 0.2882 -· 0.18515 I 0.1771 I 0.1996 
1-!:".!''-llsllcs ..... __ . _j___ _ ___ [ .. (1~,~7)__ __ j____ _ _ _j__(-33~) __ J ······-. _.[ ___ (:!~~~- ............. ___ --·1 .[_(-:2.~--···-• 
TANG 0 43215 . 0 4177 i 0.4470 *** 0.3799 ! 0.315153 II 0.3876 0.3512 I 0.3260 ! 0.3630 - 0.3342 ; 0.3360 ! 0.3350 
t-statm!Jcs I (-2.8m) . (-2.5374) ; I (-32714) ; I (0.0854) 
1- PROF D.io515 -7- 01386 _.. -il07is- -;;;;;. "oo667 1-0-llSo- -:- o.ri362- .. ;;; ..... ilm18-·1-o~098il""-·;----o·.ou8"-- ·;;;;;;;· -o.0758l"""ii:046o """i""-(i1i86j" ____ ... 
1-!:~-=lCS · · -14.:5149 ___ 1_4is2ll-·-·r4~~'}-----.;;;;; ---i2.50154- .. '---u:mrl .. ~H:;-..... _ ... i .. ili2m .. + .... 12oi94 .... +_ji't~;~ .......... 1i341~ ....... iims ....... l <;~~~~ .. 
!-statistics ! , (-4.8411) i ! (-2.06153) ! ! (1.3808) ! (-2.6346) 
r-t.:~·:.:··· ::· 1 ~::·-·r-~-.~-~~:r.::~~~~~;::·-;;~ .::::::ioio~_::::::~---~~~~~ r~;~~ .. ::1:~~~::1·:~825~:::]~~~:;,-... ::... . .. ~:~~~356! ·····[:=::~-=~=-······· 
NDTS 0.0439 i 0.0395 ! 0.0481 -· 0.0282 I 0.0250 i 0.0302 0.0328 I 0.0283 I 0.0353 i 0.0406 I 0.0382 
r·t.:.s.!~~ ........ - ............ -L ............ - ... ! ....... ~1.!l>. ..... --............. - .......... +---........... _., ....... (:?..:!.634l .............. --... ~ ...... --...... ····-f-...\~~~~L............ . ........ --........ I·--..Jg~_6.L_ ........ . 
UQ 15333 ' 159<10 ! 1.4%6 1.8178 ! 1.8800 I 1.7828 1.81529 ! 19330 I 1.8301 29478 ' 2.928.5 I 2.9942 
t-statistics .......... L ...................... _ ... .!. ... .t!:.!.!..."'9 .... - ........ ___ ....... L .... _ .... _L. (9..~ .. 1~L .. _. __ J____ .L. ... J1~-~L ........... ·-·-- ...... -......+ ... --···· ! .. _c..o.t..~5.) 
4 . .5257 ! 3.4969 
·__Ql~"-""""""' 
0.1439 
-0.0.529 ·-
(15.31521) 
5.D5.53 ! 4.3361 I .5.5344 *** .5.5927 ! 4.815.54 I 6.1798 *** 8.0.5.53 ! 7.140.5 I 9.021.5 *** 1.0101 ! 0.9143 I 11060 *** 
~=-••~ :~:i~~:'_L:~~-::~~:l~~~tt!:::•:::~t:~~::t!!::: =~~~j:_~ ___ ; 
i"'--~: + :,: i ~ ... ~: 1--::: -f ~i~- ::- !--;: 1-~E:~----~=--~ ,:: l ·- -
.... .!.-:-·- --~-9810 .... I······--:T.4994 ... --f-J~r~~) ...... r----:is-47-s-r··· .. ···:i .8877 ......... 1·-~t~~-........ -=-:iJCio'r-t-.. ·:29653 .. -···t ........ ~~~~w .................... :iti.44i·a· .. · .. ·i---Ts-:965IT ... ~6G1~i ......... . 
r-·:~!!:·-· .... 7,m7""1 ....... :9:5rn-... 1 .. 5~; ... -- ..... :006··-·t~5:295sf .. ·<~!~! ........... r-·:ijmj··-~ui5 ....... r~~·=! .. •• ~·:5234-l···~~~rn ...... , ...... ~~!~-
~..eve,. (LEV) is tlii: debt to Cllpitol mtic. Tlmglbility (TANG) is delmed as the zatio oftotalfuaed IISSets to total assets. Pl:ofi.tability (PROF) is the mtics ofemni:lgs befine inte11:st, tax !llld depxeciaticn to total assets. Firm 
size (SIZE) is the l:lahrn!llaprithm of total .... ts. Gmw!h opporllmity (GROW) is the zatio ofbook Vllluo of totalossets less book wluo of equity plus market vahm of equity to book vahm of total assets. Non-debt tax 
shield (NDTS) is defftd os the zatio of depmcia.tion to totolossets. Liquidity (UQ) is the mtic of cum:nt assets to cumnt liobilitiOll. Eammp volatility (VOL) is the obsol"llie diffotOl:ll:e behwen ormw pen:entege clumfl: in 
emni%1gs befo~e int.rest !llld tlllii:S !llld the i!.WJ:II&" of this chang~:. Slwe price pelfm:mmu:e (SPP) is the fm~t diffe~e= of lop of emwal slwe price. BIIDk develcp=lll (BICDEV) is the mtic of'biiDk assets to GDP. Slo1:k 
market developmmd (MICDEV) is the mtic of morket cepitelizalion to GDP. Wlatitm (INF) is chm>ges in coDSumer price iDdox. Tho b!Yel of inte>est rate (INT) is defilled os the lendi!lg rate matched to the mmdh of fums' 
fiSCal yoar-l!nd. Temi structll111 of intlm!St rates (TERM) is the diffimlru:e betwl!en ~~~~ bond yiald !llld lending rate. Equity p~emium (EQPR) is ==d by the cost of equity ~elatiw to the ~etum on risk~ 
investmmt matched to the month of f1I111ll' fJScel year-end. T-Test in column (3) is used to test whether the diffmnces of the """"'~~"" ofwriabl!:s between sub-periods .,. statislil:olly significent or DC!. 
* ** - Signifu;lmt at 10%, .51'. !llld 1 Y. IM!~ =pectively. 
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Table 3.3 : Average• of finn-sped& and marlmt-wide wrlable• (tontinUBd) 
Panel B : By tountry groupinp 
Variable Countriel Leut Atliltmd by the C:rilil 
(I) (2) (J) 
Countrie• MD•t Atliltmd by the C:rilil 
(4) (5) (6) 
Full Sample l Pre- Critil i Polt-Crilil Full Sample Pre-Crilil Polt-Crilil 
(19!13 .. 2001) ! (1!1!13 .. 1!1!16) i (111!18 .. 2001) (1!1!13 .. 2001) (1!1!13 .. 1!1116) (1!1118 .. 2001) 
LEV 0.21461 0.1685i 0.2478 ••• 11.334:1 ••• i 0.1930! 0.4247 ••• 
!=j~~~ .. ··· ······-·······a:343iT ·o~331d·····-········(~.!.o.o~~~········· · - t-22o~iJ:J ··• !· ····· ··-·-ii"3s97i·-······-·t~~\}JgJ····· 
..... !=jli~~~-· ··· ·· ······ ·········ii":ms9l · ·- ···-···· .. o ·iii"13!· ···· ...... J.~.J.o~~1JJ··········-·· · ····· ... .c.:.~. 1o~g;n · ··-··t-··· ········-····-·oi274r··· · ..... .J=~o~:l····· 
... !:~.~~~·-···· .................... i.ii74I"i··· ...... ···-· i 2 .ii·6! .... -- .. {~f-2~ ..... ·- ·-· .. -- .. _(~f3~f;JJ} ·••··\-··· . ·······-···Ti2692i ............. {y3~iril·· .. . 
. . !:~.t.~!!:s.!~~·-···· ................•........ : ... -· - ... ... : (-1.1857) (-27.4032) i ! (0.95.52) GROW -2.90.56J -4.3.510!
1
· ... ··::fif"fj(+ .. . . ....... i.57oi·;;.,;.;·r ..... i4793f ··--·········f265i.*•• 
..... !:~.t.t~!!:s.!~~·-···· .............................•....•... : ...........•............................ 
1 
................... (~.1..:1~¥.) ................................ H:.~.~.~.1. ............. ; ..................................... : .................. tl.~:~?.1 ............ . 
NDTS 0.03.56 l 0.0346 0.0366 0.11340 •• 11.1131.5' 11.03.59 ••• 
...... !:~.~.~!!!.!!~~·-···· ........................................ .L ......................................... ; ................. J.~.!.:~~~~l... ............................. J~:.~.?.~.?.L........... : .......... t~:.~.~~.L .......... . 
IJQ 2.3815! 2.4432! 2.3.598 1.7119 ...... 1.749.5 1.69111 
~:!~: :::::-:::?~~t::~:=:~~~t:::;=!t::-::~~::~:!t::c: ___ '_":~--__J~!t: 
SPP -0.0344! 0.12111: -0.1101 ••• -0.1349 ••• ! 11.0716 -0.122J ••• 
!-statistics i i (10.8188) (7.1901) ! i (11.3368) 
·······-JiimiV··-···· ···············~····~···;~3f97T··-··--·-·····-4_·;;-2-29·t·····-····-············5·~9419·;;;· ··········-····--··-;·:428i-:;;·-··r-···············-··-·4.70i8T·-········----·····;~9828···-••-· 
!-statistics : ! (-11.7609) (-2.1736) ! i (-128.76.55) ::::::;::~.:::::: ::::::::::::::::::::~:=::~~I::::::::::::::::::::::::::~~:~:t .......... ::::::,:;:~:r:::::::: ::::::::·:::::~:~·;.;~~:::~~::r· ::·::~~.~:::1:::::::::::;~:~~~~~.:~~~: 
1NF 4.4598! 7.7899! :JD238 ••• 3.3465 ••• i 4.040.5! 2.4312 ••• t-st~ics 7-:28o7} ·· f7o2J. ·· J~~61~fJI·····················(9.9~g3J~·····I ····il5o671····· · .J~?7~:JJ;;. ... 
....... !:~~······· ·· ······-·:-g:o395 ···········-··········:9i865T ........... J!.~6~J~···;;;;;;;;;·· ............ ..t~~~·~i:J·······\-········· ·····~1-:7694-I-···········-···P~!·~fJ~··•••·· 
!-statistics . (-11.3347) (-63.0023) i l (-2.1lJ89) 
·········"Eijm:········ ·······················:i97iro -3.1040! ····-········-·····:J:si"6:5-••··· ··-·-·····--··-····:is67·i········1······-·······-····~63553·!·······-···-····-···:iii.n4······· 
!-statistics ! (-4.:1793) (50.4814) i · (-.52.9234) 
I..swrege (LEV) is the debt to capital!atio. Tllllglbility (T ANO) is defmed as the mtio of total fued assets to total assets. Pmfitllhility (PROF) 
is the mtios of earning~~ before interest, lex IU1d. deprecilltion to total assets. Finn size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Growth 
opportunity (0 ROW) is the mtio of book vall!! oftotal assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity to book value of total 
assets. Non-debt tu shield (NDTS) is defined as the mtio of depreciation to total assets. Jjquidity (UQ) is the mtio of cumnt assets to 
cumnt liabilities. Earning~! volatility (VOL) is the llhsolute difference between annual percentage change in earning~~ before interest IU1d. tllliBs 
IU1d. the ave~age ofthis change. Shme price perfol'l11811Ce (SPP) is the f1111t difference of lo" of annual shme price. Bank development (BKDEV) 
is the mtio ofbank assets to ODP. Stock market development (MKDEV) is the mtio of market capitlllization to ODP. Inflation (!NF) is 
changes in coDSumer price iruiex. The ml of interest mte (!NT) is defmed as the lending mte matched to the month offums' fiScal year-end. 
Term structure of interest mtes (TERM) is the differance behwen government bond yield IU1d.lending mte. Equity premium (EQPR) is 
measUI1ldby the cost of equity relative to the return on risk fiee investment matched to the month of firms' fiScal yeill'-end. T-Test in column (3) 
is used to test whether the differences of the averagvs of variables between two sub-periods IIlii statistically sigllifu:ant or mt while t-Test in 
column ( 4) is used to test whether the differences of the IM!!IIf.BS of variables between twc country JQtlUP~ IIlii statistically signifu:ant or 110!. 
•••••• Signiflc1111t at lOY., .:W.IU1d.l ,., m~ respectively. 
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Because Australia scores the least in term of creditor rights, Australia is expected 
to have the highest level of liquidity relative to the other sample countries. Table 3.3, 
Panel A, also presents the average of the variables for pre-crisis and post-crisis periods 
with the t-test being used to test whether means between the two sub-samples are 
significantly different. It shows that for Thailand and Malaysia, the averages of the 
variables are significantly different from each other between pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods. Therefore, the role of each determinant is expected to vary accordingly. 
Although the t-test shows a number of significant differences in means between pre-
crisis and post-crisis periods in Singapore, the level of differences is not as high as in 
Thailand and Malaysia. As expected, the variables in Australia are not much affected by 
the crisis. Table 3.3, Panel B, shows the averages of firm-specific and market-wide 
variables by country groupings, countries least affected and countries most affected by 
the crisis. The table shows that the averages of the variables for the full sample between 
country groupings and between sub-samples are significantly different from each other 
according to the t-test. As expected, the variables are significantly affected by the crisis 
mostly in countries most affected by the crisis. This table suggests that it would be 
useful to divide the sample countries into two sub-groups as it is highly likely that the 
role of each determinant on firms' financing decisions differs between the two country 
groupmgs. 
Before proceeding regression analyses, it was necessary to examine the correlation 
structure between variables. The results of the Pearson correlation analysis are shown in 
Table 3.4. In general, the correlation between leverage (LEV) and its determinants are 
quite consistent to the hypotheses identified in the previous section. Firm size, earnings 
volatility, bank development and equity premium are positively correlated with leverage 
. while negative correlations are found'"for liquidity, stcfck'~mai'kel development-and---
interest rate for all sample countries giving support to the market timing theory. 
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Table 3 A : Correlatlo1t Malrix 
p..,.J A : Thallaad 
LEV TANG PROF SIZE GROW NDTS LIQ VOL SPP BKDEV MKDEV INF INT TERM EQPR 
LEV 1.000 
TANG 0.080 1.000 
PROF -0.383 -0.004 1.000 
SIZE 0.187 -Om! -0.107 1.000 
GROW -0.3:19 -0.110 OD30 OD24 1.000 
NDTS 0.031 0.360 0.149 -0.140 -0.069 !DOD 
LIQ -0.3.l1 -0.176 0.101 -0.077 0.017 -0.132 1.000 
VOL 0.107 ODBO -O.O.l1 0.03.l -0.018 OD36 -0.040 1.000 
SPP 0.060 OD31 0.086 -O.OW -O.O.l.l 0.103 O.DV O.D06 1.000 
BKDEV 0.391 OD30 -0.131 0.111 -0.346 O.O.l.l -0.044 -0.001 -0.101 1.000 
MKDEV -0.393 -OD38 o.m -0.118 0.366 -0.096 0.007 0.016 0.086 -0.8.l6 1.000 
INF -0.131 -O.O.l7 0.11.l -0.03.l O.l.l4 -0.14.l -0.007 -0.038 -0.36.l -0.094 0.317 1.000 
INT -0.193 -O.O.l6 0.120 -OD19 0.118 -0.148 -0016 -0.033 -0.376 0.030 o.n2 0.9.ll 1.000 
TERM -0.117 0.017 0.007 -0.063 0.180 O.O.l3 0.017 0.016 o.m -0.699 o.m -OJ30 -0.623 1.000 
EOPR 0.139 0.048 -0.099 -0.001 -O.O.l7 0.111 -0.001 O.o38 0.411 -0.198 0.044 -0.801 -0.847 0.80.l 1.000 
p....,) B : Mala)'Sia 
LEV TANG PROF SIZE GROW NDTS LIQ VOL SPP BKDEV MKDEV INF INT TERM EQPR 
LEV 1.000 
TANG -0.013 !DOD 
PROF -0.348 0.041 1.000 
SIZE 0.118 -0.089 0.068 1.000 
GROW -Ol.ll -0.033 -OD6! -0.281 1.000 
NDTS -0.017 0.469 -0.073 .o.m 0.031 1.000 
LIQ -0.288 -0.166 0.088 -0.119 o.m -0.111 1.000 
VOL 0.076 -OD3.l -0.114 -0.049 OD24 -0.008 -0.019 1.000 
SPP -0.090 OD14 0.024 -O.OU OD22 O.Ol.l 0.010 -OD19 1.000 
BKDEV 0.341 OD18 -0.104 0.03.l -0.2.ll 0.061 -0.013 OD18 -0.317 1.000 
MKDEV -0.301 -0.034 0.091 -0.031 0.218 -0.066 0017 0.003 OJ.ll -0.6l.l 1.000 
INF -0.060 -0.046 0.114 O.Dl8 0.042 -0.108 -0.011 -0.017 -0.067 -O.l.l4 0.116 1.000 
INT -0.131 -O.O.lO 0.137 0.011 0.071 -0.094 0.004 -0.011 -0.36.l O.O.l4 0.040 0.611 1.000 
TERM 0.036 0.037 -O.ll.l -0.010 -O.Dl4 0.04.l -0.012 -0.002 0.294 -O.l.ll -0.112 -0.161 -0.684 1.000 
EOPR 0.17.l 0.047 -O.IW -0.014 -0.110 O.IO.l -0.011 0.011 0.406 0.063 O.O.ll -0.61! -0.819 0.4.l6 1.000 
p....,) C : Sbra"''•re 
LEV TANG PROF SIZE GROW NDTS LIQ VOL SPP BKDEV MKDEV INF INT TERM EQPR 
LEV 1.000 
TANG 0.101 1.000 
PROF -0.194 O.O.l7 1.000 
SIZE 0.2.l8 -0.170 0.00 1.000 
GROW -0.417 -0.041 o.ru -0.111 1.000 
NDTS -0.109 0.494 0.164 -0270 0.108 1.000 
LIQ -0.368 -0266 0.04.l -0.110 0.101 -0.173 1.000 
VOL 0.033 OD4D -0.113 -0.030 -0.040 0.001 -0.009 !DOD 
SPP 0.026 OD!3 O.O.l4 0.034 -0.102 0.019 -0.00 O.OO.l 1.000 
BKDEV 0.2.l3 OD46 -0.109 -O.O.ll -0.1!9 0.108 -0.001 -0.010 -0.109 1.000 
MKDEV -0.023 0.001 -0.04.l -0.01.l 0.060 0.021 -0.004 0.030 OJ16 -0.171 1.000 
INF -0.171 -OD64 0.060 0.020 0.131 -0.073 0.033 -OD!O 0.000 -0343 0.24.l 1.000 
INT -0.068 0.004 O.O.l6 0.046 0.048 -0.018 -0.009 -0.011 -0293 -0.180 -0.37.l O.ll.l 1.000 
TERM 0.174 0.030 -0.091 -0.019 -0.094 O.O.l4 -O.on 0.017 0.166 0.4l.l 0.178 0.047 -0.679 1.000 
EOPR O.O.l.l -0.037 -0.061 -0.01.l -0.119 -0.060 -0.027 -O.O.l1 0.107 O.O..l4 -0.07.l 0.178 0.011 -O.l.l2 1.000 
p.,..J D : Australia 
LEV TANG PROF SIZE GROW NDTS LIQ VOL SPP BKDEV MKDEV INF INT TERM EQPR 
LEV !DOD 
TANG 0.267 !DOD 
PROF 0.002 o.m 1.000 
SIZE 0.373 0.433 0.171 1.000 
GROW 0.119 0.171 0.199 0.337 1.000 
NDTS ODJ.l OJ.ll 0.017 0.070 0.020 1.000 
LIQ -0.194 -0.301 -Oms -0.309 -0.370 -0.173 1.000 
VOL 0.007 -0.001 -O.O.ll -0.072 -0.011 0.031 0.086 1.000 
SPP -0.073 ODD9 0.001 -0.049 O.OU -0.03.l -0.017 0.003 1.000 
BKDEV 0.071 0.003 0.048 0.099 OD63 -0.013 -0.004 -O.OJ.l -0.137 1.000 
MKDEV 0.06.l 0.000 0.00 0.09.l 0.068 -0.033 -0.003 -OD21 -0.126 0.981 1.000 
INF 0.067 -O.D06 0.001 O.O.l.l -OD21 0.002 O.OU -OD20 -0.101 0.171 0209 1.000 
INT -0.066 -OD07 O.DO.l -0.04.l -0.043 0.006 -0.006 OD17 0.118 -0.686 -0.714 0.1.l2 1.000 
TERM 0.066 0.016 0.006 0.06.l 0.060 -0.006 0.002 -0.020 -0.131 0.760 o.n3 -0.191 -0.937 1.000 
EQPR 0.048 0.000 -0.00 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.001 -0.009 -0.020 0.380 0.404 -0.428 -0.839 0.165 1.000 
Soo Table 3.1 ond 3.3 and Section 3.4 for the definition ofvoriablu 
140 
However, there are some variations among the sample countries. Profitability has 
a negative correlation with leverage which is consistent to pecking order theory for 
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. On the other hand, a positive correlation is found for 
Australian firms which may indicate that Australian firms do not follow pecking order 
theory. Share price performance is found to be negatively related to leverage according 
to market timing theory only for Malaysia and Australia. Non-debt tax shield has 
negative correlations with leverage for Malaysia and Singapore giving support to tax 
hypothesis. There are also positive correlations between tangibility and leverage for 
Thailand, Singapore and Australia which gives the support to the theory that firms can 
use tangible assets as collateral. There are some small correlations among independent 
variables. For Thai and Australian firms the relationship between growth opportunity 
and firm size is positive implying that larger firms may grow faster than smaller firms. 
On the contrary, negative relationship is found for Malaysian and Singaporean firms 
implying that smaller firms grow faster than larger firms. Profitability has positive 
correlation with firm size for most sample countries implying that larger firms have 
higher profitability. As observed from Table 3.4, the correlation coefficients are not 
sufficiently large to cause multicollinearity problems among firm-specific variables in 
the regressions. However, there are high correlations among country-specific factors in 
each country; therefore, multicollinearity problems need to be accounted for in analysis 
relating to country-specific factors. 
3.6 Empirical Results 
The empirical analysis of the determinants of capital structure is performed in the 
following order. First, the focus is on firm-specific determinants of capital structure. 
The analysis ·starts with· the· cross:;sectioniil results froh{ estimating equation (3:1) ·for 
each sample country over the whole sample period of 1993 to 2001. Then equation (3.1) 
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1s re-estimated for the pre- and post-crisis periods in order to find the possible 
significant effects of the crisis on firm-specific determinants where the pre-crisis sample 
covers the period of 1993 to 1996 and the post-crisis sample covers the period of 1998 
to 2001. Next, equation (3.2) is estimated in a pooled time-series cross-sectional 
framework using OLS based on the full sample and sub-samples. After examining the 
firm-specific determinants of capital structure, the focus is moved to country-specific 
determinants: (i) market-wide and (ii) legal and corporate governance determinants. The 
data for all sample countries are pooled to create one panel data set. Equation (3 .2) is 
augmented by adding country dummies and then these country dummies are replaced 
with market-wide variables one at a time. The effect of the crisis on market-wide 
determinants is investigated using two sub-samples. Where sub-sample periods are 
concerned, Wald-statistics are estimated to test for any statistically significant change in 
the role of the identified variables as a consequence of the financial crisis. Finally, 
equation (3 .2) is augmented by adding legal and corporate governance variables one at a 
time. 
3.6.1 Firm-Specific Determinants: Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Table 3.5 presents the results of estimating equation (3.1) for each country over 
the full sample period using cross-sectional regressions of leverage ratios on firm-
specific variables. Although, tangibility is found to be positively related to leverage for 
all sample countries, the relationship is statistically significant only in Australia. 
Australia is a market-based economy in which firms have dispersed ownership structure 
and arms-length relationships with banks. Therefore, collateral plays an important role. 
Australia has the lowest level of creditor protection among the sample countries. 
therefore, lenders tend fo'requiie added"sd~uritywheri fitms'iaise debt capitaL - ·-· -· 
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Table 3.5 : CroS~-&ectional analysis of 6nn-iped& detenninantl of eapital1trw:iure: Whole ~ample period 
CoNtant 0 .0817 i 0.1980 0.2905 -0.1306 
............ t.:.s.~~~-~.!.ic..s. ........................... J9.:~?.~L ........... .J ............ J!.}.9..~-~-L ...... ,l. .......... J1..:~.1-~~L ............. j ............ t.1 .... 3..1..q_9.1. ............ . 
TANG 0.1647 I 0.0404 I 0.1027 j 0.195.5 .. .. 
!-statistics (1.438:1) i (0.5947) i {0.8742) i {2.3.544) 
................... PR:oi .................................. ~·o:2;6i .............. T ................ ~a·_-ii-142 .. ~~~ .. -r ............... ~o:'i'834 ................ r ............... ~ii-:ii568 .............. . 
!-statistics (-0.9196) i (-4.8539) ! (-0.5939) i (-0.7838) 
..................... sm:........... .. ............... o:oJ'i·; .. ·~-~~- .. r .............. o.:ii329 .. ~~~-T ............. o:a25·i· ............. r .............. o.:ii·2-99 .. ~~~ .. -
t-•tatistics (2.6213) i (3.539.5) I (1 .6182) I (3.8037) 
::::::::::::::;.::.:~:.~:::::::::::::: :::::::::::::(::~~1~~~::~:~:::::::~.::::::::::;:.~~~;~;~::::::::::::r:::::::::::::,:.:~~7.t.~~~:::~:~~::::r::::::::::~~~;:~~-:::::::::::::: 
NDTS -2 . .'5.573 ••• i -2.460.'5 ••• i -2.1709 "'"''" i -1.2201 "'"' 
............. .t.:.s.~~t.~.t.ic..s. .......................... (:.3._,_1_?.?.U ................ i ............. (:~.,~.l..~-~t ............. l. .......... J:.~:!.!?.~). ............... J ......... J:~.,~.?J.l.t ............ . 
UQ -0.0.591 .... ! -0.0433 .... i -0.0682 ....... I -0.0040 .. .. 
.............. !.:.S.~~ts. ......................... J:.~~:~~;~"""""""'i"""""J:~~~::~-"""""'"'i""""'"{:.~~:J~:~""""""""i"""'".J:~~:~~;; ..............  
!-statistics (1.1816) i (-0.1887) i {-0.5280) I {1.3118) 
.................. ;;~; .................................... :.ii:6497 .. ·~-~~ .... T ................ ~o-_iii99 .. -~~~ .. T ................ :.ii:35'i'3 .. :~~ .... r ............... ~o-:2452--~~-..... . 
!-statistics (-.5.68.53) i (-6.6146) i (-:1.8176) I (-2.4488) 
'- .MJI.t2 ,.,,.,,., -- ,, .. ,.,,.' q:~6.~ J 0.36}_~ ' L ' '-· _0.~~~2.- ·--··I .... --- 0.2028 
No. ofobs. 277 584 I 211 l 187 
Levemge,,= ~~ + ~1TANGi .. + ~JPROFi .. +~,SIZE;. .. + ~:GROWi .. + ~,NDTSi•• + ~rUQi .. + ~:VOLt •• + ~PP,., + .,._, 
The t-ltah.ltics 11111 the t-wlues adjusted for heteroscedasticity consistent stlllldlutl. errors.lndustry dummies 
11111 included in order to control for industry effect but no statisticllily significant effect wu found. See Tabl8 
3.1 and 3.3 and Section 3.4.1 for the definition of the variabl8s. 
"', "'"', "''"'" SignifiCant at 1 0':1., .5Y. and 1':1. !eve~ respectively 
The insignificant relationships found in other sample countries can be explained 
by tight family held and concentrated ownership. Firms in East Asian countries appear 
to have close relationships with their lenders which lead to a reduced need for collateral. 
Zhang (2003) finds that many Asian banks are controlled by a single family who also 
own many non-financial firms. Claessens et al. (2003) show that the percentage of firms 
with bank ownership is large in Malaysia and Thailand. Moreover, Malaysian firms are 
over-dependent on banks; therefore, firms can get access to bank loans easily without 
collateral. For Singapore, banks are not allowed to own firms directly; however, 
Singaporean firms are dominated by government. In addition, weak corporate 
governance and lack of bank supervision can also lead to unsound lending. All of these 
OWn~rship characteristics mean that firms in East Asi~- countries have't'ess'-i:ieed to 
provide collateral when they borrow. 
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Profitability is uniformly found to be negatively related to debt for all sample 
countries as suggested by the pecking order theory that firms rely on internal financing 
sources and have less need for external finance. However, the relationship is statistically 
significant only in Malaysia. It can also be assumed that Malaysian firms might have 
high financial slack to use when they need financing. The majority of insignificant 
relationships found for other sample countries is in contrast to the fmdings of previous 
studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Zoppa and McMahon, 2002; 
Cassar and Holmes, 2003). One possible explanation for this is that previous studies 
focus only on a limited set of variables while equation (3 .1) includes additional finn-
specific variables overcoming a possible omitted variables problem in the earlier 
studies.49 The insignificant relationship found does not suggest that firms in this region 
do not follow the pecking order theory because profitability is not the only variable that 
can be used to test the predictions of the pecking order theory. The evidence may be 
picked up by other variables such as liquidity. 
Firm size is found to be positively related to debt for all sample countries, in line 
with the trade-off and agency theories and is also consistent with the findings of 
previous studies (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Pandey, 2001; Prasad et 
al., 2003). The positive relationship implies that larger firms have higher debt capacity 
than smaller firms because they normally fail less, have smaller bankruptcy costs, 
smaller agency costs of debt, less volatile cash flow, lower interest rates and lower 
informational costs, are more diversified, and have easier access to bank credit. The 
relationship between finn size and leverage is weakest in Singapore because of high 
government support in Singapore. Singaporean firms are dominated by government; 
49 A restricted version of equation (3 .1) with only four conventional firm-specific variables as in Raj an 
and Zingales (1995) was estimated. The results confirm a significant negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage in all sample countries showing that the findings presented in this chapter are 
not data specific. 
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therefore, firms face lower risks of financial distress and lower level of solvency 
regardless of their size and also perform better with close guidance from government. 
Growth opportunity is found to be negatively related to debt at significance level 
for all countries except Australia but the relationship is statistically significant only for 
Thailand and Singapore. The negative and significant relationships found give support 
to agency theory and market timing theory and are also consistent with previous studies 
(Zoppa and McMahon, 2002). The results imply that Thai and Singaporean firms with 
high growth might try to use less debt because of high agency costs of debt especially in 
Thailand where the risk of expropriation is high (as shown in Table 2.4). These firms 
also do not want to lose the opportunity of investing in positive net present value 
projects by committing themselves to use debt that might come with possible 
restrictions imposed by lenders. This is also consistent with the fact that countries in this 
region are growing; therefore, firms would not want to lose any opportunities when they 
arise. Moreover, it is shown that firms do time the market. When market value is high, 
firms tend to issue equity rather than debt. 
Non-debt tax shield is uniformly found to be negatively related to debt for all 
countries at a highly significance level, consistent with earlier research 
(Wiwattanakantang, 1999) and the trade-off theory. The results imply that firms use 
non-debt tax shields to reduce their corporate tax payments. Liquidity is found to be 
uniformly and highly significantly negatively related to debt as expected for all 
countries. This shows that firms in this region have substantial amounts of liquidity 
which they can use to finance their investment instead of raising external finance giving 
support to the pecking order theory. Earnings volatility appears to have no significant 
effect on leverage for all sample countries which is also consistent with the findings of 
\ViwatfaHakru1iang (1999) and Aritorliou -enil. (2002).- Tlie-results'osuggest'risk; 'financial-- -
distress costs and the costs of entering into liquidity are so low that they can be ignored. 
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It might imply that these firms are risk-neutral and do not take into account of risk or 
earnings volatility in deciding their financing mix. If firms are operating below their 
debt capacity, or if ownership structure is highly concentrated, earnings volatility has no 
effect on firms' capacity for borrowing. Share price performance is uniformly found to 
be negatively related to debt for all sample countries giving strong support to the market 
timing theory. This suggests that firms issue equity after share prices increase. 
In conclusion, the cross-sectional results from Table 3.5 show the variations 
across sample countries which can be explained by the differences in corporate 
governance. However, in general the results are consistent with the findings of previous 
studies and give support to capital structure theories. The results confirm the significant 
role of firm-specific characteristics in determining the capital structure of firms in this 
region. In general, among the four conventional firm-specific variables, tangibility and 
firm size are found to be positively related to debt while profitability and growth 
opportunity are found to be negatively related to debt. In addition, the results show that 
firm-specific variables other than the four conventional variables such as non-debt tax 
shield, liquidity and share price performance are also found to be inversely related to 
debt at significance levels giving support to the pecking order, market timing and trade-
off theories. However, earnings volatility appears to have no significant effect on firms 
in this region. These findings are consistent with the results from most previous 
empirical studies. Therefore, it can be concluded that firms in the Asia Pacific region 
determine their capital structure based on the same factors as firms in other regions and 
those factors affect the use of debt in the same direction. However, some variations can 
be explained by the differences in institutional, legal and corporate governance among 
sample countries such as ownership structure, rule of law and legal system and might 
· possibly be due to the effect of the financial crisis:These will be further investigatedoin···· 
the next sections. 
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3.6.2 The Effect of the Financial Crisis on Firm-Specific Determinants: Cross-
Sectional Analysis 
As stated earlier, one of the objectives of this chapter is to examine the possible 
effects of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 on the importance of various determinants 
of capital structure. To achieve this, the full sample is divided into two sub-samples: 
pre- and post-crisis periods. The dependent variable for pre-crisis (post-crisis) period is 
the leverage of 1996 (200 1) while the explanatory variables are the averages of 1993-
1995 (1998-2000). The Wald statistic is estimated to examine whether there has been 
any significant change in the role of the explanatory variables due to the financial crisis 
of 1997. The cross-sectional results for pre- and post-crisis periods are presented in 
Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 : Cro11-tecdonal anal)'llil offirm-IJieclfil: dell!nninanlll of caphalttrutture: Pre- 8Jid pott-crilil periodt 
Varlalllet Thailand Mala )'Ilia Singapore Autfnllia 
Pre-Crilil Post-Crilil Pre-Crilil Pott-Crilil Pre-Crilil Po1t-Crilil Pre-Crilil Potf-Crilil 
-(1!19J - 1!1!16) (1!1!18- 2001) (1!1!13- 1!1!16) (1!1!18- 2001) (1!1!13- 1!1!16) (1!1!18 - 2001) -(1!1!13 - 1!1!111) (1!1!18- 2001) 
Conttant 0.4100 .... 0.2374 0.2218 0.3390 ••• 0.4677 •• 0.2482 0.1240 -0.1700 • 
1-statistil:s (2.8.522) (1.1490) (1.4661) (2.8672) (VI498) (1.1806) (0.6704) (-1.8024) 
Weld Test <2.03915> <8.9291> ••• <1.9829> <2.8808>. 
TANG 0.00915 0.0830 -0.0626 0.09.56 0.1307 0.003.5 -0.0236 0.1919 •• 
1-slatistil:s (0.1208) (0.6469) (-0.9886) (1.4403) (!.Om) (0.0336) (-0.1646) (2.5558) 
WlllrlTest <0.9036:> <0.368.5» <0.0013:> <1.6095> ·-
........................... 1-----·--···-
PROF 
-0.50.58 ·- -0.5563 .... -0.6971 ••• -0.4521 ••• -0.1173 -0.2695 0.0201 -0.0772 
1-slatistil:s (-2.7392) (-3.0813) (-5.0258) (-4.9134) (-0.3013) (-1.0071) (0.3069) (-0.8626) 
Weld Test <0.1346> <18.5424> ••• <1.8382> <0.8423> 
.................. ..... ,. .... ..... ........................... 
SIZE 0.0120 0.0328 -· 0.0130 0.0192 •• -0.00615 0.0246. 0.0078 0.03115 ·-
1-stalistil:s (1.4604) (2.6475) (1.2467) (2.46154) (-0.5300) (1.7090) (0.4773) (4.2.547) 
WlllrlTesl <9.9026> -· <6.4001> •• <4.288.5> •• <15.6852> ·-
... ... ............... -.......... 
GROW -0.0.540- -0.0872 -0.00.57 -0.0440 .... -0.0.561 •• -0.0723 ••• 0.0007 -0.0002 
1-statistil:s (-3.0712) (-1.6290) (-1.187.5) (-2.7380) (-2.4923) (-3.0949) (09266) (-0.4141) 
Weld Test <.5.94.51>- ~-0.722.5 
<22.1087> ••• I ---------- <0.77.54> <0.1480> 
-- ·----- :i:6209 •• ...................................... NDTS -0.8.5.52 -2.5251 .... -1.92.54 -U163 •• -0.39.52 
-1.1701 ·-
1-slatistil:s (-1.2718) (-2.384.5) (-1.0257) (-3.6835) (-1.4516) (-23077) (-0.8426) (-4.0655) 
Weld Test <.5.7658>- <209707> ••• <4.8766> •• <11.1914> ·-................................... ........................................ _ ... . ........... ........... __ ...... 
IlQ -0.0301 • 
-0.0786 -· -0.0049 -0.0565 ••• -0.0327 .. -0.063.5 ...... -0.0023 -0.0042 •• 
1-statistil:s (-1.7730) (-2.6220) (-0.4409) (-3.89.52) (-1.7128) (-2.9362) (-03902) (-2.2897) 
Weld Test <21..5140,. ..... <85.8641> ••• <4.4432> ... <3.2021> •• 
VOL 0.0003 0.0024. 0.0005 -0.0008 0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0010 0.0013 ........ 
!-statistics (0.628.5) (1.7121) (02063) (-0.4453) (0.3750) (-042.53) (-08342) (0.7458) 
Weld Test <3.6780>. <03360,. <0.6786> <1.1299> 
. ······························ I······ -- - .......................... _. . .................... ·····-···· 
SPP -0.3096 .... -0.1899 ..... -0.1945 ..... -0.2.587 ••• -0.12.53 • -0.3017 .... 0.0221 -0.2464 ...... 
1-slatistil:s (-5.4233) (~3.3197) (-2.6996) (-7.0460) (-1.7625) (-3.6024) (02067) (-4.6967) 
Weld Test <.5.3208> •• <3.62.52> .. <6.8993:> ••• <3.5.4607> ..... 
AAIJ~l 0.4409 
.. 0,~1119 ........ 0.2321 0.4393 0.2346 0.3J12~ ...... ...... . :0,1172_ 0.3042 
No. ofob1. 191 277 235 .584 105 211 19 187 
l.eveJ11&81•= ~~ + ~l TANG,,.+ ~~PROFi,. +~,SIZE,,.+ ll:OROW1., + ~,NDTS,., + ~Q1., + ~sVOL,,. + ll.m'P1,. + r.;, 
The l-51ali5tic5 are the 1-vallllls adjusted for heteroscedastil:ity consistent st&lldard emns. Industry dummies are iru::luded in o!der to control for industry 
··effie! but ilo slatistil:ally significant e!Thci\WS fbund: Weld test (chi-square distllbuted with I de~~~:~~e a~ freedom) is used to _find whe!):~er.the difl'ete111:es 
ofthe coeffu:ients beiW8en pre- and post-crisis periods lll1l statistil:lllly signifu:ant or lUll. See Teble 3.1 and 3.3 and Section 3.4.1 forth.. de'fmitiOn ofihi- · 
wriebles. 
•. -. ••• Significant at 10%. 5)1, and Ill, leve~ Jespectiwly 
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The results show that the crisis appears to have had a significant effect on capital 
structure decisions. In general, first, the significances of some firm-specific 
determinants such as firm size, non-debt tax shield, and liquidity found in the whole 
sample period are driven by significant relationships from the post-crisis period. 
Second, other firm-specific variables, including tangibility, profitability and earnings 
volatility, appear to be statistically unaffected by the crisis. Last, where the determinants 
are significantly related to leverage for both pre- and post-crisis periods, the coefficients 
have different impacts between the two periods for variables such as share price 
performance. 
The crisis appears to have had a significant impact on the role of firm size. The 
coefficients are insignificant before the crisis but became significant after the crisis 
indicating that firms are more concerned with survival and the higher probability of 
bankruptcy after the crisis. Lenders are more willing to lend to larger firms than to 
smaller because of the lower default risk. In particular, Singaporean firms are dominated 
by government; therefore, they are protected more and are at less risk of financial 
distress. However, after the crisis, as in other countries, lenders were more concerned 
about survival and tended to lend to larger firms to reduce the risk of bankruptcy. In 
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, the reorganization procedure dos not impose 'an 
automatic stay on the assets' of firms on filing the reorganization petition as shown in 
Table 2.5; therefore, creditors may race to seize the assets which further lead to an 
increase in financial distress and bankruptcy in these countries. Therefore, in order to be 
safe, creditors prefer to lend only to large firms. 
The roles of growth opportunity and impact from the crisis appear to differ across 
sample countries. In Thailand, growth opportunity is found to be negatively related to 
debt'at'significance level oefore the ocrisi~fbut became insignificant after the crisis: This-
shows that, after the crisis, growth opportunities reduced and there was less concern for 
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underinvestment. Moreover, after the crisis investors can no longer rely on the increase 
or decrease in market value of firms because it varies depending on how firms coped 
with the crisis. Therefore, the market timing behaviour reduced after the crisis. In 
contrast to Thai firms, growth opportunity originally is found not to be related to debt at 
significance level. However, after the crisis it became an important determinant of 
capital structure for Malaysian firms. It shows that Malaysian firms recovered from the 
crisis better than Thai firms and have higher growth opportunities than Thai firms. 
Therefore, in order to avoid underinvestment, Malaysian firms will use less debt when 
they have high growth opportunities. In addition, after the crisis, firms have to concern 
themselves more with revenue and expenses and survival. A negative relationship found 
for the post-crisis period implies that Malaysian firms do not want to commit 
themselves to debt because growth opportunities cannot provide immediate revenue and 
have limited collateral or liquidation value. The evidence shows that Malaysian firms 
are risk takers and decided to take chances in the movements of their market value due 
to the financial crisis by issuing equity when market value was high relative to book 
value. The evidence also shows that growth opportunity was the significant determinant 
of capital structure for Singaporean firms and the crisis had no significant effect on this 
relationship. On the other hand, it is found that growth opportunity has no relationship 
with debt at all for the full sample or either sub-sample for Australian firms. This 
implies that Australian firms do not consider growth opportunity when they determine 
their capital structure. If market to book ratio is a proxy to test market timing theory, it 
also shows that Australian firms do not time the market by issuing equity when market 
to book ratio is high. 
Non-debt tax shield is found to be negatively related to debt because of tax 
deductibility benefit. The results are very robust across sample countries. The 
relationship is found to be insignificant before the crisis but became significant after the 
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crisis because the crisis has lead to higher costs of borrowing and bankruptcy risk; 
therefore, firms try alternative ways to minimize their tax expenses. The results show a 
significant influence of the financial crisis on the relationship between liquidity and 
leverage. For Thailand and Singapore, liquidity is found to be consistently and 
negatively related to debt for both sub-samples. This shows that Thai and Singaporean 
firms do use liquid assets to finance their investments first before looking for finance 
from other external sources. The Wald test shows that the coefficients increased 
significantly after the crisis indicating that these firms rely more on using liquid assets 
to finance their investments instead of debt probably because the cost of borrowing 
became higher after the crisis. On the other hand, for Malaysia and Australia the 
coefficients are found to be insignificant before the crisis but became significant after 
the crisis implying that costs of external financing are cheaper before the crisis for 
Malaysia and Australia than in Thailand and Singapore. Therefore, although firms have 
liquid assets, they prefer using external finance to following the pecking order theory. 
Share price performance was uniformly found to be negatively related to debt for 
both sub-samples for all countries except Australia where an insignificant relationship 
was found for the pre-crisis period. It shows that before the crisis, Australian firms did 
not move along with the trend and did not time the market movement. However, after 
the crisis, there was a big movement in the share price; therefore, Australian firms gave 
more consideration to the movement of the share price leading to a negative 
relationship. On the other hand, negative and significant relationships found in other 
sample countries for both sub-samples show strong support to the market timing theory. 
Although consistently related to leverage for both sub-samples, the role of share price 
performance on leverage is found to be significantly influenced by the crisis as well. 
-Tlie W ald -test shows 'tnat the Values -before lmd after the'' crisis· for· those countries· are· 
significantly different from each other. However, the differences are in different 
150 
directions. The coefficient decreased significantly for Thailand. The crisis originated in 
Thailand leading to the loss of confidence in firms. Therefore, Thai firms found it more 
difficult to issue equity when share prices were overvalued leading to the decline in the 
coefficient. In addition, there is revaluation of assets; therefore, the overvaluation is less 
severe leading to reduced use of market timing. In contrast, the coefficient increased 
significantly for Malaysia and Singapore. This implies that after the crisis asymmetric 
information may have been more severe in Malaysia and Singapore than in Thailand. 
When there is asymmetric information, investors will require discount. The discount 
will be very little if firms issue equity rights after share prices increase. 
In summary, the sub-sample results from Table 3.6 reveal that firm-specific 
factors that influence capital structure decisions are significantly driven by changes in 
economic condition such as the financial crisis. The analysis of sub-samples shows that 
firms' reliance on some of these variables changed after the crisis because the crisis 
increased the risk of bankruptcy and costs of financing. In addition, the impact of the 
crisis also appears to differ to different degrees across the sample countries necessitating 
the investigation of the role of differences in economic conditions, corporate 
governance and institutional settings. 
3.6.3 Firm-Specific Determinants and the Effect of the Financial Crisis: Panel 
Analysis 
In this section, the investigation of the firm-specific determinants of capital 
structure and its effect from the crisis is performed using panel analysis as in equation 
(3.2). Table 3.7, Panel A, presents the results of estimating equation (3.2) for the dataset 
that contains firms in all four sample countries using pooled time-series cross-sectional 
-re-gre'ssions of leverage ratios on fi'firi-sp'eCific variables. · 
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Table 3. 7 : Panel ~u of the fina-8pec:i& de1erminan:ls of capi1alstrw:tue 
Panel A : Pooled 4 coun'lries I Panel B : Coun'lries least aSiec1ed by the emu I Panel c : Coun'lries most aSiec'led by the emu 
Equation I Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis I Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis I Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
(1993- :Z001) (1993- 1996) (1993- :Z001) (1993- :ZOOl) (19!13- 1!1!16) (1!1!13- :ZOO I) (1!1!13- :ZOOl) (1993- 1996) (1!193- :ZOOl) 
..... ~;;;:. ..... L_J~.~~~~~---:.:.: ........... J.~.~~~~~~--.:.:.: ........... J.~.;~~;~~~--.:.:.: .. .I. ...... J.:.i~?.~~~~--: ............... J.~.9~~~~~---·······-····--·J~.~~~~~~---=-:t ...... J.:~~~~~:.:: ......... J _;~~~~--~---········-~=.9~~~~~ ....... _, 
TANG 
t-st.a.tistil:s 
0.0815 ••• 
(3.2100) 
0.0414 
(1.4800) 
0.1014 ••• 
(3.4000) 
0.1572 ••• 
(4.2400) 
0.1193 ••• 
(2.8300) 
0.1876-
(4.3700) 
0.0082 
(0.2550) 
-0.0460 
(-1.3700) 
0.0107 
(0.2820) 
Wald Test <11.5931> *** <2.5297> <0.0797> 
·····-··-·-···············- ·-············-··~-·-·············----·············--·-············-·-·-···········--···-·-···· ·······---·············---···············-----············-----·············-.. ···-············ .. ---············ .. -·-···················-···········-·--·-············-----···········---
PROF -0.2327 -• -0.0581 * -0.2996 *** -0.0830 *** -0.0161 -0.1733 -• -0.3588 •- -0.7762 *** -0.3353 *** 
t-st.a.tistil:s (-5.1900) (-1.9200) (-7.2200) (-2.7400) (-1.0900) (-3.6100) (-8.1400) (-9.2000) (-7.3000) 
Wald Test <33.9203> *** <13.0057> *** <92.1108> *** 
·····---····--··············· ·-···········----····-··""''''''""'"'"''""'"''"''-·-·-"''"""''-"''''-"'''"''"--""' ....... - ................ _ ...... _ ..................... _ ........................................ - ............................................................................ - ................. - .................. , ____ ,,, ................ 1 
SIZE 0.0506 *** 0.0331 *** 0.0553 *** 0.0294 *** 0.0190 *** 0.0374 -• 0.0502 *** 0.0348 *** 0.0492 "'** 
t-st.a.tistil:s (13.1000) (7.5900) (13.0000) (6.5400) (3.4100) (7.0800) (9.3800) (5.3800) (9.1400) 
WaldTest <27.0943> *** <12.1429> -• <7.1767> *** 
......... G"iiovi' ...... _ ..... ~(J:ooci9-;· .......... - ... --:ri:oiiD6-;;;:· ......... ----:-a:ooo4·-·--··· ·· .. ···--:o~ooo2 ____ ................ ii':ooo4 ...... ___ , __ .......... a:ooo'i ...................... _.~a:o'io6 --.................. ~a:o'io3 .... ; ............... -:o:D2:sa· .. ;;:;;.;.·' 
t-st.a.tistil:s (-1.8900) (-2.3500) (-0.4370) (-0.7760) (1.2200) (0.1430) (-1.4800) (-2.3500) (-3.2900) 
Wald Test <0.0550> <0.0204> <3.9386> ** 
................................... ·-············----·-----······--··--·---·------···--··--···-·--------·--··--····---------------···----··----·-----·----···· ....... -......................................................................................................................................................... -.............................................. - ............................................... .. 
NDTS -0.1161 0.1242 -0.3209 -0.6221 *** -0.1749 -0.8588 -• 0.4333 1.7798 *** 0.1024 
t-statistil:s (-0.6430) (0.5240) (-1.4700) (-2.7900) (-1.0400) (-3.1000) (1.5100) (5.0700) (0.3320) 
Wald Te>t <2.1738> <9 .6019> *** <29 .6191> *** 
................................... ·-·········--------·-··-----·········----·-·------·--·······--·-·-----·--................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... : 
UQ -0.0141 *** -0.0048 ** -0.0190 '""'* -0.0051 *** -0.0011 -0.0058 -• · -0.0273 *** -0.0075 ** -0.0434 *** 
t-st.a.tistil:s (-5.1400) (-2.0700) (-4.6800) (-2.9400) (-0.4600) (-3.4000) (-4.3600) (-2.5600) (-4.0800) 
Wald Test <12.3298> *** <11.5475> *** <11.4153> *** 
.............................. --·-······--··-------·--·--··----······· ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ .. 
VOL 0.0014 *** 0.0010 ** 0.0017 *** 0.0007 * 0.0005 0.0010 *** 0.0014 *** 0.0002 0.0017 *** 
t-st.a.tistil:s (4.1700) (2.3100) (4.2400) (1.9000) (0.88.50) (2.9500) (3.4700) (0.4840) (32700) 
Wald Test <3.5887> * <8.7224> *** <10.7086> ••• 
...... _ .......................... ·-····--·· ........ _ ............................................. _,_ ................................................................................................................................................................................ ,_ ................... - ........................................................................................................................ .. 
SPP -0.0064 * -0.0250 ** -0.0015 -OD144 ** 0.0347 ** -0.0256 -• -0.0032 -0.0478 *** 0.0057 
t-st.a.tistil:s (-1.7600) (-2.2100) (-0.2930) (-2.1700) (2.2300) (-3.2300) (-0.7570) (-3.6500) (0.9380) 
Wald Test <19.7515> *** <57.9771> *** <76.6208> -• 
......... ~--~~ .......... _ ............ g.,~~.!.~ ............................... g.:.!.~~ ............................... g.,~Q~.L ............................ g_,~g~~ ............................. g.:.!.~.!.?. ............................. g.,~~.!.?. ........................... g:~?.!l-~ ............................. g.,~~?.~ ............................. g.~~~~ ............ , 
No. ofob•. 7541 1868 4780 2395 644 1491 5146 1224 3289 
Leverap ,=~.+~,TANG +~.PROF,+ ~,SIZE,+ ~,GROW,+ ~.NDTS + ~,UQ, + ~.VOL + ~.,SPP ,+ a.+ 11. 
Tlu! t-~t<lli~l:ic.s .ue tlu! t-values adjusted for lu!temsced.a.>ticity comistem st.uul.a.Jd eno:rs. I:adushy dummies .ue ilu:luded in onler to control for Utdushy efFect but = st.a.tistil:ally sipUfu:ant 
effect was fomui. Wald test (clD.->qnarl! ctismhrted with 1 aer;me of fl'l!edcm) is used to f'mi whi!ther the mffel'l!m::es of the coefF~rients briwl!en pl'l!- and post-aisis period> """ st.a.tistil:ally 
sipUf~~:ant or I:IDt. See Table 3.1 and 3.3 ami Sectiol\3.4.1 for tlu! aefizlitioll oftlu! variables. 
*, -, *** Sigrrif'~~:ant at 1 OY., 5% and 1% level, l'l!spectively 
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The results show that for the full sample period leverage is positively related to 
tangibility, firm size, and earnings volatility while negatively related to profitability, 
growth opportunity, liquidity and share price performance. In general, these 
relationships appear to be consistent with capital structure theories and the results are 
quite robust to the cross-sectional analysis. Like cross-sectional analysis, the financial 
crisis is found to significantly affect the role of each firm-specific variable in 
determining the capital structure of a firm. 
Apart from being a test of robustness for a cross-sectional analysis, the use of 
panel analysis offers the opportunities to further divide the sample countries into two 
sub-groups with regard to how severely they were hit by the crisis (and their level of 
market development), (i) countries least affected by the crisis (Singapore and Australia) 
and (ii) countries most affected by the crisis (Thailand and Malaysia). Table 3.7, Panels 
B and C, presents the results of estimating equation (3 .2) for the dataset that contains 
firms in the two country groupings using pooled time series cross-sectional regressions 
of leverage ratios on firm-specific variables. Although the results are quite robust to the 
cross-sectional analysis, the variations across countries in the previous sections are 
made clearer by the use of country groupings. The results show that firms rely on firm-
specific characteristics differently depending on the severity of the impact of the crisis 
on the market; this is except for firm size and earnings volatility for which relationships 
with leverage appear to be similar between both country groupings. The differences are 
not only in the attitude of the role of the firm-specific determinants but also in the 
direction of how it relates to leverage. 
Tangibility is found to play a significant role for firms in countries least affected 
by the crisis while it plays no role for countries most affected. The results suggest that 
-ilfthe Hitter group, firms are riot required to~ provide ·any collateral'when they borrow. 
This might be due to high ownership concentrations in these countries. On the other 
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hand, firms in countries least affected by the crisis have arms-length relationships with 
lenders; therefore, collateral is important. The results also show that the crisis has no 
impact on the role of tangibility in determining capital structure. Although profitability 
is found to be negatively related for the full sample for both country groupings, the sub-
sample results reveal that profitability did not play any role in determining capital 
structure for firms in the countries least affected by the crisis during the pre-crisis 
period. This implies that firms did not follow the pecking order when they financed 
before the crisis. However, the crisis has made firms in both country groupings more 
aware of the available options and also of tax expenses leading to a more significant 
relationship between profitability and firm leverage after the crisis. 
Growth opportunity appears to play no role in determining capital structure for 
firms in the countries least affected by the crisis while the relationship is negative and 
significant for firms in countries most affected by the crisis. Similarly, non-debt tax 
shield also plays an opposite role between the two country groupings. In countries least 
affected by the crisis, the trade-off theory based on the tax hypothesis is supported. 
When the non-debt tax shield is high, firms tend to issue more equity. However, the 
evidence is driven by the crisis. In countries most affect by the crisis, the relationship is 
found to be positive for pre-crisis period for firms. However, after the crisis, no 
significant role is found. Liquidity and earnings volatility appear to play similar roles in 
both country groupings except for the insignificant relationship detected during the pre-
crisis period for countries least affected by the crisis. In addition, the crisis has 
significantly increased the role of both liquidity and earnings volatility. In contrast, 
share price performance has a different role in firms' financing decisions between the 
two country groupings. The market timing theory is supported more by countries least 
affected by the crisis or countries with mote "filatufed stockmarkets. 
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In summary, dividing the sample into two country groupmgs provides new 
insights into the role of each firm-specific determinant on firms' financing decisions. 
The findings reveal that firms in different country groupings or different market 
development do behave differently. The evidence from countries least affected by the 
crisis also supports capital structure theories more. As expected, the crisis affected the 
role of firm-specific determinants differently depending on the severity of the crisis. It 
appears that the crisis made firms behave more closely to, or be more aware of, the 
predictions of capital structure theories. 
3.6.4 Country-Specific Determinants: Panel Analysis 
3.6.4.1 Market-Wide Determinants 
Table 3.8 presents the results of estimating equation (3.2) with the inclusion of 
country dummies and market-wide factors as discussed in Section 3.4.2, using panel 
data that combine all firms across all sample countries over the whole sample period to 
show the aggregate effects of market-wide determinants on leverage ratios. Market-
wide factors include economic development, bank development, stock market 
development, inflation, level of interest rates, term structure of interest rates, and equity 
premmm. 
Overall, the results present similar relationships between firm-specific variables 
and leverage to the cross-sectional results from the previous section. All three country 
dummies are significantly different from zero suggesting that corporate capital structure 
decisions are significantly influenced by country-specific factors. However, similar to 
the role of firm-specific determinants, the role of market-wide determinants may vary 
depending on how severely the sample countries were hit by the crisis, and thus 
estimating across all countries may be "misle-ading as effeCts iriay-canceh~ach other out 
in the full set of sample countries as in Table 3.8. 
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&J...&a Moclal-1 MoH!al-2 Model-3 Model-4 Model-l Modal-6 Moclel-T Model-S 
Coutant -0.1207 • -0.3364 ••• -0.3893 ...... -02616 ••• -0 . .3697 ... -0.4S6:Z ... -0.3099 ••• -0.3590 ••• 
~amtir:o ···- __{:_LB.500) ______ (:5.S60Qj _________ H,~400!__ _________ I:.~.o!!900l ____ !.:!._~l--·----~-8.0900) --·-·- (-5.0300) ____ (-5.9600) --·· 
TANG 0.0633 ... O.D700 ••• OD76:Z "* 0.0882 ••• 0.0820 ..., O.OS03 ... 0.0727 ••• O.OSOl ••• 
_____ _t_:l_l•lut_i<._~_ ...... _____ J.~.:~!~---··-·-·····P:~L ____________ (2,~QL _________________ p_,~~) ______________ J:.!,~) __________________ .J3.2300l ___________________ (~,~L. _______ .i3.:!_1!QQL __ _ 
PROP -0.2734 ••• -0.2:265 ••• -O.D03 ... -0.23.57 ••• -0.2328 ... -0.2343 ... -a.ms ... -o.nn ... 
__ 1-olatio_l_i<.! _______ (~,BBOOL._ ___ J:~l!!Ql ______ ..!.:~1800) ________ f:.3.:}_~ ___ J.:S..c~------ (-5.0900) ________ J:.~J~--------(:_5.1.500) __ 
SlZl! 0.0308 ••• OD473 ••• 0.0511 ••• 0.0455 ••• 0.0505 ... 0.0438 ... 0.04!16 ••• 0.0418 ... 
1-olatu!i<L.-.. _.(!,~300) ___ (!2.100Dj _____ f!;!.QQQL __ (I_!_,!CJQ!ll _ _____1!_3..:!..09.QL ___ (10.9000) ____ (12.!1!100) ___ JE~L __ 
CROW -0.0009 • -0.0010 " -0.0010 •• -O.OIJ06 -0.0009 • -0.0001 -ll.0011 •• -ll.OOOB • 
______ t.:.'l•lul~---·- . ____ !.:!,~~QQL. _________________ J:.~:?1!lfll ...... __________ !.:.!:~t .................... I:)..:.!.~l ...... _ .............. !:_1_,~L .... ___ .... J:_1_,~~L .. ________ J:.~}_l.QQL ________ (:!,!QQQL .... ___ _ 
NMS -ll.5713- -ll.D825 -OD689 -ll.3320 •• -0.1144 -0.2820 • -0.0669 -0.1756 
_ __l_:llaml_i<.! __ -----~.:..l!l.Ql_ ________ _(:Q;~-~---·- (-0.3760) ______ (:)~~.Q_O) _____ j_:Q,~~-QL.. ___ _(-1.6.500) _____ _1-0~_I!L_ ____ (-ll.992(Jl__ __ 
UQ -ll.01SS ••• -0.0143 ... -0.0140 •- -ll.Ol45 ••• -0.0141 ••• -0.0145 ••• -0.0141 ••• -0.0143 •-
1-olatiJtir:o (-5.4800)__ __ (-52000) ~liDO) (-5.25_QQ) __ _!.:_U_JOQL (-5.2.500) (-5.131J1)) __ ~.1900) 
VOL 0.0012 ••• 0.0014 - 0.0014 ... 0.0014 - 0.0014 - 0.0014 "* 0.0014 - 0.0014c;;,;-
_____ l:.!_l&lioli<o ___ -------~!l.P.QL ____ ~,~----···--·-(~,!!!!Ill-. _____ ..... (U~QL ____ ~_l_ ____ _l42000l _____ J~!~9.QL _____ ~~-
sPP -0.0017 -ll.D048 -ll.OOS3 -0.0011 -0.0058 0.0047 -ll.OOS6 O.OIJ06 
_____ t.:!~.~~io_t!<.~ __ .. _J:'!:~~1-~l ______ !.:l~.!QQL ____ -·-· I:1_~QQL _____ i:!l.:~----·---·-J:!,l.~L-·-·-·····-·J1_~l._ -·- _I:l~~L- ______ @:!_~1.1:1L ...... _ 
l1IDUM 0.1985 ••• 
-----~.:!~-~)_ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _ 
MLDUM O.D395 ... 
····-~.!.~~!'.!.~---·· ____ .(!~.QQQ~---·-·····-···---·····-····--······-···-.......... _________________ .. ,_ 
SPDUM 0.0477 ••• 
1-olalulio:o ........ ····-·····E:?_~L ... ························-·-········-·············-- ·····························-···· l!l)EV OD538 ••• 
1--·-'-1-=•l=•lillll:::::::-:" ''-----~------- (4.4200) -·----::-::-::-::-::-c-:-----··-·-------------··----------------
BKDI!V 0.0070 ••• 
f--··...!.:•l•mli<• __ ---·----··---·-·-·--··---------·J:.!!:5.QO_J ----·---·-------·--····-----·--·--·--------------------·· 
MKDEV -0.0166-
--·----~-:!~.!.~~.!.~.~--- ........... - .......................................... --.. -·-·------··-----·---·------------- .... l:.~.:~~--.. --------·- ............ -········-------------- ........................ _______ .............. __________________ _ 
0.0011-
(4.1400) 
lNT 0.0190 ••• 
t-stUistiCI -----~.:7~-----------·------
ll!liM 0.0035 -
___ !:1_1~1!"..~----------------···---··-----··---···---··------·-··--------------J.~,~~L ________ _ 
EQPK -ll.D062 ••• 
1-olati>tir:o ( -6.0100) 
Lo .. np_,= ~:+~ . .TANG.,+ ~,PROF._.+ ~.SIZE .• + ~.GROW.+ ~,NDTS + ~-LIQ ,+ ~.VOL.+ ~-SPP .. + ~-MAI!UT-WIDE FACTORS.+ 11. + IJ.. 
Market-wide datermilwlt1 ntp!.ce country dommiet orut .t ~ time.Tlw 1-ltatillicl an tlw t-nbt1 mjusted for hetetoscedistirity comistmt stmdud enon. Inb:try dummies uw 
Wblad ill o:rdar to conbo1 for indwtry eff1c:t ~~ 110 statistU:.Uy Jiplifh=ct 1fFec:t wu fbwul. Ste Tibla 3.1 Uld 3.3 &nd Sachon3.4 fb:r the definition oftM vuilbles. 
•, ...... Sicnificmt &t 1 OY"' S% &nd 1% lanl. Jetpectift1y 
In addition, the aggregate effects from Table 3.8 may hide conflicting country-
specific influences that some determinants may have on leverage ratio. Therefore, the 
sample countries are subsequently divided into two groups, countries least affected and 
countries most affected by the Asian crisis. Equation (3.2) is then augmented again with 
market-wide factors (excluding economic development dummy), one at a time over the 
whole sample period. The results for the pooled panels of the two country groupings are 
presented in Table 3.9 in comparison with the aggregate effect in Table 3.8. As the 
relationships between market-wide determinants and leverage found in Table 3.9 are in 
the opposite directions between two country groupings, the results show the importance 
of country groupings and how the severity of the crisis on the sample countries and their 
market developments may affect the role of market-wide determinants and may explain 
the variations of the determinants of capital structure among sample countries. 
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Table 3.9 : Panel~ of the fmn-opeci& omd IDIIrhet-wide detenninana. of capi'ialoiruriuze loy country poupin;!o: Whole oample period 
Panel A : Cow.trie• leeri aftiected loy the c:rioil I Panel B : Countrieo most a&cted loy the crilil 
l!q-tion Model-l Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 Model-5 Model-6 Model-7 Model-l Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 Model-5 Model-6 Model-7 
Conoiant -0.1116 * -0.1628 *'" -0.1.51.5 ** -0.1082 * -0.0174 -0.06.58 -0.07.51 -0.4404 ••• 0.2317 O.OSIJ! -0.488.5 *'"* -0.150.53 ••• -0..5175' *** -0.4647 *** 
, ... !:~!~.~!~~ .... J:.l .. :?J.o..!l) .. ___ ........ J:~:.S.}.Q.Q) ................ .J:~.~.S..Q.QJ... ............. J:.~.:.?.Q.9.Q.l.. ............... J::ll.:.2..~.S..QJ. ............... J:.~.:.Q.~.Q.O..L ............ J:.~.:.!.~.Q.QJ.. .......... J:~:.2..~.Q.O.J ................... Ll .. ~.~-Q.Q). ................... J9..:~.~-~.QJ... ............. J:~.:~.~Q.Q} ........ _ ...... J:~X?.Q.Q.L ... _ ...... J:~)EP.!!2. ___ ..... _.J:~.:~l0oo) ___ .... _. 
TANG 0.1.572 - 0.135'6 - 0.1437 *** 0.1.5151 -• 0.1.514 ••• 0.14.5.5 -• 0.14157 ••• 0.0082 0.008.5 0.009.5 0.0086 0.0118 O.o!11 0.005'1 
1-statisti<:s (42400) (3.8700) (39800) (4.2000) (4.1.500) (4.0200) (4.0700) (02.5.50) (027.50) (0..31.50) (0.2710) (0..3870) (0..3.520) (02870) 
....... Pitoii ....... _ ...... ~o.os3ii ............. -::o .. o772 ................ ::0-:ii77'ii"••• ......... ::o .. osn ................ ~iioiiii'6 ................ ~o-.ii'7ii'ii .. ••• .......... ~iiii7s7 .. ••• ........ ~ii3'5iiii ....... -...... =ii3637 ........ --.... ::o5686 .. ••• .......... :ii3.S4o ............... :ci'iii'i"';;;;;;--·--::o'3'63o-••··-.. -·::o'3.546*** 
... !:·~~~-~!~~-... J:~.1~.0..Q)_ ............ J:~:.?.?..9.9.l ............... J:~,?.~O..QJ. ..... - ...... J:~:.?.l_Q_Q). ................ J:~:.?.~.Q.QJ. ............... J:~:.?.~.o..!l.L ........... _ .. (:~:.?.~.Q.O.J... ........... J:~:.!.~.9.Ql... .......... _J:~.:2..2..0..9J... .............. J:~.~-O..o..!l.L ............ J:?.:.~.~P..9J. ................ J:~:.Q.~.0..0.1.. .............. k~:.!.~.9.Q.l.. .............. .1:!1:.0..Q.O..O..L ...... .. 
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Table 3.8 shows a positive relationship between economic development and 
leverage as expected. The results show that firms in developing countries tend to issue 
more debt than firms in developed countries confirming the highest level of debt found 
in Thailand and the lowest level of debt found in Australia as shown by Figure 3 .l.An 
expected positive relationship between bank development and leverage is also found 
from Table 3.8. However, once the sample countries are divided into 2 country 
groupings as in Table 3.9, the opposite relationship is found. Firms in countries least 
affected by the crisis use higher levels of debt when bank development is high while 
banks play an opposite role for firms in countries most affected by the crisis. Bigger 
size of banking sector does not guarantee higher borrowing capacities to firms in these 
countries. A similar pattern is found for the relationship between stock market 
development and leverage ratio. The results show that stock market development also 
plays a role in capital structure decisions. A negative relationship is found for firms in 
countries most affected by the crisis. When stock market development is high, firms in 
these countries tend to issue more equity. In contrast, a positive relationship is found 
for firms in countries least affected by the crisis. 
A positive relationship between inflation and leverage is found for firms in 
countries most affected by the crisis showing that inflation reduces the real cost of 
employing debt. However, an inverse relationship is found for firms in countries least 
affected by the crisis. The level of interest rates is found to be positively related to 
leverage for firms in countries most affected by the crisis implying that firms in these 
countries are more concerned about the benefit of high interest rates as tax deductibility 
than the cost of borrowing itself. Higher interest rate means higher cost of borrowing. 
Even when the cost of borrowing is higher, firms still prefer debt to equity implying the 
higher cosCof issuing equity. Iti' addition;··a·'positive ·relationshipcnmy also' suggest-that ··· 
firms may be more concerned about the effects of future inflation on their cost of capital 
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than the immediate risk of default. On the other hand, the direct role of interest rate is 
found for firms in countries least affected by the crisis where high interest rate means 
higher cost of borrowing leading firms in these countries to borrow less. 
Term structure of interest rates is found to be negatively related to leverage for 
firms in countries most affected by the crisis implying that firms in these countries rely 
more on short-term borrowings. Therefore, when short-term loans are cheap relative to 
long-term loans, firms prefer debt to equity issues. On the other hand, a positive 
relationship is found for firms in countries least affected by the crisis. The results show 
that equity premium is found to be inversely related to leverage for firms in countries 
most affected by the crisis. This gives support to the market timing theory given that 
there is an overvaluation in the stock market; therefore, when equity premium is high 
due to the overvaluation, firms will prefer equity to debt in order to time the market. On 
the other hand, the evidence fails to support the market timing theory for firms m 
countries least affected by the crisis where a positive relationship is found. 
The next step is to investigate whether the role of firm-specific and market-wide 
determinants changed as a result of the crisis. Table 3.10, Panel A, presents the 
estimates of equation (3 .2) using a panel data set that includes all firms across all 
sample countries over the pre- and post-crisis periods where pre-crisis period covers the 
sample of 1993 to 1996 and post-crisis period covers the sample of 1998 to 2001. 
Similar to the full sample analysis, the sample countries are divided into two country 
groupings; countries least affected by the crisis and countries most affected by the 
crisis. The estimates based on the two country groupings are presented in Table 3.1 0, 
Panels B and C. The results from Table 3.10 show that market-wide factors play 
opposite roles for firms in different country groupings confirming the significance of 
. dfviding the sample col.intries'~into" two country groupings based' on the'" severity With· 
which the countries were hit by the crisis. 
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When looking at Table 3.10, Panel A, in comparison with Panels B and C, the 
results show that the effects of market-wide factors are offsetting each other. In order to 
see the real effects of each market-wide factor, the estimates based on country 
groupings are more reliable. Although the findings show that the financial crisis did not 
influence the direction of the role of each market-wide factor, it is found to have 
influenced the attitude of each factor. One main finding is that firms in countries least 
affected by the crisis do not take much account of market-wide factors when they 
determine their financing decisions during normal stable economic conditions. 
However, once the economic conditions start to be unstable, firms rely more on the 
market-wide factors when they decide their debt-equity mix. On the other hand, firms in 
countries most affected by the crisis consistently take account of market-wide factors 
regardless of the economic conditions but the severe effect from the crisis changed the 
significance of the role of a few market-wide factors. 
In the countries least affected by the crisis, bank development plays a significant 
role in determining the capital structure of firms only for the post-crisis period. The high 
development of banking sectors induces firms to borrow more after the crisis. On the 
other hand, in countries most affected by the crisis, although the relationship was 
consistently negative, the role of bank development reduced significantly after the crisis 
implying that firms in these countries rely more on bank development when they 
determine their capital structure. One possible explanation is the decrease in credit 
supply due to the fact that banks were also severely hit by the crisis. The role of stock 
market development also becomes significant for firms in countries least affected by the 
crisis only for the post-crisis period. On the other hand, the relationship between stock 
market development and leverage is consistently negative for pre- and post-crisis 
periods for firms iri countries 'most affected by the crisis';. , 
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The crisis has turned a positive relationship between inflation and leverage 
found for the pre-crisis period to a negative relationship during the post-crisis period for 
firms in countries most affected by the crisis. A positive relationship suggests that 
inflation reduces the real cost of employing debt. When inflation was high, firms 
preferred to issue debt with the hope that inflation would get lower in the future. 
However, higher inflation rate due to the crisis led lenders to lend less and at higher 
interest rates which then affect the cost of borrowing. The relationship between level of 
interest rate (term structure of interest rates) and leverage is consistently positive 
(negative) for both pre- and post-crisis period for firms in countries most affected by the 
crisis. Wald tests reveal that the crisis did not affect the role of level of interest rates and 
term structure of interest rates on firms' borrowing decisions. On the other hand, level 
of interest rate and term structure of interest rates became significant factors for firms in 
countries least affected by the crisis only for the post-crisis period. Finally, the crisis 
changed a negative relationship between equity premium and leverage to a positive one 
for the post-crisis period for firms in countries most affected by the crisis. The results 
suggest that the overvaluation no longer existed after the crisis. On the other hand, a 
significant relationship is found for firms in countries least affected by the crisis only 
for the post-crisis period. 
In conclusion, the results show that the financial crisis had several significant 
effects on the relationships between market-wide factors and leverage. In several cases, 
the crisis changed the direction of the impact of the market-wide factors. The findings 
also show that firms in this region behave differently and rely on each market-wide 
factor in different ways depending on how severely they were hit by the crisis and how 
well their stock market development is. The crisis also has significant effects for firms 
in 'countnes least affected by the crisis: The evidence is provided by the fact that-firms-
started to rely on market-wide factors only in the post-crisis period. 
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3.6.4.2 Legal and Corporate Governance Determinants 
Having examined the role of firm-specific and market-wide determinants of 
capital structure, the focus now turns to the role of legal and corporate governance 
factors. Table 3.11 presents the estimates of equation (3.2) using a panel data set that 
includes all firms across all sample countries over the full sample period. Due to the 
nature of the data, only the full sample is analysed. Legal and corporate governance 
factors (quality of legal enforcement, legal protection, ownership concentration, and 
information intermediary activity) have been included as explained in Section 3.4.2. 
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The results show a negative relationship between efficiency and integrity of legal 
- - - . 
system and leverage. Firms in countries with efficient legal systems prefer to use higher 
equity issues. Legal protection is also found to play an important role in determining 
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the capital structure of firms. The coefficient of creditor rights shows a significant and 
positive relationship between the creditor rights index and leverage. The results confirm 
that when creditors are better protected by law, firms' borrowing is likely to be higher. 
The opposite relationship is found between the shareholder rights index and leverage 
suggesting that when shareholders are better protected, firms are likely to raise their 
capital through equity issues. 
A positive relationship is found between ownership concentration and leverage. 
Firms in this region, with the exception of Australian firms, have concentrated 
ownership structures leading to lower levels of asymmetric information between lenders 
and borrowers and lower transaction costs. Because of easier access to borrowing, firms 
in countries with high ownership concentrations may find it easier to borrow. 
Information intermediary activity is another factor that significantly influence firms' 
capital structure. As auditors and analysts help to transmit information to the markets, 
the level of asymmetric information between firms and the markets should be lower 
when they are involved; therefore, firms are likely to issue equity. 
In summary, the results confirm that country-specific factors (market-wide and 
legal and corporate governance) are as important as firm-specific characteristics in 
determining corporate capital structure. The results show that the coefficients of market-
wide variables are highly significant and vary depending on the maturity of the stock 
market development and how severely the countries were hit by the crisis. Firms in 
different country groupings finance their projects in different ways suggesting the 
importance of country groupings. The findings confirm that a firm's capital structure is 
not only determined by its characteristics but also by the environment in which it 
operates. 
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3.7 Summary 
In contrast to the irrelevancy theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital 
structure does matter and there are some specific factors that explain differences of 
capital structure across countries once the assumptions of Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
are relaxed. The analysis in this chapter adds to the literature by (i) focusing on firms in 
the Asia Pacific region, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia; (ii) 
investigating the effect of the financial crisis on firms' capital structure; (iii) examining 
the effects of country-specific factors and (iv) investigating the determinants of capital 
structure based on two country groupings categorized by the severity with which each 
country was hit by the crisis. In this chapter the determinants of the capital structure of 
four countries have been analysed using both firm-specific and country-specific factors. 
The results show the variation in the determinants of capital structure across sample 
countries in the region. A firm's characteristics are basic important determinants of 
capital structure in the Asia Pacific region in the same direction as firms in other regions 
with the exception of earnings volatility. The results give support to the trade-off, 
market timing and pecking order theories. Although not significant for all sample 
countries, firm size and tangibility are found to be positively related to leverage. On the 
other hand, profitability, growth, non-debt tax shield, liquidity and share price 
performance are found to be inversely related to leverage. 
In addition to firm-specific variables, both groups of country-specific factors 
(market-wide factors and legal and corporate governance factors) are also found to play 
an important role in capital structure decisions. The results are consistent with the 
research of Antoniou et al. (2002) that capital structure decisions are not only the 
product of firms' characteristics but also the corporate governance and institutional 
·-environment that they are operating in. 'Fhe main·interestihgcfindihg'is~firms' different-
behaviour found when sample countries were divided into two country groupings: (i) 
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countries least affected by the crisis and (ii) countries most affected by the crisis. This 
country grouping is based mainly on how severely the countries were hit by the crisis 
but also can be linked to the maturity of the stock market in each country. The results 
show that firms in the different country groupings do rely significantly on market-wide 
factors but in opposite directions. The results also reveal that the financial crisis had a 
significant effect on both firm-specific and market-wide determinants of the capital 
structure of firms in this region. The relationships between determinants and leverage 
altered significantly between pre- and post-crisis periods. 
In conclusion, although there are some variations m determinants of capital 
structure across countries in the Asia Pacific region, most of the time firms in this 
region rely on the same determinants in the same directions as the results found in most 
previous papers for firms in other regions. The results are consistent with the findings of 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), who examined financing policies in Thailand, that capital 
structure choices in Thailand are affected by similar factors as in developed economies. 
It can be concluded that firms in the Asia Pacific region do follow the way managers in 
other regions make their financing decisions. This gives robustness to results from 
previous papers such as Rajan and Zingales (1995) on G-7 countries. It implies that, to a 
certain extent, there are some universal factors that firms in different regions consider 
when they determine their capital structure. The analysis from this chapter also suggests 
a few lines of research. First, there are other related factors that might be important to 
firms when they determine their capital structure, such as ownership structure, because 
the data is not available for our sample countries. Second, this chapter shows only 
effects in term of regression analysis. However, practically, managers might determine 
their capital structure differently. Therefore, case studies or survey research might help 
to re've~lmore of the variation in term of dtpitalstrtictlire·"tfcross cot.u1tries. 
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Chapter 4* 
The Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure 
4.1 Introduction 
Corporate debt maturity decision is an integral part of the capital structure 
decision and is one of the most important financing decisions because a badly chosen 
mix of short- and long-term debt can result in inefficient liquidation of a positive net 
present value project. Under an imperfect market, the choice of debt maturity can also 
be used as a signalling device in order to provide information about firms' quality, 
creditability and future prospects. The debate on the existence of an optimal debt 
maturity structure can be traced back to Modigliani and Miller's (1958) seminal paper 
which not only proposes the irrelevancy of capital structure but also implies that 
maturity of debt has no effect on firms' value. Stiglitz (1974) also explicitly analyses 
the irrelevancy of debt maturity choice. Therefore, originally under a number of 
assumptions of perfect capital markets, all financial decisions including debt maturity 
do not matter. However, Morris (1976) suggests there is a role for short-term debt in 
reducing shareholder's risk if there is uncertainty about future interest rates due to the 
unavoidable inter-temporal risk. Therefore, in this context, debt maturity can affect 
firms' value. 
Subsequent theoretical literature has extensively introduced market imperfections 
and their effects on optimal corporate debt maturity and firms' value. While there is a 
vast amount of both theoretical and empirical literature on firms' choice of debt and 
equity, there is much less investigating firms' choice of corporate debt maturity. This 
theoretical literature offers arguments for four main hypotheses: (i) moral hazard and 
agencY -hypothesis ·(Myers, 1977;· Barilea· et al., 1980); (ii) tax··hypothesis (Brick and· < 
* The main elements of this chapter have appeared in Deesomsak et al. (2005). 
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Ravid, 1985, 1991; Kane et al., 1985; Lewis, 1990); (iii) adverse selection and 
signalling hypothesis (Flannery, 1986); and (iv) liquidity risk hypothesis (Diamond, 
1991 ). Despite an extensive amount of theoretical literature on debt maturity, there is 
less empirical work on the determinants of debt maturity than on debt-equity decisions. 
The first generation of empirical studies emerged as a by-product of the investigation of 
the determinants of corporate capital structure such as Titman and Wessels (1988). This 
was followed by a number of empirical studies that primarily focused on corporate 
capital structure and then decomposed leverage ratios into short-term and long-term 
debt ratio (Booth et al., 2001; Bevan and Dan bolt, 2002). These empirical studies find 
that determinants of capital structure vary significantly depending on the maturity of the 
debt component being analysed. Therefore, the analysis of capital structure is 
incomplete without a detailed investigation of all forms of debt. Recently, much more 
work has been done directly in the area of debt maturity. Several studies have set out to 
test debt maturity theories and then empirically explain the observed debt maturity 
structure patterns. 50 
On the strength of both theoretical and empirical results, it is now widely accepted 
that debt maturity structure choice is one of the most important financing decisions and 
that a sub-optimal decision could lead to under-investment or an inefficient and 
ineffective choice of investment. It is possible that the relationship between capital 
structure and its determinants may vary between short- and long-term debt because the 
related costs of short- and long-term debt are different and because they have different 
incentive characteristics. Firms might decide to use short-term debt as a buffer when 
they want to change their capital structures (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993). High 
contracting costs also induce short-term debt. Despite this wealth of debt maturity 
--· < __ -__ • __ • .L" .• ·--~-
50 Direct empirical evidence on debt maturity structure was given by Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes 
and Opler (1996), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Ozkan (2000, 
2002), Scherr and Hulburt (2001), Barclay et al. (2003), Fan et al. (2004) and Antoniou et al. (2006) 
among others. 
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structure literature, both theoretical predictions and empirical evidence are still mixed. 
Research on the determinants of firms' maturity structure choice has until recently been 
limited to firms in developed countries. However, recent research shows that there are 
many similarities in the underlying factors of firms' debt maturity choices both in the 
developed and developing countries (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Little is 
known about the empirical determinants of corporate debt maturity structure especially 
for firms in Asian Pacific countries, particularly with the aspects of the impact from the 
financial crisis on these determinants. 
Therefore, the contribution of this chapter is the presentation of important 
international empirical evidence by examining the determinants of debt maturity of 
listed firms in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia to determine the relative 
importance and potential effects of firm- and country-specific factors in corporate debt 
maturity decisions. It also presents evidence of the effects of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis on the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure. The objectives of this 
chapter are to investigate (i) firm- and country-specific determinants of the debt 
maturity structure of firms in the Asia Pacific region; (ii) whether and how the financial 
crisis of 1997 in East Asia affects the determinants of the debt maturity structure of 
firms in this region; and (iii) why the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure 
in this region are different across countries that are at different stages of economic and 
financial development. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the insight of the 
main debt maturity hypotheses. Section 3 then examines the potential firm- and country-
specific determinants of debt maturity structure, develops testable propositions, 
discusses methodology and presents the measurement of variables. Section 4 describes 
daia arid descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical results and section-6 
concludes. 
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4.2 Debt Maturity Hypotheses 
Previous research has put forward several hypotheses that identify factors that 
determine corporate debt maturity which can be categorized into four main hypotheses: 
(i) moral hazard and agency hypothesis; (ii) tax hypothesis; (iii) adverse selection and 
signalling hypothesis; and (iv) liquidity risk hypothesis.51 This section briefly discusses 
how each hypothesis relates to the debt maturity structure of firms. 
4.2.1 Moral Hazard and Agency Hypothesis 
The moral hazard and agency hypothesis emphasizes the role of short-term debt in 
reducing agency problems. There are two main types of agency problem that are caused 
by the conflict between managers and debtholders; (i) underinvestment and (ii) asset 
substitution. When a firm has a future growth option, the benefits of these investments 
will be shared between shareholders and debtholders. Because part of the benefits will 
go to debtholders, managers might be reluctant to undertake the project if undertaking it 
means reducing the wealth of shareholders, assuming that managers aim to maximize 
shareholders' wealth. Shareholders may not capture enough of the return; therefore, 
managers may pass over new positive net present value projects. The reduced incentive 
to undertake that project leads to a decrease in investment opportunity set and ultimately 
to a decrease in the value of the firm. These problems are severe especially for risky 
firms with high growth opportunities. Myers (1977) points out that the magnitude of the 
underinvestment problem can be directly proportional to the maturity of debt. On the 
other hand, the asset substitution problem is known as the risk incentive cost of debt or 
risk shifting. Examples of the asset substitution problem are when shareholders intend 
to increase their payoffs by increasing the project risk or when firms that were financed 
with iisky debt have- ar{ihcerttive lo shift from low tisk to 'high risk 'assets. 
51 See Ravid (1996) for the extensive survey of the various theoretical studies investigating the maturity 
structure of corporate debt. 
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There are several ways for firms to prevent asset substitution and underinvestment 
problems as well as to gain back the benefits of investment from debtholders. Myers 
(1977) and Barnea et al. (1980) suggest that firms can control underinvestment 
problems by decreasing the overall leverage, by restricting covenants or by shortening 
the effective maturity of its debt. Short-term debt can help reduce underinvestment 
problems if it matures or expires before growth options are exercised because there is an 
opportunity for firms to re-contract or re-negotiate. Refinancing its long-term debt 
before the growth option exercises allows debt to be repriced so that gains from the new 
investment do not go to debtholders. Therefore, short-term debt is preferable for firms 
with high growth. Myers (1977) assumes that the cost of rolling over short-term debt is 
higher than the cost of issuing long-term debt otherwise all firms would prefer short-
term debt regardless of the severity of agency problems. 52 Barnea et al. (1980) argue 
that short-term debt can also mitigate adverse risk incentives of debt financing or asset 
substitution or risk shifting problems. Since short-term debt is less sensitive to shifts in 
risk of firms' underlying assets or changes in the variance of projects, it will reduce 
shareholders' incentives to engage in low-risk and high-variance projects leading to a 
reduction in loss of value. Firms with more growth options can face more severe asset 
substitution problems because it is likely to be easier to increase the risk of new 
investments. Therefore, it is suggested that high growth firms issue short-term debt to 
help reduce asset substitution problems. 
In addition to using maturity of debt to mitigate these agency problems, banks can 
play an important role in hypotheses development. The predictions of the moral hazard 
and agency hypothesis can vary depending on the relationship between firms and banks. 
Because banks have a number of advantages over the public market in gathering 
· information; reriegotiating··loans and enforcing· other loan contract terms; firms shoald · 
52 The higher cost of short-term debt includes higher floatation costs, higher opportunity costs of time 
management in dealing with more frequent debt issue and greater reinvestment risk and potential costs of 
illiquidity (Barclay and Smith, 1995). 
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be able to use other tools than shortening maturity of debt to reduce agency cost 
problems for risky (low quality) firms. As a consequence, in countries where the level 
of relationship between firms and their banks is high, there will be less use in managing 
debt maturity to mitigate agency problems. Therefore, the effect of the moral hazard and 
agency hypothesis on firms' debt maturity should be less significant in high bank 
related countries than in low bank related countries. 
4.2.2 Tax Hypothesis 
Brick and Ravid (1985) were the first to provide a framework for tax discussion. 
They show that debt maturity decisions are irrelevant. Tax might be affecting capital 
structure decisions but not debt maturity decisions. However, if any of the conditions in 
the irrelevance proposition is violated, debt maturity decision will matter. The tax 
hypothesis was then introduced by Brick and Ravid ( 1985, 1991) under both interest 
rate certainty and interest rate uncertainty. Under interest rate certainty, it is beneficial 
for firms to issue long-term debt if the yield curve is upward sloping because long-term 
debt provides a higher tax shield which helps to reduce the firm's tax liabilities leading 
to an increase in the firm's market value. The impact of long-term debt with an upward-
sloping yield curve is even greater under interest rate uncertainty because the 
uncertainty increases the capacity of having long-term debt leading to greater tax 
benefits from long-term debt. Kane et al. (1985) establish that firms lengthen debt 
maturity if the tax advantages of debt are not less than amortized floatation costs. On 
the other hand, Lewis ( 1990) argues in favour of irrelevancy in the presence of taxes. In 
sum, long-term debt appears to be preferable to short-term debt because firms try to 
optimize their debt maturity by focusing on interest tax shields. However, irrelevance 
... may happen ifthe temtstructtire'ofinterest rates' is flat. 
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4.2.3 Adverse Selection and Signalling Hypothesis 
According to the adverse selection and signalling hypothesis, rational investors 
can get information about firms by observing firms' choice of debt maturity. Flannery 
(1986) argues that when there is asymmetric information between lenders and firms, the 
nature of equilibrium is determined by transaction or floatation costs. The signalling 
model assumes that managers have better or timelier information about firm value than 
investors. In the presence of asymmetric information, the market cannot distinguish 
between good quality or low risk firms and bad quality or high-risk firms. Maturity is 
chosen to minimize the effects of private information on financing costs. There is a bias 
toward short-term debt which is induced by asymmetric information. Firms with 
favourable information avoid using long-term debt because they expect to be able to 
borrow under more favourable terms later. Firms with private information that they 
have relatively low risk or high quality (high risk or low quality) would prefer short-
term debt (long-term debt) in order to avoid paying a market premium which reflects a 
probability of future credit quality problems that is above (below) their expectations for 
their quality. Therefore, it predicts debt maturity to be an upward (downward) sloping 
function of firms' risk (quality). 
4.2.4 Liquidity Risk Hypothesis 
The liquidity risk hypothesis also assumes the presence of asymmetric 
information. Firms have private information about their credit quality. However, a firm 
also has a liquidity risk which is defined as the risk that a firm is unable to pay back its 
debt because of deterioration in financial or economic conditions and therefore will be 
liquidated by its lenders. It is suggested that firms trade off the benefit of short-term 
debt< in o improving credit quality 'rating. against their liquidity risk. Diamond { 1991) 
argues that firms with high credit ratings or favourable private information will issue 
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short-term debt because the benefit ofupgrading ratings at the time of refinancing short-
term debt is higher than the liquidation risk. Therefore, the benefit of using short-term 
debt for low risk (high quality) firms is that there is a high possibility that they will be 
revealed to the market as being at low risk or good quality at the time of refinancing; 
therefore, they can continue paying relatively low interest rates. On the other hand, 
firms with lower (intermediate) credit ratings or unfavourable private information would 
prefer long-term debt because the liquidity risk is higher. They prefer long-term debt in 
order to avoid the possibility that they will be revealed as being at high risk or low 
quality and will be required to pay relatively high rates or the possibility that they will 
be rejected for funds at the time of refinancing. Ideally, firms with the lowest credit 
ratings or lowest quality would also prefer long-term debt but they would be forced to 
use short-term debt because their access to the long-term debt market is limited due to 
their level of credit rating. Therefore, the differences between the prediction of adverse 
selection and signalling hypothesis and liquidity risk hypothesis in term of quality or 
credit risk of firms is that lenders may refuse to issue long-term debt to high risk firms 
to mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
4.3 Methodology, Hypotheses Development and Variable Identification 
4.3.1 Firm-Specific Determinants 
There is evidence to show that some factors might be captured by panel data 
analysis and the effect of some variables on debt maturity might not be picked up by 
cross-sectional analysis. Johnson (1997) estimates the equation in a single equation 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) framework as the robustness test and suggests that OLS 
regression can be relatively robust to specification errors, multicollinearity problems 
arid error-in-variables. There are a humber ofadvailtages~that make panel analysis more-
suitable for this line of research as mentioned in Section 3.4. The panel data set should 
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also be utilized because it captures the dynamic of financing decisions of firms. 
Therefore, to test the hypotheses regarding firm-specific determinants of debt maturity 
structure, the analysis starts with the OLS estimation using unbalanced panel data. 53 
Individual firm's debt maturity structure (MAT) is modelled as a function of k firm-
specific factors in a pooled cross-sectional and time-series framework. More 
specifically, the following relationship is estimated using OLS for each country54 : 
N 
Y;,l = ao + IrkF~,i,1 +a/+ Jl;,l 
k=l 
(4.1) 
where, Y;,r is firm's i debt maturity structure at time t, measured at the accounting 
year-end; FFk.i,t is a vector of k firm i's specific factors. ar captures firm-invariant time-
specific effects and is the same for all firms at a given point in time but varies through 
time. Including ar helps control for both observable and unobservable aggregate effects. 
The full sample covers the period of 1993 to 2001. To investigate the possible effects of 
the 1997 Asian crisis, equation ( 4.1) is re-estimated over two sub-sample periods: (i) the 
pre-crisis period of 1993-1996; and (ii) the post-crisis period of 1998-2001. Because 
the crisis started in mid-July 1997, the data for 1997 are excluded when analysing the 
sub-sample periods. Wald-statistics are also estimated to test for any statistically 
significant changes in the role of the identified variables as a consequence of the 
financial crisis. 
Debt Maturity 
One of the most significant differences in the empirical studies on debt maturity 
structure decisions is the formulation of the dependent variable or the measurement of 
debt maturity. Most studies consider some forms of a debt ratio. They differ in whether 
book or market values are used and also whether how long the maturity of long-term 
53 Cross-sectional and fixed effect analyses are applied as alternative methodologies for robustness tests. 
54 All model specifications include industry dummies, but their coefficients are not reported here. 
Previous empirical studies that also include industry dummies in the model to control for industry effects 
are Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Fan eta!. (2004) among others. 
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debt is considered. In general, previous empirical studies have followed two approaches 
in studying the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure: (i) balance-sheet 
approach (the percentage of a firm's total debt that matures in certain periods) and (ii) 
incremental approach (maturity of bond issuance). The balance-sheet approach argues 
that in real life a debt issue is not a single operation; therefore, firms must take into 
account their current structure of assets and liabilities. This approach assumes that firms 
follow an optimal policy on a continuous basis. This can be tested by regressing a 
measure of maturity of the firm's debt against various variables. This approach defines 
debt maturity as a percentage of a firm's total debt that matures in more than a certain 
period of time (such as in Barclay and Smith, 1995)55 or as the weighted-average 
maturity of a firm's liability item (such as in Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Scherr and 
Hulburt, 2001).56 The most commonly used measure of debt maturity structure is the 
ratio of long-term debt to total debt. 57 However, different previous studies employ 
different maturity of debt to calculate this measure. The most commonly used maturity 
periods of debt are 1 year, 3 years and 5 years. Although there is no clear conclusion of 
definition sensitivity of debt maturity structure measure in previous studies as in capital 
structure studies, there are a few studies that find evidence of definition sensitivity in 
debt maturity structure studies (for example, Ozkan, 2000). 
On the other hand, the incremental approach argues that the model is better to be 
tested by regressing the maturity of new issues on various variables. The incremental 
approach has been used by several empirical studies (Guedes and Opler, 1996; Stohs 
and Mauer, 1996). They examine debt maturity structure using term to maturity which 
55 This measure is also applied by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999); Ozkan (2000, 2002); 
Danisevska (2002); Barclay eta!. (2003); Fan eta!. (2004) and Antoniou eta!. (2006) among others. 
56 The weighted-average maturity of a firm's liability is a more precise measure of corporate debt 
maturity than the proportion of total debt that matures in more than a certain period. However, not many 
studies have applied the weighted average rnaturity .because data is not.avail~ble alld)f tbey .are aV,aihlble, 
obtaining them is time-consuming. - - · --- " 
57 Several previous empirical studies have combined the studies of debt maturity structure with capital 
structure and use the proportion of long-term debt or short-term debt of total assets as proxy for debt 
maturity structure. However, previous studies that directly focus on debt maturity structure mostly use the 
proportion of long-term debt to total debt. 
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should be a more appropriate proxy for debt maturity structure. However, the data is 
difficult to obtain especially for certain countries. Those who employ the incremental 
approach argue that balance sheet data often involves the averaging of financing 
decisions over time, which might resulting in misleading indications of the choice of 
debt maturity. In contrast, research using an incremental approach is better at dealing 
with debt choice issues because identification of debt type is really achieved and there is 
no bias of averaging of financing decision over time. Incremental approach is preferred 
when examining whether firms' choice of corporate debt maturity can signal their future 
prospects to the market and examining the effect of tax based theories on debt maturity 
choice. However, it is inappropriate and noisy to use this approach to test the moral 
hazard and agency hypothesis that suggests firms to match their maturity of assets and 
maturity of liabilities. Berger et al. (2005) suggest that tests based on incremental 
approaches (focusing on debt at issuance time) are more advantageous for testing the 
effect of risk and asymmetric information than tests based on a balance sheet approach 
(focusing on the existing maturity of debt) where risk and asymmetric information may 
be different as decisions were made at different historical point~ in time. 
Due to the limited data available, debt maturity structure is defined as the 
proportion of long-term debt to total debt where long-term debt includes debt that 
matures in more than 1 year (MA1). 58•59 Prior empirical studies have identified several 
factors that can affect a firm's choice of debt maturity structure. Based on relevant debt 
maturity structure theories and availability of the data, firm-specific determinants 
58 An example of studies that define long-term debt as debt maturing in more than 3 years is Barclay and 
Smith (1995) and for debt maturing in more than 5 years is Ozkan (2000, 2002) among others. 
59 It should also be noted that there are limitations of using this approach. First of all, there is a problem 
concerning the misclassification of long-term debt in short-term debt category. Long-term debt that is 
long term cin nature suchr"as,,IQ,year·,govemment bond::may,,be,categorized as short-term,d~bt in.J~e' 
analysis if there is Jess than 1 year left in its maturity. However, by nature this type of debt should be 
classified as long-term debt. Secondly, there are different types of debt such as bank debt, commercial 
paper, private placements, debentures, notes, and bonds, etc. which are important components of 
liabilities of firms and may have different implications on bankruptcy cost, liquidation decisions and 
seniority of debt. Due to the data limitation, these aspects are not taken into account in the analysis. 
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included in the model are leverage, firm size, growth opportunities, earnings volatility, 
liquidity, profitability, share price performance, asset maturity, and firm quality.60 
Table 4.1, Panel A, presents the measurement of firm-specific variables while 
Table 4.2, Panel A, summarizes the relationship postulated by different theories 
between firm-specific variables and debt maturity. 
Table 4.1: IndU:amn ofvariable• 
Panel A : Debt Maturity and Firm-Sped& Detenninana 
Variable• Definition So1m:e 
Debt Maturity MAT Long-Term debt/ Total debt Dataslrelllll 
~mg;; ........................................................... uv .......... o~'bt"i~··t~t;;-i'~~pil;t: ..................................................................................................................................................... o;t!;!;;;;;;; ......... . 
Total debt/ (Total debt+MV of equity + B V of prefereru::e share) 
Finn Size SIZE N lllurul..ofJ!rltlun of BSsets Dataslll!lllll 
Growth Opportunity GROW Market-to-book111tio Datastrelllll 
= (Total assets - Book value of equity + Market value of equity) I Total BSsets 
'"'''''''''''''''''''''''''-'''"'''''''''''''''''''''"' '''''"'''"' '''''''"'''"'''''''''"'''" OOOOOOOO.,OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO<-•<••••••o••<••HOoo-•••••••••-•••-••••••••••••••-••••••••••••••-••••••••••••••••• .. "•••••••••-•••-••••<<<oOo0000HOOOOOOOOOOOOOOHOOO-OOOO-•oo-ooo-oo•• "'""'" .... 'HOO<ooo-••••••••••••••••••••• 
Earnings Volatility VOL Absolute value of [(EBJT,- EBIT ,,U -IMI11!f,ll of[CEBIT ,- EBITt~>l DatBSirelllll 
EBIT>1 EBITH 
Liquidity ·-·~:.i'Q .......... c;;;;·~~·;;;t;i·c;re~i-·llilbili!;; ................................................................................................................ ········o~!;!;;;;;;;··-.... -
·--·························-··············-···-·········-···-··············-.............. -···································-· 
Profitability PROF Earnings before interest, tax mi depmciatiol'll Total assets DatiiSIII!IIlll 
's'h'm':PriC~'p~'jf[i'~i"' '"""'SJi'p' ....... 1h8'ft;i";jiftii';;;;;;~"[if'ih8"i;;'gii~r·~;J";};;;;'j;ri;;i~'(';:;;i·~hedt~ ib;;;;~ih of ""'"'i);!;!;;;;;;;""""' 
.................................................................................................... r.~:.~~~~.~.~ .........................................................................................................................................................................................  
Asset Maturity AMA T Total fmd !ISseis I Total !ISseis Dataslrelllll 
.Fim'.Qi'iaiity.................... QUA ...... Aii;;;;;•&z:s~~;·;;............................. . .................................................................. -.... o;i·;'j';;;;;;; ........ . 
Panel B : Market-Wide Detenninana 
Detenninana Indkamn So1m:e 
Ecoromic Development EDEV Dummy equal to I for developing ecoromy mi 0 otherwise DatBSirelllll 
siink'D'M'iilii'iliB.~i ..................... ·-·amE:v······ 'iiifo~lhiY'aiink·a;;s;;is"iooii··cr;iC'b;;J'i'[i"ih8 .. ;o~i'i;;·~r'f~' .. r~~4i"y;·~·;nrlj .. ···· .......... oii&;;i;;;;;;;···· .... -
siec'k·'M~k;;i'nM'iOii·m;;·~i--· .... M'KnF:v .... iii~~ih!Y'ivi~k;;!'C'~Pii~;;-i;-;;~~·ao:P .. <m;;!~h.eii:-tii.'tb;;·~n~h-o.rh·;n;;~;}·-···· .......... o~!&;!;;;;;;;··· .. ···· 
................................................................................................... ~~.~.!':cit ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................  
Term Structure of Interest TERM Government Bond Yield (long-term) - Monthly lending Rate (matched to the Datastrelllll 
Rates .............................................................................. ~ll:t~.c:Jf..f.~: .. f.lliP.ii:! . .Y.1'!:!. .. ~!':cl.L ............................................................................................................................................................... . 
Inflation INF Chan&Jis in monthly conslll'l\llr price index (matched to the month offums' fiscal DatBSirelllll 
yearend) 
Pallel C : Legal and Corporate Govenwu:e Determbwtis 
Determbwtts 1'hai1:uld Malaysia Singapore Australia Definition Souree 
~.!--~llf..9~P.t.i.ll.1'.1............. CORR ~:P..5. ............ ....... ~.~ ......... ...... ~:~ ........... ....... .l.AL ........... ~~-e..:r. .. ~~.le..~,'! .......... :F. .. '!1'.1.~.t..B.l.:.C2..~!1.1L .. . 
~.~l!..c!!f:ll.r. .. ~s!t.t.s._ .......................................... S:.~ .................... 3. ......................... ~ ......................... ~--····-·-- ............... 1.. ................... ~ .... !.:!.!~!~ .. ~-~ .......... ~ . .!.'ll.r.t.~ .. e.~ ... a.t,(!~~?.:! .. 
~.t_l~_e_~c:J!~e.~~s!t.t.S. .......... _ --~.I:!!L 2 4 .. _ 4 ................... ~............... ..~.~-e.T..~~J.eJ}__ -~-~-o-~_!t_IIJ..(!.9..~~-
.~.e.~.S.~P. .. ~.IlP..c .. e.!!.t.r.~t.ic:J1'.1 ......................... 9..~-- .......... .Q,~?. ..................... 1!..~1 ..................... .9c~ ................... 0.,~~ .................. ~.~.B. . .T!~!~..lc.~ ........... ~!l . .!.'.ll.r.t .. a.~~ ... a.l:..(!~~?.:! ... 
lnformationlntennediary Activity AUD 0.58 0.66 099 0.89 Sea Table 2.7 Fm at a!. (.!004) 
• Altman's Z-scoze (Pmxy for quality and default risk) (High scon= means law probability ofbankruptcy) 
Mmuf~~eturing fums = (I.J*XI) + (1.4*X2) + (J.J•X3) + (0.6*X4) + (I*X.5) 
Non-manuf~~eturing firms= (6.56•X!) + (3.26•X2) + (6.72•XJ) + (I.0.5•X4) 
X I = working capital/ total BSsals; 
XJ = 111IBiMd ~ I total assats; 
XJ = EBIT I total assets; 
X4 =market value /total Iillbilities; 
X5 = sales I total BSsets 
60 The set of variables is consistent with those identified by Barclay and Smith (1995), Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1999), Fan eta!. (2004) and Antoniou eta!. (2006) 
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Table 4.2 : E1:pected I'PL-.tion betwPen debt matmity stt1.tctm·e and fum-~pecifir and rotmtry-~pecifir detenninants 
P<111el A: Finn-Specific Detennin.-.nts 
Detenniu.-.nts Positivl' 
Leverage Liquidity risk hypothesis 
Firm Site Moral hazard and agency hypothesis 
Signalling hypothesis 
Access to the market, transaction cost 
Gr-owth Opp ortwlity Liquidity risk hypothesis 
Earnings Volatility Liquidity risk hypothesis 
Negative Mostly fonnd i 
El:pt>ctl'd reL'Ition 
Moral hazard and agency hypothesis Positive 
OooO-oO-OOHH•Oo-OOooooo-ooooo-oooooooooH-n•-•""-"'"-"'-'''-'''''''''''-'''"0-·•-••• '''' ••-•••••-••-•-••--••••--••-••·--··--••• 
Liquidity risk hypothesis Positive 
Moral hazard and agency hypothesis 
Signalling hypothesis 
Moral hazard and agency hypothesis 
Bankruptcy cost 
Negative 
Negative 
Liquidity Capacity Negative 
Pro lit ability Tax hypothesis 
Share Price Performance Signalling hypothesis 
Market timing theory 
Positive 
Optimistic behaviour Positive 
Asset Maturity Moral hazard and agency hypothesis Priority of claim Positive 
Liquidity, financial distress, cash flow 
Firm Quality 
Panel B: J.Vhrkt>t-Widl' Dt>hmnin:mts 
Detl'nnil~<'lllts Positive 
Bank Development Creditor right 
Stock Market Information 
Development 
Signalling hypothesis 
Moral hazard and agency hypothesis 
Liquidity risk hypothesis (non-monotonic) 
Monitoring system 
········-··-·-···-····-···--·····--
Other sources of finance 
--··-·--··--··-··-···--··-··-··- ··-····-··--··-··--··-- ··-····-·····--·-·······- ·········--······-···-------- ---··-·····-··--···-····-·····-··--··--··-
Term Structure of Tax hypothesis Market timing theory 
Interest Rates Optimistic behaviour 
Negative 
I Non-monotonic 
Mostly fotutd! 
El.'}ll'rted reL'ltion 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive 
················-·········-·······--··-······-···--·-··-· .. ··-· .. ··-· .. --................ ·----~·---··-··""-"''''"''"""-"'"'"''""'"'- ........................... ,,,_,,,,_,, ..................................... -.. ,_,,_, __ ,,,~ ... -
Inflation 
Panel C ; Lt>gru and Goven~.'lnre Dl'tenniunnts 
Dett>nnil~<'lnts 
Level of Corruption 
·--·-·-··------···--· .. ·-···--···--------·-
Creditor Rights 
Shareholder Rights 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Positive 
Moral hazard and agency hypothesis 
Uncertainty Negative 
Negativl' 
Moral hazard and agency hypothesis 
Monitoring System 
Moral hazard and agency hypothesis 
Mostly fmmd i 
Expt>rted relation 
Negative 
Negative 
Positive 
Negative 
Information Intermediary Moral hazard and agency hypothesis Positive 
Activity 
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Leverage 
As suggested by several previous studies such as Stohs and Mauer (1996), the 
regressions would be misspecified if leverage were not controlled. Leverage (LEV) is 
defined as total debt to total capital. Liquidity risk hypothesis predicts that a firm would 
lengthen its debt maturity as leverage increases in order to offset the higher probability 
of a liquidity risk and to delay their exposure to bankruptcy risk (Diamond, 1991 and 
Stohs and Mauer, 1996). Firms with high leverage try to avoid sub-optimal liquidation 
by choosing long-term debt (Diamond, 1991, 1993). Heavily levered firms would 
borrow long-term debt in order to make sure that they will earn enough money to repay 
their creditors (Heyman et al., 2003). Therefore, under the liquidity risk hypothesis, 
leverage is expected to be positively correlated with debt maturity. 
On the other hand, Myers (1977) suggests that underinvestment problem can be 
mitigated by reducing leverage or by shortening debt maturity. If firms reduce debt to 
reduce underinvestment problems, there is less need to shorten their debt maturity 
structure. Therefore, the moral hazard and agency hypothesis predicts a negative 
relationship between leverage and debt maturity. Moreover, higher leverage causes 
higher monitoring costs; therefore, the relationship should be negative because shorter 
maturity accelerates the frequency of creditors' audit. Scherr and Hulburt (200 1) 
suggest that the relationship between leverage and debt maturity might depend on the 
trade off between the costs of underinvestment and the cost of increased liquidity risk. 
On the one hand, a firm whose growth opportunity is more important should use short-
term debt in order to reduce underinvestment problems while risking increasing 
liquidity risk. On the other hand, a firm whose liquidity problem is more important 
should use long-term debt instead of short-term debt to avoid sub-optimal liquidation. 
Although not -as -common;"Mitchell '(·1993), Guedes and- Opler ( 1996),-Barclay et 
al. (2003) are among those who find a negative and significant relationship between 
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leverage and debt maturity. Guedes and Opler (1996) argue that a negative and 
significant relationship might be the effect of credit quality instead of the direct effect of 
leverage. If leverage can be used as a measure for credit quality, highly levered firms or 
those with high credit quality would use short-term debt which is partly consistent with 
the predictions of the signalling hypothesis. Barclay et al. (2003) argue that a negative 
relationship confirms the theory that leverage and maturity are substitutes for each other 
instead of a supplement in reducing underinvestment and over-investment problems. In 
contrast, there are a few previous studies that suggest that the relationship between 
leverage and debt maturity depends on the methodology used. 61 
Firm Size 
As in Antoniou et al. (2006), Fan et al. (2004) and Esho et al. (2002) among 
others, firm size (SIZE) is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets. There are 
several studies concluding that there are differences in the determinants of debt maturity 
structure between small firms and large firms because small firms differ from large 
firms in several important ways including tax, ownership, flexibility, industry, 
economies of scale, access to the market and level of asymmetric information (Scherr 
and Hulburt, 2001; Heyman et al., 2003). Smaller firms are more likely to face a higher 
potential conflict between shareholders and debtholders such as risk shifting, asset 
substitution and claim dilution. They tend to have more growth options and thus higher 
agency costs of debt than larger firms. Managers of small firms usually hold substantial 
amounts of equity in firms they manage; therefore, actions that benefit shareholders 
would also benefit managers. Because managers of small firms control the action of 
firms, they could be more risk seeking than managers for larger firms. Because of this 
conflict and risk, debtholders reduce the risk of lending to smaller firms by restricting 
61 For example, Johnson (1997) finds leverage to be insignificantly and negatively related to debt maturity 
in fixed effects regression while a negative and significant relationship is found for short-term maturity (a 
positive and significant relationship with long-term maturity) in pool time-series and cross-sectional 
regressions. 
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the length of debt maturity to smaller firms. The moral hazard and agency hypothesis 
suggests small firms reduce their maturity of debt to control this conflict (agency cost of 
debt). In addition, large firms tend to issue more long-term debt because of easier access 
to capital markets because the possibility of bankruptcy is low for large firms. 
Therefore, smaller firms are generally precluded from accessing long-term debt 
markets. As a result, smaller firms tend to rely more heavily on bank debt which has 
shorter maturity than public debt. 
Moreover, the cost of issuing long-term debt is so high that smaller firms could 
not afford it. These high costs make smaller firms less responsive to small year-to-year 
changes in the economic environment. Small firms rely much more on short-term debt 
to minimize floatation and transaction costs of issuing long-term debt. Due to a large 
fixed component of issuance costs for public issues, there exist significant scale 
economies which smaller firms are less able to take advantages of. Larger firms would 
issue public debt which normally has longer maturity than private debt while smaller 
firms would go for private or bank debt which has shorter maturity (Barclay and Smith, 
1995). Smaller firms have lower proportions of collateralizable assets to growth 
opportunity than larger firms; therefore, larger firms with higher tangible assets can 
issue more long-term debt. Signalling hypothesis also predicts a positive relationship 
between firm size and debt maturity. Firms with large potential information 
asymmetries are likely to issue short-term debt because long-term debt is associated 
with larger information costs. Due to economies of scale in information production and 
distribution, smaller firms might produce less information to outsiders leading to higher 
levels of asymmetric information. Firms with smaller potential asymmetric information, 
such as larger firms, will be less concerned about the signalling effects of their debt 
maturity choice and are more likely to issue long-term debt. 
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The liquidity risk hypothesis suggests that firms with higher probability of 
defaults (smaller firms) will issue long-term debt leading to a negative relationship 
between firm size and debt maturity.62 Moreover, the negative relationship implies that 
firm size car. be a measure of credit quality. However, if firm size is a proxy for credit 
quality such as in Johnson (1997), a non-monotonic relationship is expected. High and 
low quality firms would prefer short-term debt while intermediate quality firms would 
issue long-term debt; therefore, large and small firms are expected to issue short-term 
debt and medium size firms would prefer long-term debt. In contrast to other studies, 
Danisevska (2002) finds no significant effect of firm size on debt maturity structure. 
Antoniou et al. (2006) find mixed evidence among their sample countries. 63 Scherr and 
Hulburt (200 1) suggest that mixed evidence found by previous empirical studies on the 
effect of firm size and debt maturity structure could be caused by the fact that firm size 
could be used as a proxy for several variables such as agency cost, information 
asymmetry, credit quality, etc. 
Growth Opportunity 
Following Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996), the ratios of 
market value of firms' asset to their book value is used as a proxy for growth 
opportunities (GROW) where market value equals book value of total assets minus book 
value of equity plus market value of equity. Firms with high market to book ratio are 
likely to have higher growth opportunities. Asset substitution and underinvestment 
problems are likely to be high for firms with high growth opportunity because it is 
easier to increase the risk of new investments than assets in place. Shortening debt 
62 Guedes and Opler ( 1996) find a negative relationship that firms with a high probability of bankruptcy 
······· · .. . ·'(small firms) would prefer"tojssue,Jong~term debt, supporting liquidity risk argumenL .. . . . 
63 A positive and significant relationship is found for UK firms while there is ~0 ~ignlfiCMt effec'Tf'(){i'f{(f-
for French and German firms. The positive relationship found in the UK is consistent with previous 
studies for the US which might be due to the fact that financial traditions of UK and US firms are quite 
similar. On the other hand, bankruptcy costs, corporate ownership structure and long run relationship 
between firms and creditors are different in France and Germany than in the UK. 
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maturity is one of the options to mitigate these problems. Short-term debt can deter 
firms from shifting into riskier projects or from applying for negative net present value 
projects because short-term debt requires borrowers to re-apply for funding at regular 
short periods when information is revealed. Therefore, firms facing greater growth 
opportunities tend to issue shorter-term debt leading to a prediction of a negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and debt maturity. 
Stulz and Johnson (1985) suggest that another way to control the underinvestment 
problem is to issue fixed claims with high priority which helps to limit wealth transfers 
from shareholders to bondholders. This reduces the incentive of shareholders to pass up 
the good projects. Short-term debt should have a higher effective priority outside 
bankruptcy because it is paid first. Therefore, high growth firms should issue more 
short-term debt. Adverse selection and signalling hypothesis also predicts a negative 
relationship because firms with large information asymmetries (such as high-growth 
firms) are likely to issue short-term debt to signal to the market and to avoid larger 
information costs that come with long-term debt. Stulz (1990) argues that firms with 
fewer growth opportunities should use more long-term debt because long-term debt is 
most effective at limiting managerial discretion in making bad investment decisions. 
Short-term debt is also preferable when firms have high growth opportunities because it 
can help to maintain financial flexibility (Barclay and Smith, 1999). Titman (1992) 
argues that high growth firms could benefit from issuing short-term debt and swapping 
it for a fixed rate contract because high growth firms have higher bankruptcy probability 
and optimistic future outlooks. Therefore, a low proportion of long-term debt is 
expected for firms with high growth opportunities. 64 
The liquidity risk hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between growth 
opportunity and debt maturity because shortening debt maturity in order to reduce asset 
64 Previous studies (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Ozkan, 2000, 2002; Barclay et al., 
2003; Danisevska, 2002; Fan et al., 2004) find that firms with high growth opportunities tend to issue 
significantly more short-term debt. 
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substitution and underinvestment problems comes with costs (liquidity risk).65 Previous 
studies have found a negative and significant relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities which implies that firms cannot reduce underinvestment problems 
completely by shortening maturity of debt; therefore, high growth firms need to use less 
debt. The reason why firms cannot shorten their debt maturity to avoid underinvestment 
problems totally is that short-term debt comes with a risk of optimal liquidation leading 
to increases in expected bankruptcy costs which, therefore, will reduce firms' optimal 
leverage. Liquidity risk hypothesis predicts that firms with high long-term growth 
opportunities which require ongoing managerial discretion should prefer to hedge or 
buy insurance against liquidity risk in form of long-term debt (Diamond, 1991 ). 
Therefore, firms can avoid inefficient liquidation of their risky growth opportunities by 
issuing long-term debt. The liquidity risk hypothesis predicts that firms with risky 
growth opportunities have an incentive to use long-term debt in order to avoid the threat 
of inefficient liquidation. Hart and Moore (1995) also argue that long-term debt could 
be used as a discipline device for self-interested managers and prevent them from 
financing unprofitable investments (overinvestment problem). 
Earnings Volatility 
As in Antoniou et al. (2006), earnings volatility (VOL) is defined as the absolute 
difference between the annual percentage change in earnings before interest and taxes 
and the average of this change over the sample period. Kane et al. (1985) argue that 
there is a trade off between bankruptcy costs and the cost of raising debt and pre-period 
tax advantage of debt financing which leads to the optimal debt maturity structure. 
Firms choose to have longer debt maturity structures when the earnings volatility is low 
because they do not have to rebalance their capital structure frequently due to expected 
bankruptcy costs. Firms with higher business risk are more likely to experience the 
65 Johnson (1997) explores the trade-off between the role of short-term debt in reducing underinvestment 
and asset substitution problems on the one hand and the liquidity risk on the other hand. 
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rating downgrade and more likely to be subject to higher agency costs; thus, they have 
an incentive to lower agency costs by shortening maturity. However, Johnson (1997) 
argues that firms with high earnings volatility may experience some difficulties in 
repaying debt; therefore, they would prefer long-term debt. 
Liquidity 
Liquidity (LIQ) is measured as a ratio of current assets to current liabilities which 
is the same measure as in Antoniou et al. (2006). Nam and Redulescu (2004) argue that 
liquidity should be negatively related to debt maturity. Excessive liquidity reduces 
managers' ability to commit to investment; therefore, high liquidity ratios may reduce 
firms' fund raising capacity, which in turn shorten the maturity for available debts. They 
argue that non-depreciating but liquid assets such as inventory do not support long-term 
debt. Therefore, a negative relationship between liquidity and debt maturity is expected. 
Profitability 
Profitability (PROF) is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest, tax and 
depreciation to total assets. Based on the tax hypothesis, profitability should be 
positively related to debt maturity because profitable firms have higher taxable income 
leading to higher tax expenses and long-term debt offers better tax advantages than 
short-term debt. Scherr and Hulburt (2001) argue that taxability can influence firms' 
debt maturity because choosing long-term debt over short-term debt can create a tax 
timing option to repurchase and reissue this debt. Fukuda et al. 's ( 1998) model suggests 
that the effect of profitability on debt maturity depends on whether liquidation risk or 
renegotiation exists. Based on their model, profitability is expected to be positively 
related to debt maturity if a liquidity risk is present but the opposite relationship is 
expected if there exists a chance of renegotiation. 
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Share Price Performance 
Same as in Antoniou et al. (2006), share price performance is defined as the first 
difference of the logs of annual share prices, matched to the month of firms' fiscal year-
end (SPP). The market timing theory predicts a positive relationship between share 
price performance and debt maturity by suggesting that undervalued (overvalued) firms 
issue short-term (long-term) debt in order to signal their undervaluation (overvaluation) 
because it is expected that undervalued (overvalued) firms will have positive (negative) 
abnormal stock returns at the issuance time (Antoniou et al., 2006). Share price 
performance such as past stock return can be used as a indicator of debt maturity 
because it is generally accepted, as in Lucas and McDonald's ( 1990) model, that firms 
will issue informationally disadvantaged securities (long-term debt) when share price 
increases (Guedes and Opler, 1996). If managers behave optimistically, firms with 
favourable information (positive share price) would try to avoid long-term debt by 
issuing short-term debt instead because they hope to get more favourable terms later 
leading to a negative relationship. 
Asset Maturity 
As in Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), asset maturity (AMA1) is defined 
as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets which is an indicator of the structure of firms' 
assets. This measure is commonly referred to as the measure of tangibility in capital 
structure studies. Several studies, including Ozkan (2000), have applied the ratio of net 
property, plant and equipment to annual depreciation expense as a proxy for asset 
maturity. As the measure for debt maturity structure is the proportion of long-term debt 
to total debt, it would be more appropriate to use the ratio of long-term asset to total 
assets as a proxy of asset maturity to test the matching maturity of assets and maturity 
of liabilities. It is believed that firms should match the maturity structure of their assets 
with the maturity structure of their liabilities. Thus firms with high long-term assets are 
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expected to have more long-term debt. Myers (1977) argues according to the moral 
hazard and agency hypothesis that firms schedule debt payment to match the decline in 
asset value as a way to lower agency costs of debt. Therefore, firms with more long-
term assets should be able to support more long-term debt. Because debt repayments are 
scheduled to correspond with the value of assets; matching maturity can reduce the 
agency costs of debt. Issuing debt that matures at the end of the life of assets can help to 
re-establish the appropriate investment incentives when new investment is required. 
Matching maturity also allows firms to extend their debt maturity without increasing the 
agency costs of debt. It can also be used to reduce the severity of asset substitution 
leading to a positive relationship between asset maturity and debt maturity because 
tangibility is an inverse proxy for the severity of asset substitution. When firms have 
few tangible assets, their degree of asset substitution is high. Therefore, they would 
prefer to use short-term debt to reduce the asset substitution problem. Matching 
maturity can also control for risk and costs of financial distress (Antoniou et al., 2006). 
Moreover, matching maturity can also help firms with their cash flow problems 
which occur (i) when debt maturity is shorter than asset maturity leading to insufficient 
cash to pay back the debt obligation when it is due or (ii) when debt maturity is longer 
than asset maturity leading to the cease of cash flow while firms still have some debt 
commitment to pay or to the problem of firms finding new assets to support the existing 
debt services. It is risky to have a maturity of debt shorter than a maturity of assets 
because assets might not yield enough profit to pay back debt but it is also risky if 
maturity of debt is longer than maturity of assets because debt has to be repaid while 
there is no more return from the assets. Therefore, matching maturity can help firms 
reduce these insufficient cash flow problems leading to a prediction of a positive 
ielatioiiship{Stohs· and Mauer~· 1996;~Nam ·and Redulescu,"2004):c'Maturity matching ·is--~··· 
therefore a form of hedging device that reduces expected financial distress costs. 
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Emery (2001) argues that firms can avoid term premiums by maturity matching. 
Because fixed assets are normally used as an indicator of the structure of firms' assets, 
firms with a high ratio of fixed assets should have greater borrowing capacity because 
fixed assets can be used as collateral. This collateral argument supports the matching 
maturity hypothesis because net fixed assets shift financing from short-term debt to 
long-term debt while inventories (intangible assets) shift financing from equity to short-
term debt and long-term debt (Thies and Klock, 1992). Moreover, the value of tangible 
fixed assets is stronger in the long-run while in the short-run asset specificity reduces 
the collateral value and also increases operational risk and the probability of bankruptcy 
(Grossman and Hart, 1982). The liquidity risk hypothesis also suggests that financing 
long-term assets with long-term debt can reduce liquidity risk. All the above arguments 
imply that firms with long-term assets will have more long-term debt. Although short-
term and long-term debts have the same priority in bankruptcy, short-term debt has a 
higher effective priority outside bankruptcy because it is paid first. Therefore, issuing 
short-term debt may offer benefits which are similar to using secured debt to control an 
underinvestment problem. 
Firm Quality 
Altman's Z-Score (Altman, 1984) is used as a proxy for credit quality (QUA). 66•67 
It is taken as a prediction of the probability of bankruptcy. Higher scores indicate lower 
probability of bankruptcy (high quality firms). The signalling hypothesis predicts a 
negative relationship between firm quality and debt maturity. Due to the presence of 
information asymmetry, debt issues are valued as if they have average quality. Flannery 
(1986) and Kale and Noe (1990) examine the signalling implications of firms' debt 
maturity choices and suggest that debt maturity structure can be used as a signal of 
66 This measure is also used by Esho et al. (2002). 
67 A number of studies have separated the test of quality of firms from credit I default risk or credit rating. 
However, because fmns with low default risk or high credit rating can also be considered as having high 
quality, the analysis of quality of fmns, credit/ default risk and credit rating are combined in this chapter. 
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change in _firm quality or future earnings anticipated by insiders when they are 
systematically better informed than outsiders. When level of asymmetric information is 
high, the market's required default premium is excessive which is unreasonable on 
long;term debt because of the outsider's perception of a higher profitability of credit 
qual~y deterioration than the firm's or insider's. Therefore, good quality firms should 
wan~ to issue short-term debt in order to signal to the market that they do not fear 
scru~ny from the markets. Low-quality firms cannot mimic this behaviour because they 
' 
cannot afford the high positive transaction costs of rolling over short-term debt. 
Therefore, they will self-select into long-term debt instead. Because pricing of long-
term debt is more sensitive to changes in firm value than the pricing of short-term debt, 
mis{\ricing problems of long-term debt are greater. If the market cannot distinguish 
between high- and low-quality firms, high (low) quality firms will issue less (more) 
underpriced or undervalued short-term (long-term) debt. Therefore, according to the 
adverse selection and signalling hypothesis, firm quality is negatively related to debt 
maturity. However, if there is no asymmetric information or transaction cost, the choice 
of debt maturity is indifferent between good and bad quality firms. 
Diamond (1991, 1993) extend the signalling model and add several important 
elements to the analysis based on asymmetric information. He analyses a trade-off 
between the signalling incentive and a refinancing risk or liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is 
defin,ed as the risk that borrowers will be forced into costly liquidation because creditors 
choose to liquidate the firm instead of refinancing their debt. While previous models 
end tlp with either short-term or long-term debt, they suggest that high quality firms 
would prefer a combination of short-term and long-term debt while bad firms will 
gene~ally prefer long-term debt. Issuing only long-term debt will create disadvantages 
. ,_, -~ _, ~ _ "' beca1,1se there ,is no separation betweenc good,andc bad:boJTowers·while' short.;.term debt''-""-----
com~ with a cost of liquidation risk. Houston and Venkataraman (1994) also propose a 
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model in which a high quality firm would prefer a mix of short-term and long-term 
debt. High quality firms prefer short-term debt because liquidity risk is irrelevant to 
them and because they would be able to take advantage of the revelation of future good 
news (the positive information effect). 
Liquidity risk is crucial for the credit of medium quality firms with greater risk 
because creditors could refuse to extend the loan if the credit decreases and might try to 
take control or liquidate the firm. A small downgrade might result in liquidation of 
firms. Firms with greater risk (medium quality firms) would issue longer-term debt in 
order to prevent the exposure to liquidity risk. Similarly, low quality firms ideally 
would like to use longer-term debt as well to prevent liquidity risks but they are unable 
to do so because creditors would not want to lend money in the long term to low quality 
borrowers due to extreme adverse selection problems. Because bad news about the 
credit quality of firms may arrive at the refinancing date, investors would not want to 
extend credit to these firms. Also the rate of return required to compensate investors for 
bearing long-term credit risk might be too high for these firms, forcing them to be 
screened out of the long-term debt market. Because short-term debt can allow firms to 
reduce their debt's interest rate at refinancing due to revealed positive information, very 
low-risk firms should take this opportunity to borrow in the short term. Therefore, the 
liquidity risk hypothesis suggests a non-monotonic relationship between credit quality 
and debt maturity in that low and high quality firms would borrow short-term debt 
while long-term debt is preferable for intermediate quality firms. 
It has been found that the relationship between debt maturity and quality of firms 
depends on the approaches applied in measuring debt maturity. Most studies that 
applied a balance sheet approach have found support for the predictions of a non-
predictions of the signalling hypothesis. Most studies that applied an incremental 
193 
approach (new debt issues) do not have this sort of findings. Barclay and Smith (1995), 
Stohs and Mauer (1996), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) 
among others find support for non-monotonic relationships and the signalling 
hypothesis that only high quality firms would issue short-term debt while Schiantarelli 
and Sembenelli (1997) find a positive relationship between debt maturity and firm 
quality. 
4.3.2 Country-Specific Determinants 
Corporate financing decisions are likely to be determined not only by a firm's 
characteristics but also by country-specific factors such as economic conditions, 
corporate governance and institutional environment as shown in the previous chapter.68 
This section focuses on how a country's corporate governance and institutional 
structures affect firms' debt maturity structure. A limited number of recent studies have 
documented this aspect. Since each country has a different institutional system, the 
observed debt maturity pattern in a cross-country sample should vary systematically 
across countries. Different market conditions can influence a firm's borrowing decisions 
by affecting the absolute level of long-term and short-term debt and by creating 
incentives for firms to alter the mix of long-term and short-term debt (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1999). Therefore, this section explores the extent to which cross-
country differences in debt maturity choices can be explained by differences m 
economic conditions, corporate governance and institutional environment. 
Similar to the analysis of country-specific determinants of capital structure in the 
previous chapter, the country-specific explanatory variables used in the chapter are also 
classified into two groups: (i) market-wide determinants, which include economic 
·--"devel'opment;'·barilcdevelopment,' stock "rriarlCet development; feriri structure of interest--- "-· 
68 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999); Booth et al. (2001); Fan et al. (2004); Antoniou et al. (2006) 
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rates and inflation; and (ii) legal and corporate governance determinants, which include 
quality of legal enforcement, legal protection, ownership concentration and information 
intermediary activity.69 To test whether differences in economic conditions between 
countries have any effect on corporate debt maturity structure, the data for the four 
sample countries are pooled to create one panel. Equation ( 4.1) is then augmented with 
country dummies (THDUM, MLDUM and SPDUM) as in Chapter 3. Subsequently, 
equation ( 4.1) is re-estimated by replacing the country dummies with market-wide and 
legal and corporate governance variables, one at a time. Because the role of market-
wide determinants may vary depending on how severely the crisis hit different 
countries, and thus estimating across all countries may be misleading as effects may 
cancel each other out, the data for the four sample countries are subsequently divided 
into two groups: (i) countries least affected and (ii) countries most affected by the Asian 
crisis as in the analysis of the determinants of capital structure in the previous chapter. 
Equation ( 4.1) is then augmented with market-wide factors, one at a time over the whole 
sample period. Table 4.1, Panels B and C, present the measurement for market-wide and 
legal and corporate governance variables. Table 4.2, Panels B and C, summarize the 
relationship postulated by different theories between these two groups of country-
specific variables and debt maturity. 
Economic Development 
Fan et al. (2004) show evidence that firms in developing countries tend to use far 
less long-term debt than firms in developed countries. Therefore, a negative relationship 
between the economic development dummy and debt maturity is expected. In order to 
69 These factors are consistent with Fan et al. (2004) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). 
However, it should be noted that the legal and corporate governance factors are not time-varying. They 
- _, ~ __ ,,w :are jndicators calculated or collected by previous empirical stUdies and other organizations as averages of--- cc --·d 
particular periods in those studies. As suggested by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), significant 
changes in a country's legal system are infrequent, and indicators of the institutional environment, such as 
creditor rights and shareholder rights, are relatively stable over time. However, it should be also noted 
that these country-specific factors may be affected by the effect of the crisis. Due to data unavailability, 
no time-varying data can be applied; therefore, cautions must be made when interpreting the results. 
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test for this, a developing economic dummy (EDEV) variable is used. The dummy takes 
a value of 1 if the country is classified as a developing economy according to the World 
Bank classification based on countries' gross national income levels and 0 otherwise. 
This economic development dummy variable is included because it might be able to 
pick up an element of financial development that is not captured by other country-
specific variables. 
Bank Development 
The size of banking sector, which is measured by the ratio of bank assets to GDP 
(BKDEV), is used as a proxy for bank development. The influence of banking sector on 
debt maturity is not as much as its influence on capital structure. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) suggest that the implications of development of banking sectors for 
debt maturity are less clear. Financial intermediaries or banking sectors directly 
influence the financial structure of firms because they are main resources for financing. 
The prime function of such intermediaries is to monitor firms. They have greater 
incentives to use the collected information to discipline borrowers than other smaller 
investors due to the free-rider problem. Development of banking sectors should be 
inversely related to debt maturity because short-term debt enables intermediaries to use 
their comparative advantage in monitoring (Fan et al., 2004). Therefore, one might 
expect to see firms being financed with more short-term debt in countries where the 
banking sector is developed and large. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) argue in term of positive relationship 
between size of banking sector and debt maturity based on creditor rights. They suggest 
that size effect has some influence on the relationship between financial size of banking 
sector and debt maturity. There has been evidence that increase in creditors' protection . 
• 
-~-.-·-·,- ·-r·'•..:-J._~--~ ;_c_£:·~;,,::..·· • ....: ___ ;_,_y_,-~-.; ____ -.; ·-:-~•-.:-.. ::~·:._·._;_:_.-..;_:o:::· ;--:· -___ ,,_-~-- ··- ~-:_<'. --- .-- ·. -:-_. "::"-0. :\,:-:_·,_, __ .;,.___..,.....~--·"--
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raises the use of long-term debt indirectly by increasing the size of banking sectors. 
They argue that creditor rights are an important determinant of predicted value of bank 
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lending to GDP. This provides some evidence that strong creditor rights can promote 
the use of long-term debt in small firms. They also suggest that the use of long-term 
debt for small firms is correlated with year-to-year changes in financial size of banking 
sector. On the other hand, the needs of large firms for borrowing can be satisfied even 
when the banking sector is underdeveloped. Therefore, a positive relationship is 
possible. 
Stock Market Development 
As in Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), the ratio of market capitalization 
to GDP (MKDEV) is used as a proxy for stock market development. Grossman (1976) 
shows that prices quoted in the market could partially reveal information from more 
informed-investors to the market. This makes lending to firms that have been quoted on 
the market less risky. Therefore, if the stock market is active, firms are more able to 
obtain long-term debt. However, a negative relationship can be expected. There is an 
incentive for firms in countries with developed stock markets to switch from long-term 
debt to equity (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). The additional liquidity of 
stock markets makes it easier for informed shareholders to escape the consequences of 
failed gamblers. This, therefore, encourages risk taking behaviour (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999) and might lead the relationship to be negative instead because firms 
might want to use short-term debt to reduce the agency cost of debt. 
Term Structure of Interest Rates 
Based on the availability of data, term structure of interest rates (TERM) is 
defined as the month-end yields on long-term (1 0 years or more) government bond 
minus lending interest rate (short-term rate) matched to the month of firms' fiscal year-
whenever term structure of interest rates is not flat. Brick and Ravid (1985) show that 
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different time patterns of interest payments can affect the choice of debt maturity of 
firms. Firms try to maximize or accelerate their interest payments in order to maximize 
the present value of interest tax shields. However, accelerating interest payments is 
more costly to firms than slowing down interest payment. Long-term debt pays more 
interest in early periods and less interest in later periods than short-term debt. Therefore, 
in order to slow down interest payments and enhance firms' value, firms prefer long-
term debt when term structure of interest rates is upward sloping because the tax-shield 
value of long-term debt is higher (Kim et al., 1995; Ravid, 1996). In the early years the 
interest expense from issuing long-term debt is greater than from rolling over short-term 
debt. However, it is less in later years. Therefore, the tax hypothesis implies that firms 
issue more long-term debt (short-term debt) when term structure is upward (downward) 
sloping to increase the firm's market value. However, this will hold only when the 
benefits of tax shields are significant, such as when firms expect unshielded income. In 
addition, if term structure of interest rates is flat, debt maturity is irrelevant. Kim et al. 
( 1995) also predict that firms will lengthen debt maturity as the term structure of 
interest rates increases. They demonstrate that issuing long-term debt could maximize 
investor tax-timing option value. 
The market timing theory predicts a negative relationship between term structure 
of interest rates and debt maturity.70 Graham and Harvey (2001) find that the interest 
yield curve appears to influence the maturity of new debt. When short-term interest 
rates are low in comparison to long-term interest rates, or when the term structure of 
interest rates is high, firms prefer to issue short-term debt while they are waiting for 
long-term interest rates to decline. This behaviour is consistent with the optimistic 
behaviour of managers discussed by Baker et al. (2005). However, Lewis (1990) argues 
70 Baker et al. (2005) summarize some of the empirical studies related to debt maturity timing and term 
structure of interest rates. 
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selected before debt maturity. If they were selected simultaneously, tax would have no 
effect on optimal debt maturity structure; therefore, implying that the debt maturity 
structure is irrelevant and there should not be any significant relationship found between 
the term structure of interest rates and debt maturity. 
Inflation 
The change in consumer price index is used as a proxy for inflation (JNF). 
Inflation is included in the model because debt contracts are generally nominal contracts 
and thus high inflation may increase the interest rate risk faced by firms. This will cause 
firms to prefer short-term debt in periods of high inflation because high inflation comes 
with high uncertainty about future inflation. There is also evidence showing that the 
increase in inflation rates reduces the use of long-term debt. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) find that high average rate of inflation are negatively related with 
the use of long-term debt for both large and small firms. Therefore, inflation is expected 
to be inversely related to debt maturity. 
Quality of Legal Enforcement 
The quality of legal enforcement is measured by the level of corruption (CORR) 
which is inversely related to integrity; therefore, level of corruption should be 
negatively related to debt maturity (Fan et al., 2004). Fan et al. (2004) and Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) suggest that when the legal system has less integrity, and 
is inefficient or costly to use, debt would be used more than equity and short-term debt 
would be used more than long-term debt leading to a positive relationship between the 
efficiency and integrity of the legal system and debt maturity. Short-term debt is 
preferable to long-term because shorter maturity limits the potential for expropriating 
-- ·~ --- ... ,,.-creditors' rights. In addition,'biamoncr(199i: '1993)ai{dRaj(Ul (1992) s~ggest benefit;'"-- ·"'·"" . , 
of short-term debt when the legal system is inefficient. Short-term debt makes it more 
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difficult for firms to defraud creditors because the opportunity for firms to exploit their 
creditors is limited to a shorter period. In addition, creditors can review firms more 
often if short-term debt is issued. This allows creditors to vary the terms of financing 
choice because sufficient losses accumulate. Therefore, a positive relationship between 
efficiency of legal systems is suggested. 
Legal Protection 
The creditor rights ( CRR) and shareholder rights (SHR) indexes calculated by La 
Porta et al. (1998) are used to measure legal protection. The creditor rights index 
aggregates different creditor rights and ranges from 0 to 4 whereas the shareholder 
rights index ranges from 0 to 6. Diamond (1991) argues that lenders who engage in 
monitoring have incentives for short-term lending. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999) also argue that strong creditor rights increase the incentive for banks to monitor 
firms. Therefore, creditor rights are expected to be negatively related to debt maturity. 
However, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) find a positive relationship between 
creditor rights and debt maturity via the positive influence of financial size of banking 
sector. There is evidence that increase in creditor rights increases the use of long-term 
debt indirectly by increasing the size of banking sectors. However, they find no 
evidence that the index of creditor rights helps predict debt maturity directly. When the 
shareholders are protected, the agency cost of debt decreases. Therefore, in countries 
with strong shareholder rights, firms would need less short-term debt to mitigate agency 
cost problems. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between shareholder rights 
and debt maturity. 
Ownership Concentration 
·ewnership 'co-ncentratioli''( o wNtfs"p'roxi'ect' 1Jf'the ·owners hlp ''byth~ ihr~~~~gest ____ · ... 
shareholders of the ten largest non-financial domestic firms from La Porta et al. (1998). 
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When managerial concentration is high, the interest of shareholders and managers 
aligns. This leads to a higher level of agency cost of debt as managers try to maximize 
the profit of shareholders. Underinvestment problems tend to occur because managers 
and shareholders bear the cost of investment while the profit is shared with debt holders. 
Therefore, the moral hazard and agency hypothesis predicts that firms in countries with 
high ownership concentrations (high agency cost problems) should issue more short-
term debt in order to mitigate the problem, leading to the prediction of a negative 
relationship between ownership concentration and debt maturity. 
Information Intermediary Activity 
As in Fan et al. (2004), the big-5 auditors' market share (AUD) is used as a 
measure of the level of information intermediary activity. As with capital structure 
(discussed in the previous chapter), the debt maturity structure of a firm is also likely to 
be determined by corporate information. Therefore, the involvement of institutions such 
as auditors and analysts that participate in collecting and disseminating information 
should be considered as a main factor. Fan et al. (2004) suggest that markets that are 
characterized by a strong audit function should have lower leverage and longer maturity 
debt than markets with weaker audit roles, leading to a positive relationship between the 
role of auditors and debt maturity. 
4.4 Data, Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
4.4.1 Data 
This chapter studies the determinants of debt maturity structure of firms in 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia. The sample covers a cross section of 
developed and developing countries and the period of 1993 through 2001. Firms' . _ 
; ---·~--~:;.;:_r~.:.:-.o•_;,_~ •.. :.o-1-;_·~~~~ ;,',; ',·>i: -.. -.<,;;,,:.".;-~~',;>•'c·:'; .":·.:_ ';.:~~:.._•"''·~~ '.J:)_--'"_:: ;._:;;'':;;_:.·-'~t'~·:"-.-.. -~··:;_:._~,_;_~.:_: ·": ;,e..-~,=.:;-:;,';...::~::,..;l '---2'-·~~··;~--~0'~----;: :__·:.__._,.,;,-;:~_;;__--:._-~::_.-\~ ;:~:'.;;z,';. •i;'_-i.;.-7"!;.'\~. . '···· ~- -·: •.• • .• -. '·!:_·- '\·i"_:;--':..:;_)::;.,•.~~.:z..:_ .•• •_·_,_,..;::.__+.. ~,:.:."cl-"';:'---
financial data is obtained from Datastream. The panel data are constructed as follows. 
First, firms from the financial sector (such as banks, financial services, and insurance 
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firms) are excluded because, due to capital requirements, decisions concerning the 
corporate capital structure and debt maturity structure of financial firms could be 
affected by other different factors (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996). 
Second, firms which have any missing observations for any variable in the model 
during the sample period are dropped. The final sample consists of 1,726 observations 
for Thai firms; 2,493 for Malaysian firms; 1,164 for Singaporean firms; and 807 for 
Australian firms. As in Chapter 3, the sample is also divided into pre- and post-crisis 
periods and into country groupings by how severely they were hit by the crisis. 
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
Table 4.3, Panel A, presents the average of the variables used to measure debt 
maturity, firm-specific and market-wide determinants, calculated over both the full 
sample period and the pre- and post-crisis periods by each country. We find that the 
proportion of long-term debt to total debt is 29%, 31%, 41% and 65% for Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, respectively. This indicates that there are differences 
in debt maturity patterns for countries of different development levels. Australia has a 
considerably higher proportion of long-term debt to total debt than other sample 
countries. Bleakley and Cowan (2005) confirm that Asian firms were highly levered 
during the 1990s and most of their debt was short term. The low long-term debt ratio 
implies high use of short-term debt in Thailand and Malaysia. As Thailand and 
Malaysia were hit harder than Singapore and Australia, there might be some 
relationship between the use of debt maturity and the financial crisis. Several studies 
(i.e., Bleakley and Cowan, 2005) have shown that firms in Asia were highly levered and 
most of their debt was short term. 
f~-;·,' .-:.--·'.~'''r"·'"'~"-·· -~-- , .. _.:- ~~,lo_-.,._·, :...--- .-~:.:.. · 
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...... t:~ .. a!is.~-- ...... L .................. J. ................... ..i ....... ~ .. -~!L ........................................... L ...................... ..L .. J:~.:6.~.5..o..t ............................................ J .............. J.J.:f.?.~~~~- .... ·-·----·----- ........... ..J ............................ ..I ..... (:~~,~?!I!.L ............. , 
INF ,"4ll42.5 i 53212 ! 1.8704 -• 3.D428 ! 3.4767 i 2.67Jl6 ••• .5.6952 ! 109602 ! U344 ••• 2..50815 i 2.7899 i 2.7984 
t-statistics i ! (.54..5485} ' i G!4D199) ! ; 
( 
Debt maturity (MAT) is the pmportimt ofkmg-term debt to tatahlebt. Levemge (LEV) is the debt to capital mtic. Fimuize (SIZE) is the llllllllllllogarithm of totaliiSSets. Growth oppommity (GROW) is the mtic ofbaok 
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Table 4.3 : Averapt offinn-11pecl& and market-wide ftliallle1 (continued) 
Panel B : By country groupinp 
Variable Countrle• Leut Afl'l!cted by the Cmil Countrlet Mort Afl'l!cted by the Cmu 
(I) (2) (J) (4) (5) I (6) 
Full Sample i Pre-Cmu i Port-emu Full Sample ! Pre-emu 1 Putt-C:rilu 
(1993- ZOO I) i (1!193- 19!16) I (1998- 2001) (1993- 2001) ! (1993- 1996) I (1998- ZOOl) 
MAT 0..5162! 0.49031 0 . .5290 .... 0.3000 ••• I 0.2801! 0.3044 ••• 
........ :::·!:: .. ·- ...................... o:2f46+·----........... oT6s5j ............ ~~::o~~!!~-.. -................ ;~~~!!~-··•i" ........... ·-·---·o~w30·j--.. ---;_~:,~~~--··• .. 
............................................................................................................................... j ........................................ L ................................................................. , ........................................... , ....................................................... . 
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....... !:~.!~!!:8.~~ ............................................... ! ...................................... j ...................... W.,@.?.~L ........................... (L@!~l..•••·I ....................................... I .................. !:Q,~P.TIL ...... .. 
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__ !:~!!t!J.I!i!:!. .. ............ 1 ........................... 1, .................... w.,~~-t.L ............................. Q.~_:m.. ............ j ......................................... L ................ (Q,~~P .. _ ..... .. PROF 0.0789 0.0113
1 
0.0789 0.0811 ! 0.12741 0.0496 *** 
----~:!.!:~!!! ...................... -........ ::o~o344 ...... o .. i2od .............. _J~~[~--... -................... (~~li~-.... -1 ....... -.............. o .. mltf!·-.. --.......... u!o~P~--... .. 
t-statistica . i {to.ill88) (7 i90I) i . I (ll.:i368) 
··---··wf········- ········---·······-·aj43i ....................... if33Ttl ....................... o~35o2 ................................. o.3!l!i5-·•••l······-··-·······---o:Js97T··--· .. ··----··oAil68••• 
~~-:;!1:::.::~ :.:::·::::::·::.:::~:~:.~' ··:::::·:.::·:::.·~.·:~:~:.~t: ... :::::~:;:!t:~: ~:::.:::::·::.~~;!~~~~~:· ·-·-·:::.:.:::~-~~~:1::::::::::~~~:2~1t~~~: 
BKDEV .5.3197! 4.7229! .5.9419 ,... .5.4288 •• 1 4.7038! .5.9828 *** 
........ !:~!!!_t!!'~! .......................................... - .... L ................................ _ .. j ............... E!.:..~~~L ........................ t~,p~~L ......... 4. . ........................... ! ............. (:!~,?~5.~1.. .......... . 
MKDEV 3.6686j 3.79:20! 3.6902 4.1985 ***! 5.3815j 3.1652 ••• 
........ !:~!!t!!'~~ ............................................. ..i.. ................................ --l ................ IL!!~QL........ .. ..... _J:.l..~,~~L .... _.J ............... _______ j __ ............. @I.~J!1L ..... .. 
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.......... t:!_!!t~!~! ............................................ J ......................................... j ............... J:1..!}1~?.L .......................... J:~-~,Q!l.~.~J... .......... J ........................................... l ................... (:~,~f..l!.9.1.. .......... . 
INF 4.4.598'1 1.1899i 2.0238 ••• 3.3465 ••• i 4.040.5! 2.4312 ••• 
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Debt maturity (MAT) is the pmportionofl.ollg-tmndBbt to totaldBbt. Leve119 {LEV) is the dBbt to capita! ratio. Firm size {SIZE) is the 
l'llllunll.l.ogtlrithm oftota!assets. Gmwth opportunity (GROW) is the ratio ofbook wlua oftotal111sets ll!ss book wlua of equity plus market 
wlua of equity Ia book wlue oflata!IISSets. Ean!i!lp volatility (VOL) is the absolute diJfereJU:e between 1111111llll pe~eentage cq in elllllinp 
befbre interest and tllliBs and the IMI19 of this chanp. Liquidity(UQ) is the 111tio afcllmlnt assets to cunent liabilitiss. Pmfitability(PROF) is 
the 111tios of elllllinp before intmst, tex and dBpreciation to tota!BSSets. Slwe price perl'armaru:e {SPP) is the fust difference of logs of llliiiUBI 
slwe price. Asset Maturity {AMAT) is the ratio oftotal fred assets to total useta. Firm quality (QUA) is Altman's Z-Score. B4nk 
dewlapment {BKDEV) is the 111tio ofbllllkusets to GDP. Stack!Mlket dewl.opment (MKDEV) is the 111tio of market capitalization to GDP. 
Term structUJ:e of intmst111tes (TERM) is the difi'e111JU:e between government baNI yield and leN!iDg 111te. Inflation (IN F) is chanps in 
consumer price iluleL T -Teat in column (3) is used to teat whether the diJfereru:es of the IMII19S of variables between two sub-periods are 
statistically significant ar not while t-Test in column { 4) is used to test whether the differe!U:Bs of the IMII19S of variables between two ca1llltry 
groupings are statistically signifu:ll\t or not. 
• •• ... Signiflcant at to,-., .5,-, and I ,-,Jew~ mpectively. 
Dadush et al. (2000) also suggest that the rapid increase in short-term debt in East 
Asia was a key factor in the financial crisis of 1997. The leverage ratio is lowest in 
Australia (18%) and highest in Thailand (44%).71 This implies that the greater 
proportion of low debt that Australian firms issue are long term. The figures are 
consistent with the conclusion by Fan et al. (2004) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
( 1999) that developing economies seem to dominate the low range of the use of long-
. c~ -.. -,--~-'?' - '- '·;.:-, "~'--' -.. ' ·-. ·=>::._t.J~7:~";._"~';:-rz·::-i~-r~~·:_:::-:'..-':_:: ~~'=_,;;"-'·~"'-~c.:;.·" ; ..• -·'--'<-~"'-·";:;;..., ~ .... _, .. ;;.~.- _,,,_':,"''~~:,.;.,.'-"~if~~ .2.~<£.-'!...;5;-.~·;.~~-:~.~,.,1.-;·_,:. _;;: . . -..l;;>~.oL,:.::::L·:..-.o.<.:;.e.._,...- ·• . - --~~ -~--..# .,"":'(~ 
~~~~~.- ------ -~.._~ -·-L71 ''Ttle figUres for the sample countries are quite similar to what is reported by Fan et al. (2004) that the 
mean long-term debt ratios for Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia are 33%, 35%, 32% and 
67%, respectively. However, our figures are substantially lower than reported for other countries by 
Barclay and Smith (1995) (72% for US firms), Danisevska (2002) (79% for US firms) and Heyman et al. 
(2003) (48% for small Belgium firms). 
204 
term debt while developed economies tend to be at the higher range. Debt has longer 
maturities in more developed economies than in developing economies. According to 
Fan et al. (2004), Australia is in the top five countries with the highest long-term debt 
ratio while Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are in the bottom five countries with the 
lowest long-term debt ratios. Greater reliance on long-term debt in more developed 
countries could be caused by the differences between asset types owned by firms in 
developed and developing countries (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). The 
average proportions of fixed assets to total assets are similar across countries: 43%, 
38%, 35% and 33% for Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, respectively. 
Australia uses the lowest proportion of long-term assets to total assets while the 
proportion of long-term debt to total debt is very high, implying the absence of the 
maturity matching principle. The average size of firms in the sample countries lies 
between 12 and 14. Thai firms are slightly bigger than firms in the other sample 
countries. As found by Stohs and Mauer (1996), debt maturity is always below asset 
maturity throughout the sample period for all sample countries except Australia. Firms 
in developing countries have higher asset maturity than firms in developed countries. 
Table 4.3, Panel B, shows the average of the variables used to measure debt 
maturity, firm-specific and market-wide determinants, calculated over both the full 
sample period and the pre- and post-crisis sub-periods categorized by country 
groupings. There were significant differences over the sample period in both firm-
specific and market-wide determinants between the two country groupings. The 
financial crisis had several significant effects on most determinants especially in the 
countries most affected by the crisis. The crisis led firms in this region to issue higher 
debt on average, as equity issues became more difficult in unstable markets. Growth 
...... ,~oppartunity,,share·price;performance·and··fimcqualitf~si'gnificantryaeccfeasetl""afiertHe·-----­
crisis, while firm size and asset maturity increased. Profitability changed significantly 
205 
after the crisis in the countries most affected. The market-wide factors in each country 
also changed considerably after the crisis. For both country groupings, banks' assets 
became larger relative to GDP. Only stock markets in countries most affected by the 
crisis were severely affected. In both country groupings, short-term interest rates 
became higher relative to long-term rates, and inflation decreased. 
According to Dadush et al. (2000), short-term debt grew fastest in East Asia. They 
argue that the rapid increase in short-term debt was due to domestic policy changes such 
as accelerated financial deregulation, capital account liberalization without stronger 
prudential regulation and tax incentives to attract short-term flows which contributed to 
an increase in short-term debt maturity combined with distortions in international 
capital-adequacy regulations. Short-term debt was also encouraged by the government 
in order to support pegged exchange rates by sterilizing capital inflows leading to higher 
domestic borrowing costs. The excessive amount of short-term debt increased the 
vulnerability of several countries in East Asia. 72 In addition, Schmukler and Vesperoni 
(2006) suggest that the shortening of maturity structures could have played a crucial 
role in the financial crisis. 
Figure 4.1 shows a comparison of debt maturity across sample countries. 
Differences in debt maturity patterns among the sample countries appear to be linked to 
levels of economic development. For example, Australian firms have a considerably 
higher proportion of long-term debt than the other sample firms, while Thai and 
Malaysian firms make more use of short-term debt. Australian firms have the lowest 
leverage ratio, while Thai firms have the highest. These observations are consistent with 
a number of studies that show that during the sample period Asian firms tended to be 
highly levered, with a high proportion of short-term debt, and that this contributed to the 
72 It should be noted that the analysis based on long-term debt might have limited insights when there 
exists the predominance of short-term debt. 
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Differences in corporate governance across the sample countries can explain the 
variation of the level of debt maturity. One of the possible reasons why the use of short-
term debt is high in Malaysia and Thailand relative to Australia is the higher creditor 
rights in Malaysia and Thailand. High creditor rights encourage the use of short-term 
debt because creditors have high monitoring power. Another possible explanation is the 
weak corporate governance in East Asia, which had been developed through the 
unhealthy relationships between firms and lenders and poor bank supervision. This 
leads creditors to issue unsound and unsupervised lending or excessive short-term debt 
to firms, which in tum could have been one of the triggers for the financial crisis. In 
addition, consistent to what is found by Beck et al. (2002), the use of lower level of 
long-term debt in Thailand may be related to the fact that Thailand's laws is mixed 
between civil and common laws. 
Figure 4.1 
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Debt maturity structure of the sample countries is fairly stable over the sample 
period. 73 Although the economic crisis occurred in 1997, the proportion of long-term 
debt to·total'--debt·did not increase much~aftetthe crisis. Schiantarellt ancl~Sembenelli 
73 Stohs and Mauer (1996) also find that debt maturity was stable over their sample period ( 1980 - 1989) 
with no systematic upward or downward drift in average debt maturity. Frank and Goyal (2003) also find 
that long-term debt was fairly stable over the period of 1970 to 2000. 
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( 1997) find that the composition of debt became shorter during recessiOn years. 
Although apparently stable, there is a pattern to the level of debt maturity among the 
four sample countries. After the 1997 crisis debt maturity continues to increase in the 
two more developed economies of Australia and Singapore. Schrnukler and Vesperoni 
(2006) find that the maturity structure shortens to a lesser degree in countries with more 
developed financial markets after the liberalization. Developed countries are less 
sensitive and less affected by financial liberalization. Figure 4.1 is consistent with this 
finding as developed countries seem to be less affected by the crisis. 
To examine the possible degree of collinearity among variables, the correlation 
matrix of dependent and independent variables is shown in Table 4.4. These 
correlations reveal some simple relations among the variables before moving to the 
regression results. It is observed that the correlations are generally not sufficiently large 
to cause multicollinearity problems in the regressions (with the exception of country-
specific factors where multicollinearity issue will be dealt with in the empirical analysis 
section). It is also observed that the signs of the correlation between debt maturity and 
the explanatory variables are generally consistent with the empirical predictions 
especially between debt maturity and leverage, firm size, liquidity and asset maturity. 
However, there are also considerable variations in the correlations across countries. 
Consistent to liquidity risk hypothesis, correlation analysis shows significant positive 
relationship between maturity and leverage in all sample countries. For our sample 
countries, firm size has the strongest correlation with debt maturity among other 
explanatory variables, followed by leverage and asset maturity implying that large and 
heavily levered firms use more long-term debt and there also exists the presence of 
matching maturity hypothesis. 
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Table 4 A : CorTelatbnt Matrix 
Pamtl A : 'Thailand 
MAT LEV SIZE GROW VOL LIQ PROF SPP AMAT QUA BKDEV MKDEV TERM INF 
MAT 1.000 
LEV 0.162 1.000 
SIZE 0.309 0.187 1.000 
GROW .0.015 -0.329 DD24 1.000 
VOL .0051 0.107 0.035 -0.018 1.000 
LIQ O.D.S3 .o.m -0.077 0.017 -0040 1.000 
PROF .0045 -0.383 -0.107 0.030 -0.052 0.102 1.000 
SPP .0.017 0.060 -0.059 .0.055 0.006 0!127 0!186 1.000 
AMAT 0.109 0.080 -O.O.Sl -0.110 0.080 -0.176 -0.004 0.031 1.000 
QUA .0.162 -0.543 .0.149 0.468 -0.072 0.578 om OD16 .0.098 1.000 
BKDEV 0.071 0.392 0.121 -0.346 -0.001 -0!144 -0.131 -0.101 0.030 -0.206 1.000 
MKDEV .0.109 -0.393 .0.118 0.366 0.016 0.007 0.172 0.086 .0038 0.227 .0.8.s6 1.000 
TERM .0043 -0.117 -DD63 0.180 0.026 0.017 0.007 0.327 0.017 0089 .0.699 0.511 1.000 
INF .0.034 -D.I.ll .Q.03.S 0.154 -0.038 -0.007 0.11.l -0.36.l .0057 0.109 -0.094 0.317 -O . .l30 1.000 
Pamtl B : Mala,..la 
MAT LEV SIZE GROW VOL LIO PROF SPP AMAT OUA BKDEV MKDEV TERM INF 
MAT 1.000 
LEV 0.061 lDOO 
SIZE 0.318 0.228 1.000 
GROW .0.077 .o.m -0.282 1.000 
VOL .0.035 0.076 -0.049 0.024 1.000 
LIQ 0.117 -0288 -0.119 0.152 .0.029 1.000 
PROF 0.108 -0348 0.068 -0.061 .0.224 0!188 1.000 
SPP .0.007 -OD90 -O.Ol.S 0.022 .0.019 0!110 0.024 lDOO 
AMAT 0.130 -0.013 -0.089 -0.033 -0.035 -0.166 0.041 OD14 1.000 
QUA 0.008 -0.329 -0.131 0.396 -0.026 0.323 0.186 0.041 .0.071 1.000 
BKDEV 0.023 0.341 0.03.S .Q.l.S2 O.Dl8 -O.Dl3 -0.104 .0317 O.Dl8 -0.184 1.000 
MKDEV .Q.OO.S -0.302 -ODJl 0218 0.003 0.017 0.091 O..'i.Sl .0.034 0.160 -0.615 1.000 
TERM .0.026 0!136 -0.020 .0.014 .0002 -D!Il2 -0.11.5 0.294 0.037 -0023 -O.t:ll .0.112 1.000 
INF 0.048 -0060 OD18 0.042 -0.017 -0011 0.114 .QD67 .0.046 0.063 .0.154 0.116 .0262 1.000 
Pamtl C : Singapore 
MAT LEV SIZE GROW VOL LIQ PROF SPP AMAT QUA BKDEV MKDEV TERM INF 
MAT 1.000 
LEV 0.195 1.000 
SIZE 0.243 02.58 1.000 
GROW .0.101 -0.417 .0.111 lDOO 
VOL .0.077 0.033 -OD30 -0.040 1.000 
LIQ 0.067 -0.368 -0.110 0.102 -0.009 lDOO 
PROF 0.013 -0.294 000 0225 .0.113 0.04.5 1.000 
SPP 0.026 0.026 0.034 .0.102 O.OO.S -0!142 0.054 lDOO 
AMAT 0.192 0.102 -0.170 .0.041 0.040 -0.166 OD57 0.013 1.000 
QUA .0.067 -0 . .547 -0.111 0.628 -0.0.56 0.486 0342 .QD5l .0.139 1.000 
BKDEV 0.02.S 0.2.B -O.O.ll -0.219 -0.010 -0.001 .0.109 .0.109 0.046 -0.187 1.000 
MKDEV .0.032 -0.023 -0.02.5 0.060 0.030 -0.004 -0.04.5 O ..S26 0.002 0.041 -0.172 1.000 
TERM 0.028 0.174 -0.019 -0.094 0.017 -0.022 -0091 0.166 0.030 -O.ll.S 0.415 0.178 1.000 
INF .0.021 -0.172 0!110 0.231 -0.010 0.033 0.060 0.000 .0.064 o.m -0.343 0.245 0.047 1.000 
Pamtl D : Australia 
MAT LEV SIZE GROW VOL Ll PROF SPP AMAT QUA BKDEV MKDEV TERM INF 
MAT 1.000 
LEV 0.34.S 1.000 
SIZE 0.401 0373 1.000 
GROW O.lO.S 0.119 0.337 1.000 
VOL 0.016 0.007 .0.072 .0.011 1.000 
LIQ .0.02.5 -0.194 .0.309 -0.370 0.086 1.000 
PROF 0.030 0.002 0.271 0.199 -0.051 .oms 1.000 
SPP 0.019 -0.073 -0.049 0.015 0.003 -0.027 0.001 1.000 
AMAT O.l.l6 0.267 0.433 O.l7J .0.001 -0.301 0.175 0.009 1.000 
QUA 0.04.S 0.099 -0.066 -0.015 0.060 0.158 0.165 .0.057 -0.077 1.000 
BKDEV 0.127 0.071 OD99 0.063 .Q.02.S -0.004 0.048 .0.137 0.003 -0.010 1.000 
MKDEV 0.131 0.06.l 0.09.S 0.068 -0.021 -0.003 0.042 .0.126 0.000 -O.Dl5 0982 1.000 
TERM 0.091 0.066 0.065 0.060 -0.010 0.002 0.006 .0.131 D.Dl6 -0.012 0.760 0.773 1.000 
INF 0.040 0.067 Q.Qjj -0.021 .0.010 0.012 0.001 .0.101 .0.006 0.005 0.272 0.209 -0.192 1.000 
See Table 4.1 end 4.3 end Section 4.3 for the definition ofvoriobleo 
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The observed positive association of debt maturity with firm size in all countries 
is supported by the theories. Another high correlation is between growth opportunity 
and quality of firms, implying that firms with high growth opportunity is considered to 
have lower probability of default. As leverage is strongly correlated with maturity and 
strongly negatively related with market to book ratio, leverage should be included in the 
model to prevent the downward bias in estimated coefficient of market to book ratios. In 
addition, the correlation between growth opportunity and leverage is mostly negative, 
indicating that firms with greater growth opportunities use less leverage. As suggested 
by Stohs and Mauer (1996), this negative relationship can imply that management of 
debt maturity may be of little importance to firms with large amounts of growth 
opportunities because these firms have little debt. In addition, although the mean level 
shows some evidence of matching maturity in this region, the correlation between asset 
maturity and debt maturity is quite low suggesting that firms match the maturities of 
their assets and liabilities to a certain degree. 
4.5 Empirical Results 
The empirical tests are performed in the following order. First, the debt maturity 
equation (equation (4.1)) is estimated in a pooled time-series cross-sectional framework 
using OLS based on full sample to find firms' characteristics that determine the debt 
maturity structure of firms in this region. Second, equation ( 4.1) is re-estimated using 
sub-samples of pre-crisis and post-crisis periods to investigate the effect of the financial 
crisis of 1997 on the firm-specific determinants of debt maturity structure. Then a panel 
dataset is formed by combining all firms from four sample countries. Country dummies 
are added into equation ( 4.1) using this panel dataset to find whether country-specific 
-~-- -factors ~have- any~impact"on~the- determinants- of·capital ·sttuctiire;~-and · tnen-couiitry- -- · · -
dummies are replaced with market-wide factors one at a time to find out which factor 
210 
has significant influence on the determinants of debt maturity structure and which factor 
can explain the variation of the determinants across sample countries. Then, the effect 
of the financial crisis on market-wide determinants is investigated. Finally, equation 
( 4.1) is augmented to include legal and corporate governance variables. Therefore, 
overall, we estimate corporate debt maturity as a function of firms' characteristics, 
economic conditions, corporate governance and institutional environment. 
4.5.1 Firm-Specific Determinants 
This section tests the hypotheses regarding the debt maturity structure and its firm-
specific determinants to find out whether the maturity of debt can be explained by 
proxies for theoretically important firm characteristics. Table 4.5 presents results of 
estimating equation ( 4.1) for each sample country over the whole sample period using 
panel regressions of the percentage of a firm's debt payable in more than 1 year on firm-
specific variables. 
T .. le 4.5 : Panel anal Jill of finn-oped& ..,iermbumto of oorporaie ..,bt maturity otrw:tuno: Whole oample period 
Equation Thailarul Mala11ia Sblppore A111tralla 
Conotant -0.5640 ... -0.8712 ••• -0.5361 ... -0.2036 
, ___ 1:~!~!~-~il:~ ..... ··--·-........ (:~:!l .. I_~QJ.. .. _ ............... -.Hc.~l.----·- ..... ____ , __ (:~.~--·-··-·-- _____ ,_J:t!IQ~~·-··-···--
LEV 0.2223 ... 
l:slalistics ......... (~,2700) 
SIZE OD403 ... 
!-statistics 
. ··-····--······ ... 
GROW 
1-otalistits 
VOL 
1-slatistics 
UQ 
1-statistits 
...... ········ ····-·-. 
(~.7QOO) ..... . 
o.om-
J3.!800)_ .......... . 
-0.0014 •• 
..... <:~·370Q) 
om'4 ... 
....... J5.~00) 
PROF 0.3574 *'"" 
!-statistics .... 1 (~.4700) 
SPP 
0.108ii •• 
(2.3500) 
0.0118 ••• 
. (9.~400). 
0.0066 
(1:220()) 
0.0002 
.JOJ?.40l ..... 
0.0280 ••• 
p.uoo> 
0.1268 ••• 
.(4~) ..... . 
0.0053 
0.2142 ••• 0.3.W8 ... 
(3£151J(J) _ ......... J4DQQO) ........ . 
0.0601 ••• 0.0546 -
0.0147 
j0.62!l(J) .... . ...... . 
-0.0017 ••• 
........... <:3.1too> t· ..... 
0.0544 .. 
(48500).. . .... 
0.0001 
(0.1220) 
0.0005 
(Q.8~~) 
0.0126 • 
. .. (1~500) 
-0.1081 ... 
p.4:.100) 
0.0381 •• 
1-statistits 
-0.0074 
. (:0,1180) I ... (0.8~) 
(2.18(](1) 
0.1289 
(0J!98()) 
0.0274-
(2.!J.100) (2.2800) 
.... 
AMAT 
1-stotistics 
'"""' ........ ······ 
QUA 
1-statistits 
.. ~.It' .. 
No. ofobo. 
02489 ••• 
....... j4giOO) .. 
-0.0271 ... 
(-4.1200) 
02358 
1126 
0.2218 ••• 02789 .... 
.... <~~m .. . ............. c~OIJ!lO) 
-0.0001 -0.0095 
(-10900) (-13100) 
0.1701 0.2363 
2493 1164 
0.1096 
...... J1.2.8Q.OL 
00023 
(1.4100) 
0.2769 
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MAT"=~'+ ~,l£11,+ ~,SIZE,+ ~,GROW~-+~' VOL,,,+ ~.UQ,,+ ~:PROF"+ ~,SPP"+ ~.AMATv+ ~,.QUA,,+,.,.+ p" 
__ _ _ __ . TlleHtatistics mtlle.t-wlues adjusted fbr lletemscedastil:ity consiBtent stOJUWd error& bidu!lly liM tlme~~s\vere'iriiiJkd·ht ihe ~~~~to ~j;;;J' - .. - --· ~' _,_ . 
for industty and time effects but no stotistitolly signifu:011t elfeot"""' fbund. See Toblo 4.1 and Section 4.3.1 for tho dofmition of tile wriables . 
. .. ... Signiflc011t at 10'1., 5l'. and ll'• love~ 110SJ10Ciively. 
211 
Leverage 
Leverage is found to be positively related to debt maturity and to be the strongest 
determinant of debt maturity structure as the coefficients are largest and highly 
significant. 74 The positive relationship found gives support to the liquidity risk 
hypothesis and the renegotiation argument. Higher leverage increases the threat of 
liquidation; thus, encourages firms to stay away from short-term debt. The results are 
consistent with most previous studies such as Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and 
Mauer (1996), Barclay et al. (1997), Johnson (1997), and Antoniou et al. (2006). It 
suggests that leverage and debt maturity are used as strategic complements to reduce 
underinvestment problems as suggested by Barclay et al. (1999) that these firms would 
issue long-term debt when they are heavily levered. 
Firm size 
Although evidence in the literature on the influence of firm size on debt maturity 
structure is mixed and both positive and negative relationships have been confirmed by 
previous empirical studies, the results show that the coefficients of firm size are 
uniformly positive and significant across our sample countries consistent with several 
previous empirical studies (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Mitchell, 1991; Barclay and 
Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Ozkan, 
2000; Fan et al., 2004). The positive relationship confirms the prediction by the moral 
hazard and agency hypothesis that small firms are more prone to higher agency costs of 
debt and shortening their debt maturity would help to reduce these costs. Large firms 
74 Several studies find that inclusion of leverage in the model may influence the results because leverage 
is significantly correlated with other variables. Barclay et al. (2003) point out that the regression 
coefficients can be potentially biased and inconsistent when both leverage and investment opportunities 
are both included in the regression as independent variables. The problem from previous studies is mainly 
caused by the multicollinearity problem caused by the high correlation between leverage and growth 
opportunities. For example, when leverage is included in the model Stohs and Mauer (1996) find no 
significant relationship between growth opportunity and debt maturity. Therefore, an alternative 
formulation is performed by excluding leverage from the model (Equation (4.1)). Similar to Esho et al. 
(2002), the exclusion of leverage variable has little influence on other estimates. 
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have easier access to the markets and their cost of issuing long-term debt is lower. The 
results also confirm that small firms are generally precluded from accessing long-term 
debt because the proportion of their collaterizable assets to growth opportunities is 
relatively small. The results also give support to the signalling hypothesis because small 
firms seem to have higher levels of asymmetric information; therefore, they have high 
motivation to use short-term debt to signal to the market. 
Growth Opportunity 
Similar to the results found in the previous chapter on the determinants of capital 
structure, growth opportunities seem to have an inconclusive and puzzling relationship 
with debt maturity structure of firms in this region. The coefficients are uniformly 
insignificant for all sample countries except for the positive and significant relationship 
found for Thai firms. 75•76 The positive and significant level found for Thai firms is 
totally opposite to that expected. We expect to see a stronger negative relationship for 
Thai and Malaysian firms as developing countries face greater new growth 
opportunities. Therefore, they should issue more short-term debt to reduce 
underinvestment problems. This shows how little the agency hypothesis helps to explain 
and predict the observed pattern of debt maturity for firms in this region. Recalling the 
previous chapter on the determinants of capital structure, growth opportunity was found 
to be negatively associated with leverage ratio suggesting that Thai firms can reduce the 
agency costs of underinvestment by reducing their leverage. The results show that it is 
the leverage rather than debt maturity that is used by Thai firms as the vehicle to 
alleviate the underinvestment problem. 
The result shows little support to the moral hazard and agency hypothesis. The 
insignificant relationship implies that the underinvestment problem is not as strong in 
75 Fan et al. (2004) fmd slightly different results for the same sample countries in that a negative and 
significant relationship is found for Malaysia while the coefficients are insignificant for other sample 
countries. 
76 The result is in line with Esho et al. (2002) who also obtain similar results for Australian frrms. 
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this region or that the combination of reducing leverage and shortening debt maturity is 
so effective that the effect of growth opportunity on debt maturity can be ignored. The 
insignificant relationship suggests that there might not be sufficient variation in growth 
opportunity within the sample to observe their effects or that most existing models have 
overestimated the effect of growth opportunity on debt maturity. This argument is 
supported by Mauer and Ott (2000) who show that shortening debt maturity can no 
longer alleviate the underinvestment problem once leverage is held constant. This is 
because, when debt maturity is shortened, shareholders choose to default sooner leading 
to an increase in expected bankruptcy costs which will in turn reduce the expected tax 
shield. If this is the case, firms will maximize total firm value by exercising growth 
options sooner to offset larger expected bankruptcy costs and a lower expected tax 
shield. However, because shareholders ignore the cost of bankruptcy when making 
these decisions, the conflict between shareholders and debtholders increases when debt 
maturity is shortened. Therefore, the lack of negative and significant relationship 
between growth opportunity and debt maturity is consistent with Mauer and Ott's 
(2000) model. 
In addition, the insignificant relationship shows the presence of effective 
monitoring by banks. This might reduce the agency cost problem in the sample 
countries. It is thus unsurprising that debt maturity does not appear to be used to reduce 
the underinvestment problem because firms in the sample countries have highly 
concentrated ownership structures and close relationships with banks. Moreover, market 
to book ratio has been admitted as a noisy proxy for growth opportunities (Barclay and 
Smith, 1995). Antoniou et al. (2006) also find that the relationship between growth 
opportunities and debt maturity varied across their sample countries. 77 The findings 
from Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Johnson (1997) also show that the relationship 
77 Positive and significant relationship is found for the UK while insignificant relationship is found for 
France and Germany. 
214 
between growth opportunities and debt maturity is unclear and somehow puzzling 
because they find growth opportunity to be significantly related to debt maturity. 
However, when leverage is included in the model as a control factor, the relationship 
switches from significantly negative to statistically insignificant. This implies that there 
might be some bias in the model. Therefore, selecting variables to be included in the 
model can alter the quality of the results significantly. 
Stohs and Mauer (1996) also find mixed support for growth opportunities. They 
suggest that the problem with growth opportunities is that it is highly correlated with 
leverage and therefore there is little incentive to use debt maturity to alleviate agency 
cost. They also find that the relationship varies depending on the proxy of growth 
opportunity. A significant and negative relationship is found when R&D expenses are 
used as the proxy, while when market to book value ratio is applied an insignificant 
relationship is found. They also find that the relationship might vary depending on the 
methodology applied. In their study, growth opportunity shows an expected negative 
and significant relation with debt maturity in cross-sectional regression but a positive 
and significant relation in fixed effects regression even after leverage is excluded from 
the model. 78 
Earnings Volatility 
The results show mixed evidence of the effect of earnings volatility on debt 
maturity across countries. Earnings volatility is found to be negatively related to debt 
maturity at significance level for Thailand and Singapore. The negative relationship 
found is consistent with several studies including Guedes and Opler (1996) and Ozkan 
(2002). The negative relationship is consistent with the bankruptcy cost argument put 
forward by Kane et al. ( 1985). This implies that bankruptcy costs in Thailand and 
78 Alternative model excluding leverage is also tested. However, no significant relationship between 
growth opportunity and debt maturity is found. Therefore, the insignificant relationship is quite robust on 
the model specification. 
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Singapore are quite high and firms try to issue long-term debt when their earnings 
volatility is low to avoid the risk of bankruptcy. However, the results show that 
volatility of earnings has no effect on optimal debt maturity structure in Malaysia and 
Australia which is consistent with Johnson (1997) and Danisevska (2002). Using the 
same sample countries, Fan et al. (2004) find an insignificant relationship for the same 
sample countries. Antoniou et al. (2006) also find mixed evidence among their sample 
countries. 79 They suggest that corporate governance should be considered in the study to 
find the variation in the determinants of debt maturity across countries. On the other 
hand, Stohs and Mauer (1996) find that the relationship depends on the methodology 
used. Earnings volatility is found to be negatively related to debt maturity with 
substantial economic impact when pooled regression is used. However, the relationship 
switches to insignificant in cross-sectional regression. 
Liquidity 
Liquidity is uniformly found to be positively related to debt maturity at 
significance level across the sample countries. The results imply that firms in the Asia 
pacific region choose to issue more long-term debt while they are heavily liquid to 
avoid cash shortages and to lower their probability of bankruptcy. The positive 
relationship found is in line with Antoniou et al. (2006) for German firms. 80 
79 A positive and significant relationship was found for France but the relationship in the UK and 
Germany are insignificant. The positive relationship found in France is consistent with the argument that 
firms with high earnings volatility prefer long-term debt to prevent liquidity risk. 
80 This is strongly supported by the fact that cost of bankruptcy and probability of being liquidated in 
Germany is quite high compared with their other sample countries (UK and France). Therefore, German 
firms are highly motivated to remain highly liquid when long-term debt is issued. On the other hand, they 
_ __ .find_,that liquid~ty"_:_ha~ __ ll<> e_ffecLon _debL maturity .. of UK and French- firms: For· French Ttrins, the~---- -~ 
'--'--·~--- , ___ ··-- ~h1s1gnlficant relationship is due to the fact that rehabilitation of firms through reorganization is applied 
instead of liquidation in French bankruptcy laws. Therefore, French frrms have low motivation to remain 
highly liquid when issuing long-term debt. On the other hand, UK firms (being market-oriented) have 
better access to financing sources; therefore, their liquidity risk is lower compared with other sample 
countries leading to insignificant relationship between liquidity and debt maturity. 
216 
Profitability 
The results show mixed evidence of the relationship between profitability and 
debt maturity across sample countries. The coefficients are positive for Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore while the coefficient is negative for Australia. The results are 
exactly the same as Fan et al. (2004) for the same sample countries. The positive 
relationship is consistent with previous studies such as Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999) and with the tax hypothesis because highly profitably firms try to minimize their 
taxation by choosing long-term debt over short-term because long-term debt can create 
tax-timing options. This positive coefficient is consistent with firms' dominant role in 
fear of liquidation and loss of control which tend to be associated with short-term debt. 
The positive relationship is also highly consistent with the liquidation risk hypothesis 
developed by Fukada et al. (1998). However, the relationship is found to be negative 
and significant for Australian firms. Highly profitable firms in Australia still prefer to 
issue short-term debt instead of long-term debt even though long-term debt can help 
reduce taxation. It suggests that the cost of issuing long-term debt is quite high in 
Australia. This negative relationship is consistent to that found by Fukuda et al. (1998) 
where there exists a chance of renegotiation. 
Share Price Performance 
Mixed evidence is found for the relationship between share price performance and 
debt maturity across sample countries. Positive and significant relationships are found 
for Singapore and Australia which is consistent with the signalling hypothesis that 
undervalued firms would issue short-term debt to signal to the market and that 
overvalued firms would issue long-term debt that is more price-sensitive to a mis-
estimation of future cash flow in order to exploit market mispricing. However, no 
significant relationship is found for Thailand and Malaysia implying that changes in 
share price does not affect the firm's debt maturity structure. This discrepancy may be 
217 
due to the fact that, in countries with more developed financial markets, information and 
signalling play a more fundamental role in share price information than in countries 
with less developed and thus less efficient markets. Antoniou et al. (2006) also find 
mixed evidence across their sample countries. 81 
Asset Maturity 
The results show that firms match the maturities of their assets and liabilities as 
asset maturity is positively related to debt maturity as expected for all countries; 
however, the relationship is insignificant for Australia. The results confirm the maturity 
matching of assets and liabilities hypothesis and are in line with previous studies (Stohs 
and Mauer, 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Ozkan, 2000, 2002; Fan et 
al., 2004). The positive relationship is consistent with the matching maturity and agency 
hypothesis that firms try to match their asset and liability maturity in order to reduce 
asset substitution and underinvestment problems. The insignificant relationship found 
confirms the descriptive statistics in the previous section which indicate the existence of 
mismatching maturity in Australia and also lends support to Guedes and Opler's (1996) 
view that the matching maturity does not seem to work universally. In their findings, the 
coefficients of asset maturity sometimes show reversed sign and sometimes are 
insignificant. Mitchell ( 1991) also finds no support for the proposition that firms choose 
maturity of debt to match their maturity of assets while Antoniou et al. (2006) find 
mixed evidence among their sample countries. 82 
81 A positive and significant relationship is found in the UK and Germany while insignificant relationship 
is found for France. 
82 A positive and significant relationship was found for the UK and France and an insignificant 
relationship found for Germany. The insignificant relationship found in Germany confirmed the argument 
by Claessens et al. ( 1999a) that there is a mismatch of the maturity of assets and liabilities in civil law 
countries such as Germany. It also implies the absence of underinvestment problems in Germany. 
_concentrated'-ownership-structurecandcthe-close relationship between firms-andctheir creditors might help- - -- ---·- · --
to reduce agency problems. Therefore, there is less need to use matching maturity to mitigate these 
problems in countries like Germany. This contradicts a significant and positive relationship found for 
Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean firms where ownership structure is concentrated and there are close 
relationships with banks. It implies that underinvestment problems in the Asia Pacific region are more 
severe than in Europe. 
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Firm Quality 
The results show mixed evidence for the effect of firm quality on debt maturity 
among our sample countries. The coefficients of firm quality are insignificant for all 
sample countries except for a negative effect found in Thailand. 83 This negative 
relationship is in line with previous studies (Guedes and Opler, 1996; Johnson, 1997) 
and gives support to the signalling hypothesis that low-risk (high quality) borrowers 
tend to have economically and statistically significantly shorter maturities than other 
borrowers. This suggests that low risk (high quality) firms try to separate themselves 
from high-risk (low quality) firms by choosing short-term maturity. It also reflects the 
willingness of financial markets to provide short-term debt to good quality firms only. 
The results show that firms with high quality prefer short-term debt because short-term 
debt is less undervalued than long-term debt. It shows that good quality firms use short-
term debt to signal their value and to exploit market mispricing. 
The significant relationship found between firm quality and debt maturity in 
Thailand is also a reflection of the low rating on accounting standards and on disclosure 
compared with other sample countries. As shown in Table 2. 7, the ratings of accounting 
standards and disclosure are quite similar for Malaysia, Singapore and Australia while 
they are lower for Thailand. The lower ratings imply higher asymmetric information for 
Thai firms. Therefore, they have to try harder in order to signal to the markets. 
According to the liquidity risk argument, when asymmetric information exists 
between firms and lenders, short-term debt lowers expected financial costs for good 
borrowers. Therefore, where there is no chance of liquidation risk, short-term debt is 
preferred by good quality firms. As a negative relationship is found for Thailand, this 
implies that liquidity risk is not as high for Thai firms. 
83 Berger et a!. (2005) find mixed evidence when different risk class was investigated. A negative and 
significant relationship is found for their low-risk borrowers while an insignificant relationship is found 
for high-risk borrowers. This sheds light on the study of firm risk or quality that the effect of firm quality 
or risk on debt maturity might vary depending on the majority risk class of firms in the sample. 
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On the other hand, an insignificant relationship is found for other sample 
countries, in line with Ozkan (2002) and Esho et al. (2002) who find that there is no 
evidence of firms using debt maturity structure to signal their quality to the market. This 
implies that firms in these countries do not use debt maturity to signal their firm quality. 
However, Danisevska (2002) argues that insignificant relationships cannot be 
considered to be in conflict with the signalling hypothesis because a firm might have no 
incentive to signal by shortening its debt maturity unless it has both positive inside 
information and asymmetric information. Antoniou et al. (2006) find mixed and weak 
evidence among their sample countries. 84 They suggest several explanations for their 
insignificant relationships. First, as Diamond (1993) suggests, good quality firms might 
prefer the combination of short-term and long-term debt to short-term debt only as 
predicted by Diamond ( 1991) because short-term debt may cause inefficient liquidation. 
Second, as Ball et al. (2000) argue, close relationships between firms and lenders in 
civil law countries might help to reduce asymmetric information. Therefore, the 
relationship should be insignificant in Germany and France. Danisevska (2002) suggests 
that the empirical evidence on signalling is mixed and contradictory because of 
measuring problems as there are several measurements that can be used as proxy for 
asymmetric information. 
Barclay and Smith ( 1995) suggest that the relationship between firm's quality and 
debt maturity might vary depending on the methodology applied. Because firm's quality 
tends to be unstable over time, the relationship might not be captured by cross-sectional 
analysis or the signalling hypothesis should be more difficult to test by examining the 
cross-sectional variation compared with time-series analysis where the signalling 
hypothesis should be more relevant. Ozkan (2000) finds a mixed evidence for the 
- " sigrlallinghypotllesis''depending"ori"tlie' definition ofaeot ir1aturitf When \tebcmattii1iy~·-· -- ·--·J .,,· 
84 They find a weak support of negative relationship in the UK. However, no significant relationship is 
found for Germany and France. 
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is defined to include all loans maturing in more than 1 year, a negative and significant 
relationship is found. However, when debt maturity structure is defined to include debt 
with longer maturity (more than 5 years), no evidence of a significant negative 
relationship is found. The relationship between credit quality and debt maturity can also 
vary due to the proxy applied. For example, an insignificant relationship is found by 
Danisevska (2002) when future abnormal earnings are used as a proxy for credit quality. 
However, when bond rating is applied, the results support the non-monotonic 
relationship predicted by Diamond (1991 ). 
In summary, the results presented in Table 4.5 show that some determinants are 
more powerful and consistent than others in explaining the choice of debt maturity.85 
The results lend some support to the liquidity risk and adverse selection and signalling 
hypotheses and provide mixed support for the moral hazard and agency hypothesis. 
Although small firms use short-term debt to mitigate agency cost of debt and firms 
match their maturity of assets and liability, the relationship between growth opportunity 
and maturity is mixed leading to moderate support for the moral hazard and agency 
hypothesis. There is also a variation in the determinants of debt maturity structure 
across the sample countries in line with previous studies. The mixed result for the moral 
hazard and agency hypothesis might be due to the nature of the sample. Several firm-
specific variables are identified as important determinants of debt maturity but their 
importance varies between countries. Some variations can be explained by the 
concentration of ownership structures and close relationships between firms and lenders 
85 Further tests were also conducted to ensure the robustness of the results. Equation ( 4.1) was re-
estimated using cross-sectional regressions. Although cross-sectional analysis does not exploit any time-
series variation in the observations, it preserves the dispersion across ftrms and eliminates the serial 
correlation problem in residuals, which may tend to inflate the t-statistics of the coefficient estimated in 
pooled and fixed effects regressions. Furthermore, equation ( 4.1) was also re-estimated using fixed 
___ --" _______ .company:..:effects;, whereAhec frrm.,specificc time-series mean for· each·-variableccis -subtracted- from- each'"'~- -' -- · 
observation. A fixed effects regression is used as an alternative method for dealing with the problem of 
serially correlated errors. The main difference between pooled and fixed effects regressions is that the 
fixed effects model allows for firm-specific regression intercepts (Stohs and Mauer, 1996). The results 
from both the cross-sectional and fixed company effects estimations are consistent with the results 
presented here. 
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in this region. Therefore, differences in financial institutions and corporate governance 
can be important factors in determining debt maturity structure thus it is necessary to 
investigate details of the effects of country-specific factors. 
4.5.2 The Effect of the Financial Crisis on Firm-Specific Determinants 
As the sample period has a structural break in 1997, the variation among the 
sample countries might be explained by taking the financial crisis into account. A 
clearer pattern of the determinants of debt maturity across countries is expected for pre-
and post-crisis periods. Although Figure 4.1 shows that the financial crisis did not affect 
the level of debt maturity structure of firms much, there is the possibility that the factors 
that firms consider when they determine their debt maturity structure might be 
influenced by the effect of the crisis. The East Asian financial crisis of 1997 should 
have some significant impact on the determinants of debt maturity structure as the crisis 
affects the availability of credit to firms. Moreover, there has been evidence of Asian 
firms making excessive use of short-term debt which could be considered as one of the 
causes of the financial crisis in Asia because lenders can withdraw the fund quickly with 
short-term debt. The crisis has also increased risk and volatility of earnings. Because the 
evidence found in the previous section is mixed, and some do not support by the main 
hypotheses, it is possible that this is due to the effect of the financial crisis in 1997, in 
the middle of the sample period. Splitting the sample into two sub-samples should give 
clearer results. Therefore, this section will examine the effect of the financial crisis on 
corporate debt maturity. The purpose of this section is to examine whether the 
theoretical hypotheses are supported more significantly by the data after the crisis than 
before. As in Chapter 3, the empirical analysis is done by dividing the full sample into 
---'--~··~o -~--~'pre-- ~nd-po'st.:.cfi~is"peHods:'·Except .. for differerices"'in csarriple'"'penod's,- the:-data~"'source~ ~--""'· 
and estimation methods are the same as those explained in the previous section. 
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The results for pre- and post-crisis periods for each country are summarized in 
Table 4.6, Panel A. There are variations in the effects of the East Asian financial crisis 
on debt maturity structure across countries. The effects from the crisis can be divided 
into three different patterns: (i) significant effects, (ii) no effect, (iii) mixed effects 
across sample countries. 
First, the financial crisis is found to significantly affect the relationship between 
debt maturity and leverage, earnings volatility and profitability. Although found to be 
positively and significantly related to debt maturity, leverage seems to have different 
effects on debt maturity during the pre- and post-crisis periods. In Thailand, where the 
crisis originally started, liquidity risk is at the highest. Therefore, after the crisis, firms 
are more concerned about their liquidity risk and tend to use more long-term debt when 
leverage is high to offset the higher probability of being liquidated because long-term 
debt can help delay the exposure to bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, Singapore and 
Australia are not affected as severely as other countries by the crisis. Liquidity risk in 
Singapore and Australia should not be much higher after the crisis. The results confirm 
this because the effect of leverage on debt maturity decreases after the crisis for 
Singaporean and Australian firms. However, the relationship found in Malaysia is 
totally opposite to other countries. Before the crisis, leverage has a significant and 
positive impact on debt maturity but the relationship becomes insignificant after the 
cns1s. 
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An explainable relationship is found for the effect of the financial crisis on the 
relationship between earnings volatility and debt maturity. A negative but insignificant 
relationship is found for the pre-crisis period but the relationship is significant after the 
crisis for Thailand and Singapore. Before the crisis, the volatility was not so high that it 
could affect the optimal debt maturity structure; therefore, an insignificant relationship 
is found. However, the crisis increased risk and volatility, especially in Thailand where 
the crisis originated; therefore, Thai firms were more concerned and tried to reduce 
those risks by issuing short-term instead of long-term debt when earnings volatility was 
high. Singaporean firms also picked up similar effect to Thai firms. However, the 
relationship is consistently found to be insignificant for Malaysia. This implies that the 
crisis did not affect the volatility of firms enough to drive firms to consider earnings 
volatility when they determined their optimal debt maturity structure. The results show 
that the crisis has no significant influence on the risk of Malaysian firms. On the other 
hand, the results show opposite effect of earnings volatility on debt maturity in 
Australia. Before the crisis, a positive relationship is found implying that Australian 
firms were concerned about liquidation and that firms that have difficulties in repaying 
debt might prefer to use long-term debt when earnings volatility is high. However, the 
relationship switches to negative but insignificant after the crisis. This implies that, 
compared with other sample countries, especially Thailand, earnings of Australian firms 
are not volatile enough to affect their debt maturity structure. This also confirms that 
Australian firms have not been affected by the financial crisis as have other sample 
countries. 
There is a variation of the effect of the crisis on the relationship between liquidity 
and debt maturity across sample countries. For Australia, before the crisis, liquidity is 
, -"~ , __ -round -·to_:_be-"p6sitivdf 'biN insignificimtly ~'relatea ·1,r debt -maturity:· However; Lthe""~·-'-"~ -"·"· ~-
relationship later becomes significant. This implies that after the crisis highly liquid 
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Australian firms chose to issue long-term debt to avoid cash shortages. However, the 
opposite pattern is found for firms in other sample countries. The role of liquidity 
appears to decrease for the post-crisis period for Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. 
There are also some certain patterns in the effect of financial crisis on the relationship 
between profitability and debt maturity especially among Thailand and Malaysia. The 
relationship is found to be insignificant for these countries for the pre-crisis period but 
switches to positive and significant for the post-crisis period. This implies that the 
financial crisis raises more concern about firms' taxation. However, the crisis does not 
affect the profitability of Australian firms severely enough to change the sign of the 
relationship between profitability and debt maturity. As in the full sample, profitability 
is still found to be insignificant for both pre- and post-crisis periods. 
Second, the results reveal that the financial crisis does not have as much influence 
on the effects of firm size, growth opportunity and share price performance on debt 
maturity as on capital structure as shown in the previous chapter. The relationships 
betweenfirm size and debt maturity seem to be fairly stable for both the pre- and post-
crisis periods. Similar to findings for the full sample and for the effect on capital 
structure, no clear pattern of relationship between growth opportunity and debt maturity 
is found even when the sample is split into pre- and post-crisis periods showing little 
support to the moral hazard and agency hypothesis. A few significant relationships are 
picked up across sample countries; however, the sign is not as expected and no 
conclusive pattern in the relationship is observed. Moreover, the relationship between 
share price performance and debt maturity remains insignificant in Thailand, Malaysia 
and Australia while a positive and significant relationship is found in Singapore for the 
pre-crisis period but this becomes insignificant after the crisis . 
. , __ ~""fiflallY,cctlfe'results reveat SO IDe "yafiatfon§ "itf tne'' effecY"of the~flitaficfar-'crisit On··- . -· ·- ·•L 
the relationship between both asset maturity and firm quality and debt maturity. A 
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positive relationship between asset maturity and debt maturity is consistently found for 
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore for both pre- and post-crisis periods. On the other 
hand, the crisis affects Australian firms differently. There is no evidence of matching 
maturity before the crisis but a significant relationship is found after the crisis. 
Australian firms tend to rely more on the maturity matching hypothesis after the crisis. 
The results show some support to the signalling hypothesis. The relationship between 
firm quality and debt maturity is found to be negative for Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore. However, they are significant only for Thailand and Singapore. The 
signalling hypothesis is most supported in Thailand as the relationship is found to be 
negative and significant for both before and after the crisis. However, the significance 
level reduces after the crisis. For Singapore, there is a similar pattern. The signalling 
hypothesis is less supported after the crisis. On the other hand, as in the full sample, 
there is no evidence supporting the signalling hypothesis in Malaysia and Australia for 
either sub-sample. 
In summary, from the aggregate results in Table 4.6, Panel A, it is shown that 
financial crisis had a few obvious significant effects on the determinants of debt 
maturity structure especially for Thailand where the crisis originated. There are 
similarities and differences in the pattern of the effects across countries. The results also 
reveal that the crisis does not affect Australian firms as severely as firms in other 
sample countries. However, splitting the sample into pre- and post-crisis periods does 
not help much in explaining the variation across countries. Because the sample 
countries were hit by the financial crisis to different degrees, the sample countries are 
grouped into (i) countries most affected by the crisis and (ii) countries least affected by 
the crisis, as in the previous chapter. Equation (4.1) is re-estimated based on country 
--- ~--- _,_~"groupings-for' both ·pre:.- and==-post"crisis periods,_'and"the·results are- p-resented 'in-TEible-- -
4.6, Panel B. The results show that between two country groupings the crisis has had 
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three different patterns of effects on firm-specific determinants of debt maturity 
structure: (i) opposite significant effects; (ii) same significant effects; and (iii) no 
significant effect. 
First, the Asian crisis appears to have had different effects between the country 
groupings on the relationship between debt maturity and leverage, earnings volatility, 
profitability and asset maturity. Leverage is positively related to debt maturity in both 
the pre- and post-crisis periods. However, the role of long-term debt in offsetting the 
higher probability of liquidity risk and in delaying the exposure to bankruptcy reduced 
substantially after the crisis especially in the countries least affected by the crisis. 
Earnings volatility plays no role in the most affected countries in both pre- and post-
crisis periods, whereas it became a significant negative factor in the least affected 
countries after the crisis. This negative relationship implies a stronger agency effect in 
the more developed markets and it is consistent with several studies of developed 
markets, including Guedes and Opler (1996) and Ozkan (2002). On the contrary, the 
relationship between profitability and debt maturity in the most affected countries 
became significantly positive in the post-crisis period, implying that the financial crisis 
might have raised the firm's awareness of tax effects. While the crisis had no impact on 
the role of asset maturity in the most affected countries, the relationship between debt 
maturity and asset maturity became significantly positive after the crisis for the least 
affected countries, implying that maturity matching became important only after the 
crisis. Second, the crisis appears to have had similar effects on the relationship between 
debt maturity and liquidity and share price performance in both country groupings, 
regardless of how severely they were hit by the crisis. Although before the crisis 
liquidity played no significant role, after the crisis it became a significant positive factor 
-- -- ---"·-- ~- '·riraefermiriing""det:5t-m-arlitity.-TB.is"-irr1pli"es"tnai ·"'afier~tlie ctisisfirmswitnhighetfeveis------~- ·- , 
of liquidity chose to issue long-term debt to avoid cash shortages. Share price 
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performance became insignificant after the crisis, as stock market uncertainty increased 
in both country groupings. Third, the results also reveal that the financial crisis did not 
have much influence on the effects of firm size, growth opportunity and firm quality, in 
line with previous evidence on the pre- and post-crisis effects of these variables on 
leverage in the same sample countries as found in Chapter 3. 
4.5.3 Country-Specific Determinants 
As with the analysis of the determinants of capital structure in the previous 
chapter, there are variations found among firm-specific determinants of debt maturity 
structure in this region and the effects of the crisis on these determinants also differ. 
These differences may be due to the differences in economic conditions, corporate 
governance and legal setting among the sample countries. Therefore, equation ( 4.1) is 
augmented by including country dummies which will then be replaced by country-
specific factors one at a time. There are two groups of country-specific factors in the 
analysis: (i) market-wide and (ii) legal and corporate governance. The first analysis will 
focus on market-wide determinants and then move on to legal and corporate governance 
determinants. Due to the nature of the data, the investigation on the effects of the crisis 
and country groupings can only be performed on market-wide determinants. 
4.5.3.1 Market-Wide Determinants 
Table 4.7 presents the results of estimating equation (4.1) with the inclusion of 
country dummies and market-wide determinants, using panel data that combine all 
firms across all sample countries over the whole sample period. The coefficients of the 
firm-specific variables are consistent with the ones presented in Section 4.5.1. 
::;;;,._ ___ ~--_,_.:. __ ._ ..... ~ __ ;.,_-~- ....:.:· ::'::'-
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Tahle 4.. 7 : Panel anal)'IU of firm-iipecmc and marJII!t-wide de1enninan1J of co1pora1e de'bt maturity stnKture: Whole sample period. 
Equa-tion I Model-l ! Moclel-2 ! Moclel-3 Moclel-4 ! Moclel-5 Moclel-6 
Con.'lant -0.3099 - j -0.1879 "'"'"' j 0.0228 j -0.0739 j -0.4249 "'"'"' j -0.0710 
t-sta.tistics (-3.5600) l (-2.6600) l (03010) l (-0.8780) l (-624DD) . (-0.9650) 
·-·····-L!V-·····-· ···----o:f73T-•••-r-··-· .. ·-··oii9Is······-·r····-····-·-o:o:536············r··············c~:o36:r············r··············fi:oa39·····•···:················fi:o3:54··············· 
t-sta.tistics (6.1600) i (3.2300) i (1.7800) i (1.1800) i (2.92DD) i (1.1600) 
···sm ····· tJ:o:S7I.•*•T· iJ:o4:56***T ti:o296"'"T o:o326*'*'*T········o:i]37r•••r· o:o323"'** 
t-sta.tistics (9 .6900) ! (102000) ! (6.8700) ! (7 .1400) i (8.7400) i (7 .4200) 
· cR:ow · ·· ·· -o:oo06 ·· · ·· r · ···~o:ooio T ·· ·· :.o:ai:iii · · T ··· ~o:oi:ila T a:oooo ·· ··: ·· ····· ~o.oois 
t-sta.tistic> (-0.5120) ! (-0.8800) ! (-0.9550) ! (-1.4400) i (-0.0380) ! (-1.4400) 
·· vot; ·· ·· ·· :::o:ooos ** r :::O:i'ii:io9 •• r ·· ~o:oooa •• : ··· ~o:Oi:ids •• · r ·· ·· ~-iJ:ooo9 •• r · ····· ~iJ:oooa •• · 
t-sta.tistics (-l.96DD) l (-1.9900) i (-2.2800) l (-2.0800) i (-2.3700) i (-2.0800) 
·····iJQ··· ·· · · ·· ········· o:0222· •••·r ············ o:ii2o7 ··,..··:-········· ·c:o:aa4· ••* ·: ········a:o:at!r••···r·········· ·fi:oi79···••r··········· o:o2ia······ 
t-sta.tistics (39200) l (3B500) l (3.72DD) l (3.8500) l (33200) l (3.8700) Pior · ·· · o:o3:sir · ·· r ·· ifo4t4· · ··r o:o:576 • ·· ·· r · ti:oatr•• "T · · -c:ih46 T ifosoo •• 
t-sta.tistics (1.1000) i (13200) ! (l.82DD) ! (22800) i (0.5150) ! (2.3100) 
sliP · · ·· o:oo!n ••· T fi:oi:56·•·•·: ···· iiois4 •••T · ·iJ:o2fs ••• r ·· ·ii:of76 •••T o:o224 *** 
t-sta.tistics (19900) i (3.1200) i (3.6200) i (3.7200) I (3.5400) i (42400) 
···AiitA:f. ·· ···············a·2f37 ••• :·· ·········fii7i!i•••·r ········· riT3ff·•••r·············ai244·•••r·············fil667.*** : ··········· o·1243··;;;;;;;;;·· 
t-sta.tistics (6.6800) ! (5.:2000) i (3.7ooo) i (3.5100) ! (4.92cc) i (3 . .5100) 
ijtiA: .. . . . ·o:oo04 . T ':.0-:i'ioiiif . ·r· . . :.Oiio27 ** T ~iJ:oo44 ** ! . ..o:ooo3 ., ~o:i'io44 *** 
t-sta.tistics (0.5700) l (-1.5700) l (-2.1600) l (-2.5500) l (0.3350) i (-2.6500) tHDtiM .. . ~i:i:.So4f·***·i .... ... . . ..... .. i . ............................. .... T ... .... ....................... T . .. . . 
t-sta.tistics (-179000) i l l I MLJ)bM . :.0:3504'"'**! .......... ....... T ....................... i T 
t-sta.tistics c-14.9ooo) I I I I s:PDbM .. :.Oi2i8 ***T .. ..... .... ..... .. T i ..... .. .. .. ..... .. .. .. T 
t-sta.tistics (-8.40DD) i i i i 
.. mri ................................ T .... :::0:2446 •••r· ! ........... ................. r·· ...... ··························· .. 
t-sta.tistics l (-14.7000) l l l smE\1 · · ·· i ····························· .. i · ·· ·· :.o:o232 •• T ·· ·· · ·· ··· ·············· ·· · T 
t-sta.tistics ! ! (-5.1600) i i . MKI>ri. ·· ········· · ·· · ·r · ·· ·· · · · · · · ·· · r·· .. · · .. ·· ·· ·· r ······ 'tJ:oooir· · i ········· ·· ·· ·· ·· ... i ·········· ·· · 
t-sta.tistics ! ! ! (0.1650) ! ! 
'il!ilM . . . . .. .. .. . ·r . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . T . . . . .. T .. .. . . ................ .. T .::fi:o24i ••• T . 
t-sta.tistic• ! i : ! (-14.5000) i oo · ·· ' ·· ·· · ·· ········: ·· · · · r ··· ·· ··· ·· ·· ·· ·· ·· ·· ·· ····· : ·· · ·· o:Cioo9 · 
t-sta.tistics l l ! l ! (0.8430) 
N~~~.J · · ·· 0'~t~ · ·· ·· ·· ·· 0 '~~~~ ·· ·· ····· i ·· ····· ··· o.!I~~ · ·· ·· i ··· · · g.!I~~ ·· ·· ·· 0~}~~ · ·· ·· 0'!I~~ 
.MAT;.~=~:+ ~,LEV,,+ ~ 3SIZE,.+ ~.GROW,.+~- lii?L,, + ~~LIQ,.,+ ~,PROF""+ ~ 3SPP,,+ ~.AlliAT,.+ ~,11 QUA,,+ ~" Mt!kn-w~fot:ton,.+ a,+ /1; .• 
Market-wide dl!temlizwtts :replace com1.hy dummies olll! a.t a. tima. Tile t-sta.tistic> .ue the t-valuas ad,iusted for hetemscedasticity comiste11.t >tal.'ldam e:mJ!5. Imlust:ry azui tima dummies 
~:re im:illded in the model in otder to comm1 for indust:ry azui tima effects but no statistically sipmica11.t effect was fOUlld. See Table 4.1 azui 4.3 azui Sec:tic11. 4.3 for the dl!fimticn of 
the variables. 
·.., ** *** Sigrlif~ea11.t a.t 10%, 5% azui 1% U.wl, :respecliw1y. 
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All country dummies coefficients are significantly different from zero. This 
shows that country-specific factors play important roles in corporate debt maturity 
decisions of firms in this region. This implies that in addition to a firm's characteristics, 
the location of the country in which a firm operates is also an important determinant of 
its debt maturity structure, consistent with Fan et al. (2004). Economic Development is 
also found to play a significant role in determining debt maturity structure of firms in 
this region. The results show that developing countries tend to issue less long-term debt. 
This confirms the descriptive statistics from Section 4.4. Consistent with Fan et al. 
(2004), the results show that bank development (size of banking sector) is negatively 
associated with debt maturity. This implies that banks exploit their benefits of 
monitoring in this region by issuing more short-term debt. The results support the 
monitoring role of banks. However, although found to be positive, the results show that 
stock market development (stock market activity) has no significant effect on the choice 
of debt maturity in this region. This is consistent with the insignificant relationship 
found by Fan et al. (2004) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). Because size of 
banking sector shows a significant effect on debt maturity, it can be implied that banks 
have a stronger effect on debt maturity than stock markets in this region and that stock 
market development does not help explain differences in the usage of long-term debt. 
The results show that the coefficients of term structure of interest rates are 
negative and significant giving support to the market timing theory and in line with the 
findings of Guedes and Opler (1996) and Johnson (1997). This result shows some 
evidence of less than fully rational behaviour of managers (optimism) as discussed in 
Baker et al. (2005) that managers may time their debt maturity decisions by issuing 
short-term debt when term spread is high in order to wait for the decline of long-term 
-fates· iii the futUre to feCfuce tlie'overaWcost of debt. Tlie ne-gative ·an"d insignificant 
relationship found suggests that widening of the yield spread between short- and long-
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term debt does not encourage firms to issue longer-term debt in order to take advantage 
of the tax shield. On the other hand, firms in this region are encouraged to use short-
term debt when term structure of interest rates is increasing. Therefore, similar to 
Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Guedes and Opler (1996), the 
results fail to support the tax hypothesis that predicts a positive relationship between 
debt maturity and the slope of the yield curve. Barclay and Smith (1995) find that the 
relationship between term structure of interest rates and debt maturity depends on the 
methodology applied while Antoniou et al. (2006) find mixed influence of term 
structure of interest rates on debt maturity. 86•87 
Since the findings in Table 4.7 reflect the aggregate effects across sample 
countries, it is possible that the estimated coefficients may hide the conflicting country-
specific influence that some determinants may have on debt maturity. In particular, 
given that the sample countries were at different stages of economic development and 
were hit by the crisis to different degrees, some of the true market-wide effects may 
have been washed out when estimated over the full set of sample countries as in Table 
4.7. It is an important question whether the market-wide determinants had a different 
impact on sample countries depending upon their stage of development and 
vulnerability to the crisis. Table 4.8 presents the findings from estimating equation (4.1) 
for the pooled panels of the two groups of countries, least and most affected by the 
crisis. The results reveal an opposite pattern in the relationships between bank 
development, stock market development and the term structure of interest rates and debt 
maturity among the two country groupings. 
- -~ Barclay, and Smith- (1995)- find -a- negative and· significant- relationship 'when· pan-el data Was- applied- in 
pooled OLS and fixed effects regression but found an insignificant relationship when cross-sectional data 
is used providing no support for tax hypothesis. 
87 Antoniou et al. (2006) find a positive and significant relationship in the UK lending strong support to 
the tax hypothesis. However, an insignificant relationship is found for France and Germany implying that 
the tax effect does not influence debt maturity of French and German firms. 
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Table 4..8 : Panel anal)'lis of firm-sped& and market-wide de1erminantJ of coipora'le debt maturity strw:ture by counD:y groupings: Whole sample period 
Panel A : Countries Least .ABec1ed by the Crisis I Panel B : Countries Most .ABec1ed by the Crisis 
uation Model-l j Model-2 i Model-l i Model-4 Model-l i Model-2 i Model-l i Model-4 
Constant -0.2041 • i -02283 •• i -0.6081 ••• i -0.4095 ••• -1.0499 ••• i -0.8244 ••• i -0.3194 ••• i -0.3484 ••• 
t-ste.tistics (-1.8300) i (-2.0500) i (-5.7900) i (-3.4900) (-5.8300) i (-5.3500) I (-2.8900) i (-3.1200) 
··········--··uv-··············· ···················ii2687········r······-·········ii2476".***T··················ci:n:ss-··;;.;····r·················ci"T6ii"i········ ···················a:i3si···••r···············-ci"Ti5·a·i5····••-r·················aj23i"··;;;;;;;;·r··········-····o.i154··;;.;;;;·· 
t-ste.tistics (5.1900) i (4.7800) ! (4.5700) i (3D100) (4.1300) i (5.0600) ! (3.7500) i (3.5200) 
siiE ···· ·c.a54i•••:··· oii56a·•..,r ··c:o:S76•••r a·.a641••• ········· ii04:57•••r······a:ii"sti•••1······ ii040i•••r o.a3sii ..... 
t-ste.tistics (7..5100) i (7.8200) ! (8.1000) i (8.1700) (7.5700) i (7.31500) i (7..5000) i (7.4200) 
· --c:R:<>"w· ··· · ··· ···~:ooa3···· ···r ···· ·~o:aaa:r ····· r·· · ·~:oooi·· ····r···········~iiaai3 · ···· ······ · · ·a:oii2* · T · · ·· ·li"aosa· ···T ·· ··a:o09o ···· ·:· ···· ·· o·:aos6· · · 
t-ste.tistics (-0.2760) i (-0.3440) ! (-0.3630) i (-1.0900) (1.8700) i (1.4900) ! (1.5100) i (1.4500) voL · ······ ·· · · ··~a:ooo:s · ·r· ·· ·~o.oail"s · · T · · ·· ·~a·:aoa:s·· ·· r·· ·····~o-.oil"as· · · · ·· ·· ~a:ooois T ····· · · :o:ooo7 ···· -:· ··· · ·~a·:ooo:s · r ·· ~o~ooo6 
t-ste.tistics (-1.1400) i (-1.0800) ! (-1.0900) i (-1.1400) (-1.0300) i (-1.0900) ! (-0.8420) i (-1.0300) ii(f ······ .......... """o:i]i8C•• Hr· .. ··o.oliii**" r ....... O":oi77"".j;.j;rH···. ··a:o2i"3···· OH···· o.o:l59***"! ··a.ri2i5••··;······ ··a:o25i ........ T o:o:i48" ..... 
t-ste.tistics (2.4800) ! (2.4400) j (2.3600) ! (2.15300) (3..5900) ! (3.8100) j (3.6400) ! (3.6000) H"Piioi" H .. .. . H~:Ci940"••• TH ~il.o939"***T -~ii9ii"•···l·········· ··:a.o265 .. ..... ......... ""rii292"***T ... Hoo~1"5ii2"*** r .. H "iii229 ***T . "(jjf:il"••• 
t-ste.tistics (-2.8300) i (-2.8900) : (-2.8100) i (-0.6590) (4.4400) i (5.0000) : (4.1900) i (3.8700) sw·H ····· · ....... o:Ci3:s:s·•*•·r ...... o.:aso&•••rH ··a:o330**•T ........ o.647T**• · ···a:oosi· ·:· ···~o.o"i3i** ·; ~a:oo2a·· ·r o:Oo3s-
t-statistics (32800) i (4..5400) l (3.0300) I (4.0200) (1.5700) I (-2.1100) ! (-0.4820) i (0.6470) 
······ H·:AMA~r-··· ····· ··················6:i94tr•••···r .. ······ ........ o.:i9i"s·······r·· ....... ····6:i936. •••·r··H··········· .. ·oi54i·••··· ······H· ········a:i96i. •••· :·· .............. o:-2"137 .. *** ·r···· ···· ...... a.:is28 •·••· :···· ·········H·o·:is"i&"·•••·· 
t-ste.tistics (3.7soo> i (3.7200) ! (3.7400) I (2.69oo> (4.99oo> I (5.48oo> ! (4.62oo> I (4..58oo> 
·······"Qui······ ······ ·H· ............ o.o023H·········-r .............. Ho~D"oi9 ·······rH··· .... ······a:oo20" .......... r .......... ··~o-:iio41"·····H· ··· ............ ~O":ooi2········· .. ··r··· .......... ~o·."Oois··· .. ·····;······ ........ :iiooi3 ............ : ····· ....... ~ifiioi-:3···· 
t-ste.tistics (1.4900) ! (1.2300) j (1.3100) : (-2.2500) (-1.5900) i (-1.7000) j (-1.6100) i (-1.6200) 
....... iK»iV""""" .................. ~:o375"······:····"""""" .................................. r ............................................. T""""" ............................ ..... ... ... ....... o":ii88""0.;;.;··r··· .......................................... ! ............................................. :······ ..................................... . 
t-ste.tistics ( -9 .3900) i ! i (5 .3500) i ! i MKiiEv· ······· ···· ···························· · · r· · ~o:as62 ***T ............. ··············· · · : ········ ········ ··················· ······· ··· ... .. : · · a·:a402***T · · ···· · · r· 
t-ste.tistics I <-9.o8oo> : i i (6.40oo> : i 
... n:RM · · · ·· · · · · ······ ··· ···: H - • T ······ ~.o2o3 ···•r · · · · · r ···· · · · · r· · om46 •••: 
t-ste.tistics i l (-8.8200) i I l (4.4300) i 
· .... INF ... ···· ·· · · ·· · ·""~··· ····················· · r · · ·· .. r··· -0.0008 · .... r ............................. T.. · ........ ·r· 
t -statistics ! i i ( -0 .5240) i ! ! 
...... !'1-J~~--- ...... , ........... .... .9.}~~ ...... . ! ........... 0...3.}5.?.. L.. .. 0.}1~ ........ i ....... a. .. ~~~-~ . ·····I· . 0.:1.~1. . i . ..0.}~3~ ..... L ........... .9.}.4(]7. .... : .. 
No. ofobs. 1973 ! 1973 i 1973 i 1973 4219 ! 4219 ! 4219 j 
-0.0115 ••• 
(-2.9400) 
0.1374 
4219 
MAT,r= ~1 + ~1LEV,r+ ~~SIZE,.,+ ~.,GROW;,+~:. VOL,,+ ~,UQv+ ~,PROF,,+ JJsSPP~,+ ~~AMATu+ ~1oQUA;, + ~n Mt.l~t-wirJ,FactD:rs~,+ ex,+ l';r 
Market-wide dete:rmimmts replace country dumm.ies one 8t a time. The t-ste.tistics lll'!l the t-VBl.ues adjusted for hetemscedllsticity consistent stlllldBrd e:rmm. Industry 8lld time dumm.ies were 
included in the model in olrler to control for industry 8lld time effects but no statistically signifJCIIl'lt effect WliS found. See Table 4.1 8lld 4.3 8lld Section 4.3 for the defurition of the wriBbles. 
• •• -· SignifJCIIl'lt 11t 1 0%, 5~. 8lld 1 Yo leve~ respectively. 
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The negative and highly significant coefficient of bank development for the 
sample of countries least affected by the crisis supports the findings of Fan et al. (2004). 
In developed economies banks are able to take full advantage of their monitoring power 
and act as information providers to other creditors. Thus, the larger the banking sector, 
the more firms are encouraged to issue short-term debt. In the countries most affected 
by the crisis, a positive and significant relationship shows that a larger banking sector 
leads to more long-term debts. This finding is consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic' s (1999) argument that in developing countries with weaker legal systems, 
a larger banking sector will be associated with longer-maturity debts, as creditor's rights 
are strengthened by the size of the banking sector. In addition, the closer relationship 
between firms and their banks in developing countries, and the lack of an efficient 
equity market, may also encourage banks to grant relatively more long-term debt. 
In line with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), the results show a 
significant role of stock market development in determining debt maturity structure that 
stock markets in countries least affected by the crisis are quite developed and since 
firms can more easily raise long-term finance from equity, they will hold relatively 
shorter maturity debts. The reverse is true for firms in countries most affected by the 
crisis as their stock markets are less developed. Consistent with the tax hypothesis, 
firms in countries most affected by the crisis employ more long-term debt when term 
structure of interest rates has a positive slope. On the other hand, the market timing 
theory dominates the effect for firms in countries least affected by the crisis which is in 
line with the findings of Guedes and Opler ( 1996). This result shows some evidence of 
less than fully rational behaviour of managers (optimism) as discussed in Baker et al. 
(2005). Finally, in line with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic's (1999) findings, the 
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However, the coefficient is not significant for firms in countries least affected by the 
crisis. 
Table 4.8 shows that market-wide determinants have different effects on different 
country groupings. As the developed countries are least affected by the crisis while 
developing countries are most affected by the crisis, it is important to further investigate 
whether the role of market-wide determinants changes as a results of the crisis. Table 
4.9 presents the results relating to market-wide factors for the pre- and post-crisis 
periods for the two country groupings identified. While the crisis changed the 
relationship between debt maturity and a number of firm-specific factors, it does not 
appear to have affected the direction of the effect of all market-wide factors, apart from 
inflation. 
All the coefficients of the market-wide factors are highly significant in both 
country groupings in the pre- and post-crisis periods, in line with the findings for the 
whole sample period presented earlier in Table 4.8 which shows that market-wide 
factors play opposite roles in the two country groupings and the crisis did not change 
this contrasting behaviour. Overall however, the crisis changed the size of the impact of 
market factors, especially in the less developed countries. Similar effects on bank 
development and market development are found between country groupings. Although 
remaining in opposite directions between country groupings, the role of bank 
development in determining debt maturity structure reduces for both country groupings 
after the crisis because banks also were hit by the crisis which led to a less effective 
monitoring role while the role of stock market development increased for both country 
groupings after the crisis . 
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On the other hand, the crisis affected the role of term structure of interest rates 
differently between country groupings. The role increased for countries least affected by 
the crisis while it decreased for the countries most affected. This implies that the 
concern for tax is lowered for countries most affected by the crisis. The market timing 
theory still continues to dominate the effect for firms in countries least affected by the 
crisis with a negative relationship found. The coefficient of inflation changes sign after 
the crisis and becomes positive for both country groupings. This may explain why 
inflation appears insignificant in the previous aggregate analysis of the whole sample 
period, as negative and positive effects cancel each other out. 
4.5.3.2 Legal and Corporate Governance Determinants 
Table 4.10 presents the results of estimating equation ( 4.1) with the inclusion of 
legal and corporate governance determinants. Consistent with Fan et al. (2004), the 
results show that corruption level is negatively associated with debt maturity implying a 
positive relationship between quality of legal enforcement and debt maturity. This 
suggests that the higher the quality of legal enforcement, the greater the proportion of 
long-term debt financing showing support to the monitoring function of short-term debt. 
Legal protection is also found to be a significant factor in determining a firm's debt 
maturity choice. In particular, firms in countries with superior creditor rights use more 
short-term debt than firms in countries with low creditor rights implying that the ability 
of firms to use short-term debt is higher when creditors are better protected because 
banks as a main creditor have advantages of monitoring. 
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On the contrary, firms in countries with higher shareholder protection use more 
long-term debt, in line with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). The results 
confirm that when shareholders feel protected, the agency cost of debt reduces and firms 
have less need to shorten their debt maturity. This suggests that the indexes of investor 
protection help explain differences in the usage of long-term debt. A negative 
relationship between debt maturity and ownership concentration shows support for the 
moral hazard and agency hypothesis. In support of Fan and Wong's (2002) argument, 
the results show a positive relationship between information intermediary activity and 
debt maturity highlighting the role of auditors in facilitating information circulation. In 
countries with high big-5 auditors' market share or with a substantial role for auditors, 
firms tend to use longer debt maturity. 
In summary, the results are highly consistent with the findings of a number of 
previous studies that examine how corporate debt maturity structure differs across 
countries. The ratio of long-term debt is strongly related to both market-wide and legal 
and corporate governance factors in the expected signs. The results reveal that market-
wide determinants not only influence the maturity of firm's borrowing, but also affect 
firm's debt maturity in different ways depending on the country's economic 
development and how severely they were hit by the crisis. It confirms the significant 
roles of corporate governance and institutional environments in determining debt 
maturity structure for firms in this region. Therefore, similar to capital structure 
decision, the debt maturity structure decisions of a firm are not only the product of its 
own characteristics but also the results of the environment in which it operates. 
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4.6 Summary 
Decisions concerning debt maturity structure are as important as the capital 
structure decisions of a firm's capital structure. This chapter has investigated what types 
of non-financial firms in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia over the period of 
1993 to 2001 chooses long-term debt. The results show the conditions under which 
firms prefer long-term debt. Four main leading theoretical models (namely the moral 
hazard and agency hypothesis, the adverse selection and signalling hypothesis, the tax 
hypothesis and the liquidity risk hypothesis), their empirical test, financial crisis and the 
effect of differences in corporate governance and institutional settings have raised 
significant academic and policy interest relating to debt maturity decisions. 
The descriptive statistics show that there are variations among debt maturity 
structure of firms in the sample countries. These variations seem to be related to the 
level of market development. Debt appears to be at longer maturity in more developed 
economies such as Singapore and Australia but at shorter maturity in less developed 
economies as in Thailand and Malaysia. The high use of short-term debt in Thailand 
and Malaysia is consistent to the belief that excessive use of short-term debt may be one 
of the factors that triggered the financial crisis. 
This chapter aims to explore the effects of both firm-specific determinants and 
country-specific determinants (market-wide and legal and corporate governance) on 
corporate debt maturity choices. The results presented in this chapter are consistent with 
the hypotheses and the results from previous empirical studies that examine corporate 
debt maturity structure decisions and how it may differ across countries. The ratio of 
long-term debt to total debt is found to be strongly related to a number of firm-specific 
factors. In particular, firms with high leverage and growth would prefer long-term debt 
·- -- in order to offset the higher probability of a liquidity risk and to delay their exposure to 
bankruptcy risk giving support to liquidity risk hypothesis. In support to signalling 
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hypothesis, the results show that undervalued and high quality firms prefer short-term 
debt because these firms have high asymmetric information and want to signal to the 
market or want to be revealed as high quality at the re-contract time. Firms with high 
quality would also want to issue short-term debt to avoid paying the market premium 
that is too high than their quality because the premium reflects the average probability 
of default. However, the results provide mixed support for agency hypothesis. On one 
hand, small firms and firms with high volatility prefer short-term debt because these 
firms are likely to have higher agency cost; therefore, they have incentive to mitigate 
the problem by shortening their debt maturity. Firms match maturity of assets and 
liabilities to reduce agency cost because debt repayments are scheduled to correspond 
with the value of assets. On the other hand, the relationship between debt maturity and 
growth opportunity is mixed. However, there is little support for the tax hypothesis. 
Firms with high profitability prefer long-term debt to minimize tax expenses but this is 
not robust for all sample countries. Therefore, among firm-specific determinants, long-
term debt is used more by firms with higher leverage, larger size, higher liquidity, and 
longer asset maturity. Firms consider these factors in particular in order to offset the 
higher probability of a liquidity risk, to delay their exposure to bankruptcy risk, to 
signal to the markets and to reduce agency cost. 
The results also confirm that market-wide factors are as important as firm-specific 
characteristics in determining debt maturity structure. These market-wide factors not 
only influence the maturity of firm's borrowing but also appear to have different effects 
depending on the country's economic development. For example, in developed 
economies, banks can take full advantage of their monitoring power and act as 
information providers to other creditors. In less developed economies, the closer 
~--- ~--- -- "-relationshlpocbetween'"Cfirms and'tlieir Danks' and'"tne lack o:f ail"-erficieni market'may-
encourage banks to grant relatively more long-term debt. In countries least affected by 
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the crisis, where stock markets are relatively more developed and firms can more easily 
raise long-term finance through equity issues, firms will hold relatively shorter maturity 
debts. In countries most affected by the crisis, investors rely on the role of market prices 
in transmitting information. Thus, lending to quoted firms can be less risky leading to 
higher long-term debt capacity. Consistent with tax hypothesis, firms in countries most 
affected by the crisis employ more long-term debt when term structure has a positive 
slope. In contrast, managers in least affected countries time their debt maturity choice 
by issuing short-term debt when term spread is high in order to wait for the expected 
decline of long-term rates. 
Similar to market-wide determinants, legal and corporate governance factors have 
also found to play significant role in determining corporate debt maturity structure. The 
results show that firms in countries that are viewed as more corrupt tend to use more 
short-term debt. This suggests that the higher the degree of legal enforcement, the 
greater the proportion of long-term debt financing supporting the monitoring function of 
short-term debt. It is also found that in countries with high creditor rights, firms use 
more short-term debt. When creditors are protected effectively, the capacity of firms in 
using short-term debt is higher because banks as a main creditor have advantages of 
monitoring. In contrast, when shareholders feel protected, the agency cost of debt 
reduces and firms have less need to shorten their debt maturity. Also firms in countries 
with high ownership concentration prefer to use more short-term debt to reduce agency 
problem. The presence of auditors also helps to diminish the role of short-term debt in 
mitigating information problems; therefore, once auditors are involved, firms have less 
need for shortening their debt maturity to signal to the market. In sum, firms use higher 
long-term debt in countries with efficient legal system, strong shareholder rights, and 
high big 5 auditors' market share while firms prefer short-term debt in countries with 
developing economy, strong creditor rights and high ownership concentration. 
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Finally, the results also show that the financial crisis of 1997 has had several 
significant effects on both firm-specific and market-wide determinants of debt maturity 
structure. As expected, there are variations in how the crisis has impact on debt maturity 
because different countries have been affected by the crisis to different degree. I n 
Thailand where the crisis originated, the effects detected are mostly due to higher risk 
and more concern on tax effects after the crisis. The relationship between debt maturity 
structure and its determinants changed significantly after the crisis either in size or 
direction or both. For example, high-levered firms have higher probability of 
bankruptcy; therefore, banks as main creditors are more cautious about lending to these 
firms leading them to issue less long-term debt or more short-term debt to firms after 
the crisis so that they can review or monitor firms more often and to avoid being caught 
up in a payment suspension. This reflects in the reduction in the significance or the 
coefficients. The relationship in the most affected countries became significantly 
positive in the post-crisis period, implying that the financial crisis might have raised the 
firm's awareness of tax effects. High profitable firms seem to be more concerned about 
their tax expenses after the crisis leading to a change from negative relationship to a 
positive and significant relationship after the crisis 
In sum, the results show that the inclusion of country-specific factors into the 
model helps to improve the explanatory power of firm-specific variables. The variation 
between the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure across countries can be 
explained by differences in economic conditions, corporate governance and institutional 
environments across countries in the region. Therefore, it can be concluded that similar 
to capital structure decisions, debt maturity decisions of a firm are not only the product 
of its own characteristics but also the results of the economic conditions and 
institutional environment in which it operates. 
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Chapter 5 
Is There Still a Pecking Order in Corporate Financing Decisions? 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, the focus of the analysis was on investigating the 
determinants of capital structure and debt maturity structure based on firm-specific and 
country-specific factors identified by previous theoretical and empirical studies. We 
have learnt that choices of both capital structure and debt maturity structure are likely to 
be determined by a combination of factors that are related to the characteristics of firms 
as well as to the institutional environment in which firms operate. The findings also 
reveal that the financial crisis of 1997 has had several significant effects on firms' 
financing decisions. However, still puzzling is whether the behaviour of firms in this 
region has favoured any particular capital structure theories in particular. Several 
theories have been put forward on the subject and a vast number of studies have been 
performed to empirically test the dominance of capital structure theories. The results so 
far have suggested that firms in this region behave according to a combination of capital 
structure theories drawn from trade-off, market timing, signalling and pecking order 
theories. In the literature, trade-off and pecking order theories are the two leading but 
contradictory capital structure theories. 88 The research in the capital structure field has 
been dominated by these two rival theories which are particularly interesting because 
they predict the firm's financing behaviour in an opposing pattern. However, it should 
be noted that the existing theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They can 
complement each other and jointly explain the observed financing behaviour of firms. 
88 See Harris and Raviv (1991) and Frank and Goyal (2005) for the comprehensive review and 
evaluations of capital structure theories. 
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5.1.1 The Trade-off Theory and The Pecking Order Theory at a Glance89 
The trade-off theory emerged in the process of relaxing the perfect capital market 
assumptions on which the irrelevancy theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958) relied. 
Derived from the models based on market imperfections such as taxes and agency cost 
argument, the trade-off theory predicts that each firm has a well-defined optimal capital 
structure which can be reached by balancing a number of marginal costs against a 
number of benefits of additional debt. The chosen optimal capital structure is in the 
form that equates these marginal costs and benefits. The benefits of debt include tax 
deductibility of interest paid, the use of debt to indicate firms' high quality performance 
(signalling) and the use of debt to reduce the amount of firms' resources that are free for 
managers to waste for their own benefits or for unprofitable projects (free cash flow 
problem) and agency cost of equity. The costs of debt include the cost of inefficient 
liquidation, bankruptcy costs, agency costs of debt due to suboptimal investment 
behaviour and underinvestment problems and an increase in monitoring and contracting 
costs that comes with a higher level of debt. An optimal capital structure occurs when 
the benefit of the last dollar of issuing debt offsets the cost. The trade-off theory, 
therefore, suggests the existence of an optimal capital structure and mean reverting debt 
ratios. It asserts that firms have a predetermined capital structure and from time to time 
they might deviate from this target but eventually try to move towards it. Firms will try 
to use external finance strategically in order to reach the target. Several previous studies 
find evidence showing that firms rebalance their debt ratios to achieve an optimal 
capital structure. 90 While the trade-off theory has a solid ground, it fails to explain 
several commonly observed practices such as a negative relationship between 
profitability and debt. Therefore, attention is drawn towards the pecking order theory. 
89 More detailed reviews of the theories are summarized in Section 3.2. 
90 Auerbach (1985); Hovakimian eta!. (2001); Korajczyk and Levy (2003) 
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In contrast to the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory provides a theory of 
the dynamics of corporate financing and contradicts the existence of financial targets as 
proposed by the trade-off theory. In the pecking order theory, firms do not have 
leverage targets and leverage is not mean-reverting but instead firms follow a pecking 
order. There is no optimal capital structure mix in the prediction of the pecking order 
theory because there are two kinds of equity which are at different ends of the financing 
order, internal equity (retained earnings) and external equity. The pecking order theory 
asserts that firms are concerned about transaction costs and costs associated with 
asymmetric information between managers and investors. These costs overwhelm the 
costs and benefits of debt proposed by the trade-off theory. The pecking order theory 
predicts that the capital structure of a firm is driven by financing deficit instead of the 
marginal cost and benefit of debt. The observed and actual debt ratios will respond to 
the differences between investment and retained earnings and will reflect the cumulative 
requirements of financing decisions over time. 
The pecking order theory predicts that firms will choose to finance their new 
investments in a specific order of financing hierarchy with internal funds at the top of 
the order and equity issues at the bottom due to the costs from asymmetric information 
between managers and the market. When financing is needed, firms would prefer the 
safest source of finance such as internal sources and then riskier sources such as debt. 
The final resort would be equity which would be preferred only if the marginal costs of 
debt are very high such as when firms are highly levered or have low debt capacity. 
Therefore, two firms can both follow the pecking order theory and each can end up with 
totally different capital structures, depending on the availability of their internally 
generated funds. 
246 
5.1.2 The Predictions ofthe Trade-off Theory and the Pecking Order Theory 
Theoretically, although these two competing theories are motivated by different 
driving forces, the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory do share a number of 
common predictions including (i) firms with more volatile earnings should have less 
debt and (ii) firms with high profitability, with fewer growth opportunities, or with 
lower earnings and cash flow volatilities (assuming that large firms have lower 
volatilities) are expected to have higher dividend payout ratios. These common 
predictions make it more difficult to test the dominance of each theory and it cannot be 
concluded from the findings of the determinants of capital structure whether the results 
are due to the driving forces of the pecking order theory or the trade-off theory. 
Therefore, it is still uncertain which theory is the best for describing the reality of firms' 
financing. 
However, there are a few conflicting predictions of these two competing theories. 
First, the pecking order theory predicts that firms with high profitability will have lower 
debt, and there is no need to increase debt when profit exceeds the need of investment 
because it is not necessary for firms to issue debt when their retained earnings are 
enough to fund their investments. On the other hand, the trade-off theory predicts that 
debt increases when firms are profitable because profitable firms are expected to have 
higher levels of debt to exploit the tax benefits of interest deductibility. Second, trade-
off theory predicts that growth opportunity is inversely related to debt due to agency 
considerations. Firms with high growth opportunity for a given amount of cash flow 
should have less need for debt, especially firms with large amounts of free cash flow. 
This is because once there is high investment, there is less need to use debt as a means 
of constraining the interests of managers in spending for their own benefit. In contrast, 
. --····""-··"···.'b::>?:-. ··-. ..:-.. ·.:- . ..!..~<i~:';-..::·,,~~----.---".-:.::.·--_-_., ~'--:". __ e.:- ~:.:;h'"··_ ~- ·c..1. ·.,·~- .. ···· :.. __ , ___ ... -~ ~-~-., ___ ._. _:_1;.,>,- ~v--~--'-- ,:·· ·: ·:- ,_ .. -- - .. _ .. _ ._ ,_ ..... ,, . "''-- ---
the pecking order theory predicts that for a given 'airiourit of casli-flo\¥, -debCsliotild--
increase when investment increases because firms need to seek external finance when 
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internal finance is insufficient and debt is less risky than equity. Third, when firms have 
sufficient profits to fund all their investments using internal finance, the pecking order 
theory suggests firms use less debt to stockpile their debt capacity. However, the trade-
off theory predicts that firms with large and persistent cash flows relative to their 
financing needs will increase their use of debt in order to reduce agency costs or free 
cash flow problems. 
5.1.3 Failures of the Trade-off Theory and the Pecking Order Theory 
Empirically, although there has been ongoing research and debate on the 
dominance of both theories, there are still no clear-cut answers to why firms make 
financing decisions the way they do. Each capital structure theory has its successes and 
failures when empirically tested. The conflicting evidence in the large body of literature 
poses a puzzle for the existence and the dominance of each theory. In spite of the fact 
that it has been suggested that trade-off considerations such as bankruptcy and agency 
costs of debt play an important role in capital structure, little empirical support exists for 
other aspects of the trade-off theory such as (i) there are still doubts as to the existence 
of a capital structure optimal target91 ; (ii) a negative relationship is empirically found 
between profitability and leverage by previous studies, which is consistent with the 
predictions of the pecking order theory, while other capital structure theories, including 
the trade-off theory, cannot explain this negative relationship92; (iii) firms do not issue 
equity very often; (iv) large positive abnormal returns for the firm's shareholders are 
associated more with debt increasing events than debt decreasing events; and (v) 
managers consider share prices to be a key factor in their issuance decisions and they 
91 Huang (2004) proposes a new dynamic model that unifies the trade-off theory with asymmetric 
information. This model predicts instead that finns have target ranges and there is no precise target as 
. f:redicted by the trad~-:-off)heory, _ ·c c.c:· .. ·•C .• •· • 'C'".'. ·· ·c; ·'"-'•C·;; , •.... •c· o·;.•. '" .. .. ·c: •>-'•'' ; .. ·_; i ·C' .·.·.·~";.'. ••. :"-'·: .,,_Sc· .. c ........ .. 
· 
2 Huang (2004) suggests that there are two possibilities why profitable finns have less debt. First, there 
may be free cash flow problems where managers prefer to keep cash flow for their own use. Second, there 
are several costs that lead finns to prefer internal fmance such as asymmetric information, transaction 
cost, costs of revealing information to the public, cost of time, freedom and efficiency. This is consistent 
with the prediction of the pecking order theory. 
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normally issue equity when their share prices mcrease while the trade-off theory 
predicts that an increase in the firm's share price which effectively lowers the leverage 
ratio should lead to debt issuance to revert back to their optimal capital structure.93 
Like the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory suffers from a lack of 
compelling evidence for certain aspects. Firms do not always issue debt before equity. 
Equity is not always the last resort and it is quite common for firms to issue equity even 
when they could issue debt. Helwege and Liang (1996) show that equity is issued by 
firms that could have obtained debt in the form of bank loans while Choe et al. (1993) 
report that firms are likely to issue equity over debt in economic expansion periods 
when investors have a favourable outlook on the economy. In practice, equity issues are 
more common than the pecking order theory would suggest. The pecking order theory 
also fails to explain how taxes, bankruptcy, and agency costs, as well as other factors, 
affect capital structure. Previous studies find that young and small firms, which are 
believed to have high asymmetric information and would be expected to rely more on 
internal finance or debt issues, tend to issue equity more often than the pecking order 
theory would predict. The observed pattern that firms with high levels of asymmetric 
information, such as small and young firms, tend to issue equity is consistent with the 
predictions of trade-off and market timing theories. These firms issue equity in order to 
(i) avoid the bankruptcy costs of debt; (ii) escape a debt overhang problem; and (iii) 
time the market when they are overvalued. In addition, previous studies such as Smith 
and Watts (1992) and Barclay et al. (2001) find that firms with high growth 
opportunities have a higher proportion of equity than debt. This is in contrast with the 
prediction of the pecking order theory that firms with high growth opportunities should 
have large financing needs; therefore, these firms should have high debt ratios 
•. ,_ .fie._·. :..~·-·. ,.::._ · .. · . ....,. __ -·· .. ...:::.... . ....;-, .. 
93 Several studies (Marsh, 1982; Jung et al., 1996; Baker and Wurgler, 2002) find that firms issue equity 
rather than debt when share prices are high. They do not try to reach their optimal capital structure by 
issuing debt when prices increase. 
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5.1.4 Empirical Tests of the Pecking Order Theory 
The direct test of pecking order theory can be found in Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999), Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003), in particular to test how 
firms fund their financing deficit. Different tests can be done including regressing 
financing deficit on net debt issues or nesting the financing deficit in a conventional 
model. The pecking order theory seems to work where it should not and does not 
perform well where it should. For example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find 
support for the pecking order theory in large and matured firms that have little 
asymmetric information. On the other hand, it cannot explain why young and small 
firms, which face large asymmetric information problems, issue equity. Galpin (2004) 
argues that the pecking order theory works well only with firms that have debt rating 
and access to public debt, such as large firms. Frank and Goyal (2003) and Fama and 
French (2002) find less support for the pecking order theory, as their sample firms relied 
more on equity from the 1990s. They also find that small firms issue more equity and 
are less levered which is in contrast to the prediction of the pecking order theory. Also 
Frank and Goyal (2003) show that net equity issues track financing deficit more closely 
than net debt issues. 
In addition to the traditional method of testing the pecking order hypothesis of 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), several studies have also suggested that additional 
factors should be included in the model, as they have been shown to be important 
factors. These studies include those by Lemmon and Zender (2004), Chang and 
Dasgupta (2003) and Agca and Mozumdar (2004) that focus on debt capacity, and Chen 
and Zhao (2004) who study bankruptcy risk, while Autore and Kovacs (2005) and 
Leary and Roberts (2005a) suggest that time-varying adverse selection costs play an 
~impotianf role Iii' firms' fi'naficing --heha~i~ti;'.- Be~a~~e ·th~re-is ffiixed"~~ict~~~~--~~~th;-··--
prediction of the pecking order theory, it is important to test further whether the pecking 
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order theory is widely applicable in countries with different economic and social 
environments. More specifically, this chapter aims to test whether the pecking order 
theory is supported by the evidence from the Asia Pacific region or not. 
5.1.5 Objectives and Contributions 
The objective of this chapter is to test the extent to which the pecking order theory 
accounts for the financing behaviour of a broader sample of firms in the Asia Pacific 
region for the period 1993 - 2001. It aims to test whether the pecking order theory is 
best supported by the sample or whether the pecking order theory dominates other 
capital structure theories and to find out whether firms in this region exhibit stronger or 
weaker pecking order behaviour than firms in developed countries. In addition, the 
objective is also to find out whether empirical support for the pecking order theory 
varies depending on the financial institutional environment or economic conditions and 
whether the financial crisis has any influence on this behaviour or not. 
This chapter contributes to the literature firstly by focusing on firms in the Asia 
Pacific region. In this field of research, a number of previous studies have concentrated 
on developed economies, mostly in a single country context.94 Little empirical work has 
been conducted in other countries.95 This chapter presents empirical evidence to 
examine whether the pecking order hypothesis can be applied to firms in the Asia 
Pacific region or not and to what extent firms in this region follow the pecking order in 
their financing decision making. The results will shed light on the dominant financing 
behaviour of firms in the Asia Pacific region. Second, the effect of the financial crisis of 
1997 is investigated by splitting the full sample into pre- and post-crisis periods . 
. -· ,21.Previous studies include,Shyam~Sunder an& Myers ('1999), -Fama and FrenCh'(2002),' and'·Frank~and­
Goyal (2003) on US firms; Adedeji (2002) and Dang (2005) on UK firms; and Medeiros and Daher 
(2005) on Brazilian firms. 
95 There are some capital structure studies in developing countries such as Wiwattanakantang (1999), 
Booth et al. (2001), Prasad et al. (2003) and Deesomsak et al. (2004). However, these studies focus 
mainly on the determinants of capital structure not on the tests of capital structure theories. 
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Because the crisis has increased risk, it has potential effects on firms' financing 
decisions and how the predictions of the pecking order theory might be affected by the 
crisis. Firms are expected to follow different financing policies between pre- and post-
crisis periods due to the variation in financing constraints. Firms that face financing 
constraints should exhibit stronger pecking order behaviour due to higher risk and 
asymmetric information and reduced access to the markets.96 Therefore, the purpose is 
to examine whether firms exhibit stronger pecking order behaviour in the post-crisis 
period than in the pre-crisis period. 
Third, an extension of the empirical framework of Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) is suggested by incorporating corporate governance 
and economic condition indicators into the models. The results show that country-
specific factors play an important role in financing decisions and they are the main 
driving forces that lead firms in each country to move toward or away from the 
predictions of the pecking order theory or lead firms to behave differently from firms in 
other countries. Finally, further unique methodologies including logistic regression and 
non-linear quantile regression are employed to provide alternative ways to test the 
predictions of pecking order theory and to provide evidence for robustness tests of the 
results. Logistic regression is used to find the deviation from the pecking order theory in 
mild and strong forms while non-linear quantile regression is applied to capture the non-
linearity of the relationship between financing deficit and net debt issues. 
This chapter is organised as followed. The next section briefly reviews the 
pecking order theory and summarizes the empirical evidence of the pecking order 
theory tests in the literature. Section 3 presents methodologies and section 4 presents 
hypotheses and variable identifications. Section 5 summarizes data and descriptive 
-statistics·:Bection 6~ discussd;'thtrestfnuitfon r~stilts and <section-7 concludes· the cha}Jte;.--'"'~~'" - - - -
96 Vogt (1994) fmds that the degree of financing constraints a firm faces can determine the dominance of 
firms' fmancing behaviour. 
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5.2 The Pecking Order Theory and Related Empirical Evidence 
5.2.1 The Original Pecking Order Theory 
The single-period pecking order theory (the original pecking order theory) was 
formalised by Myers and Majluf(1984) and Myers (1984). Managers have a preference 
ranking over their choice of financing source, which is a consequence of asymmetric 
information making up a substantial portion of adverse selection and transaction costs. 
The asymmetric information problem arises because managers normally know more and 
better about firm value and their growth opportunities than outside investors. The 
hierarchy of the pecking order starts with internal finance, then debt issuance and finally 
equity issuance. If firms have enough financial slack, they will carry out all available 
positive NPV projects. Internal funds come with no flotation costs and require no 
additional disclosure of financial information; therefore, they are preferable to external 
funds. The requirement of additional disclosure that comes with external finance could 
lead to more severe market discipline and possible loss of competitive advantages. The 
pecking order theory argues that the availability of internal finance determines (i) the 
amount and type of external finance used to fund firms' investment and (ii) the amount 
of investment taken. Therefore, the implication of the pecking order theory is that firms' 
external finance and the amount of investment spending are the residual of firms' 
available internal funds. If external funds are required, the safest security will be issued 
first. Debt will be preferred to equity because equity issues are interpreted by investors 
as the shares being overvalued and thus investors will discount the share price. 
Therefore, firms will issue equity only when the profitable projects cannot be 
postponed, or cannot be financed through debt, or the overvaluation is large enough that 
the existing shareholders can tolerate the market penalty in order to gain from the 
-- -- - - -c -overvah.iatiiifi>Anf 'intemar fUridsc 'iii-"'-excess'-'-()(" financing~' 'rieeds \vlll be' use(f"to'- - --. 
repurchase debt before equity due to adverse selection problems. 
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5.2.2 Factors that Lead to Financing Hierarchy 
There are a number of factors that are the consequences of asymmetric 
information and can lead to the financing hierarchy. These factors include (i) adverse 
selection problems; (ii) the existence of transaction costs and floatation costs; and (iii) 
inevitably negative market reactions to an announcement of a new equity issue. Adverse 
selection problems arise when firms with low value have an incentive to issue securities 
in order to imitate firms with high value. Because managers have better information 
than investors, they have opportunities to issue equity when the securities are 
overvalued, assuming that managers normally act in the interest of existing 
shareholders. However, investors are aware of this; therefore, they will rationally adjust 
or discount the price that they are willing to pay to reflect the adverse selection costs 
leading to mispricing problems. Mispricing can be so severe that the net present value 
of the new project is captured by new investors leading to a loss to existing 
shareholders. Thus, managers might forego any new value-added or profitable 
investment if they have to be financed by risky funds such as equity, leading to 
underinvestment problems. The adverse selection problem can be mitigated if firms 
follow a pecking order hierarchy by using the source of finance in the order of severity 
of underpricing to finance the project. The source of finance that has least risk and is 
least sensitive to mispricing and valuation errors is preferred. Therefore, internally 
generated funds with no risk are preferred to external finance because firms can avoid 
informational problems entirely. Among external finance, debt that has its prior claim 
and is less severely affected by mispricing than equity is preferred. 
Second, the pecking order can be explained by the existence of transaction costs 
and floatation costs associated with external finance. Firms prefer debt to equity 
... because transaction ~and j floatation· costs'- for· debf are '·tower "'thai{ 'those c.fot' equity ___ .. 
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issues.97•98 Therefore, equity should not be issued unless firms have exhausted other 
alternatives. Myers (1984) suggests that the asymmetric information and transaction 
costs dominate the driving forces that are suggested by the trade-off theory. To 
minimize these financing costs, firms will follow the financing hierarchy. Third, how 
the capital markets treat the announcement of new equity issues can lead firms to prefer 
debt to equity. Debt decreasing events such as new stock offerings or equity-for-debt 
exchange schemes are associated with the decline in share price while no such drop 
occurs with debt issues. One of the explanations for this decline is the information 
asymmetry cost. Announcements of new equity issues are normally treated as a signal 
that managers feel that firms' stocks are overvalued and that they want to take 
advantage of this overvaluation. The belief in overvaluation implies that earnings are 
likely to decline in the future. Therefore, firms should conduct debt decreasing events 
only when they are forced to do so. On the other hand, a debt increasing event is 
interpreted as a sign of managers being confident about firms' future prospects and their 
ability to service debt into the future. Investors might view the high use of leverage as 
willingness by managers to take on more risk. Therefore, the market normally perceives 
debt increasing events as good news. 
In addition to the above factors, there are other explanations that can lead to a 
financing order that is similar to the pecking order but not necessarily due to 
asymmetric information.99 This makes it difficult for any capital structure theory to 
explain firms' behaviour by itself. Other incentives for firms to favour debt over equity 
include tax incentives (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980), 
signalling (Ross, 1977), and manager-shareholder agency conflict (Myers, 1977). In 
97 Donaldson (1961 ); Baskin ( 1989) 
~- -- - '-"·'· 98 Galpin {2004) shows that this is not always the case:·'Jt is ~Jike1y that transaction costs"of debtisslies·can- ---~- --~' _,. · 
exceed transaction costs of equity issues. 
99 Several papers including Myers (2003) show how mechanisms other than asymmetric information such 
as taxes and agency costs can lead to the same pattern of pecking order. Halov and Heider (2005) also 
suggest that the fmancing order like the one predicted by the pecking order theory is not necessary a 
product of asymmetric information. 
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addition, there are other reasons why firms prefer internal to external finance. Managers 
might prefer to use free cash flow for their own benefits; therefore, they try to avoid 
monitoring from outside by using internal finance. Debt issues can lead to unwanted 
monitoring and equity issues lead to both unwanted monitoring and control dilution. 
Concern about the control or the discipline of the market can play an important role and 
can encourage firms to stay away from external finance. Managers, especially the 
owners-managers of firms, do not want to lose control over firms; therefore, they 
hesitate to accept new shareholders. They avoid this loss of control by trying to finance 
with internal funds as much as possible first and then moving on to debt issues which is 
the next safest choice. Narayanan (1988) shows that debt is always preferred to equity 
under information asymmetry as firms use debt financing as a barrier to discriminate 
inferior firms while Heinkel and Zechner (1990) show that issuing debt helps to resolve 
overinvestment problems. Although there are some rational justifications to the 
prediction of the preference of debt to equity, there are also some other incentives that 
tend to favour the use of equity (Quan, 2002). The incentives that lead firms toward 
equity include bankruptcy costs (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) and agency costs such 
as asset-substitution problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Due to these factors, it is 
important that the evidence we find is not misleading and is interpreted with caution 
and, in order for the pecking order theory to be supported, there must exist asymmetric 
information. 
5.2.3 Extensions of the Original Pecking Order Theory (The Modified Pecking 
Order Theory) 
There are several subsequent extensions of Myers and Majlufs (1984) pecking 
order theory. Myers (1984) proposes a dynamic or modified version of the pecking 
order theory that takes into account not only asymmetric information and transaction 
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costs but also costs of financial distress and debt capacity. The modified pecking order 
predicts that when concern over bankruptcy risk is modest, firms will follow the 
financing order of the original pecking order theory. But when it increases, the support 
to the pecking order theory is weakened and firms will try to reduce bankruptcy risks by 
lowering their use of debt. If there are fixed costs to external finance or added cost for 
firms that operate near their limit of debt capacity, firms might decide to break the 
original pecking order by financing their investment with new equity issues instead of 
new debt issues. Firms have financial slack and can stockpile this amount of cash for 
future use. Therefore, if the cost of issuing equity is favourable, firms might issue equity 
instead of debt in order to reserve their debt capacity for future use or to retain their 
financial flexibility. The predictions of the modified version of the pecking order theory 
appear able to explain several financing behaviours of firms giving more empirical 
support in the literature. Firms may have to issue equity because (i) they have already 
used up their debt capacity and cannot issue any more debt to finance current 
investments or (ii) they anticipate the need for new external finance for future 
investment and this requirement might not be reachable because the required debt would 
make the future debt ratio exceed debt capacity. Financing in these circumstances is not 
believed to violate the modified pecking order theory. 
Viswanath (1993) extends the single-period pecking order framework of Myers 
and Majluf (1984) to a multi-period pecking order framework where adverse selection 
costs vary over time. In this framework, firms might prefer equity to debt even if cash 
or debt capacity is available. Equity issuance will be optimal only when the expected 
level of information asymmetry in the future is high and when the dilution of equity 
issue is small compared with the cost of passing up the investments. It is predicted that 
when adverse selection costs are low, firms will issue equity in order to save cash to 
ensure future investment. Chang and Dasgupta (2003) extend Myers and Majlufs 
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(1984) model into a two-period setting in order to derive new testable implications of 
how adverse selection costs and debt capacity constraints interact in order to determine 
the capital structure of firms. In their model, firms invest in the projects at the beginning 
of each period. Although equity issues come with adverse selection costs, issuing equity 
in the first period can help firms to pledge more of their future cash flow to the second 
period lenders. Issuing debt in the first period can be costly as it reduces firms' debt 
capacity. Their model predicts that the probability of debt issues is not a linear but 
rather a non-monotonic function of the size of financing deficit due to the variation in 
adverse selection costs of equity or the loss of debt capacity from issuing debt. When 
the financing deficit is small, the costs associated with issuing debt and the loss of debt 
capacity increases at a slower rate compared with the increase in adverse selection costs 
of issuing equity. The cost is larger at the peak point when the size of financing deficit 
gradually increases but will diminish again when financing deficit becomes larger 
beyond the critical level. At this point the loss of debt capacity is no longer a concern as 
the available growth opportunities should already have been exhausted. The probability 
of issuing debt will therefore increase at first when adverse selection costs of issuing 
equity outweigh the cost that comes with the loss of debt capacity. However, once debt 
capacity becomes more important, the probability of issuing debt decreases and will 
increase again when financing deficit is large. 
5.2.4 Related Empirical Evidence 
The pecking order theory has received a significant amount of attention in the 
literature; however, the empirical findings are far from reaching a consensus. The early 
studies of the predictions of the pecking order theory start in the form of the survey of 
firms' financing policies by Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989). They find that managers are 
much more likely to follow a financing hierarchy as suggested by the pecking order 
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theory than a target capital structure as suggested by the trade-off theory. Holmes and 
Kent ( 1991) later survey SME firms and find that they also follow a financing hierarchy 
similar to the predictions of pecking order theory and that SME firms follow a stricter 
pecking order than larger firms. Ang and Jung (1993) analyse mail responses for 
Korean firms which fail to support the predictions of the pecking order theory. Their 
evidence shows that Korean firms with high asymmetric information rank their order of 
financing preference as debt and equity before retained earnings. They also suggest that 
firms might follow a financing order that is similar to the predictions of the pecking 
order theory but their reasons are not due to asymmetric information problems. The 
pecking order can be seen to contribute to other explanations such as taxes and agency 
costs. They find that asymmetry of information is lower than previously expected. The 
majority of the responses show that their lenders do not underestimate their future 
prospects and if there is an asymmetric information problem, disclosure cannot help to 
resolve the problem much. This implies that asymmetric information (if there is any) is 
not due to the lack of information but to the differences in belief or expectations 
between managers and outside investors. Thus they note that caution should be used 
when finding evidence in support of the role of asymmetric information in forming the 
pecking order. On the other hand, recent surveys on the pecking order theory find some 
support for the theory. For example, Mota and Nakamura (2004) find that there is a 
clear preference for the use of retained earnings as the first choice of financing of 
Brazilian firms while the second choice is debt, and equity issue is the last resort. 
In addition to the survey, there are a number of other empirical studies that have 
tested the implications of the pecking order theory. However, the findings of these tests 
are contradictory. Current empirical tests of this theory are quite weak as there is still a 
large debate whether the pecking order theory holds and to what extent. The evidence 
has been mixed so far ranging from support of the pecking order to evidence suggesting 
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that the pecking order theory is dead because the model does not fit the evidence. 
Support for the pecking order theory has recently faded. Studies appear to find no 
conclusive evidence in support of one particular capital structure theory. Several recent 
studies have instead suggested either that (i) modified pecking order that takes account 
of debt capacity and financial distress as well as future investment can explain the 
observed financing patterns better than the original one; or (ii) the pecking order theory 
and the trade-off theory are both necessary and compatible. These two rival theories 
individually only explain part of firms' financing behaviour; therefore, firms' financing 
decisions are not explained by any capital structure theory in isolation but instead by a 
combination of different theories as an integrated model. 
There are only a handful of studies that find evidence in support of pecking order 
behaviour. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) refine the predictions of the pecking order 
theory into a testable prediction by regressing net debt issues on the financing deficit, 
constructed from an aggregation of dividends, investment, changes in working capital 
and internal cash flows. If firms follow the pecking order theory strictly, the coefficient 
of the financing deficit should be 1 which means that the financing deficit of firms 
should be matched dollar-to-dollar with the change of debt issues. Using a sample of 
continuous data over their sample period for relatively large and matured US firms, they 
find a coefficient of financing deficit of 0.75. Although this coefficient is statistically 
different from 1, it is economically close to 1. Their results show that firms' external 
finance is made up substantially more by debt than by equity. Medeiros and Daher 
(2005) test the pecking order theory for firms in a different setting and find that the 
estimated coefficient for the financing deficit is very close to 1 for Brazilian firms. 
Their results show that their sample firms issue debt to cover their financing deficits and 
repay debt when there is financial surplus. Equity issues are hardly utilized. 
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On the other hand, evidence that goes against the pecking order theory is 
plenteous. Chirinko and Singha (2000) comment on Shyam-Sunder and Myers' (1999) 
regression results that there might be some bias in the test due to the inability to 
discriminate the pecking order theory from competing theories such as the trade-off 
theory. They raise and discuss an issue of statistical power problems in the tests of the 
pecking order theory; however, they do not propose any solution. In addition, given that 
firms in the sample do not only issue debt to cover financing deficits as predicted by the 
pecking order theory but also issue equity during the sample period, the predicted 
coefficient of financing deficit should be less than 1. They argue that in contrast to the 
pecking order theory firms do have a fixed proportion of the use of debt and equity. 
Helwege and Liang (1996) examine a sample of IPO firms and show that the financing 
decisions of firms are weakly related to financing deficit. 
Fama and French (2002) examine (i) target leverage, (ii) the mean reversion of 
leverage and (iii) short-term response of dividends and debt to variation in earnings and 
investment. Although they find that short-term variation in earnings and investment are 
mostly absorbed by debt as predicted by the pecking order theory, small growth firms 
tend to issue equity significantly. Their results suggest that firms' financing behaviour is 
influenced by both the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. They promote a 
unified understanding of both theories. Consistent with Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999), they find that debt is used to fill the variation in short-term investment and 
earnings. However, they find a large amount of equity issues when firms had 
maximized their debt capacity which is in contrast to the original pecking order theory 
suggesting that this behaviour might be more consistent with a more complex version of 
the pecking order theory. Their results also show that firms that issue large amounts of 
equity are mostly small and high growth firms. This is also in contrast to the pecking 
order theory because small and high growth firms tend to have high asymmetric 
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information; therefore, pecking order theory should perform well in high asymmetric 
information environments. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that the results of Shyarn-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
do not hold for broader samples of smaller size with recent data. They apply the same 
test as in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) to a much larger sample of firms over a 
longer period of time and then include conventional factors identified by previous 
studies (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Raj an and Zingales, 1995) as being important in the 
choice of the capital structure of firms in the model. They find that (i) the use of equity 
issuance has significantly increased; (ii) net equity issues track the financing deficit 
better than net debt issues; (iii) the power of the pecking order theory seems to fade 
through time as equity issues were quite common in the 1990s; and (iv) equity is often 
issued by small firms while the pecking order theory works well with large firms which 
is in contrast to the prediction of the pecking order theory because small firms tend to 
have higher adverse selection costs; therefore, the pecking order theory should perform 
better among small firms. In addition, when financing deficit is put in a nested model 
that also includes conventional factors predicted by the competing trade-off theory, 
coefficients of the conventional variables remain statistically significant but the 
financing deficit has lower explanatory power. More importantly, the effect of financing 
deficit does not wipe out the effect of conventional variables. The results suggest that 
the pecking order theory fails to dominate the trade-off theory. They conclude that 
financing deficit is found to be just another additional factor that firms trade off and that 
the pecking order theory is just the generalization version of the trade-off theory. 
Mayer and Sussman (2004) suggest that there is no single capital structure theory 
that provides explanations for all aspects of the data or is an adequate description on its 
own. Their results show that in the short term, projects are funded with debt especially 
for large and profitable firms as predicted by the pecking order theory. However, in the 
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long run firms show the trend of reverting back to their initial capital structure which is 
consistent with the trade-off theory. They not only find strong support for leverage 
reversion but also find that firms revert by issuing equity and they issue equity even 
when they are not close to insolvency. Galpin (2004) focuses on transaction costs and 
shows that the predictions of the pecking order theory about the transaction costs of 
debt being lower relatively to the transaction costs of equity do not hold. First, costs of 
issuing equity are not always larger than costs of issuing debt as assumed by the 
pecking order theory. He finds that the cost of issuing debt is often higher than the cost 
of issuing equity especially for firms without access to public debt. 100 Also the 
prediction of transaction costs of equity being higher than that of debt did not hold over 
their sample periods. The results show that transaction costs of equity fell below 
transaction costs of debt for a relatively long period of time especially from 1997 
onward. These are driven by the lack of debt rating for the sample firms. Second, 
although asymmetric information is significant in influencing access to debt and equity, 
he finds no evidence that asymmetric information leads firms to behave according to the 
pecking order theory. Third, highly profitable firms use lower debt but not lower equity. 
He suggests that the capital structure model would be able to explain more of the 
observed pattern of financing decisions if asymmetric information were incorporated 
into the trade-off theory. 
Fama and French (2005) examine how often and under what circumstances firms 
issue and repurchase equity. Their findings reveal several aspects that violate the 
pecking order theory. First, the evidence shows that firms have issued large amounts of 
equity on average and with high frequency even when they are not under duress or 
concerned about their debt capacity. Equity issuances occur too often to be consistent 
with the pecking order theory. Second, apart from seasoned equity offerings, firms can 
100 Galpin (2004) suggests that only the largest firms can issue public debt and firms in large size deciles 
have debt rating. 
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issue equity in several other forms which do not involve high asymmetric information 
problems and transaction costs. 101 Third, there are also occasions when the cost of 
issuing equity is ignored leading firms to issue equity more often than predicted by the 
pecking order theory. 102 Fourth, share price responses to some forms of equity issues are 
not always negative. 103 Finally, repurchases are not limited only to firms with low 
demand for outside financing. Therefore, they suggest that the pecking order theory is 
no longer an applicable and practical model for capital structure because equity issues 
are not the last resort of finance and asymmetric information is not the main driver of 
capital structure. They conclude that both the trade-off theory and the pecking order 
theory have their own serious problems as stand alone models of capital structure and 
they should in fact be regarded as stablemates of capital structure models because the 
predictions from each model can help to explain different aspects of firms' financing 
behaviour. 
Leary and Roberts (2005a, 2005b) develop a model that captures the order of 
financing choice between internal versus external finance and debt issues versus equity 
issues and that quantifies the degree to which firms adhere to or violate pecking order 
hierarchy. Their results show that the pecking order theory by itself performs poorly in 
determining the choice of debt and equity. First, the violation of external finance choice 
is not due to either debt capacity or leverage targeting concerns because equity issuing 
firms appear to have enough internal funds and strong financial profiles with sufficient 
debt capacity. Second, firms issue or retire equity more often than predicted by the 
101 Fama and French (2005) suggest that there are at least seven other forms of equity issues apart from 
SEOs including (i) mergers via an exchange of stock, (ii) employee stock options, grants and other 
employee benefit plans, (iii) subscription right, (iv) warrants, (v) convertible debt, (vi) dividend 
reinvestment or other direct purchase plans and (vii) private placements. Some of these equity issues 
come with low transaction cost and asymmetric information problem such as direct purchase plan and 
employee stock option, grants and other benefit plan. 
102 In some cases, agency cost might lead managers to ignore the high cost of equity issues (Jung et at. 
1996) or equity issues can provide benefits that are higher than their costs and also offsets asymmetric 
information costs such as the tax benefits that come with equity issues in merger (Fama and French, 
2005). 
103 Share price response to private placements is positive (Hertzel et at., 2002) while no evidence of 
negative response is found for announcement of right issues (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). 
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pecking order theory. Third, firms do actively rebalance their debt ratios toward the 
target ranges. Fourth, the observed financing decisions are more in line with the 
integration of the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. In addition, they find 
that what drives the pecking order theory is still empirically unanswered because their 
results reveal that asymmetric information is not the main driving force that leads to 
pecking order behaviour. They find no evidence of improvement in the fit of the model 
when asymmetric information level increases; therefore, they question the link between 
information asymmetry and the pecking order theory. However, this does not weaken 
the importance of asymmetric information in influencing firms' financing behaviour. 
They instead suggest that there are other driving forces that relate to the trade-off theory 
such as taxes and agency costs which might contribute to such behaviour. They also 
examine the deviation from the pecking order by looking at the variation in information 
asymmetry. If information asymmetry varies across firms or time, it is possible that 
deviating from the pecking order might not be as costly to firms as previously expected 
or firms might be able to avoid adverse selection problems by going through other 
channels of equity issuances as suggested in Fama and French (2005). They find no 
relation between deviation from the pecking order theory and the degree of asymmetric 
information and they find no improvement in model fit when the degree of asymmetric 
information changes. Overall, their results suggest that the concern over debt capacity 
and the variation in asymmetric information do not appear to be one of the main reasons 
why firms violate the pecking order theory by issuing equity. They conclude that the 
motivation to issue equity comes from sources other than debt capacity concern and the 
adherence to the pecking order hierarchy based on asymmetric information. 
Dittmar and Thakor (2005) develop and test. a new theory of why firms issue 
firms have a project to be financed. Their prediction is inconsistent with both the trade-
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off theory and the pecking order theory. The decision to issue equity in their model is 
based on the high share price due to the market agreement whereas in the pecking order 
theory equity issue occurs when asymmetric information is low. Their model predicts 
that managers' financing decisions will be based on degree of agreement. Managers will 
issue equity when they believe that there is agreement about the projects between 
themselves and investors. Therefore, the model predicts that firms will issue equity 
when share prices and agreement are high and will issue debt when share prices and 
agreement are low. 
While the findings of the tests of the pecking order theory by previous studies are 
far from conclusive, there are a growing number of studies that try to compromise the 
assumptions of the pecking order theory by introducing some related factors to augment 
the pecking order and the factors that can explain the conflicting evidence in the 
literature. The factors that have received the most attention recently and are also 
considered as part of the modified pecking order theory are market misevaluation, debt 
capacity, time-varying adverse selection costs and bankruptcy risk. Elliott et al. (2004) 
use a multi-period valuation model to examine the impact of market misvaluation on 
firms' chosen method of covering their financing deficit. They extend the models of 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) by adding the interaction 
term between over/undervaluation dummy variables and financing deficit. The results 
show that misvaluation of firms' equity is one of the important factors that plays a 
crucial role in the choice of source of fund that firms choose to cover their financing 
deficit and that the impact of the overvaluation varies over time. The results reveal that 
the coefficient of financing deficit varies depending on the level of misevaluation. 
When equity is overvalued and the implied cost of capital is relatively low, firms will 
fund their financing deficit with equity rather than debt. On the other hand, firms that 
are undervalued tend to issue more debt. In addition, they show evidence suggesting 
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that market timing theory and the differences in sample selection criteria can explain the 
variation in the coefficients of financing deficit from previous studies. Their results 
show that the contradictory results of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and 
Goyal (2003) are due to (i) high market overvaluation in the 1990s leading firms to 
prefer equity to debt which explain why recent studies have found firms issuing more 
equity in contradiction to the pecking order theory and (ii) the fact that Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) require firms to have continuous data while Frank and Goyal (2003) 
do not impose this requirement. 
Lemmon and Zender (2004) examine the impact of debt capacity. When firms' 
debt capacity is controlled, firms do follow the pecking order financing hierarchy by 
starting with internal finance first. If external finance is needed, debt is preferable to 
equity if there is no concern about debt capacity. They suggest that firms will issue 
equity when they have limited debt capacity because additional debt issues can increase 
bankruptcy costs or can force firms to pass up future investments. They provide 
evidence to reconcile some of the contrasting findings in the literature by focusing on 
the role of debt capacity. Previous studies including, Frank and Goyal (2003) and Fama 
and French (2002), argue that the pecking order theory does not perform well where it 
should. While small, young and high growth firms should have greater incentives to 
follow the pecking order, they find that the pecking order theory performs best among 
large and matured firms. Therefore, their results appear to be in contrast to the pecking 
order theory. However, Lemmon and Zender (2004) argue that the evidence from the 
announcement effects of new equity issues shows that small, young and high growth 
firms in fact face lower adverse selection costs than large and matured firms when they 
issue equity. Therefore, the findings of previous studies of young and high growth firms 
issuing more equity are not in contrast to the pecking order theory. In addition, similar 
to Frank and Goyal (2003), they also find it difficult to find support for the pecking 
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order theory in the 1990s. This is due to the fact that there were a number of small and 
high growth firms emerging during that period. These firms have one common 
characteristic, a concern over debt capacity. Therefore, the weak support for the pecking 
order theory during this period is expected and should not be considered as evidence 
against the pecking order theory once debt capacity is controlled. 
Like Lemmon and Zender (2004), Agca and Mozumdar (2004) argue that firms 
might be forced to issue equity instead of debt due to debt capacity. In particular, they 
focus on the differences of firms' behaviour between small and large firms. They divide 
their sample into deciles based on firm size due to different practices between large and 
small firms. Their conclusions can help to reconcile the contrasting results of Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003). The pecking order theory was 
found to perform badly for small firms because they have low debt capacity which is 
quickly exhausted. This leaves small firms with no choice but to issue equity. That is 
why Frank and Goyal (2003) did not find much support for the theory from their 
sample, which consists mostly of small firms, while Shyam-Sunder and Myers ( 1999) 
find support for pecking order theory because their sample consists mostly of large 
firms. Agca and Mozumdar (2004) conclude that the debt level depends on the lower 
amount between (i) how much firms need to borrow and (ii) how much firms can 
borrow (how large is their debt capacity). 
Chang and Dasgupta (2003) not only perform empirical tests to examine the role 
of debt capacity in firms' capital structure but also extend the original pecking order 
model by deriving and testing new implications about the interaction of adverse 
selection costs and debt capacity and how they affect firms' financing behaviour. They 
focused on how the size of financing deficit can affect firms' financing choice and find 
strong evidence of the significant relevance of debt capacity concern. The probability of 
debt issuances varies depending on the size of financing deficit and debt capacity. 
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However, Autore and Kovacs (2005) find that debt capacity is not the main explanation 
why firms tend to move toward equity issuance. They provide evidence that can 
reconcile the mixed evidence in the literature by allowing time-variation in adverse 
selection costs. 104 They argue that previous studies find mixed evidence because they 
fail to control for time-varying adverse selection costs which are the key factor in 
distinguishing the pecking order theory from other capital structure theories. Their 
results are in favour of multi-period pecking order theory where time-varying adverse 
selection costs accommodate the issue of equity even when firms have sufficient debt 
capacity and internal cash flow. 
In addition to debt capacity and time-varying adverse selection costs, bankruptcy 
risk is also considered as an important factor. Chen and Zhao (2004) focus on the 
modified version of the pecking order theory and study the effect of different classes of 
bankruptcy risks. They argue that the pattern of firms having high proportion of equity 
to debt is not due to the fact that equity finance exceeds debt finance but rather to the 
debt reduction issue that comes with the concern over bankruptcy costs. Firms are more 
likely to reduce the use of debt when bankruptcy costs increase which seems to be 
consistent with the trade-off theory. However, once taking account of bankruptcy costs, 
they find other evidence leading to a conclusion in support of the modified pecking 
order theory. First, they find that firms with lowest bankruptcy risks who are supposed 
to gain most tax advantages by using debt according to the trade-off theory appear to be 
using debt conservatively. Second, there is a clear preference of debt over equity which 
is consistent with the pecking order theory. Their sample firms not only prefered debt to 
equity but also issued debt in large proportions. Third, the deviation from the capital 
structure target plays an insignificant role. Therefore, they conclude that the modified 
pecking order theory predicts that as long as bankruptcy costs are moderate the optimal 
104 Previous studies (including Korajczyk eta!., 1991; Choe eta!., 1993; Bayless and Chaplinsky,1996) 
have also identified and discussed the impact of time-variation in adverse selection costs on security 
issuance decisions. 
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target debt ratios, predicted by the trade-off theory, are outweighed by the concerns of 
financing costs, as predicted by the pecking order theory. Their results reveal that the 
strength of the pecking order theory varies depending on the concern over bankruptcy 
risk and costs of external financing. In addition to bankruptcy risk, they also suggest 
that the market timing hypothesis of Baker and Wurgler (2002) should be considered as 
an additional factor in the modified pecking order theory because market timing can 
arise either by a rational dynamic version of the pecking order theory or by an irrational 
equity market mispricing. Because both rational and irrational issues that affect market 
timing can also affect the relative costs of debt and equity financing, they should be 
considered as part of the modified pecking order theory. 
Halov and Heider (2005) suggest that the pecking order theory applies only if risk 
plays no role and should work well only for firms that have smallest adverse selection 
costs of debt. If risk matters, debt can be mispriced to a greater extent than equity and 
the adverse selection costs of debt relative to that of equity could be so large that equity 
will be a better choice of finance. This is due to the fact that the outside capital market 
knows less about firms' future investment risks leading to higher adverse selection costs 
of issuing debt. In order to take account of the role of risk in asymmetric information, 
they rank firms into deciles and run a similar regression to that of Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) separately in each risk decile. They find that 
firms in higher risk deciles issue more equity and less debt to finance their financing 
deficit. Therefore, they suggest that the pecking order theory is a special case that works 
well when there is no risk. 
As there is mixed evidence in the tests of the pecking order theory, it is important 
to broaden the tests to firms in other countries where the institutional environment is 
different and to take into account other firm-specific and country-specific factors that 
might potentially affect the validity of the pecking order theory across countries. 
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5.3 Methodology 
In this section, the empirical analysis consists of three main elements. The first 
examines the linear function of the financing order and the factors that can affect this 
order using panel analysis with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 105 As most previous 
studies perform the tests with no sense of order among firms' financing decision106, the 
analysis starts with the examination of factors that influence firms to prefer internal to 
external financing. Then, the disaggregation of financing deficit is test for justification 
where the relationship between each component of financing deficit and net debt issues 
is analysed. The implication of the pecking order theory similar to that of Shyam-
Sunder and Myers' (1999) model will be examined to find the factors that drive firms to 
prefer debt to equity. In addition, the relation between firm-specific characteristics and 
the source of external financing is tested. Then, the focus turns to the effect of country-
specific factors on influencing firms' financing decisions in both tiers of financing. The 
second element involves the application of logistic regressions to test the deviation from 
the pecking order theory as suggested by Autore and Kovacs (2005). Finally, non-linear 
quantile regressions are applied to test the predictions of pecking order with the aspects 
of different size and decile of financing deficit. 
In order to test the pecking order theory, we use panel regressions where all year-
firm combinations are treated as equally important independent observations. Panel data 
analysis makes it possible to capture the behaviour of variables in both time-series and 
cross-section dimensions. Similar to the previous chapters, where applicable, the full 
105 A number of previous studies such as Lemmon and Zender (2004), Autore and Kovacs (2005), and 
Halov and Heider (2005) suggest the use of fixed-effect to emphasize time-series relationship between 
dependent and independent variables. Firm dummy has been used as a set of indicator variables to 
account for fixed firm effects in Frank and Goyal (2003) and other studies. However, Agca and 
Mozumdar (2004) argue that the use of fixed firm effects in a frrst-differenced model specification is 
inappropriate because the effects will be cancelled out when examining changes in leverage. They argue 
that the assumption of the existence of fixed effects while explaining leverage changes is not realistic 
because it implies that a frrm's leverage ratio increase or decrease indefmitely from year to year. This is 
explored further by re-estimating the regressions with fixed frrm effects and the results support Agca and 
Mozumdar's (2004) argument that coefficients become insignificant. 
106 Except for Autore and Kovacs (2005) 
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sample will be divided into pre- and post-crisis periods to investigate the effect of the 
financial crisis. It is expected that firms' financing deficits will be filled in different 
ways between pre- and post-crisis periods. Wald-statistics are estimated to examine 
whether there have been any significant changes in the role of the explanatory variables 
due to the financial crisis. 
5.3.1 Linear Regressions 
5.3.1.1 Internal versus External Financing 
Previous studies such as Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal 
(2003) base their tests on how firms finance their need for external capital by focusing 
on the factors that drive firms to prefer debt to equity. However, one key implication of 
the pecking order theory is missing in their frames, the order of financing decision. The 
pecking order theory predicts that firms will adopt a hierarchy of financing. Internal 
finance will be given preference over external finance. Therefore, the analysis begins 
with a focus on the choice between internal versus external finance. The aim is to 
analyse what factors drive firms to prefer internal to external financing by estimating 
the linear regression of financing deficit on a set of firm-specific variables as follows. 107 
DEF;,, =a+ LflkFSk,i,t +~>;,, 
hi 
(5.1) 
FS represents the vector of k firm-specific factors including the conventional 
factors of tangibility, growth opportunity, firm size and profitability to control for debt 
capacity, suggested to be one of the most important aspects ofthe pecking order theory. 
In addition to these conventional variables, there are other variables that might influence 
the financing deficit because they reflect the differences in the level of adverse selection 
107 Autore and Kovacs (2005) also study similar specification of internal vs external finance but their 
main objective is to focus on time-varying adverse selection costs. 
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cost and asymmetric information including firm age (AGE), asymmetric information 
level (BIG4), management team (PMGMT), adverse selection cost (SIGMA) and 
trading activity (TURN). Financing deficit (DEFi,t) is the difference between 
investments in fixed and working capital and cash generated. Following Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003), DEFi,t is represented by an accounting 
identify as followed 108, 
(5.2) 
where DIVi,t is cash dividends in year t, Ii,t is net investment in year t, l:l Wi,t is 
change in working capital in year t, Ci,t is cash flow or cash generated after interest and 
taxes, llDi,t is net debt issued in year t and llEi,t is net equity issued in year t. All 
variables are scaled by total assets. 109 Although the pecking order theory does not 
require scaling, we do so to control for differences in firm size. 
5.3.1.2 Debt versus Equity Issues for External Financing 
5.3.1.2.1 Disaggregation of Financing Deficit 
As aggregation of the accounting data is used to test the pecking order theory, it is 
important to investigate whether the aggregation step is justified or not. Frank and 
Goyal (2003) suggest that some of the components of financing deficit might behave in 
different ways from those hypothesized by the pecking order theory and can still help to 
account for debt issuance. Therefore, in this section financing deficit is disaggregated 
into cash dividend, investment, changes in working capital and cash flow as in equation 
108 Shyam-Sunder and Myers ( 1999) include the current portion of long-term debt as part of the financing 
deficit. However, Frank and Goyal (2003) find that the current portion of long-term debt does not appear 
to belong as one of the components of fmancing deficit and excluding the current portion of long-term 
debt does not affect their main conclusion. 
109 Frank and Goyal (2003) suggest that it is conventional to scale the variables by assets or sales. They 
replicate all tests by scaling variables by total book assets, the sum of book debt plus market equity and 
sales. Their main results are not affected. 
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(5.2). The use of disaggregation allows us to analyse the impact of each component on 
debt. The way to check whether the components of financing deficit behave in the 
manner predicted by the pecking order theory is to run the regression on a 
disaggregation basis similar to Frank and Goyal (2003) using the following 
specification, 
According to the pecking order theory, a unit increase in DEFi,t should have a unit 
impact on ~Di,t. Therefore, each of the components of DEFi,t should also have a unit 
impact on ~Di,t· Therefore, the original pecking order theory predicts that Pmv = P1 = Pw 
= Pc = 1. 
After making sure that all components of financing deficit relate to net debt issues 
in the predicted manner, the choice between debt and equity as the external source of 
finance is now examined as to how firms finance their financing deficit, which is the 
need for external finance and should be met only by debt or by equity issues. The 
analysis starts with the basic model that investigates the relationship between financing 
deficit and net debt issues in the aggregated form of financing deficit. Then financing 
deficit is disaggregated and the relationship between the components of financing 
deficit and net debt issues is analysed. Then we focus on other factors that might 
influence net debt issue decisions by adding other firm-specific variables into the 
model. 
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5.3.1.2.2 Basic Net Debt Issues Model 
Similar to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003), it is 
assumed that the adverse selection problem of external financing automatically leads to 
the original pecking order in which debt dominates equity. 
The relationship between financing deficit and net debt issues is tested by using 
the following specification. 110' 111 
(5.4) 
This test is based on the prediction of the pecking order theory that firms' deficit 
will be filled entirely with new debt issue. Changes in the net debt issues should be 
driven only by the financing deficit not by the attempt to reach an optimal capital 
structure. The simple or original pecking order theory predicts that a = 0 and PPo 0 = 1 
while in the modified pecking order theory PPo 0 can be less than but close to 1 due to 
the concern over debt capacity and bankruptcy risk. Rejection of the modified pecking 
order theory implies rejection of the original pecking order theory. It is obvious that the 
pecking order theory cannot explain firms' behaviour or the observed pattern in 
financing decisions by itself because there are other reasons why firms need to issue 
equity. For example, when firms have limited debt capacity, they are forced to find 
alternative or costly sources of finance. Firms also try to look forward and forecast by 
implementing the policies that will allow them to have enough debt capacity to finance 
future investments; therefore, they might still issue equity even though they have 
enough debt capacity at that time. Also in case ofiPOs, firms would issue equity. There 
110 This specification is originally developed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and modified by Frank 
and Goyal (2003). Although this specification has been interpreted as having statistical power problem, it 
has been a popular tool for testing the pecking order theory in the literature. 
111 Previous studies such as Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003) and Dang (2005) 
have explored different definitions of dependent variables including the first differenced debt ratios, net 
debt issued and gross debt issued ratio and fmd the same conclusions that net debt issued yields the better 
fit. 
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are also other forms of equity issues that are not related to asymmetric information 
(Fama and French, 2005). In addition, the discount of new equity issues is not only due 
to transaction costs based on asymmetric information. There are also market timing, risk 
aversions and direct costs that can represent other transaction costs that can influence 
firms' financing decisions about the new capital (Galpin, 2004). Moreover, because the 
equity market was relatively overvalued during the 1990s leading firms to prefer more 
equity than debt, financing deficit coefficient is expected to be lower than found by the 
previous studies that focus on an earlier sample period. 112 In addition, in the 1990s there 
were a number of young, small and high growth firms who had limited debt capacity. 
These conditions force them to issue equity. Therefore, due to the above reasons, PPo0 
is expected to be less than 1. 
5.3.1.2.3 Basic Net Equity Issues Model 
Following Halov and Heider (2005), we investigate further by running the basic 
regression on net equity issues with financing deficit to test the extent to which equity is 
issued to finance the deficit. The specification is as follows: 
(5.5) 
To prove the accuracy of the cash-flow data, PP0° in equation (5.4) and PPoE in 
equation (5.5) should add up to 1 because equation (5.2) is an accounting identity. 
112 Elliott et al. (2004) show that the overvaluation in the 1990s is one of the explanations why recent 
studies that focus on the 1990s sample period find the coefficient of financing deficit to be lower than 
expected. 
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5.3.1.2.4 The Second-Order Term of Financing Deficit in Net Debt Issues Model 
Chirinko and Singha (2000) and Agca and Mozumdar (2004) point out that it is 
difficult to make reliable inferences based on the estimated coefficient from a regression 
of new debt on the deficit because we cannot distinguish between the following options: 
i) firms prefer to issue new debt before new equity as predicted by the pecking order 
theory; ii) firms prefer to issue new equity before new debt; and iii) firms do not have 
any particular preferences in issuing debt and equity but instead issue both together in a 
certain relative ratio. They argue that the debt-financing deficit relation will be concave 
if the first scenario is correct but will be convex for the second scenario and linear under 
the third. Therefore, the nature of the second-order term of financing deficit in the debt-
financing deficit relation is examined to indicate whether the pecking order theory as in 
the first scenario is valid or not by estimating the following regression as a concavity 
function: 
(5.6) 
The pecking order hypothesis predicts that firms will prefer less risky funds to 
riskier sources; therefore, debt should be issued before equity. If firms prefer to issue 
new debt before new equity as predicted by the pecking order hypothesis, the net debt 
issues will be a concave function of the financing deficit. 
5.3.1.2.5 Using Other Information to Account for Leverage: Conventional Model 
In addition to the pecking order theory, the trade-off theory is also frequently used 
to explaining the observed patterns of financing decisions of firms. Harris and Raviv 
(1991) review the relationship between the conventional set of variables (tangibility, 
growth opportunity, firm size and profitability) and the use of debt. Then a number of 
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empirical studies including Rajan and Zingales (1995) incorporate these variables into a 
simple model. These conventional variables have been tested in different contexts by 
several empirical studies. Booth et al. (200 1) point out that it is difficult to distinguish 
between trade-off and pecking order models because the variables used in each model 
are normally relevant to each other. Although these variables can make the pecking 
order theory more difficult to test, excluding these variables from the model might be a 
significant omission (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
Since the pecking order theory makes predictions about incremental financing 
decisions, the first difference term is applied. 113 The conventional regression is used to 
explain the leverage in level terms while pecking order regression aims to explain the 
change in, rather than the level of, leverage. First difference terms can be used to 
account for the impact of changes in the variables. Frank and Goyal (2003) suggest that 
as long as the shocks are uncorrelated across years, the specification in first differences 
of conventional variables can be applied. 114 Therefore, the relationship between firm 
characteristics and the source of external financing is examined further by running net 
debt issue regression in the aspect of the trade-off theory where net debt issues are 
regressed on firm-specific variables which include both conventional variables and 
additional variables to verify that the conventional determinants of net debt issues have 
the expected sign in our first-difference specification. 
113 There are other alternative specifications that have been applied by previous studies. These include (i) 
the use of level term by Frank and Goyal (2003) and Adedeji (2002); (ii) the use of lag I period of firm-
specific variables by Adedeji (2002); (iii) the use of interaction term between fmancing deficit and level 
term of firm-specific variables by Lemmon and Zender (2004) and Autore and Kovacs (2005); and (iv) 
the use of interaction terms between financing deficit and first difference terms of firm-specific variables 
by Autore and Kovacs (2005). 
114 However, Frank and Goyal (2003) point out that the R2 is likely to be lower with first difference term 
and we expect to lose some accuracy. In addition, it is possible that the coefficients might be biased 
toward zero but this bias is not large enough to affect their main results. They also note that this 
assumption is unlikely to be held. Therefore, the results must be interpreted with caution. 
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The specification used is as follows. 115 
w,,l =a+ I f3kMSk,i,l + e,,l 
k=l 
(5.7) 
The next step is to analyse how the financing deficit fits into this conventional 
model and how the financing deficit performs as an additional explanatory variable for 
the new debt issues by adding financing deficit into equation (5.7). By doing this, it 
helps us to investigate how well the financing deficit works in the conventional context 
or to see whether the pecking order theory model falsely omits the conventional 
determinants of net debt issues. In addition, the conventional factors can also be used as 
control factors for debt capacity which is the main concern in the modified pecking 
order theory. Therefore, we add financing deficit as an additional factor to equation 
(5.7) which is simply a modified version of the trade-off theory or an extension of 
equation (5.4) by adding firm-specific variables in first differences. However, it should 
be noted that this specification cannot be used as a model to distinguish between the 
pecking order theory and the trade-off theory because if the conventional variables are 
correlated with financing deficit, the explanatory power of financing deficit will be 
lower (Lemmon and Zender, 2004). The specification used is as follows 116•117 
w,,l =a+ f3DEFlDEF;,I + Lf3kMSk,i,l + 8;,1 
k=l 
(5.8) 
115 This specification is also applied by Frank and Goyal (2003) and Halov and Heider (2005) among 
------------ ----~'--"---others-, _, ------·~ ---- _, :- .o:·:·.: _·; - -·'-'•' ,_. ,_- ; ---· ·-- -._"::-_ -,,._'{, - ",- c ,,,,.-, .. , ,, ._, "" ·-·--; -e,,,~c~- "-'·-·"· -- -
116 This specification is suggested by Frank and Goyal (2003) and followed by Agca and Mozumdar 
(2004) and Halov and Heider (2005) 
117 Dang (2005) employs a unified framework that embeds both trade-off and pecking order theories but 
in a different specification by including cash flow deficit in the partial adjustment model to nest the 
pecking order theory. 
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The second-order term of financing deficit is added to equation (5.8) to take 
account of the concavity function. The specification used is as follows. 118 
wi,l =a+ f3vEFJDEF;,, + PvEF2DEF;/ + LfJkMSk,i,l + ci,l (5.9) 
k=J 
Frank and Goyal (2003) also include lagged dependent variables in equation (5.7). 
Therefore, equations (5.7), (5.8) and (5.9) are re-estimated with lagged dependent 
variables as additional explanatory variables as followed. 
wi,l =a+ L {JkMSk,i,l + fJ MJwi,t-J + ci,l 
k=J 
wi,l =a+fJDEFJDEF;,, + LfJkMSk,i,l +fJMJI:!JJi,t-J +ci,l 
k=J 
wi,l =a+ {JDEFJDEF;,, + PvEF2DEF;/ + LfJkMSk,i,l + f3wi:!JJi,t-J + ci,l 
k=J 
(5.10) 
(5.11) 
(5.12) 
5.3.1.3 Country-Specific Effects on Internal versus External Financing and Debt 
versus Equity Issues 
There are few studies that incorporate the impact of country-specific factors in 
tests of the pecking order theory mainly because most previous empirical studies focus 
on a single country context. Because the sample countries differ in term of corporate 
governance, economic development and financial institutions, it is possible that these 
differences may affect the way firms adhere to or violate the pecking order theory. The 
findings from the previous two chapters have shown several significant effects of 
country-specific factors that influence capital structure and debt maturity structure. 
Therefore, it is highly likely that the variations found among the sample countries when 
testing the pecking order hypothesis might be due to differences in country-specific 
118 Agca and Mozumdar (2004) also examine the concavity function of fmancing deficit. 
280 
factors. Country-specific factors are grouped into five categories: (i) economic 
development; (ii) legal enforcement; (iii) legal protection; (iv) ownership structure and 
(v) accounting and asymmetric information. Some of the factors in these groups might 
seem to be more related to firm level. However, country level data is applied in this 
section. The examination of country-specific factors starts by re-estimating equations 
(5.1),(5.4),(5.6) and (5.9) using a data set that combines all firms from all sample 
countries over the sample period. Then country dummies are added to find whether 
there are any country-specific effects. As in Chapters 3 and 4, country dummies are 
THDUM, MLDUM and SPDUM which are then replaced one at a time with country-
specific factors to avoid possible multicollinearity. 
5.3.2 Predictive Logistic Regressions 
Autore and Kovacs (2005) suggest that there is a potential problem with equation 
(5.4) because net debt issues (~D) are not related to financing deficit when ~D and net 
equity issues (~E) have opposite signs. This is due to the fact that firms can use the 
funds from issuing equity to reduce their debt. Therefore, predictive logistic regressions 
are applied instead of linear regressions to test how the probability of firms deviating 
from the pecking order is affected by firm-specific characteristics and country-specific 
factors. The test of deviation from the pecking order can also be used as an indirect test 
of the financing order among the financial decisions that have been overlooked by 
previous studies. The deviation is grouped into two forms, mild and strong deviations. 
Mild deviation is defined as when firms need to access external finance or when 
financing deficit is more than zero (DEF>O). Strong deviation is defined as when firms 
issue equity or when net equity issues are more than zero (~E >0). 
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The specifications for mild and strong deviations are as follows; 
LOG(DEF;,, > 0) =a+ LfJkFSk,i,r +&i,r 
k=I 
LOG(Mi,r > 0) =a+ LfJkFSk,i,r + ei,r 
k=I 
(5.13) 
(5.14) 
where LOG (DEFi,t >0) equals 1 when deficit is more than zero and 0 otherwise. 
LOG (~Ei,t >0) equals 1 when net equity issues are more than zero and 0 otherwise. FS 
is a set of firm-specific variables. 
5.3.3 Non-Linear Quantile Regressions 
Chang and Dasgupta (2003) point out that the positive relationship between net 
debt issues and financing deficit does not indicate that a firm is more likely to issue debt 
if its financing deficit becomes larger. They suggest that the probability of debt issuance 
varies depending on the size of financing deficit. Their findings imply that the 
relationship between debt issues and financing deficit should be non-monotonic due to 
the non-monotonic relationship between the size of financing deficit and the costs 
associated with the loss of debt capacity when firms finance their additional deficit with 
debt. The probability of issuing debt increases initially with the increase in deficit size 
because at this point adverse selection costs of issuing equity outweigh the loss of debt 
capacity. This probability decreases when the loss of debt capacity becomes more 
important and goes up again when financing deficit is very large. 
Qiu and Smith (2005) suggest the use of a non-linear quantile regression to test 
pecking order models and to reconcile the evidence of the previous empirical studies. 
They show that the conflicting results from previous studies are in fact consistent with 
each other after taking into account nonlinearity. Their results suggest that financial 
decisions -of firms ar~ consistent with the pecking ~rder th~ory when finanCing deficit is 
low. They find an opposite pattern of financing behaviour between firms with financing 
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deficit and firms with financial surplus. Their results show that most firms use debt to 
cover their financing deficit when financing deficit is below 20% of total assets while 
most firms use both debt and equity to fund financing deficits when financing deficits 
exceed 20% of total assets. However, when the financing deficit is large (exceeds 50% 
of total assets), most firms use only equity to fund their financing deficit. On the other 
hand, firms use financial surplus to repay debt no matter how big the size of the 
financial surplus is. In addition, they find that conventional factors such as firm size, 
tangibility, growth opportunity and profitability affect firms' behaviour regarding 
financing deficit and financial surplus. Therefore, they reject the original pecking order 
theory and support the modified pecking order theory where the role of bankruptcy 
costs is primary and the role of conventional factors is secondary. 
As suggested by Qiu and Smith (2005), the non-linear quantile regression should 
be applied for several reasons. First, the original pecking order model predicts that all 
financing deficits will be covered by net debt issues. However, there has been evidence 
rejecting this prediction that firms would prefer equity issues when they have high debt 
levels because it is likely that bankruptcy costs will be severe. Therefore, it is expected 
that the relationship between financing deficit and net debt issues should vary 
depending on the size of financing deficit. Second, it is very likely that the relationship 
between financing deficit and net debt issues differs from the relationship between 
financial surplus and net debt issues because the relative cost of issuing debt versus 
equity differs from the relative cost between repaying debt versus repurchasing stock. 
Therefore, a method of a non-linear quantile regression is employed as an 
alternative estimation technique compared to the use of linear regression using OLS, as 
in Section 5.3 .1, when the distribution of the error term is asymmetric or when the 
-assumption ·of a normally distributed error teirn is in question. This techllique is applied. -
to account for nonlinearity in the relationship between financing deficit and net debt 
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issues and to allow for the dependency of the effect of financing deficit on net debt 
issues on size of the financing deficit. The use of non-linear quantile regression helps to 
(i) improve understanding of the type of firms for which the pecking order theory is 
appropriate; (ii) identify the proportion of firms that do not use net debt issues to cover 
financing deficits on some certain given financing deficit level; and (iii) to measure how 
the distribution of net debt issues changes with the change in size of financing deficit. 
Because the firm's financing behaviour regarding financing deficit and financial 
surplus might be different, the analysis is divided into two parts, financing deficit and 
financial surplus. 
Financing deficit 
Financing deficit is defined as financing deficit that exceeds zero or positive 
financing deficit. Positive financing deficit will be divided into several bands depending 
on the maximum value of financing deficit in each country. For simplicity, assuming 
that there are few observations of firms that have financing deficit that exceed 0.2, 
financing deficit will be divided into three bands and three explanatory variables will be 
created to capture the nonlinear effect of financing deficits on net debt issues. If this is 
the case, the following specification would be used: 
BAND 1 : DEF;, 1 (0.0 to 0.1) 
BAND 2 : DEF;,1 (0.1 to 0.2) 
BAND 3 : DEF;,1 (over 0.2) 
=DEF;,1 
= 0.1 
=0 
= DEF;, 1 - 0.1 
= 0.1 
=0 
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ifO ~ DEFu ~ 0.1, 
if DEF;,t?. 0.1; 
if DEF;,1 ~ 0.1, 
if 0.1 ~ DEF;,1 ~ 0.2, 
if DEF;,t?. 0.2; 
if DEF;,1 ~ 0.2, 
if DEF;, 1 ?_ 0.2 
For example, when the financing deficit equals to 0.295, we would have DEFi,t 
(0.0 to 0.1) equal to 0.1, DEFi,t (0.1 to 0.2) equal to 0.1 and DEFi,t (over 0.2) equal to 
0.095. Specifically, we use the variables in Table 5.1, Panel A, to estimate the piecewise 
linear regressions for firms with positive financing deficits in each sample country. For 
instance, the maximum positive financing deficit for Thai firms is 1.1390. As there are 
only few observations with financing deficit above 1.0, the range of positive financing 
deficit is divided into eleven bands creating eleven explanatory variables to capture the 
nonlinear effect of financing deficits on debt issues, DEFi,t G to j+O.l ), where j = 0, 0.1, 
0.2, ... 0.9 and DEFi,t (over 1.0). Therefore, the basic piecewise linear regression for 
Thailand would be as follows: 
0.9 
!:illi,t =a+ Lfl;DEF;/i to j + 0.1) + {J0DEF;,1(over 1.0) +c;,t (5.15) 
}=0 
The estimated coefficients of ~i to ~o will indicate the marginal effect of changes in 
financing deficit on net debt issues in different positive financing deficit ranges. 
Table 5 .I : Tits specifU:atiaRS ofvariahles m estbnam the piecewise linear regress:loRS 
P.....,I A : Finan!;btc De& it 
TI&ailaJul : MaximUJil ofDEF = 1.1390 (II positiw h&llds) 
DEF Value Condition 
DEF~t ('().0 to 0.1) = DEFi,t lfO S DEF~t S 0.1 
0.1 IIfDEF ... ~ 0.1 
DEF;, ('().1 to 0.2) 0 lfDEF;,SO.I 
=DEFu -0.1 lfO.I S DEF;, S 0.2 
0.1 IIfDEF, ' :!' D 2 
DEFu ('().2 to 0.3) 0 lfDEFit S 0.2 
=DEFu -0.2 lfO.J S DEF~t S 0.3 
0.:2 lfDEF· > 0.3 
DEF;, ('().3 to 0.4) 0 lfDEF;, S 0.3 
= DEFit -0.3 lf0.3 S DEF~t S 0.4 
0.3 IIfDEF, . :!' D 4 
DEF~t ('().4 to 0 5) 0 lfDEF;, S0.4 
= DEF~t -0.4 lf0.4 S DEF;, S 0 . .5 
0.4 IIfDEF; ' ~ 0 . .5 
DEF~t ('() . .5 to 0.6) 0 lfDEF.,SO . .S 
= DEF~t -0 . .5 lfO . .S S DEF~t S 0.15 
0 . .5 lfDEF· ~ 0.15 
DEF;, ('().15 to 0.7) 0 lfDEF;,SO.I5 
= DEF~t -0.15 lf0.15 S DEF~t S 0.7 
0.6 IIfDEF. ~ 0.7 
DEF~t ('().7 to 0.8') 0 lfDEF;,:S0.7 
=DEF;, -0.7 lf0.7 S DEF;, S 0.8 
0.7 IIfDEF;·· ~ 0.8 
DEF~t ('().8 to 0.57) 0 lfDEFit :S 0.8 
= DEF~t -0.8 lf0.8 S DEF~t S 0.9 
,' 0.8 .. ·,,-:,. • lfDEF, . ::>: 0.9" · .. ' -
DEF it ('() .9 to I .11) 0 IfDEFit :S 0.9 
=DEF.,~0.9 lf0.9 S DEF., S 1.0 
0.9 IIfDEF, ' :!' 1.0 
DEFit (over 1.11) 0 IfDEF., :S 1.0 
= DEF; -1.0 IIfDEF; ~ 1.0 
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Tallie 5.1 : Tiae specificatio:ns ofvariahles lD estimall! the piecewise linear regressio:ns (continued) 
Malaysia : Maximum ofDEF = 1.5937 (15 posl'live bands) 
DEF Value Condition 
DEF., ron to o.n = DEF~L lfO S DEFtt S 0.1 
0.1 IIfDEF· ~0.1 
DEFt, 1'0.1 to 0.2) 0 lfDEFtt S 0.1 
= DEF;, -0.1 lfO.I S DEFtt SOl 
0.1 IIfDEFt > 0.2 
DEFtt 1'0.2 to 0.3) 0 lfDEFtt S 0.2 
=DEF;,-0.2 lf0.2 S DEFtt S 0.3 
0.2 IfDEF·, :1> 0.3 
DEFtt 1'03 to 0.4) 0 lfDEFtt S 0.3 
= DEFtt -0.3 lf0.3 S DEFtt S 0.4 
0.3 ITfnEF ~0.4 
DEFtt (0.4 to 0.5) 0 lfDEFtt S 0.4 
= DEFtt -0.4 lf0.4 S DEFtt S 0.5 
0.4 lfDEF ~0.5 
DEFtt 1'0.5 to 0.6) 0 lfDEFtt S 0.5 
= DEF;, -0.5 lf0.5 S DEFtt S 0.6 
0.5 fDEF ~0.6 
DEFtt 1'0.6 Lo 0.7') 0 lfDEF;,S0.6 
=DEF;,-0.6 lf0.6 S DEFtt S 0.7 
0.6 lfDEF ~0.7 
DEFtt 1'0.7 to O.&l 0 lfDEFtt S 0.7 
=DEF;,-0.7 lf0.7 S DEFtt S 0.8 
0.7 lfDEFt· > 0.8 
DEFtt 1'0.8 to 0.9) 0 lfDEFtt S 0.8 
=DEFtt-0.8 lf0.8 S DEFtt S 09 
0.8 IfDEF· ~09 
DEFtt 1'0.9 to 1.0) 0 lfDEFtt S 0.9 
=DEF;,-0.9 lf0.9 S DEFtt S 1.0 
0.9 lfDEF > 1.0 
DEFttCI.O to 1.1) 0 IfDEFtt S lD 
= DEFtt -1.0 If !.OS DEF tt S 1.1 
I lfDEF· > 1.1 
DEFttCI.I to 1.2) 0 lfDEFtt S 1.1 
= DEFtt -1.1 If I.IS DEFtt S 1.2 
1.1 IfDEF· ~ ll 
DEFt, (1.2 to 1.3') 0 IfDEF;,S 12 
= DEFtt -1.2 lfi.2S DEFtt S 1.3 
ll IfDEF ~1.3 
DEF;t(l.3 to 1.4) 0 IfDEFttS 1.3 
= DEF;, -1.3 If1.3S DEFtt S 1.4 
1.3 fDEF· > 1.4 
DEFtt (over 1.4) 0 IfDEFtt S 1.4 
=DEFtt 1.4 lfDEF > 1.4 
Singapore :Maximum ofDEF = 1.2274 (10 posl1ive bands) 
DEF Value Condition 
DEFtt ro.o to D.l'l = DEF~L lfO S DEFtt S 0.1 
0.1 IfDEF ~0.1 
DEF;, 1'0.1 to 0.2) 0 IfDEFtt S 0.1 
= DEF;, -0.1 lfO.I S DEFtt S 0.2 
0.1 IIfDEFt >02 
DEFtt 1'0.2 to 0.3'1 0 lfDEFtt S 0.2 
=DEF;,-0.2 lf0.2 S DEF;, S 0.3 
Ol fDEF· > 0.3 
DEFtt 1'0.3 to 0.4) 0 IfDEF;,SOJ 
=DEFtt-0.3 lf0.3 S DEFtt S 0.4 
0.3 IIfDEF; ~ 0.4 
DEFtt 1'0.4 Lo 0.5) 0 lfDEFtt S 0.4 
= DEF;, -0.4 lf0.4 S DEFtt S 0.5 
0.4 fDEF·, ~ 0.5 
DEF;, 1'0.5 to 0.6) 0 lfDEFtt S 0.5 
= DEF;, -0..5 lf0.5 S DEF;, S 0.6 
0..5 IIfDEF, ~06 
DEF;, 1'0.6 to 0.7') 0 lfDEFu S 0.6 
=DEFtt -0.6 lf0.6 S DEFtt S 0.7 
0.6 fDEF.,:!'0.7 
DEFtt 1'0.7 to O.&l 0 lfDEFtt S 0.7 
· = DEFtt- 0.7 .• lf0.7 S DEFtt S 0.8 
0.7 ITfDF.J: .. > 0 H 
DEFu 1'0.8 to 09) 0 lfDEFu S 0.8 
=DEFtt -0.8 lf0.8 S DEFtt S 09 
0.8 IfDEJ1 .. ~ 0.9 
DEF;, (over 0.9) 0 lfDEF;. S 0.9 
=DEF· -0.9 lfDEF ~ 0.9 
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Table 5 .I : 11te specificatioiiS of variables to estimam the piecewise linear regressions (continued) 
Australia : Maximwtl ofDEF = 1.8843 (18 positiw hands) 
DEF Value Condi&n 
DEF;, CO.O to 0.1) = DEF~t IfO :S DEF;, S 0.1 
0.1 IfDEF;, l!: 0.1 
DEF;, (0.1 to 0.2) 0 IfDEF;, S 0.1 
=DEF;,-0.1 IfO.l S DEF;, S 0.2 
0.1 IfDEF;, l!: 0.2 
DEF;, (0.2 to O.J) 0 IfDEF;, S 0.2 
=DEF;, -0.2 If0.2 S DEF;, S 0.3 
0.2 IfDEF· l!:03 
DEF;, (0.3 to 0.4) 0 IfDEF;, :S 0.3 
= DEF;, -0.3 If0.3 :S DEF;, S 0.4 
0.3 ilfDEF;, l!: 0.4 
DEF;, (0.4 to 0.5) 0 IfDEF;, :S 0.4 
=DEF;,-0.4 If0.4 :S DEF;, :S 0.5 
0.4 IIfDEf;. l!: 0.5 
DEF;, (0.5 to 0.6) 0 lfDEF;, :S 0.5 
= DEF;, -0.5 lfO..S :S DEFit S 0.6 
0.5 lfDEF, 2:0.6 
DEF;, C0.6 to 0.7) 0 lfDEFit S 0.6 
=DEF;,-0.6 lf0.6 :S DEF;, :S 0.7 
0.6 lfDEF· 2:0.7 
DEF;, (0.7 to 0.8') 0 IfDEFit S 0.7 
= DEF;, -0.7 lf0.7 :S DEF;, S 0.8 
0.7 lfDEf,. > 0.8 
DEFit (0.8 to 0.9) 0 IfDEF;, S 0.8 
= DEF;, -0.8 lf0.8 :S DEF;, S 0.9 
0.8 If I1FJ1;, > 0.9 
DEFit (0.9 to 1.0) 0 lfDEFit S 0.9 
=DEF;,-0.9 lf0.9 S DEF;, S 1.0 
0.9 lfDEf; .. ;:: 1.0 
DEFit (1.0 to 1.1) 0 lfDEF;, S 1.0 
= DEF;, -1.0 If l.OS DEF;, S 1.1 
I lfDEF· > 1.1 
DEFit (1.1 to 1.2) 0 lfDEF~t S 1.1 
= DEF;, -I .I If l.IS DEFit S 1.2 
1.1 lfDEF;, > 1.2 
DEF it (1.2 to l.J) 0 lfDEF;, S 1.2 
= DEF;, -1.2 If 1.2S DEFit S 1.3 
1.2 lfDEF· l!: 1.3 
DEF;, (1.3 to 1.4) 0 lfDEFit S 1.3 
= DEF;, -1.3 If 1.3S DEF;, S 1.4 
1.3 lfDEF~t > 1.4 
DEF;d1.4to 1.5) 0 lfDEF;, S 1.4 
= DEFit -1.4 If 1.4S DEF;, S U 
1.4 lfDEF;, l!: 1.5 
DEF;,(U to 1.6) 0 lfDEF;, S 1.5 
= DEFit -1.5 If l . .SS DEF;, S 1.6 
u IfDEF;, l!: 1.6 
DEF;, (1.6 to 1.7) 0 lfDEF;, S 1.6 
= DEFit -1.6 If 1.6S DEF;, S 1.7 
1.6 lfDEF <!:1.7 
DEF it (over I. 7) 0 lfDEF;, S 1.7 
=DEF· -1.7 lfDEF· ;:: 1.7 
Panel B ; FmanciJ!I S!Ql!lus 
Thailand : MillimWil ofDEF = -OA044 (4 negatiw hands) 
DEF Value Condition 
DEFit (0.0 to -0.1) = DEF~t If -0.1 S DEFit S 0.0 
-0.1 lfDEF· <-0.1 
DEFit (-0.1 to -0.2) 0 lf-0.1 S DEFit S 0.0 
=DEF~t+O.l If -0.2 S DEF;, S -0.1 
-0.1 IfDEF·. S -0.2 
DEF;, (-0.2 to -O.J) 0 .. 
... 
If -0.2 :S DEFi, ~· O.ll 
= DEF~t+0.2 lf-0.3 S DEFit S -0.2 
-0.2 lfDEFit S -0.3 
DEFit (below -O.J) 0 lf-0.3 S DEF;, S 0.0 
=DEFi,t+0.3 lfDEFit < -0.3 
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Table 5.1 : 1'he specificanons ofvariahles to estimam the piecewise linear regressions (continued) 
Malaysia: Mbdmwn ofDEF = -OA247 (4 negative bands) 
DEF Value Condinon 
DEF;, (0.0 to -0.1) = DEFLt If -0.1 S DEF;, S 0.0 
-0.1 IIfDEF •• s -0.1 
DEF;, (-0.1 to -0.2) 0 If -0.1 S DEF;, S 0.0 
= DEFLt+O.l If -0.2 :S DEF;, ~ -0.1 
-0.1 lfDEFir..S -01 
DEF;, (-0.2 to -0.3) 0 If -0.2 :S DEF;, ~ 0.0 
= DEFLt+0.2 If -0.3 S DEF;, S -0.2 
-0.2 fDEF;, :S -0.3 
DEF;, (below -0.3) 0 If -0.3 S DEF;, ~ 0.0 
=DEFLt+0.3 IfDEF;, S -0.3 
Singapore : Mbdmwn ofDEF = -03932 (3 negative bands) 
DEF Value Condinon 
DEF;, (0.0 to -0.1) = DEFLt If -0.1 :S DEF;, ~ 0.0 
-0.1 lfDEF_ir..S -0.1 
DEF;, (-0.1 to -0.2) 0 If -0.1 :S DEF;, ~ 0.0 
= DEFLt+O.l If -0.2 S DEF;, ~ -0.1 
-0.1 IfDEF;, :S -0.2 
DEF;, (below -0.2) 0 If -0.2 S DEF;, ~ 0.0 
= DEFLt+0.2 IfDEF;, S -0.2 
Ausiralia: Minimwn ofDEF = -OA467 (4 negative bands) 
DEF Value Condinon 
DEF;, (0.0 to -0.1) = DEFLt If -0.1 :S DEF;, ~ 0.0 
-0.1 IfDEF· S -0.1 
DEF;, (-0.1 to -0.2) 0 If -0.1 :S DEF;, ~ 0.0 
=DEFLt+O.l If -0.2 S DEF;, S -0.1 
-0.1 IfDEF;, :S -0.2 
DEFu (-0.2 to -0.3) 0 If -0.2 S DEF;, ~ 0.0 
= DEFLt+0.2 If -0.3 S DEF;, ~ -0.2 
-0.2 IfDEF· < -0.3 
DEF;, (below-0.3) 0 If -{].3 :S DEF;, :S 0.0 
= DEFit+0.3 IfDEF· :S -0 3 
Financial Surplus 
Financial surplus is defined as financing deficit that is below zero, or negative 
financing deficit. It is expected that firms will behave differently when they have 
positive financing deficit from when they have negative financing deficit (financial 
surplus). One possibility is that financial distress comes with net debt issues if firms 
fund their large financing deficit with debt. However, when firms use financial surplus 
to repay debt, there is no such adverse effect. In order to test the impact of financial 
surplus, a similar process is applied as in financing deficit test. 
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For example, if there are few observations in which negative financing deficit is 
below -0.2, three bands of financing deficits will be divided and three explanatory 
variables will be created. In this case, the following variables will be used to estimate 
the piecewise linear regression for firms with financial surplus 
BAND 1: DEFu(O to -0.1) =DEF;,1 if -0.1 ::; DEF;,1 ::; 0; 
= -0.1 if DEF;,1::; -0.1 
BAND 2: DEFu(-0.1 to -0.2) =0 if -0.1 ::; DEF;,1 ::; 0; 
= DEF;,1 + 0.1 if -0.2 ::; DEF;,1 ::; -0.1; 
= -0.1 if DEF;,1 ::; -0.2 
BAND 3 : DEF;,1 (below -0.2) =0 if ~0.2 ::; DEF;,1 ::; 0; 
= DEF;,1 + 0.2 if DEF;,1 ::; -0.2 
For example, if the financing deficit is equal to -0.295, we would have DEFi,t (0 to 
-0.1) equal to -0.1, DEFi,t (-0.1 to -0.2) equal to -0.1 and DEFi,t (below -0.2) equal to-
0.095. A similar process as for financial deficit (positive deficit) is applied for the 
sample countries and the variables created for negative financing deficit (financial 
surplus) are summarized in Table 5.1, Panel B. Therefore, the basic piecewise linear 
regression for financial surplus for Thailand would be as follows: 
-0.2 
MJ;,1 =a+ Lfl;DEF;,,(j to j-0.1)+/30DEF;,,(below -0.3)+&;,1 (5.16) 
}=0 
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5.4 Hypotheses Development and Variable Identification 
5.4.1 Aggregation of Financing Deficit 
The definitions of each aggregation of financing deficit are summarized in Table 
5.2. The trade-off theory predicts that cash dividend (DIV) should be negatively related 
to debt because DIV is used as an alternative method to help mitigate free cash flow 
problems. However, DIV is a component of financing deficit. Thus, according to the 
pecking order theory, the relationship should be positive. The pecking order theory also 
predicts a positive relationship between changes in working capital (L1W) and debt 
issues. After controlling for internal cash flow and investment, !l W should be matched 
with net debt issues. Internal cash flow (C) is expected to be negatively related to debt 
issues because the pecking order theory predicts that firms should use internal finance 
before external finance. 119 After controlling for C and !l W, investment (I) should be 
matched positively with net debt issues. 120 
Table 5.2 : hulil:amrs of the aggregations offulaJu:btg defil:it and firm-specific variables 
Variables Proxy 
Financing Deficit DEF = Dividend + Net Investment +Changes in Working Capital+ C o.sh flow 
= net debt is sues + net equity is sues 
Dividend DIV =Cash dividends po.id 
Net Investment I =Capital expenditure+ net assets-acquisition+ addits to other assets+ 
increases in investment+ other use/source-inv +other uses- decreases in 
investment- other source/use-fin 
Changes in Working Capital I:J.W =-(increases I decrease in short term debt+ changes in Cash orliq) 
Cash Flow c =net income + Depre, deple & amort+ Defer tu & lTC +other Cash flow+ 
funds from operation+ extraordinary items+ funds-other oper act+ 
disposal fix assets+ EFFECT-exch on Cash+ other sources 
Net Debt Issues I:J.D =Long term borrowing- reduction in long term debt- comiPFD PURCH 
RTRD 
Net Equity Is sues I:J.E = Proceed sale/iss stk +stock option proceeds + other stock sales 
Tangibility TANO =Net fixed assets /Total assets 
Orowth Opportunity OROW = (!t/IV of equity+ BV oftotalassets- BV of equit~ I BV of assets 
Firm Size SIZE = Ln (assets) 
Profitability PROF =Operating income I Total&ssets 
Firm Age AOE = Ln (the number of years starting from when the firms are listed in the 
n&tional stock market) 
Level of Asymmetric BI04 = Equal to I if the &uditors of the firms are among Big 4 auditors 
Inform&tion 
Management Involvement PMOMT =Number ofmanagementteam with the same family name I Total number 
of mana!'lement team 
Adverse Selection Cost SlOMA =Residual stand11rd deviation calculated from 11 m11rket model 
Trading Activity TURN =Average of(dllily trading volume I dllilytotal number of shares) 
--
-- ····-
~ .. - -- ":-.·· --,·.>, ::.-•_ •J•·_O --, - -o 
" -- -
119 If cash flow is a proxy for growth opportunity, trade-off theory also predicts a negative relationship. 
120 The trade-off theory also predicts a positive relationship because high investments lead to higher debt 
capacity. 
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5.4.2 Firm-Specific Variables 
The definitions of firm-specific variables are summarized in Table 5.2. Several 
empirical studies used sub-samples regarding differences in adverse selection costs such 
as firm size, growth opportunity, profitability, firm age, volatility and sigma. 121 
However, due to the size of the sample, it is difficult to divide the sample into different 
sub-groups and to find a pattern among the sub-groups according to differences in 
adverse selection cost. Therefore, instead of separating the data into different deciles, 
these variables are included in the regressions instead. For each variable, the hypotheses 
are set for the two financing orders: (i) internal versus external finance (relationship 
between variables and financing deficit) and (ii) debt versus equity (relationship 
between variables and net debt issues). The predictions of the role of each variable are 
raised from the points of view of both the trade-off and pecking order theories. 
Tangibility 
Tangibility (TANG) is defined as the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets. 
Tangible assets can be used as collateral. Therefore, firms with high tangible assets have 
higher debt capacity. Firms with few tangible assets have greater asymmetric 
information; therefore, they should prefer internal to external finance leading to the 
prediction of a positive relationship for between tangibility and financing deficit. On the 
other hand, predictions of the relationship between tangibility and net debt issues are 
not as conclusive as between tangibility and financing deficit. Firms with few tangible 
assets would have greater asymmetric information; therefore, they tend to accumulate 
more debt over time and are likely to be highly levered because equity issues will be 
under-priced. Firms with high tangibility are also normally large in size; therefore, they 
121 Frank and Goyal (2003) focus on different size and levels of growth opportunity sub-samples. Agca 
and Mozumdar (2004) also focus on different size sub-samples. Autore and Kovacs (2005) also focus on 
different adverse selection cost and levels of profitability sub-samples. Lemmon and Zender (2004) also 
focus on different age sub-samples. Halov and Heider (2005) apply SIGMA as the proxy for volatility and 
they also focus on different risk sub-samples. 
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can issue equity at fair prices and have less need to issue debt to finance their new 
investments. Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest that firms with less tangible or 
collateralized assets should employ more debt because debt can help to limit or monitor 
managers' use of fund. Therefore, the pecking order theory predicts a negative 
relationship between debt issues and tangibility. On the other hand, the trade-off theory 
predicts a positive relationship because tangible assets can be used as (i) collateral 
which can increase firms' debt capacity and reduce bankruptcy costs and (ii) security to 
reduce agency costs of debt and to avoid asset substitution problems. 
Growth opportunity 
Growth opportunity (GROW) is proxied using market to book ratio which is 
defined as the market value of equity plus book value of total assets minus book value 
of equity then divided by total assets. Firms with high growth opportunities are likely to 
be in need of external finance. Therefore, it is expected that firms with high growth 
opportunities should have high financing deficits leading to the prediction of a positive 
relationship between growth opportunities and financing deficits. Both the trade-off and 
pecking order theories predict a negative relationship between growth opportunities and 
net debt issues. It is argued that high growth opportunities can help mitigate dilution 
costs to existing shareholders when their stocks are overvalued. Therefore, firms with 
high growth opportunities can issue more equity with less risk of dilution of control. 
The modified pecking order theory predicts that firms with high growth opportunity will 
issue equity to build financial slack or to preserve their debt capacity for future finance. 
Therefore, firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to issue equity. The 
trade-off theory also predicts a negative relationship between debt issues and growth 
opportunity because there i,s a concern that debtexpo~esfirms to_ the 'debtoverhang: 
problem which can limit the firm's ability for future growth (Myers, 1977). Also, 
because higher growth is associated with greater bankruptcy risks, firms with high 
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growth opportunities will try to avoid the use of debt to reduce bankruptcy risk. In 
addition to the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory, market timing theory also 
predicts a negative relationship between debt issues and growth opportunity. Market to 
book ratio is not only a proxy for growth opportunity but also a proxy for overvaluation. 
Market timing theory predicts that managers time over-valued equity markets 
irrationally. Firms with high growth opportunities are usually overvalued; therefore, 
firms will try to issue equity to take advantage of this. Therefore, firms with high 
growth opportunities should be associated more with equity issuance than debt issuance 
because overvaluation induces managers to issue equity. 
Firm size 
Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. It is expected 
that the larger the firm, the higher internal funding they will have generated. Therefore, 
large firms should have less need for external finance leading to a negative relationship 
between firm size and financing deficit. In addition, if firm size is a proxy for 
asymmetric information, a negative relationship between firm size and financing deficit 
is also expected. Large firms can be viewed as complex organisations with less 
transparency leading to higher costs of asymmetric information. The higher the level of 
asymmetric information, the harder it is for firms to get access to external finance. 
There is a consensus in the literature on the relationship between firm size and the 
use of debt. Firm size is expected to be positively related to debt issuance according to 
the trade-off theory because larger firms are usually more diversified, have easier access 
to debt, have lower financial distress costs, and are less likely to go bankrupt. Large 
firms are often regarded as 'too big to fail'. Large firms also have lower agency and 
transaction costs relative to smaller firms. The pecking order theory also predicts a 
_~-,.-· .. ·~_,__,_.::._. ,-,--:: .. ,,_ .- o'~. ·<:···.:c··;-- ••.• . e:: .•• -~·::'.'.- .---~-~-------·~----·. -· •r:.._-·_ ,.-.·r .,£"~ ::-;·.··-~~::.:..·.- _ 
positive relationship between debt issues and firm size because larger firms have higher 
reputations and they face lower information costs when borrowing. In addition, larger 
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firms are less vulnerable to informational asymmetries and adverse selection problems. 
Therefore, large firms can rely more on debt financing compared with small firms. 
Because both the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory predict a positive 
relationship, it is difficult to suggest which theory is supported by the results. The 
pecking order theory should work particularly well for small firms or firms that are 
unlisted for several reasons: (i) small firms tend to face more severe adverse selection 
problems than large firms; (ii) small firms have limited access to capital markets forcing 
them to use their retained earnings first and then obtain private finance from banks if 
necessary; and (iii) managers and shareholders have the motivation to retain control of 
firms leading them to be reluctant to issue equity. 
Profitability 
Profitability (PROF) is defined as the proportion of operating income to total 
assets. Firms with high profitability are expected to be less reliant on external finance 
leading to an expected negative relationship between profitability and financing deficit 
giving support to the pecking order hypothesis. On the other hand, the relationship 
between profitability and net debt issues is not as conclusive. The trade-off theory 
predicts that highly profitable firms should use more debt in order to take the advantage 
of tax shields. In addition, bankruptcy costs increase when earnings decline; therefore, 
less profitable firms should have lower levels of debt. Because highly profitable firms 
have lower risks of bankruptcy, they have higher debt capacities. Moreover, large 
amounts of free cash flow lead to agency costs of equity. Therefore, firms should issue 
more debt as a disciplinary device to diminish free cash flow problems by preventing 
managers from using free cash flow for their own benefit. Besides, less profitable firms 
provide low shareholder returns. The increase in debt for these firms would result in 
higher levels of bankruptcy risk and costs of borrowing which in turn will lower 
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shareholder returns even more. Therefore, less profitable firms will try to avoid using 
external finance, especially debt financing. 
However, most empirical studies have found profitability to be negatively related 
to debt, which is consistent with the pecking order theory. Larger earnings lead to an 
increase in the use of internal sources of finance to cover financing deficits. Because 
retained earnings do not produce information asymmetry, firms can use retained 
earnings promptly to finance their investments. However, Fama and French (2002) 
point out that the negative relationship found between profitability and debt must be 
interpreted with cautions when testing the pecking order theory because the pecking 
order theory is not the only explanation for such a relationship. First, profitability can be 
used as a signal for growth opportunity in which agency theory also predicts a negative 
relationship. Second, firms may face fixed costs of adjustment that lead firms to use 
profits in paying off debt resulting in a negative relationship even when the trade-off 
theory is in place. 
Firm Age 
Firm age (AGE) is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years from 
when firms were listed on the national stock market. Firm age is expected to be 
negatively related to financing deficit because young firms need more external funds to 
help them set up at the early stage of the business and they also have high growth 
opportunities and lower internally generated funds. A positive relationship is expected 
between firm age and net debt issues because young firms are not normally well known, 
have lower tangibility and have less access to debt markets. Older firms have a higher 
reputation or are safer so they should be able to borrow more. Therefore, young firms 
might rely more on equity issuance than debt issuance at the early stages of business 
- •. ~}':::·· -~:· -~·- - -_c.·_.,.,. ·- _ _, ?.······.-"':~-, __ -_; 1 --~·.;_ ,_-._. ·--~~- '·.ic•:.-,";f. ~~-'-~·.;.:~-~-_; .;.. _: :.- .. .. (". -~,:. , __ -c;.;._::.;,.. ~ ::..::"-'-:;.,---' '~~-- .:·:: . .'· c ... _- . ...;I .. .::.-;_- _,_-:..-;;, __ _ 
because they have high growth but lower internally generated funds with limited debt 
capacity compared with older firms. 
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The Level of Asymmetric Information 
The level of asymmetric information (BIG4) is measured by the use of Big 4 
auditors. 122 The value equals 1 when the auditors of firms are Big 4 and 0 otherwise. 
When Big 4 auditors are involved, the level of asymmetric information is reduced. 
Therefore, firms can make more use of external finance leading to a positive 
relationship between BIG4 and financing deficit. When the level of asymmetric 
information is low, the adverse selection cost is low. Firms find it cheaper to deviate 
from the pecking order when adverse selection cost is low because they expect the cost 
to be higher in the future. Fan and Wong (2005) suggest that controlling owners try to 
employ reputable, independent auditors from big audit firms in order to signal to the 
market that their financial statements provide reliable information. They also find that 
the employment of good quality auditors is positively related to entrenchment problems 
and is negatively related to lower discounts in share prices. Therefore, the use of good 
quality auditors leads to lower levels of asymmetric information. According to the 
pecking order hypothesis, when asymmetric information levels are high, firms prefer 
less risky finance such as debt to riskier sources such as equity, leading to the prediction 
of a negative relationship between BIG4 and net debt issues. 
Management Team Involvement 
Management team involvement (PMGMT) is measured by the ratio of the number 
of management team members from the same family to the total number in the 
management team. 123 If PM GMT is high, it is expected that internal funds should be 
used before external finance to avoid control dilution and to keep the control of firms 
amongst themselves. Therefore, a negative relationship between management team 
involvement and financing deficit is expected. A positive relationship with net debt 
122 Due to the lack of historical infonnation, the most up-to-date infonnation from Extel is used. The 
estimation is based on the assumption that finns do not change their auditors over the past 10 years. 
123 Similar to BIG4, PMGMT is obtained from Extel using the most up-to-date data for each finn. 
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issues is expected because firms would try to use little equity to avoid facing control 
dilution problems. 
Adverse Selection Cost 
Adverse selection cost should not be left out of the test of the pecking order theory 
because it is the main factor that distinguishes the pecking order theory from other 
capital structure theories. Autore and Kovacs (2005) argue that previous empirical 
studies fail to find evidence in favour of the pecking order theory because their tests fail 
to account for time-varying adverse selection cost. In the multi-period pecking order 
theory by Viswanath (1993), equity can be an optimal choice for firms even when debt 
capacity and internal cash flow is sufficient. Therefore, it is important to include the 
level of adverse selection cost in the model. Autore and Kovacs (2005) suggest that it is 
preferable if the proxy for adverse selection cost can reflect dispersion of opinion 
among investors because it is the best approximation of the market's reaction to an 
equity issuance. Due to data unavailability, adverse selection cost is measured as the 
standard deviation of the error term from a market model in which daily returns are 
regressed in a given period (SIGMA). This measure can be used to capture risk and cash 
flow volatility. 124 The multi-period pecking order theory predicts that firms rely more 
on external finance when adverse selection cost is low leading to the prediction of a 
negative relationship between adverse selection cost and financing deficit. On the other 
hand, when external finance is required, the multi-period pecking order theory predicts 
that firms rely more on equity when adverse selection cost is low leading to the 
prediction of a positive relationship between adverse selection cost and net debt issues. 
Firms issue equity when adverse selection cost is low to ensure financing for future 
124 SIGMA is also used by Autore and Kovacs (2005) as a proxy for volatility. They argue that the best 
proxy for adverse selection cost is the dispersion of investor belief. They use dispersion in analysts' 
earnings forecasts as a proxy for adverse selection cost. However, previous studies have identified several 
proxies to measure adverse selection costs such as residual standard deviation and trading volume. 
However, these alternative measures are noisier estimates of dispersion of investors' opinion. 
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projects that become available when adverse selection cost is expected to be higher in 
the future (Autore and Kovacs, 2005). 
Trading Activity 
Trading activity (TURN) is defined as the average ratio of daily trading volume to 
daily number of shares. High turnover reflects the capacity of external finance. 
Therefore, the relationship between trading activity and financing deficit is expected to 
be positive. Firms should also have easier access to equity markets when trading 
activity is high leading to the prediction of a negative relationship between trading 
activity and net debt issues. 
5.4.3 Country-Specific Variables 
Table 5.3 summarizes the major aspects of economic condition, corporate 
governance and financial institution of the sample countries and also presents the 
definitions and sources of these country-specific variables. 125 
Table 53 : huUcamrs ofcoUJttry-specifil: variables 
Variables 11udlaJal MaJa:rsia Singapore Australia Defildtion Source 
EDEV 0 0 See Table 2.2 F11n et al. (2004) 
Legal Enfitrcement 
LawandO:nler LAW 4.31 3.69 .S.l9 6 SeeTable:Z.4 Demirguc-KuntBnd 
······-········-·····-·········-··-····· ··-·-·····-·········-···················- ... ·····-·············· ... ·······-····································· .M.,..t<;~~r>.Y.:i.c._C:Z.Q.@. ..... . 
- ... ~.!e..~.r. .. ~!.:J.:~~.:!IJI".~I!':-.. -.. -··-·· ____ !',F._F... 3.1.5 9 . ···-··!Q ..... -.. 10 ..... !':1.~.". .. !.".1:1~~--~·~--- l:,:a,_I'CJ.~Il!~_o.:l:.(~9..9.!f.). 
······-··-~:"!e.._o.!.~.":!": ...... _,,, ............. _,,,,,_ .................................. .:l~l:J..y;: ......... 6..:~~---···· 6.78 ................ ~.:~ .. ?. ................... l.Q ................ ::1.~.~ .. !. .. ~.!.". .. ~.::'1 ...... ,l:., ..... ~.ll.r.l.": .. ".~.ll!: .. (l.~~!J). .. 
Corruption f.9.~.1.. .... ?.J.S. .............. ?.:.3..8. ........ ......... ~:.:z;! ........... ........ ~ .. -.5..2. .............. !':1."..". .. !.11:1:11~ .. ?.:.'! ..... l:,:t~:.!'.C>.~.Il.!~ .. o.:I:.C!.9..9.11') .. 
........... w;k-;r~;:;;;:b&; ........................................ ~- ....... ~-:~~ ....... .... _ ..N5 ................. P95 .......... ....... ~:~~ ............. ~;-;-~-~~t-; .. H-.... t!i>~~~'·;~~~-9985 .. 
Legal Protection 
........... ~~~~~-~!'~ ........ _ .................... -.................. _ .. -~-- .. _ ...... ~ ....... _ ............. ~.-.................. -.. ~ .. -.... ·-· ..... -............ ___ ----~~-· .. :!.~~-1-~ .. ~.L ... .'::~.P.-~~~--~~ .. ~: .. Q.~~Il}. .. 
Shareholder Rights SHR 2 4 4 4 See Table 2 . .S La Porta et al. (1991l) 
OwnersldpConcentration OWN 047 0.54 0.<1!1 0.28 SeeTable2.8 LaPortaetal.(l998) 
AccoUJlting and Asymmetric 
Big-5 Auditors' Market Share AUD 0 . .58 0.66 0.99 0.89 See Table 2.7 F11net al. (2004) 
·················-·····-··-·····-··-·-··-················-.. -·····-························· .................................................. ············-·····"·"·····"··-·····-·········"·········-····"··-····· .. ··-· .. ·· ................................. . 
78 1.S ... ::1."."._!":1:1_1~.~-~ I:,:":.!'C>.~"~~-"':C!~~II') .. 
22.05 13.61 See Table 2.7 F11n et al. (2004) 
125 It should be noted that the country-specific factors are not time-varying. They are indicators calculated 
or collected by previous empirical studies and other organizations as averages of particular periods in 
those studies. Therefore, we might not be able to detect some of the time-varying effects due to this 
limitation.~A.s~ suggested· by' Deniirguc:!Kunt' and 'Mal<simovk''(l999);-significallf'chiinges 'ili a 'Country's . 
legal system are infrequent, and indicators of the institutional environment, such as creditor rights and 
shareholder rights, are relatively stable over time. However, it should be noted that these country-specific 
factors may be affected by the effect of the crisis. Due to data unavailability, no time-varying data can be 
applied; therefore, cautions must be made when interpreting the results. 
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Economic Development 
Economic development (EDEV) is a 0-1 dummy and equals 1 when the country is 
classified as developing and 0 otherwise, according to the World Bank classification. 
Firms in developed countries are expected to have higher growth opportunities leading 
to more need for external finance. Also, when there is a choice among sources of 
external finance, firms in developed countries would be able to issue more equity than 
firms in developing countries. 
Legal Enforcement 
There are five measures of legal enforcement included in the analysis: (i) law and 
order (LAW), (ii) efficiency of judicial system (EFF), (iii) rule of law (RULE), (iv) 
corruption (CORRJ, CORR2) and (v) risk of expropriation (EXP). These factors 
measure how strong, sound or efficient legal enforcement is in each country. The higher 
scores indicate sound and efficient systems, lower risk and lower corruption for all 
measures except CORR2 where a large value means more severe corruption. Out of 
these five measures, Thailand is at the bottom and Australia appears to be at the top. 
Firms in countries with sound and efficient systems such as Australia should have 
higher need of external finance or they should have higher capacities to get external 
finance because investors and lenders are more protected by efficient legal systems. It is 
also expected that firms in countries with high legal enforcement scores would be able 
to issue more equity than debt when there is a need for external finance, leading to a 
prediction of a negative relationship between the legal enforcement variable and net 
debt issues. 
Legal Protection 
There are two legal protection measures, creditor rights ( CRR) and shareholder 
rights (SHR). Among the sample countries, Australia has the lowest creditor rights score 
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while Thailand has the lowest shareholder rights score. Because SHR is quite similar 
among the sample countries, a clear pattern in terms of shareholder rights might not be 
detected. When considering the choice of debt or equity for external finance, it is 
expected that firms in countries with higher CRR have higher debt capacity while firms 
in countries with higher SHR have higher equity. 
Ownership Structure 
The ownership by the three largest shareholders of the ten largest non-financial 
domestic firms collected by La Porta et al. (1998) is used as a proxy for ownership 
structure (OWN). The ownership structure for firms in our sample countries appears to 
be highly concentrated except for Australian firms. The ownership concentration is 
expected to be negatively related to financing deficits. It is expected that firms in 
countries that have highly concentrated ownership will prefer to use internal finance to 
avoid control dilution. When there is a choice between debt and equity, firms with 
highly concentrated ownership structures are expected to issue more debt to avoid 
control dilution from issuing equity, leading to a predicted positive relationship between 
OWN and net debt issues. In addition, concentration of ownership comes with a cost of 
agency problems. Concentrated control allows controlling shareholders to engage in 
self-dealing activities for their own benefits. Investors anticipate these problems; 
therefore, they discount firms' share price. Due to the above reasons, firms with high 
ownership concentrations are expected to move closer to the prediction of the pecking 
order theory. 
Accounting and Asymmetric Information 
One of the measures in this category is Big-S auditors' market share (AUD) which 
is the share of assets ~f listed firms audited by Big-S auditors. The sample co~'lltrfes 
vary in terms of this measure. Firms in Singapore and Australia have the highest 
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involvement of good quality auditors. AUD is expected to be positively related to 
financing deficit because once there is high involvement of auditors, levels of 
asymmetric information and adverse selection costs should be lower. In addition, the 
multi-period pecking order theory implies that firms in markets that are characterized by 
a strong audit function should have lower debt issues. Once the level of adverse 
selection cost is low, firms prefer to go for riskier types of finance because they expect 
the adverse selection costs to be higher in the future. 
Another measure in this category is rating on accounting standards (ACC). 
Thailand is found to have the lowest accounting standards and Singapore is at the top of 
the list. The fewer important items included in the annual report, the higher asymmetric 
information and adverse selection costs leading firms in countries with low ratings to 
rely more on internal finance, and if firms have to choose between types of external 
finance, debt should be preferred to equity. The last measure in this category is analyst 
activity (ANA) which is the average number of analysts per firm. Among the sample 
countries, Malaysian firms appear to have the highest number of analysts while Thai 
firms have the lowest. Firms in countries that have higher average numbers of analysts 
are expected to have higher information asymmetries and adverse selection costs 
because of higher dispersion of opinion, leading to a negative relationship with 
financing deficits. 
5.5 Data, Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
5.5.1 Data 
Financial variables were obtained from Worldscope and Extel, via Thompson 
Research, and Datastream. The sample covers the period of 1993 to 2001. Due to the 
financial crisis in 1997, the full sample will be divided into sub-samples where the pre-
crisis period covers the period of 1993 to 1996 and the post-crisis period covers the 
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period of 1998 to 2001. In addition, following the standard practice in capital structure 
studies, financial firms are excluded from the sample. Variables are scaled by total 
assets. Missing values require careful treatment especially for cash flow data. Therefore, 
it is ensured that all records add-up so that the missing values do not mean 'unaccounted 
for'. In some cases, the data were aggregated into some other items when they were 
imported into the database. Or sometimes when firms did not report a particular item, 
the data was coded as missing from the database. Similar to Frank and Goyal (2003), 
the accounting identities and missing values on these items are determined as zero 
where appropriate. A large number of observations were lost due to the use of cash flow 
variables. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) test the 
pecking order theory based on several restrictions. One of these is the requirement that 
firms report continuously on the relevant variables. Although they do find significant 
differences between a sample of firms with gaps permitted and a sample of firms 
without gaps permitted, this restriction cannot be put on the tests in this chapter due to 
the size of the sample countries and the number of firms in each country. Therefore 
when comparing the results from this chapter with results from previous studies, the 
comparisons should be made only for the set of the sample with gaps permitted. 
5.5.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
Table 5.4 presents cash flows in an aggregated form. There is a substantial 
variation in the financing sources variables (net debt issue, net equity issue and 
financing deficit). This table shows that there are variations in the movement of 
financing deficit in this region depending on economic conditions and economic 
development. For crisis-affected countries, financing deficit and external finance reduce 
over-time especially after the crisis-but the opposite is found for Australian firms. --
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Table 5.4 : Average cuh t1Dw and fbwu:ing u a fral:tion of mtal utetl 
Panel A : Thailand 
Year 1!1!13 1!1!14 1!1!15 1!1!16 1!1!17 1!198 1!1!1!1 2000 2001 
NwnberofObemationt 1J2 140 1.52 167 186 180 174 J29 228 
CIIBhDividends 0.0378 0.0341 0.0276 0.0234 0.0202 0.0101 0.0137 0.0170 0.0221 
N;t·I;;;·t·~-~~;·················-·············· ······a·:t·tsJes-····· ·····rl":"i47i··-·· ·-···o·:t-42o······ ····-·o·:i"23a·-··· -····o·.··o·6·;······· ···-·'ti':05is-···· ······a-:cJ54t······· ··-···o:o524····· ······a'.'li"6ili······· 
~~~~ztiiJ~~:::::::::::::::::::··::::: :::::~_~g11r:: ··::::~3-f;r:: ::::::g._g~r: :::::~~1~r: ::::::g._:g11~:::::: ::::::~:~~~r:: ::::::~::g~~~::::::: :::::::~:~~f.r:: ::::::~::~~~r:: 
Finanr:ingDef~eit 0.1407 0.1379 0.0944 0.0793 0.0308 -0.0032 0.0078 0.0003 0.0017 
Net Debt [ssUBs ll.02JO 0.032.5 0.0.566 0.0303 0.0142 -0.0280 -0.0239 -0.0206 -0.0130 
N~~-·F.q;;ii·v·i~;;;~··············-·············· ··-··il"XI"B"f···· ·······a:"io55··-·· ······a-:riiii······ ······o:o49o······ ······ii":ol"6·6······ ······o·:o248······ ······a-:ri31"7······ ······o:o2o!r··· ······o-:rii47······ 
Net External Finance 0.1407 0.1379 0.0944 0.0793 O.D30B -0.0032 0.0078 0.0003 0.0017 
Net Debt lssUBs (medien) 0.0000 0.0000 0.01.58 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0039 -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0014 
~~!::~~iiJ~~~::{~ .. :::.: ::::::Q::g,iiQ.o.:: ........... g_,QQQQ::::: ::::::Q;O.:@:::: ...... _g,QQQQ::::: ::::::Q:;g,g_g:g,::::: ::::::o.:QQQQ: .. :: ::::::Q:;@O. ... ::: ::::::o.:;@Q. .. ::: ::::::Q:.:QD.:g,g,:::::: 
Panel D : Mala}'llia 
Year 1!1!13 1!1!14 1!1!15 1!1!16 1!1!17 1!198 1!1!1!1 2000 2001 
NwnberofObemationt 26 146 216 2.53 J8J 287 306 471 .561 
CIISh Dividends 0.02.54 0.0202 0.0175 0.0167 0.0144 0.0138 0.0124 0.0139 0.012.5 
N~·t'·i;;·;t;;~t;····-·····-···········-········ ···-··ii09-4"f····· ·····-o·:i·2·9:i······ ·······ii'(i5~······ -·-o·.~cis-i······· ······"li:itaJ····- ···-·onsoi-···· ·····a:04f3··-· ···--o.tiif47·-· ····-o~o:s28··-·· 
:~~~¥.i9.;;F.ii:~::::::~:::::::::::::::::: ::::::::g,;QQ~~~::: :::::~IQ~Q.~::: ::::::~:O.~Q~9.~::::: :::::~Q:Q@:::::: :::::::P.:§2.~~::: :::::I!J.(~9.~::: :::::!J.:Q19.~::::: :::::I9.®.~:::: ::::::CJ.:QQ~::::: 
lntel'IWCashFlow O.o.:m 0.0619 0.031.5 0.0149 0.0106 0.0.528 O.D549 0.0336 0.0474 
Finanr:ingDef~eit 0.0.520 o.D8J5 0.0810 0.1319 o.0957 0.0283 o.oo97 0.0447 o.o:m 
Net Debt lssUBs -0.0036 0.0296 0.0118 0.043.5 0.0278 0.0112 -0.0078 -0.004.5 -0.0087 
·N~i-&q;rl!Y:·r;;;;;;····················-········ ·······a:o5:55······ ······a·:a52ii······ ······a:oiiil3"···· ······o"."ilii-s-3······· ·······a:oii79······ ······a·.o171"······ ·····o:oi"75···-· ······iio49f··· ·····-a:o3o4·-·· 
Net External Finance 0.0.520 0.08J.5 0.0810 0.1319 0.09.:57 0.0283 0.0097 0.0447 0.0217 
Net Debt lssUBs (medien) 0.0000 0.11000 11.0000 0.0000 0.000.5 0.0000 -0.0016 -0.00119 -0.0019 
:iie.L~ii.i!Y.:!~ii.e.S.:<:~~:::::: :::::::O.~Q@Q~:::: :::::o.:.:O.!l.®.:~::: :::::§@QQ:::::: ::::1Ul.9.0.:9.:::::: .::::I9.9.9.Q::::: :::IO.P!l.f·:: ::::IQ9.®.::::: ::::::Q:;O.!l.Q.9.::::: :::::9.:9.9.9.Q::~:: 
Panel C : Sillppore 
Year 1!1!13 1!1!14 1!1!15 1!1!16 1!1!17 1!198 1!1!1!1 2000 2001 
NwnberofObemationt 13 62 104 126 141 147 16.5 276 314 
CIIShDividends 0.0144 0.0131 0.0131 0.0119 0.0103 0.0113 0.0116 0.0107 0.0122 
H~!I~!:t.~!!i~~:::::::::::::::::::::::=:::: ::=:QI~~I::::: ::::::!l.n~~::=: :=It.:i!:r::: :::::P.J:~5.:6.::::: =::I1.~1~:::::: ::=:o.::g~~~::::: ::::IQ.~~~:··· ·-···a:oil49····· ·····o~oii·af··· !l:Y.f.!!~~-~P..i!~ .............. -............. ··---~ . ..Q.~~.O.-............ 0..:~.1.9..1 ... -...... :9..:0.9.5..~ ............ :O..,O.Q!.Q_ ....... ::9.:.0..~.0..0. .... ··-··O..,QQ~~--- ...... 9.:.0..~.~~--- . :::§QQ~~::::: :::::~Q:;o.:o.:g,z::::: 
lntel'IWCIIShFlow 0.10.51 0.0197 0.01915 0.0464 0.0398 0.0.595 0.0266 -0.04.5.5 0.0353 
FinancingDefll:it 0.1136 0.1399 0.119.5 0.0901 0.0850 0.0413 0.0.585 0.1.567 0.0570 
Net Debt lssUBs 0.0345 0.00.54 0.0383 0.0351 0 .0357 -0.0038 -0.01.57 -0.00.52 0.000.5 N;l .. &l;;ii·y:·"I;;·;;;····························· ··-··oO"i179·i-····· ······o:"i344··-·· ·-···o·:a·iiT2······ ····-·a:ii55o·-··· ······a·:a·4iii"3····· ···-··a:ci451-··· ····-o-:ii742····· ··-···ii":i6"i9-··· ·····iia5.ii5······ 
Net External Finance 0.1136 0.1399 0.1195 0.0901 0.08.50 0.0413 0.0.58.5 0.1.567 0.0.570 
!'1.~! .. 12~!'..! .. !s..s.~:~e..s..(~.~L ............... ~:.0..0..0..0._ ........... 9.:~QQ9. .. _ ........ 9.:.0..0..~~-·-··· .... _.Q.,QQ~~---·· _ .... 9. ... 0..0..~.! ............. :.g,QQQ?_ ........ :Q,_g_o..!.~ ...... _ .. :.O..,QQQ! .......... :9.:.0..0..~.3. ..... . 
!'I.~! .. I;rill!tY. .. !.s.~.~~--~~~ ............. ~:.O..D.;!.~...... . ..... O..:~Q?~.·-·· ·---~.:O..O..Q~ .......... 0..:9.9.9.9....... 0.0000 ........... .0..:9.9.9.Q ........... 9....0..0..0..0. .............. O..,QQQ~ .......... 9.:.o..o.o..g ..... . 
Panel D : Au1ralia 
Year 1!1!13 1!1!14 1!1!15 1!1!16 1!1!17 1!198 1!1!1!1 2000 2001 
NwnberofObemationt 8 86 113 132 156 174 223 378 390 
Cash Dividends 0.0343 0.0248 0.0249 0.0274 0.0327 0.0:.!78 0.0276 0.0245 0.02.59 
'if~·~··i-;;~t;;~~~····-·····-··················-· ·······o-niia······ ·····-o·:t·o·Ja······· ·······o·:i:564······ ······a·:i·40·s···· · ·······o·:i336····- ······a~i·2s·s······· ·····'O·:ii6i···-· ······ii'l.43·7····· ······o:i369······ 
:~~i.!~~~P.ii:~:::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::I9i6.L::: ::::I@I~: ::::::Q.;9.®.~:::::: :::::~Q~:o.~::::: :::::!1.:9!1.!~::= :::I@L::: ::::!~Q~L :~~9.]ol"?:::: :=:I9_9.35::: 
Jntel'IWCashFlow 0.014.5 0.0042 0.0427 0.0521 0.0167 0.0216 -0.0611 -0.2097 -0.1189 
Finanr:ingDefll:it 0.0919 0.12.59 0.1391 0.1119 0.1484 0.1352 0.2011 0.3762 0.2782 
Net Debt lssUBs 0.0109 -0.0488 0.0168 0.0018 0.0032 0.0022 0.0031 -0.0126 0.0071 
·N"ii""&q;riiY:·r;~;·~-·····-···········-·····-· ······o~o!ffo······ ·····-ii"."i.747·····- ······o:i.:i23······ ······o·:r!oc···· ·······ii":i4.52"···- ······oi33a······ ·····ri"iliso···-· ······i"f3iiss····· -·····a:27"if····· 
Net External Finance 0.0919 0.1259 0.1391 0.1119 0.1484 0.13.52 0.2011 0.3762 0.2782 
Net Debt lssUBs (medien) 0.0000 -0.0043 0.0000 0.0089 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .DODO 
:~:e.(~ii.i!Y.:!~~:~:<~~L::· -~~::o.:Q~9_o.::=: ::::::O.::@t::=:I:::::::[Q~I~:::::: ::::::Q;P.P.It::::::r:::::Q:;QQ~~::::: ::::::Q:O.:O.}.~::::: :::::P.:;QQ~(:::: :::::~~:Q.~?.~::::: ::::IQQ~Q::::: 
Net equity issues reduce at a slower rate than net debt issues for firms in all 
sample countries except in Australia where net equity issues increase over time. The 
number of public firms also grows a little over the sample period. 126 There is a big gap 
between mean and median of net debt issues and net equity issues. The median of both 
net debt issues and net equity issues are very close to zero while their means are larger 
126 Frank and Goyal (2003) look into the IPO effect by removing the data for each fmn for the frrst year 
that it appeared in their database_ However, the results do not show a major effect 
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suggesting that many firms remain out of debt and equity markets most of the time and 
enter these markets only occasionally. In general, external financing of firms in this 
region takes the form of equity more often than debt. Equity plays an important role in 
financing the deficit which on the surface contradicts the pecking order argument that 
debt financing should be used as the first resort of external finance. 
Figure 5.1 shows the changes in roles of net debt issues and net equity issues 
relative to financing deficits over total assets for the period of 1993 to 2001. Net equity 
issues track more closely to financing deficits than net debt issues do especially in 
Australia where net equity issues track financing deficit nearly perfectly which is in 
contrast to the predictions of the pecking order theory. This is consistent with the fact 
that firms in this region are young and most of them started in the early 1990s; 
therefore, they need to use equity issues as their main financing. A one-to-one 
relationship between net debt issue and financing deficit is not found because there 
might be some firms that are restricted by some factors and thus cannot follow the 
pecking order theory strictly and because firms may issue both debt and equity at the 
same time. In addition, the figure shows some effects of the financial crisis in that firms, 
in countries most affected by the crisis, use less external finance in the late 1990s. After 
the crisis, firms tend to use debt reduction instead of net debt issues. These factors 
necessitate further investigation of the effects of the financial crisis. Although we would 
expect to see equity issues reduced due to the effect of the financial crisis, the figures 
still show that firms are still able to issue equity and the level of equity issues depends 
on the level of financing deficit. Figure 5.2 shows the changes in roles of the 
components of financing deficits relative to net debt issues over total assets for the 
period 1993 to 2001. The figure shows that investment tracks closest to the use of debt 
iif teims of'diredion: Cash dividend Bfqiiite'·'stable 'for all'sample countries suggesting 
that firms do not change their dividends to match their financing need for investments. 
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Figure 5.1 : Awrage fuwu:illg deficit to net assets, net debt issued to net assets, and net equity issued to net assets 
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The financing deficit Ef)EF) is calculated as cash di vi.dends plus investmerts plus change in working capital minus internal cash flow. Net debt issued (D) is long-term debt 
issuance minus long-term debt redemption. N et e qui.ty is sued (E) is the issue of stock minus the repurchase of stock. The variables are constructed using data from cash flow 
statem ents vi 11. Wor1 dsc ape, Thompson Research. The definitions are summarized in Table 5. 2. 
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F:tgure 5.2 : '~wrage dividend "ID net asse'il, net invutment "ID net assets, clwage1 in wor:king capital "ID net usetl, cash flow m net usetl, and net deht issues 
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Dill is cash diVidend. INV is net investment. W is changes in working capital. C is cash flow. D is net debt issued. The Vll1'iables are ccns1ructed using data from cash flow 
statements via,;Wc:rldsccpe, Thompson Research. 
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Table 5.5 shows correlation matrix for variables used in this chapter. The 
correlation between net debt tssues and other variables are quite consistent to the 
predictions of pecking order theory. Firms with high investment or high financing 
deficits have higher need for external finance. Smaller firms need more external finance. 
The correlations among explanatory variables are very small suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a major issue here. 
Tabla SS : C.rnlotloa Malrix 
p.,.l A: ThaiJud 
AD AE 
AD 1.000 
AE -OII17 1.000 
DIY 0.0.13 0.037 
INV 0.41.l 0.:188 
6W 0.131 0.087 
c -0.160 -O_j86 
DO" 0..131 0.804 
TANG -0.019 .(J.lJ48 
GROW OD91 0.:188 
SIZE 0003 -0.~3 
PROF -ODJ.l 
-0= 
AGE -0.:141 -0.1.)4 
BIGot OD83 OD82 
PM GMT -0009 -O.O.lO 
SIGMA -0.:10.1 -O.O.lO 
1URN -ODOJ 0.:114 
P....J B : Malo,.ta 
AD AE 
AD I DOD 
6E -0.0.18 IDOO 
DIY -0018 -0.042 
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c -0.18.1 -0.618 
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TANG OD37 .(JDJ3 
GROW .OD37 -11.003 
SIZE OD39 -0.030 
PROF OD37 ODI6 
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PM GMT -11.011 OD36 
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11IRN 0.01.1 0.118 
PUIOI C : Slll&apore 
AD AE 
AD I DOD 
6E -0.1:18 1.000 
DIY 0.000 -0.077 
INV 0379 0.:120 
AW 0.014 0.170 
c -OD47 -0.810 
DO" 0.:160 0924 
TANG OII19 -0.1.17 
GROW -0.069 0.19.1 
SIZE OD49 -O.:IIl 
PROF O.O.l9 -0.016 
AGE -0.028 -0.:194 
BIGot ODJ.l 0.0~1 
PM GMT 0.036 -ODIO 
SIGMA -0.114 OD83 
T1lRN -0.023 0.237 
Paaol D : Austnllo 
AD AE 
AD 1.000 
6E .0.1.18 I DOD 
DIY 0.008 -OJJ67 
INV 02.l~ 0241 
AW 0.037 -11.0:18 
c -0.086 -0.898 
DO" 0.178 0944 
TANG 0.074 -0.164 
GROW 0.0~ 0.134 
SIZE .0.014 -0.433 
PROF O.D61 -0362 
AGE 0.030 -0318 
BIGot -0006 -0.:126 
PM GMT 0.001 -O.O.l9 
SIGMA·· ·-<O.D41·'" ···o:J7o· 
T1lRN 0002 0.1.16 
DIY INV AW 
1.000 
O.l.l4 1.000 
-0.061 .0.~01 1.000 
Q.lj.l 0.1.16 o.m 
0.063 O.o!lll1 O.l.l~ 
.OD97 oms O.Ol.l 
0.~73 0.~4.1 -0.043 
.OII19 ODG O.OO.l 
0.490 0.1.17 0.073 
.0.099 -O.~.l 0.11!8 
.0.070 0.1:14 0.014 
.0.031 .0.014 0.008 
-0.241 .0.270 0.138 
-0.001 0.0.13 -0.020 
DIY INV AW 
1.000 
-0.019 IDOO 
0.007 .0.274 1.000 
0.187 0.291 O.l.l2 
-0.046 0.379 0.1:18 
ODOI 0.136 .(JDOJ 
0.101 0.009 0.029 
0.110 0.08.1 0.021 
0.:190 O.ll.l 0.098 
-0.037 -0.137 0.069 
0.127 omo 000 
.0.032 -11.013 0.003 
-11.:1~ -O.O.lO -O.Ol.l 
-O.O.l.l 0.041 -11009 
DIY INV 6W 
1.000 
0.036 IDOO 
0.024 -0.129 1.000 
0.189 0.177 O.O.ll 
.(Jfii.l 0.360 0.172 
-0.08.1 0.161 0.001 
0.~~ OII16 ODB.l 
0.:109 -Om8 0.011 
0340 0.116 0001 
0.016 -0.1:18 O.O.ll 
0.0.18 0.067 0.006 
-0.063 0.01~ -O.D38 
-0.:111 -0.07.l .omo 
-0.0.16 0.082 -O.O.lO 
DIY INV AW 
1.000 
-o.m 1.000 
-0.036 -0.030 1.000 
0.181 0.031 0.101 
-0Jl64 a.m -0.016 
-0.019 0.1:18 0.016 
0.188 0.088 -O.DJO 
0.130 -0.099 0.0.13 
0.:168 -0.012 0.146 
-O.OI.l -0.138 -11.004 
0.099 -0.009 0.006 
0.178 -O.Dl7 -0.010 
;o·_li.!' :O.oo8. ··:o.OOJ 
-0.020 0.036 -0.~ 
Su Table l.land Sec'tion 5.3 for the definition of variables 
c DO" 
1.000 
-0 . .194 1.000 
0.070 -0 O.l~ 
-0.086 0.~7 
O.OJ.l -0 018 
0.309 .o.m 
0.149 .o.m 
-00:18 0.121 
OD37 .0047 
-0.007 .0168 
-0.162 o.m 
c DO" 
1.000 
-11.648 1.000 
0.123 -11.012 
0.0.18 -0.020 
0.106 .0008 
0.163 0.03~ 
0.122 .0.201 
0.08.1 -11.030 
.0.041 o.m 
-0.106 0.019 
.0.09.l 0.114 
c DO" 
1.000 
-0.8D7 I 000 
0.~~ -0.122 
-11.08~ 0.162 
0.203 .0.187 
0.089 0.007 
0.2.l.l -0.29.1 
0.011 0.034 
-11.014 0.004 
-11.107 0.037 
-0.207 0.221 
c DO" 
1.000 
-0.923 1.000 
0.193 .0.139 
-0.094 0.144 
0.431 -0.433 
0.397 -0.340 
O.l6.l -0.308 
0.243 .0.22.l 
O.Q71. .. .0.0.18 
-
-0.403 0.3.17 
-11.1.14 0.1.17 
TANG GROW SIZE PROF AGE BIGot PM GMT SIGMA 1URN 
IJDJ 
-0.141 1.000 
.0.170 0.110 1.000 
-0044 0.174 0.113 1.000 
OD39 .o.:m .OD38 .o.m I DOD 
OJJ63 0067 0.244 -0.009 ODO.l 1.000 
-o.rn .0016 .0.076 -0.008 -OD8.l -0.:170 1.000 
0.067 -0.196 -0.110 -0.:149 0.113 -OD34 O.O.l4 1.000 
-0.194 0.218 0.013 .om4 -0.036 0.017 0.01~ o.m 1.000 
TANG GROW SIZE PROF AGE BIGot PM GMT SIGMA 11IRN 
1.000 
-0.049 1.000 
-0042 .0249 1.000 
-0.037 .().I~ 0.:181 1.000 
-O.O.l8 0.00.1 0.:111 -0.1.13 IDOO 
O.OO.l -11044 0.186 0.130 0.103 IDOO 
-0.032 0.024 -11.0.10 -0.073 -OD77 -O.O.l.l 1.000 
-0.013 -0002 -03~ -O.:I.ll -0.177 -0.120 0.033 1.000 
-0.020 0.173 -O.I.lO 0.010 -0.:101 -0.0.18 omo 0.1.12 1.000 
TANG GROW SIZE PROF AGE BIGot PMGMT SIGMA 1URN 
1.000 
-0.1~4 I 000 
-0.1~ 0.032 I DOD 
-O.OJ.l 0.21.1 0.:196 1.000 
0.1~1 -0.181> 0.:17.1 -0.112 1.000 
0013 0.101 0.1.1.1 0Jl63 -0.014 1.000 
om1 am -0.110 -0.038 -0.0.19 -0.011 1.000 
-0.014 -0.167 -0363 -0.:17.1 -0.:116 -0.068 0.07.1 1.000 
-0.041 O.ll.l -0.114 -0.021 -0.174 -0.01.1 -0.0.12 0.127 1.000 
TANG GROW SIZE PROF AGE BIGot PM GMT SIGMA 11IRN 
1.000 
-0.126 1.000 
0.200 -O.I.l2 1.000 
0.100 om4 0382 IDOO 
0.232 -0.174 0323 0.090 IDOO 
0084 0017 039.1 0.226 0.197 1.000 
.0.007 . -0.008, 0.036. 0.111• .· ·0.070' -0.12.1 1.000" ·- --
·:o.t'ri o07o .0..194 -0.490 .0.192 -0.390 -0.086 1.000 
-0.046 0.1.16 -0.082 -0.062 -0.117 0.014 -0.044 0.091 1.000 
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5.6 Empirical Results 
Three regression methodologies are explored to test the predictions of the pecking 
order theory: (i) linear, (ii) predictive logistic and (iii) non-linear quantile. Within linear 
analysis, the focus is firstly on the firm-specific effects of internal versus external 
financing where financing deficit is regressed on firm-specific variables. Second, the 
focus is moved to the investigation of disaggregation of financing deficits. Third, firm-
specific effects on the choice between debt and equity issues are examined. In this 
investigation, different models are explored including, basic net debt issue with and 
without second-order terms of financing deficit, basic net equity issue, and the 
conventional model with and without first- and second-order terms of financing deficit. 
Fourth, country-specific factors are introduced with similar regression models as in 
firm-specific effects. Within predictive logistic regressions, two forms of the deviation 
from the pecking order theory are tested, mild and strong deviations. Within non-linear 
quantile regressions, different deciles of financing deficit and financing surplus are 
analysed separately. 
5.6.1 Linear Regressions 
5.6.1.1 Internal versus External Financing 
The results of equation (5.1) are reported in Table 5.6 for the full sample and sub-
samples. The relationship between tangibility and financing deficit is significant only in 
Thailand. Support for the pecking order theory is found only for Thai firms but the 
significance reduces after the crisis. In most cases, the results show that tangibility does 
not have any significant effect on the choice between internal and external finance. 
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Yehle 5.6 : l'aru!l ana~Tou of in'll!raal w:nu exleraal finandnr; tle~uie:na 
Thailand ~ Sinppore Autralla 
Equa&n I Full Sample Pre-c..uu Post-C..UU Full Sample Pre-C..UU Post-C..UU Pull Sample Pre-c..uu Post-C..UU Full Sample Pre-C..UU Po•t-c..uu 
(1993- 2001) (1993-19!16) (1998 - 2001) (19!13 - 2001) (1!1!13 - 19!10) (19!18 - 200 1) (19!13 - 2001) (1!1!13 - 1!1!16) (1998 - 200 1) (19!13 - 200 1) (1!1!13- 1996) (19!18 - 200 I) 
Co>Wiant 0.1322- 0.1039 0.0309 0.1756 ..... 0.2455 •• 0.0708. 0.4167 ••• 0.0686 0.5318 .... 0.7964 ••• 0.8212 ·- 0.8625 ·-
t-starutics 
. (2,J.Qllll~ .... J~.80~ll). . (0.4170~. .... ~4~J .. (2,110~~ .. P:?3~o~ ...... ... (4.1?00) (0.46.80) .......... J~.4~()0) . (6.6600) ............ C~:~10Q) ........... (6,29()0) .. 
TANC 0.0374. 0.0872 •• 0.0441 -0.0094 0.0315 0.0027 -0.04516 0.0878 -0.0665 -0.0374 -0.0312 -0.0610 
t-stati:otics (1.8200) (2.45100) (1.5800) (-0.5530) (0.6570) (0.1650) (-1.3100) (1.55100) (-1.6100) (-0.6660) (-0.2720) (-0.8820) 
Wald Test <2.3905> <0.0272> <2.5803> <0.7784> 
·····················-··· ··············-··········--···-··-····························-····-···-·-············-··-····-··-······· ······-····----··-···-······--... ········-·················-··························-·········-········ ······························································································································ ............................................................................................................................. . 
CROW 0.0246 - 0.0285 - 0.0123 -0.0083 ••• -0.0109 •• 0.0008 0.0224 0.0005 0.0478 -0.0003 0.0137 -0.0024 
t-stati:otil:s (3.4600) (2.8200) (1.5900) (-3.0600) (-2.2200) (0.2770) (1.1700) (0.0496) (1.6100) (-0.0649) (0.5810) (-0.4570) 
:'!:!:~!~~! ···-·--·-·-'-····--··---··----·-·········-····--··-····::~:.388~=-~~---· ····-··-.. - ... --.. -·--·-··--·-····-·-·-········--·~.!.~:~.~!'~~-.:':.~~-.. --··-·····-·····-··················-··-···-··········-····-················::.~.:~.~Ql=-··-······ ·-···-················--· .. ··-···--·········-·····-····-··········--·········~q.:~~~.!.:--.-···· 
SIZI! -0.0025 0.0010 -0.00315 0.0018 -0.0020 0.0017 -0.0202 ••• 0.0064 -0.0323 ••• -0.0411 ••• -0.0362 •- -0.0437 ••• 
t-stati:otics (-0.7.510) (0.1380) (-0.7740) (0.8330) (-0.3370) (0.15660) (-2.15000) (0.6550) (-3.4900) (-6.1600) (-3.2400) (-5.4400) 
Wald Test <0.5995> <0.4440> <12.1744> ••• <0.8532> 
.,_, _______ , ·---.. --.. ·-·-·-.. _ ..__ ,_,,,,, _____ ,.,_,, ____ , __ ,,, __ .,,,_ .......................... -...... -......................................... -....... - .......................................................................................................... -......................... -... - ....... --.. ·-·- ............................................................................... - .......... __ ., ___ , .. __ , .. 
PROF -0.1455 •- -0.3931 ••• -0.1168 •• -0.0427 -0.3028 - O.D312 -0.0652 -0.11586 -0.0573 -0.2423 •• -0.0203 -0.2435 • 
t-starutics (-2.7000) (-29100) (-2.1500) (-1.0600) (-2.4200) (0.8060) (-0.5820) (-0.9850) (-0.4240) (-2.1300) (-0.0991) (-19400) 
Wald Test <25.8306> ••• <74.2074> -• <0.179.5> <3.7444> * ·----- --·-.. ·--~--.... -_ .. , __ ,,_, ______ , __________ -·--·--------...... _, ___ , ______ ,,_ ......... _, .. , __ , __ ,, ..................... _,_,,, ________ ,,_,,_,, ____ ,,,,_____ __,_,. ________ ,,_, _______ ... _ .... ___________ _ 
ACE -0.0328 - -0.0478 -• 0.0012 -0.0358 - -0.0371 •• -0.0337 •- -0.0451 ••• -0.0586 - -0.0405 -• -0.0776 •- -0.0227 -0.0903 -• 
t-starutics (-2.5l300) (-2.15300) (0.0631) (-6.4100) (-2.1900) (-5.3200) (-5.7000) (-2.6400) (-4.2600) (-5.2200) (-09010) (-5.1300) 
Wald Test <6.2366> •• <0.2857> <3.5900> • <26.3198> **"' 
...... ilic-4······ ············a .oiiii·o:···················a·_oia2 .......................... o.:ais9· .. ;;;;;;··-· ··········~a·:ai3·4····-·················:.o:oi27·····················:o·:oiio··· .. ········ ············a·:oo79·························a·:a3i·a···························a·:aon············ ·-·······::o·:a27a························:o:ili3a···;;·-·················~a·:oo67 ........... . 
t-stati:otil:s (1.8500) (0.5350) (2.0600) (-1.6100) (-0.5610) (-1.4200) (0.5540) (0.9360) (0.1320) (-0.6.560) (-1.8700) (-0.1540) 
Wald Test <4.2344> - <2.0082> <0.0173> < 16.5558> ••• 
........................................ - ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ . 
PMCMT -OD765 *" -0.2088 ••• -0.0053 0.025l8 0.0680 -0.0094 -0.0237 -0.1099 -0.0083 0.0164 -0.14815 O.D371 
t-stati:otil:s (-2.15100) (-3.5700) (-0.1880) (0.7610) (0.6560) (-0.2430) (-0.4210) (-0.8970) (-0.1090) (0.1910) (-1.1100) (0.3560) 
Wald Test <.51.15444> ••• <0.2857> <0.0118> <0.12159> 
.................... -.. .. ............. - ................. _ ...... -........................................................................... -···-.. ---·--· .. ·-·-·--·-... -............................................................................ .. ................ _ .... _ ..................................................................................................................................... _., ......................................................... _ ... _ .................. . 
SICMA -03476 • -0.62215 -0.2512 -0.1935 0.0871 -0.3791 -0.913!5 ** -0.7196 -0.8823 • 0.1102 -3.4873 ••• 0.4566 
t-stati:otil:. (-1.8200) (-0.4770) (-12200) (-0.7460) (0.0612) (-1.3500) (-2.0600) (-0.2900) (-1.6900) (0.0895) (-3.3200) (0.3330) 
Wald Test <1.4817> <1.8147> <2.8714> • <8.2540> ••• 
.......................... ,,,,_, ___ , ................................................... _ .. ,.. ,_ ................ ___ ..... _, .. _ .. ____ , __ ,_,,.,, .. ,_ .... _,_ ....................... - ......... _____ .. , .. ____ ............... - ... ·-·--·-· .. - ....................... --.......... _.,_. ______ , .... _,,_, ____ , ................... - ..................... _ ........ ____ , ________ ,_, 
TURN -0.0.503 02468 -0.1732 1.1780- 0.8308 • 1.8593" 3.1356 -• 1.4833 398154- 6.8341 -0.0828 8.8343 
t-statistics (-0.2060) (0.3230) (-1.1000) (2.6600) (1.7600) (19900) (3.7600) (1.5000) (2.6900) (1.4700) (-0.0190) (1.4600) 
Wald Test <1.2041> <2.0082> <7.2491> •- <2.12551> 
&lj R: 0.1.525 0.1243 0.0251 0.0768 0.0428 0.0759 0.1789 0.0333 02479 0.2714 0.1045 0.2962 
!N;:;i~i;: ····· ...... 885" ··· ..... · ... 3i·s·· ········ ........ ·· 46.1 ......... ...... 2313···· ········ ··~77 ·· .. .. .. . i47i5 .... u)45 ...................... 244 ...................... 6iii ....... - i36i ......... ······ ........ 288 ....... ······ 940 
DEF .. =a+ T_/3 .. FS +e. 
J;~ 
~ !-statistics me adjllSted far heteroscedasticity consistenl stmdmd errors. IndllS1ry md time dummies were included in the model in order to control for induslly md time effects but no 
statistici!l.ly si~cmt effect was found. See Table j .2 end Section5.3 for the definition of the vmiables. Wal.d test(cbi-squme distributed with 1 degree of freedom) is used to find whether the 
clifferenc e s of the co effi. ci ents between pr &- and post.. crisis periods 11r e statistici!l.l y si ~fi cant or not. 
•, ••, ••• Signi1ica1'll. at 10%, 5% and 1% !eve~ respectively. 
309 
The results show a mixed relationship between growth opportunity and financing 
deficit in that high values of market to book ratio are associated with more external 
funds only in Thailand. High growth firms have limited available internal funds; 
therefore, they will look for more funding leading to high financing deficits. However, 
growth opportunity does not seem to have any influence in Australia and Singapore. On 
the other hand, Malaysian firms with low growth prefer to use more external finance, in 
contrast to the pecking order theory. When considering sub-samples, growth 
opportunities do not appear to have any effect during the post-crisis period for all 
sample countries. 
Consistent with Autore and Kovacs (2005), financing deficit is significantly 
affected by firm size. Larger firms in developed countries such as Singapore and 
Australia use less external finance. Firm size seems to have no effect on the choice 
between internal and external finance in developing countries such as in Thailand and 
Malaysia. The results suggest two possible explanations: (i) firm size has no effect on 
the choice of internal versus external finance for firms in developing countries which 
does not support the pecking order hypothesis; and (ii) large firms in developing 
countries may not have higher internal finance than smaller firms. Therefore, support 
for the pecking order theory is not found for Thailand and Malaysia. Although not 
severely affected by the crisis, the crisis had significant effects on how firm size 
influenced the choice of internal versus external finance in Singapore. Before the crisis, 
as in Thailand and Malaysia, no significant relationship is found. However, the crisis 
led firms to be more concerned about future adverse selection costs. Therefore, large 
firms who have higher internal funds would prefer to use their internal funds first to 
reduce the risk. This leads to the negative and significant relationship found after the 
··crisis: -
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The results also show that profitability can significantly affect the need for 
external finance. Highly profitable firms rely less on external finance as expected 
(although the coefficients are insignificant for Malaysia and Singapore). The effect of 
the crisis seems to vary depending on how severely the country was hit by the crisis. In 
Thailand and Malaysia where the crisis had the most influence, firms still prefer to use 
internal finance first when available. However, the impact of profitability is less after 
the crisis due to lower internal finance. The same tendency towards reduction in 
significance level after the crisis is also found in Singapore but the coefficients are 
insignificant. On the other hand, Australia was affected the least by the crisis and firms 
rely more on internal finance than external finance in the post-crisis period. In line with 
Autore and Kovacs (2005), firm age is one of the significant influences on financing 
deficit. The results show that older firms use less external finance, and this was 
particularly the case before the crisis, as predicted by the pecking order hypothesis, 
because older firms have been trading for a long time and have enough slack to finance 
their projects. However, the significance reduces after the crisis except in Australia 
where a higher negative relationship is found. 
On the other hand, the relationship between BIG4 as a proxy for the level of 
asymmetric information and financing deficit is found to be significant only in 
Thailand. 127 The results suggest that firms with BIG4 auditors use more external finance 
because they have low levels of asymmetric information; thus, they can afford to go for 
riskier options than internal finance. The results also show that BIG4 auditors play a 
larger role in Thailand after the crisis. There is also a significant relationship found 
between management team involvements and financing deficit. The number of 
management team members from the same family has a strong and significant effect on 
127 The results might not show the significant relationship as expected because of the limitation in the data 
for this variable. Due to the lack of historical data, we have not managed to get the time-varying 
variations over the sample period. 
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the choice of external and internal financing in Thailand only. 128 Thai firms with high 
proportions of their management teams from the same family rely more on internal 
finance to avoid facing the dilution of existing shareholders. However, the relationship 
is not significant after the crisis. This might be because managers no longer have that 
much control over firms during the financial distress period and are forced to rely more 
on external finance. Consistent with Autore and Kovacs (2005), the results show a 
negative relationship between adverse selection cost and financing deficit. This is in 
line with the prediction by Viswanath (1993) that low adverse selection costs provide 
incentives for firms to issue risky security or rely more heavily on external finance. 
However, since the crisis adverse selection costs no longer influence the financing 
choices of Thai and Malaysian firms due to uncertainty rising from the crisis. The 
results also show that firms tend to rely more on external finance when trading activity 
is high. Trading activity also has higher impact for Malaysia and Singapore after the 
CriSIS. 
In summary, there is evidence showing support to the pecking order hypothesis 
when considering the choice of internal and external finance for firms in the Asia 
Pacific region. Although not statistically significant for all sample countries, the results 
show that small firms, highly profitable firms, young firms, firms with high proportions 
of management in the same family, high adverse selection costs, and low trading 
activity prefer internal to external finance as suggested by the pecking order hypothesis. 
The results also reveal that the financial crisis has some significant effects on the choice 
of financing. The crisis led most of the factors to have less significant relationships 
especially in Thailand and Malaysia where the crisis originated. 
128 Similar to BIG4, the lack of historical data might lead to insignificant relationships in sample 
countries. We strongly believe that this variable is a value added factor that should not be omitted if 
proper data is obtained. 
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5.6.1.2 Debt versus Equity Issues for External Financing 
5.6.1.2.1 Disaggregation of Financing Deficit 
The results of equation (5.3) are reported in Table 5.7. The results for the full 
sample show support for the pecking order theory especially for Thailand and Malaysia 
where the coefficients of each component are higher than those in Singapore and 
Australia. The coefficients for each component have the predicted sign; however, they 
are not significantly close to 1 as predicted by the pecking order theory. The evidence 
seems to move towards support of the pecking order aggregation hypothesis after the 
crisis as all components are found to have more significant relationships with debt 
issues for the post-crisis period especially for crisis affected countries. In general, the 
coefficients of each component and the adjusted R2 are higher than reported by Frank 
and Goyal (2003) for their sample when gaps are permitted. 
The results for the full sample show a positive relationship between net debt 
issues and cash dividends implying that dividend-paying firms might issue debt in order 
to keep paying dividends. When considering sub-samples, dividend plays a greater role 
after the crisis. One of the explanations is that during and after the crisis period, the 
reduction of dividend to keep firms going might give negative signals to the market. 
Therefore, in order to retain the investors' confidence, firms prefer to borrow more debt 
to keep dividend payments stable rather than reducing dividends. The expected 
relationship is also found for investment. Although the estimated coefficients are not 
close to 1 as predicted by the pecking order theory, they are the highest among the other 
components of financing deficit. Investment appears to have strong effects for both pre-
and post-crisis periods for all sample countries. The effect also reduces after the crisis. 
This is because during and after the crisis, the investment opportunities are lower. 
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Table 5.7 : PaDel anaq.B of disagrep&n of 6nandnc de&it 
1·: 
l!qua&n I Full Semple 
(1993 - %001) 
Con.ian.t I .:0 .0 117 • 
t-statistic:s ~:!:-.~~DO.) 
DIV 0.1690 ••• 
t-statistic:s (2.6200) 
Thailand 
Pze-Cn.u Po•t-cn.u 
(1993 - 1996) (1998 - %00 1) 
-0.0052 
-0.0347 ·-
C-9:~~?QL .. J:~PQ.O.O.l ......... 
-0.1183 0.4880 ·-
(-1.3100) (4.4700) 
~-Full Semple Pze-Cmis Post-emu 
(1993 - %00 1) (1993 - 1996) (1998- %001) 
-0.0079 -0.0100 -0.0209 ••• 
....... 
(-1.3000) 
.. J:1:9.~0.9L ........ J.~.3:~~QQ~ .......... 
0.1.504 •• -0.04.56 0.2.542 ·-
(2.2800) (-021.50) (3.1600) 
Sinppo..,. Australia. 
Full Sample Pze-cn.u Post-cn.u Pull Sample Pze-Cmis Post-cn.u 
(1993 - %001) (1993 - 1996) (1998 - %00 l) (1993- %001) (1993 - 1996) (1998 - %00 1) 
0.003.5 -0.0006 -0.0216 ••• -0.0436 •• -0.0892 •• -0.0211 ... 
........ . ~Q-~~90.) ......... J.~9:0.~~~) ................. ~:~.·-~.3..0.0.). ....... . J~.2.:~2.QQ).__ J:2..-.S..?O.O.l .. J~}:?6.QQl. 
0.0946 -0.0292 0.1106 0.0960 0.9561 •• -0.0097 
(0.8330) (-0.0933) (0.8610) (1.4800) (2.1700) (-0.1290) 
Wald Test ' <20.02011> *** <9.9992> ••• <0.7406> <163.64.50> *** 
............ 1 ........................ "ii'4i'52"·;;;;;;;; .. - ....... ii379T·;;:o .............. ii51-i'i' .. *** ............. ii26n-;:o; .............. a29s6··;;;;;;;.-..... - .... ii:337:s ......................... ii2ii!i·s-··;;;;;;; ............. a:is4:s-.. ;:o;····· ........ o ..'2·~-~5··;;;;;;; .............. ii':2447 ...................... o ..'2ii'i'i···;;;;;;;--.............. li203s-•·•:o·' 
t-statistic:s (1Q.4DOO) (7 .9700) (6.8800) (7.2300) (.5.3800) (.5.7.500) (6.4300) (4.1700) (.5.3600) (.5 . .5600) (4.0000) (3.7500) 
Wald Test ., <3.1.54.5> * <0 . .51011> <0.4628> <2.0249> 
....... :&w .................. c9.'3.7ri2 ... ;;;;;;; .............. ii:2786 ................ _iJ.5728"*:.· .............. ii:i9i1·;;,;·;,; .............. o.'i4ii.ii' .. *•.;;---...... ii3iJ:s6 ... :;::;::;: .............. ii~ii994 ......................... iiil9:S8 ........................ iiii'9ii'i' ........................ ii:i93ii ..................... ::O . .'i·7-~4 ............................. ii:2469 .......... .. 
t-statistU:s (?.7700) (.5.1400) (7.4000) (.5.7900) (3.4700) (.5 . .5000) (1.6000) (1.0900) (0.9.580) (0.8.530) (-0.4420) (0.9640) 
Wald Test ' <8.0.542> ••• <0.9180> <0.9294> 
........... c ........................ ~_.2.i.a7··;;;;;;.-........... ::o:o963 ··:;:;:o ............. _:£i4i'iii ... **· --· .. ·::o:i:n4*••·· ...... -::o.a7ii7 ...... --.... :.o·:2624 ·" ........... ::o:·a63·i· .. ;;;;;; ........... -::a:c66c ....................... =o~ri5i·i···;;;;;;. ............ ~iio4"25 ...................... =a:'i'665 ........................... ~ii:o169 .......... . 
t-statistU:s c-6.0000) (-2.7400) (-.5.3000) (-4.6700) (-1.3000) (-4.1100) (-3.6.500) (-1.4600) (-2.8700) (-1.8~00) (-1.4700) (-0.89.50) 
WaldTest <16.4227> ·- <16.8886> ••• <8.2146> ·- <0.8007> 
Nt!i!~J -.~i~~! · · ·· · · ·· · ·· · 0:~~} 0.1832 0.1678 0.3652 0.2013 D.l98D ...... _. ............................ . . .. '"''"''·"'·'· ............................................................. . 0.2511 0.1776 0.0748 0.1995 0.0.500 1310 811 2548 162.5 303 868 1660 339 641 116.5 
l:.Di.t =a "t /3DN D~.t + /3I~.t + f3w.6.Wl.t- f3cC4.t + ei.t 
The t.st.at.ist.ic~ are adjusted far heteroscedesticity consistent standard errors. Industry and lime dummies were included in the model in order to control for induslty and time effects but no 
statistically si!Jli.ficant effect was found See Table 5.2 and Section 5.3 far the definition af the variables. Wald test (chi-square distributed with 1 de~e e offreedom) is used to find whether the 
differences of the coefficients between pr&- end post-crisis periods ere statistically sigpificant or not. 
•, ••, ••• Si.gl'lificam at 10%, 5% end 1% level, respectively. 
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The results show a positive relationship between changes in working capital and 
net debt issues as expected. The coefficient increases sharply after the crisis for crisis-
affected or developing countries because firms have more working capital expenses 
during and after the crisis in order to recover from the crisis. The results show a 
significant and negative relationship between cash flow and net debt issues as expected 
for all sample countries. The coefficients increase substantially after the crisis for 
developing and crisis-affected countries while reducing substantially for developed 
countries. 
In general, the results prove that the aggregation step is justified because all 
components of financing deficit are related to net debt issues with the predicted 
relationship at significance levels. The results show that firms in this region in general 
behave in the manner that the original pecking order theory predicts to some extent. In 
addition, the results reveal that the financial crisis and financial development are 
creating a tendency for firms to behave as predicted by the pecking order theory. The 
results broadly show evidence of more support to the pecking order hypothesis for firms 
in crisis-affected countries or developing countries but less support for less crisis-
affected, or more developed economies. The results reveal the evidence against the 
trade-off theory such as the positive relationship between net debt issues and dividends 
and the negative relationship between net debt issues and cash flow. However, it has 
been noted that the trade-off theory also predicts the negative and positive relationships 
between financing deficit or external finance with cash flow and investment 
respectively. Therefore, it cannot be concluded for certain at this stage whether the data 
give more support to the trade-off theory or the pecking order theory. As each 
component is related to net debt issues in the predicted manner by the pecking order 
theory;'the ruialysis· can riow·move o'tf to tesf the teiatio'tishiifBetween .fiilancirig aeeficit , 
and net debt issues in the next section. 
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5.6.1.2.2 Basic Net Debt Issues Model 
The results of equation (5.4) are presented in Table 5.8. The results show that the 
relationship between financing deficits and debt issuance is far less than 1 leading to 
little support for the pecking order theory at this point. The coefficient of financing 
deficit is highest for Thailand and at the lowest for Australia. The coefficients are 
substantially lower than reported by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). The model 
performs a lot better than that used by Frank and Goyal (2003) for their set of data 
where gaps is permitted for the period of 1990 to 1998 (their coefficient is 0.148 and 
their R2 is 0.120). 129 One explanation is that Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) impose 
the criterion of continuous data while Frank and Goyal (2003) do not. 130 Due to data 
limitation, such restrictions cannot be imposed; therefore, sample firms are included 
even if only one year of data is available. The results reveal that the support for the 
pecking order theory is quite weak in the 1990s for firms in the Asia Pacific region. 
Financing hierarchy predicted by the pecking order offers a seemingly poor description 
of debt-equity choice of firms in this region especially for Australia where the 
relationship is nearly close to zero. The results also confirm the findings of Frank and 
Goyal (2003) that the original pecking order in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) does 
not carry over to a broader sample of firms and to firms in other institutional 
environments. 
129
'Adedeji (2002) ·finos "the'' coefficient Of financing deficit to· be 0:222 for similar sairiple"period while 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) report high coefficient of 0. 75 for US firms during the period of 1971 to 
1989. On the other hand, Halov and Heider (2005) report the coefficient of 0.865 for their lowest risk 
decile and conclude that pecking order theory works well in the lowest risk decile. 
130 Elliott et al. (2004) suggest that the differences in sample selection between that of Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers ( 1999) and that of Frank and Goyal (2003) are the main reason that leads to the different results. 
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5.6.1.2.3 Basic Net Equity Issues Model 
The results for equation (5.5) are shown in Table 5.9. Financing deficit explains 
the large proportion of equity issues especially in Australia where the coefficient is 
nearly 1 which support the results from the net debt issue regression that firms in this 
region do not follow the pecking order hypothesis in the predicted manner. The 
estimated coefficients of the financing deficit from the net debt and the net equity 
regressions add up to 1 indicating no any cash-flow data are missing. The results for 
both net debt issues and net equity issues are specific to a particular time period; the 
support for the pecking order theory is stronger over time in that Thai and Malaysian 
firms behave more in accordance with the predictions of the pecking order theory after 
the crisis. The results are mainly driven by the effect of the financial crisis. 
There is also a decrease in reliance on equity after the crisis for crisis-affected 
countries. This should be due to the fact that investors lost confidence in firms in these 
countries after the crisis; therefore, firms are less able to make equity issuance. On the 
other hand, firms relied more on debt issuing after the crisis, implying that it was easier 
for firms to issue debt than equity after the crisis. Banks, as main creditors of firms, 
allowed firms to continue issuing debt after the crisis. The result shows that the crisis 
had two opposite effects for severely affected countries. The crisis pulled firms to 
behave according to pecking order predictions. However, Singaporean firms behave 
differently from Thai and Malaysian firms because the economy in Singapore has 
recovered quickly. This fast recovery led Singaporean firms to behave more like firms 
in the unaffected and developed countries such as Australia. 
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Table 5.8 : l'lmel ~is ofbuiil: net debt in""" JIU>del 
ll.D,: = a+ /3, : DEF,. + &. 
Thaila:nd ~ia SiDppore Au..tralia 
!qua&n Pull Sample Pre-Crisis Poet-Crisis Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pull Sample Pre-Crisis Po.t-Crisis Pull Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
(1!1!13- 2001) (1!1!13 -1!1!16) (1!1!18- 2001) (1!1!13- 2001) (1!1!13 -1!1!10) (1!1!18- 2001) (1!1!13 - 2001) (1!1!13- 1!1!10) (1!1!18- 2001) (1!1!13- 2001) (1!1!13 - 1!1!10) (1!1!18- 2001) 
Consilmt 0.0010 O.OO!i'l -0.0252 0.0011 0.0073 -O.Il167 O.ll234 O.Oil97 -O.Illl61 -ll.ll210 -0.05519 -0.0038 
t-statistics 
...... C~:~~~Q). . P-~-~~) ............. J.~.~-'~~9.9.L ...... ............ __ J~.:l.?.~> .... .. .. .. J9..-_8?s.~_t_ ..... _ J~.2.:~_1Q9.L. ..... q,~~9.9.L . . JI-3.?~0) ... .. c~o,~~~9.L . . ............ c~~.,l.J9.9.t... .. H-_5o~oL .......... J~,J.J..1.9.L .. 
DEl' ll.2995 ••• 02004 -· 0.4647 ••• 0.1993 ••• 0.1.543 ••• 0.2836 ••• 0.10518 ••• 0.1336 ••• 0.05107 .... 0.0661 ...... 0.17511 .. 0.0351 ... 
t-rlatistts (8.6300) (.5.871lll) (6.2600) (6.3800) (3.9000) (4.9900) (5.3700) (3.4700) (4.3200) (3.3800) (1.8900) (2.3200) 
WaldTest <12.6.538> -· <.5.1849> •• <4.1829> ... <90.3515:> -· 
Ad.iR: 0.2892 0.1650 0.3410 0.1842 0.1372 0.2407 0.0975 0.1353 0.0611 0.0330 0.14517 0.0068 
No. ofobs. 1578 .581 811 2548 641 1625 1310 303 8158 11560 3351 1165 
The t-s1atiml:s B.Je adjusted for he1emscedasticity ccmsistent sl!mdani enolS. lndustly lll1li time d1Jl'l\mies were inc lmled in the me del in e!de r 1D c entml fer industly ard time effects but m statistically sigDifica.nt effect was felll.'ld. See 
Table 5.2 lll1li S ecticn 5.3 fer the definition ef the 'll8rieb les. We.ld lest (chi-square diltributed with 1 degree ef free dcm) is used 1D find whether the differences e f the cce ffu: ients benwen pre- end PJ st-crisis periods are statistically 
sigllifu:e.nt er net 
•, ••, -• Si.g:rrifioant at 10%, 5% aJUi 1% level, respectively. 
Table 5.!1 : Panel ~is ofbuiil: net equU,y inues ......tel 
M,_ =a+ f3.:,DEF_ + &,_. 
Thaila:nd 
!qua&n Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
(1!1!13- 2001) (1!1!13- 1!1!16) (1!1!18- 2001) 
Consmnt -0.0010 -0.0091 0.0252 
t-statistios 
......... J~:~~~Q) .J:l.-2..2.~~) _ ....... J~:9.9.9.9.L ...... ....... ._ .............. 
DEl' 0.700.5 -· 0.1996 .... 0..53.53 -· 
t-statistios (20.2000) (23.4000) (72100) 
WaldTest <12.6.538> -· 
...... ~ .. ~: ..... 0.6496 0.7592 0.4092 '''"''oO'oo>oo''' "''""''""''""""'''' <•"•••••••-<oo<""''"'' .................... _._ ............... 
No.ofobs. 1.578 581 811 
Pull Sample 
(1!1!13 - 200 1) 
-0.0011 
. ............... 
(-0.1 ?60) 
0.8007 .... 
(25.6000) 
0.7751 
2.548 
~ia 
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
(1!1!13- 1!1!16) (1!1!18- 2001) 
Pull Sample 
(1!1!13 - 200 !l. 
SiDppo.., 
Pre-Crisis Pori-Crisis 
(1!1!13- 1!1!16) (1!1!18- 2001) 
Pull Sample 
(1!1!13- 2001) 
Australia 
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
(1!1!13 - 1!1!10) _!!_!1!18 - 2001) 
J::~~;~ .. .. J2.~~~~~;. J k~~~~~~ J:~~;;; . .. co.~~~~~ . L .. Jl~~~~~~ . Jl~~O:~ ...... @~~~~~~ _ 
0.84.57 -· 
(21.4000) 
0.7164 .... 
(12.6000) 
<.5.1849> .... 
0.8902 ·-
(43..5000) 
0.8312 0.6816 I 0.8591 
641 1625 1310 
0.8664 ••• 
(22.5000) 
0.8323 
303 
0.9093 ..... 
(43.3000) 
<4.1829> .... 
. .0..:~~~~ ...... 
868 
0.9339 ..... 
(47.8000) 
0.8904 
1660 
0.8209 ...... 
(8.6700) 
0.7858 
339 
09649 ...... 
(63.7000) 
<90.3.515> -· 
0.9135 
1165 
The t-s!atistics am ad jus1e d for he1e roscede.sticity cel'ISistent stmldard ermzs. lndustly lll1li time d 1Jl'l\mies were inc lmled in the me del in e!de r 1D c ontml for industly a.rd time e ffec111 but m statistically sigmflcant effect W8S folll.'ld. See 
Table 5.2 lll1li Section 5 .3 for the defmition of the "W:ril!b les. Wald lest (chi-square di!tnbuted with 1 degree ef free dcm) is used 1D find whether the differences e f the cce ffu: ients between pre- end PJ st-crisis periods are statistically 
sigllifu:ent or net 
•, ••, -• Sir;:rrifioantat 10%, 5% .uul. I% level, respeotiwly. 
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5.6.1.2.4 The Second-Order Term of Financing Deficit in Net Debt Issues Model 
The results of equation (5.6) are reported in Table 5.1 0. The estimated coefficient 
of the second order term of financing deficit is negative and highly significant 
indicating strong support for the concavity hypothesis and the pecking order theory. 
Similar to findings in the previous section, the results show that firms in crisis affected 
countries or developing countries seem to move toward the pecking order hypothesis 
after the crisis. Consistent with Agca and Mozumdar (2004 ), the coefficient of financing 
deficit on the first-order term is moving closer to 1 and the adjusted R2 becomes higher 
than the coefficients from basic net debt issue regression equation (5.4) from Table 5.8. 
The evidence therefore is stronger for the support of the pecking order theory when 
account is taken of the concavity in the debt-financing deficit relation. 
Thailand is found to show the strongest trend toward the predictions of pecking 
order theory compared with other sample countries. This can be explained by the 
differences in corporate governance and level of market development across sample 
countries. Thailand has the weakest rule of law (as shown in Table 2.4). Consistent with 
Becket al. (2002) and Khan (2003), firms in Thailand where legal and financial systems 
are weak and inefficient and level of market development is low will find it more 
difficult to obtain external finance. Therefore, Thai firms lean more toward the 
predictions of the pecking order theory. 
Overall, the results from net debt issue regressions (equation (5.4)) and net equity 
issue regressions (equation (5.5)) show that firms issue more equity and less debt to 
finance their deficit leading to little support for the pecking order hypothesis. However, 
when considering the concavity function using equation (5.6), the evidence shows 
stronger support for the pecking order hypothesis. The results also reveal that there are 
variations among sample countries based on the effect of the crisis and the development 
of the economy. 
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Table 5.10 : PaDel ouaabwu ofbui<: Det debt iso""" DtDCL.1 with the oecond....,zder 'ilenn of:liJumrinc a..&it 
6D ... ·~a+ ADEF_. +A DEF:. ~ + E:_ 
l!q-~n 
'I• I 
Pull Sample 
(1!1!13 - 2001) 
11uWand. 
Pre-cn.u P...t-Cmis 
(1!1!13 - 1!1!16) (lJI!IS - 2001) 
Pull Sample 
(1!1!13- 2001) 
Mal&Jsia 
Pre-en.• Foot-Cmis 
(1!1!13 - 1!1!16) 0!1!18 - 200 1) 
Pull Sample 
(1!1!13- 2001) 
Sblppore 
Pre-cn.u Poot-Cmis 
om- 1!1!16) (1!1!18- 2oo1> 
Pull Sample 
(lJI!Il - 2001) 
Autralia 
Pre-cn.u P..ot-cn.u. 
(1!1!13 - 1!1!16) (1!1!18 - 2001) 
Co:noDilit -0.0078 -0.00.55 -0.0148 0.002.5 0.0045 -0.0097 0.0074 -0.0013 -0.0134 -0.0320 -0.0353 -0.0208 
t-statis?.<'•.. .... J-.1.:~99~ ... J::IJ..8~.3()) ... .. ~~~:?9CI9L .............. .CCI.:~I!tlL ....... J9·~o). . . (~~:3~99.L . . .. . Q~q()()L .... J:CI·l.9.?0l .. . J~2:29CJ()l .. C:2}()()~ .......... (~?.5140()) . . . .c~.~.:fl4.0.0.) .. 
DEl'; 0.68515 -· 0.6212 -· 0.69510 -· 0.5010 ...... 0.4.518 -· 0.5285 ...... 0.3423 ·- 0.4278 ·- 0.31519 ...... 0.2803 ...... 0.4546 -· 0.15149 ·-
t-ot~ (22.6000) (13.3000) (17.4000) (19.3000) (7.7900) (18.6000) (9.0700) (6.9100) (6.8200) (.5.3400) (8.9100) (4.0400) 
Wald Test <3.7.579> • <7 .3307> ••• <.5.2871> '"'" <28.9380> *'"'" 
--:oir•.· ·-· __ ................ ::0 .. '742a··;.;;;;;· .... ·-·:a·:6:s::n .. ;;; ............ =a9657·:;:; ·--.. - .... --o.4.14B--;;;·-·-.. :o3483-;.;;·-·· .... ·=a:54Si'ii .. ;;;;;·· ..................... =ii:2'1:So ... ;;;. .......... :a·:3&64··;;;···--.. ::o-:-i922.;;;;;~ ..... -........... -::o~'i":34·1·-;;; ........ :0.:iia7-.;;;· ........... =o:OSi-i'5 ... ;;; .. 
t-statistk. (-152000) (-9.6000) (-6.3600) (-10.0000) (-5.1200) (-9.5800) (-6.9700) (-39800) (-5.9200) (-4.1900) (-6.51000) (-3.5100) 
WaldTest 
~~~. 0.4887 .............. ,. .............. .. 
No.ofok 1578 
<4.1350>-
. ...... o.3573 o.4~o.8 ....... L .. . o.4.8.oo 
581 811 2548 
0.3700 
641 
<12.3147> ...... <3.5.8658> ...... <64.4071> ...... 
();5.9.4.7. ··•···' 0.2675 0.3026 o ... ~.3.9.9 .............•........ 0.2061 0.5491 0.1010 . ................................. ,. ........ ,.... . .. .. 
1625 1310 303 868 1660 339 116.5 
The t. s;e,ti sti cs m: e edjust.e d fer heterosc edasti city consistent standard errors. Induslty lind time dummies were included in the model in order to c ont.r ol for industry IIIld time effe cts but no ste.ti sti c lilly si grlifi cant 
effect wu found. See Table 5.2 lind Section j .3 for the definition of the variables. Wa!d test (chi- square distributed with I degree of freedom) is used to find whether the differences of the coefficients between 
pre- an~ post-crisis periods are ste.tisticelly sigrlifiCIIIlt arnot. 
•, -. :"'"'" SigDificant. at 10%, 5% ami 1 'Yo level, respectively. 
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5.6.1.2.5 Using Other Information to Account for Leverage: Conventional Model 
Although the results so far show that firms in this region do not behave strictly in 
the manner predicted by the pecking order theory (the coefficient of financing deficit is 
not equal to 1 ), it cannot be ruled out that the pecking order does not apply to firms in 
this region. Firms' financing decisions may be best explained by a combination of 
different capital structure theories. Therefore, we start the examination by running a net 
debt issue regression in the aspect of the trade-off theory where net debt issues are 
regressed on firm-specific variables which include both conventional variables and 
additional variables. Then in order to see how financing deficit fits into the conventional 
model, both first- and second-order terms of financing deficit are added (equations (5.8) 
and (5.9)). Table 5.11, Column (1) for each country, presents the results of the 
conventional model as in equation (5.8) for the full sample while Table 5.12, Column 
(1) and (2) for each country, presents the results for sub-samples. Consistent with Agca 
and Mozumdar (2004), the adjusted R2 are quite low ranging from 1.3% in Australia to 
11.4% in Thailand for the full sample, substantially lower than the values reported by 
Frank and Goyal (2003). Agca and Mozumdar (2004) suggest that the high values in 
Frank and Goyal (2003) are due to the inclusion of fixed firm effects which was not 
appropriate due to the doubtful existence of fixed-firm effect. 
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Table 5.11 : Pa.nel......q.u of...,.~ fint- and oecond-o..J.er of:&..anc:iDc d.e&it co..,..ntianal-d.el: Whole •ample period 
Thailanol ~ S~ore A,..tnJia 
Column (1) (2) (J) (I) (2) (J) (I) (2) (J) (1) (2) (J) 
l!quatian (5.7) (5.8) (59) (5.7) (5.8) (5.!1) (5.7) (5.8) (5..!1) (5.7) (5.8) (5.!1) 
Coutant 0.0163 -0.0232 .. -O.D159 0.0353 -· 0.0037 0.0053 0.0141 -0.0024 -0.0198 .... 0.0130 -0.0395 -0.0538 •••I 
t-sta.tisti<:s 
.. JO.:~~~q) ........... J:1 ~:3()9) ...... (-1.340())._ . .. (~-~4.00) ............. J!l~?.~9? ............ J!l.-.~.5..291 ........ P:9:5.o.!ll. J:!l·l.?~O) ....... J:.~.:9~99L ..... .. (~.:5.4.l..Ot ..... (:.1.;:5~()~). . J:~·2.5.c!JO) . ......................... ~~ 
ATANC -0.1061 ** -(1.0125 -0.0324 0.0859 * 0.0939 ** 0.0377 * 0.0196 0.0380 0.0849 - O.o210 0.0428 0.0329 
... t.:.!!:•!~.~· J:.~:.!~~!JL ........... c:!l.-?..~~92 .... -...... J.:g ... ~~~!JL ............ c.~ .... ~.~.!l2. .......... _ ..J~c~~~L ... -·-·····1~.:9..!l.~L-.. - ... JPc~~-~L-...... J!l.~.9.~.0.t .... -........ £?..:~~!l!JL ...... _ ... .C~:.:3.!.~92. ............... J!l.:?.~~!l? ................ .C!l.-.~!?.P.2 ... -...... , 
-0.0171 ..... -0.0084 * -0.0064 -0.0008 0.0027 -0.0005 -0.0124 .... -0.0045 -0.0026 -0.0014 0.0022 0.0035 
~-:~_.870(J) __ J::.!.1~-Q..O.L. __ .... -~.:.!.~9? .... -.. ..C:!l.~~!l1 ..... _ ........ J!.o~(Jg2_ ............. _(:!J.~.9..~).. __ J:.?.-031!JL._ . .C:!l:!~~L-... _J:.!l.:~o~ . .C:!l.-.?..!.7.01. .. -.. -..... J!.:.!.!J.!l!JL ........ _ .... Q .. :S..~~---·········' 
0.0399 ·- 0.0215 .. 0.0168 0.0292 ..... 0.0131 ** -0.0002 0.0273 .... 0.0159 0.0074 0.0!83 ... 0.0181 - 0.0053 
_J.2.~1!JL_ .. _ .. (.!..:8..S..!l.!JL ........ -.C!.:.~~!l9? ........... J~:.O.~.!l2. ................. (?..:..!l!!l!JL ......... J:!J·04.~.?L_ .. ~~c!..!(J(J) _______ QJ.~O.O.L .... - .. -.. J!l.:~~~-!JL ...... _ .... C~.:S..!.O.!l1 ............... J?..:~~!JL ............. .C!l.:9..~.~()). ........... . 
-0.2142 ...... -0.1078 - -0.0653 -0.0363 0.0046 0.0146 -0.1244 .... -0.0927 ** -0.0683 .. 0.0152 0.0575 ... -0.0288 
_.(:~ ... ~~? .. _. ______ (:~340.!JJ .... ___ .J:.!.:~~!l!JL ........ .C:!l:.?.-~.9..!lJ. ................ J!l.:.~.~-~.!l? ................... c!l.-.?.~.?..!l1._ .......... ~.:.?.c~~(J(J? .... _ ...... .1:?.E.9..!l.!ll ....... -....... ~:.!.:~~!l!ll ... ____ .. c!l:.?.s.!l.!l2. .. _ ........ -E!l~!l!l? .............. c:!J.-.?..~!.!l.L ......... , 
ACE -0.0042 0.0096 0.0062 -0.0065 - -0.0037 -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0005 0.0024 -0.00215 0.0058 O.OOtill 
~.O.~.!JL. __ J!:~D.())._ __ .. .J.!}~~I!IL .. _ ... .C:~:!l.~!l.!JL ......... ~.:.!.._~!l9? ..... -..... _J:!J,!?..O.~.L. ........ J.:.!l.:.~~!J). ______ (:(Jj5l(J) _______ JO.:?.~ _(:!l£~P..L_ ......... Jl..:!l~!l!l?. ............ J.l.:.~.~!l2 .......... . 
BIG4 O.DI09 0.0007 -0.0034 -0.0073 * -0.0020 0.0007 O.DI05 0.0096 0.0078 -0.0129 0.0065 O.Dl8S 
·····-·-········-- ._.!.!.:~!l!l? .. _ ........ _J!l..:~S..~P..L __ ....... J:!l~.~.!.!JL. _(:..!c~.?.P..!ll _ ___j.:(J.52I!JL __ J!Jc~BDL ........ !.!_~O.l. .... _ ........ _.c.~ .. :?..~.!l.!l.t .... -........ !.!.:.!.~!J!l) ________ (:!.:.!l.~.!l.2 ... __ .... Q:!.J.?.~!JL ........... J.!:.S..~.!J..O) ____ _ 
PMCMT 0.0031 0.0290 - ODI04 -0.0165 -0.0261 0.0053 0.0068 -0.0014 0.0172 0.0309 O.OtillO •• 0.0500 •• 
.. t.:.!.t.~~!:!!.~- ... J~.=-~-~?.!JL._ ..... -.. -(~:f..400J.. .... -····-·-·(Q·=~~~!JL..... .J:!l.:~.~-~.!l.L_ ... -... (:.!.:.~-~~--················c!l.:~.?..!JJ..._. ______ .. J!l.~~~~ ............ J:!l.-.~.~-~-~~--·····-·······J!l.:~~~QL ...... _ .J.~ .... !l.~!ll .. _ ......... -l~.:9.~!l? .. _ ........... -~~:.!.O.!l.!JL ...... . 
ASICMA 0.2015.5 0.2332 * 0.18150 0.5964 *** 0.4014 •• 0.3162 •• 0.1404 0.1750 0.0175 0.4970 0.40415 0.1842 
... (!.~.!.!l9.? .. _._ .......... c.!,?..:3.!JP.). ..... -.. ··-·-t~.~3.!l!lL._ ... ~~~.!J.!l)_ _ ___l2.52D0) ___ ~2-~?..!l.!J.L ... JP.c~?.?.!l~·-·-········J.I.:.O..S..!l.!lJ. ....... -........ ~.!l.:.1.?.~L ... _. ___ Q ..-.?..?.P..!l2. .... -····-··C1.~~L.-... J!l ... ~~.?.!l.L ..... . 
-0.1102 0.0095 0.0207 -0.0534 -0.1447 -OD739 0.2746 0.1858 0.1238 3.8818 3.71537 3.6308 * 
-······-········-···· ... (:.Q.~~~9.? .. _. _______ .1!lE!~1--·-··--~P..:.!!4.!:l) -~"~-~.L-.. J.-0.?430L. .. ____ (:!lc~~L-. J!l.:~L·-·······-·(!l.:~.~.O.L .............. !.!l.~~~!lt._ .... _ ... J.~.:.~.9.(J(J.L ____ J!,~oo~ .. -·--·-Q·~!"l91_. 
DEP 0.43157 -• 0.7498 -• 0.3413 *** 0.5869 ••• 0.1825 ••• 0.4829 •- 0.1901 *** 0.4755 ••• 
... t.:.!rii}~- ·················-·······················C~:.~.!JP.J.. .... -..... E.1~i~~···;;; ·-···········-··-······-···-·····J~_;f~!J?-··-·····-J?.~~lf~~~-;;; ········-····························J~.~-~-9.0J. ............ Jl..~ii~~f~ih·;·; ··························-··········J.~.:~.!.Q!JJ. ........... J.~.~~~~:~·-;;;1 
t-sta.tisti<:s (-7.1700) (-11.4000) (-.5.8000) (-7.3800) 
N~f~~J 0.1~!: 0.4~:: 05~:: 1 o,{~~ . q~:~ o.~~:~ Jo·~~~ 0.1~: 0.4:~ I o.i~~~ o.~~~~ o.;: 
I:!..D, ·' = a+ L: /3, b.FS., .·" + e, , 
.~-1 
I:!..D,_ =a+ /3, ,, 1DEF: .. +"'E. /3, b.FS.,,.,_ + e, 
,_1 
till,_.= a+ /3, ,1DEF;. + /3,,, ~DEF;} + L: AI1FS., .. + E:,_ 
·•-1 
The t..sUI!istics ue adjusted fCif heteroscedasticity ccnsistem standard errors. Industty and time dummies were included in the model in order to control for industry and time 
effects but no statistically significm effect wasfoum:l. See Table .S .2 mdSection.S.l for the definition of the VBriables. 
*, ••, *** Significll%l1 at 10%, .S% llfJd 1% level, respectively: 
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Tule 5.12 • Panel--bob ofDatiJ!c &nt- aDd -oDd-order offiDaD.:inc Ufid.t co.......U......J. .....a.h ~'ft.. Uld_.......io period. 
J!4-&n 
Cohuna 
~'ft..~ -~!~'ft..~ -~·Pft..~ -~~~'ft..~ ~~~~'ft..~~~ 
0993 . 1!1!16) 0998 . :zoon i am- 1996l 0998 - :zoon I 0993- l996l 0998 - :zoon 0993- 19961 0998 - :zoon ! (1993 - 19961 0998- :zoot 
~t· ~~-.;iS :I·~ ?~=t~~·~=j~ =i!J~~~=::!~~.~§_=fi .. _ 
A ..... o.. -a.o1o6 • -0.0431 ·-; -a.oo26 -0.0342 •• ; -a.oo06 -a.031e •• o.oo26 -o.oos1 ; o.oo49 • o.o064 ; o.ooo1 -o.oo08 
eo--
t~statistics 
Wold Ten 
·····-···ou=···· 
t-ot.olim<5 
WoL!Teot 
No. ofobo. 
c-1.6800) c-2.11300) 1 c-a..so30) c-2.0200) I c-a.t290) c-2.1too) co.8.590) c-1.4too) I (1.8800) cuooo) 1 co.st3o) c-a.3790) 
<4.S109> •• ! <4.09.5.5> •• ! <4.4.579> •• cl.51753> ! <0.0614> i <0.1433> 
·-a:06tSi-..- -omm:r-··r-·a.ii448 ..--· -ooosi4--r-···o:o249-- - ····a-:-ruf3····-· -··o-:-ci6i53••--·aat96•-··r--··a.04I3••···-····o:oaS6-··-t·-··a:m73·- ···--··:o:oa36·· 
(2.4SCO) (1..5400) ,
1
• (2.0300) (0.9220) ,
1
• (1.3400) (1.1700) (2..5600) (1.9400) 
1
• (2.0900) (0.915150) ,
1
• (1.1.500) (-1.1800) 
·<10.4734> ... ' <11.9890> ••• . «1.3&.515> <213708> ••• . <37.15214> -·' <13987> 
-··--:o:4334-..-·-·-:o.l306 •• -·r··-·-o2i5S4 ·;,--·--:o.o73if--·;----a.r'iii7 .-·-··-:o:o.m -·· ·-··:om69,.;,;;.-····a~OOI4 -··-
1
,··--ii..st2o•.;;.;;·--·o:I'f132 ·····-r-
1 
·-..00988-····-····· o.tio02····-·· 
c-23SCO) c-2.oso0) ; c-L7800J c-1.6300) I c-t.82oo) c-LotooJ C-2.76ooJ co.o3415) , c-2.880ol (0.6220) , c-u40CJ (0.0216J 
<23.30315> -' <18.4272> - i <10.1094> ••• <314.4910> - j <151.5..5890> -~ <0.000.5> 
··::o:or2•r- ··--·-·am4B....-··t-· .. a.oa38 ·---···--a:mo··..-·-r-···:o.ooci5·- ·····-- ·-a:0236··..- -···::om:z;,r·· · -·-···-:a:oim···-· 1 ·--··:oDiio~-··-···-·-····:o:iltiS.s-··· 1 ····-··::o:oDiif___ ·- · :aDo22"- · ·-·· 
(-1.0400) (1.7000) I (0.4130) (2.01500) I (-O.D61S) (2.0300) (-021.50) (-2.3400) I (-0.0217) (-l.S900) I (-O.S2SO) (-0.9790) 
<2.87.53> • ! <42373> •• . <4.1212> •• <5.415015> •• ! <2..5227> ! <0.51590> 
···-··a:m9ir-···-··ano6i5-···r···-o.afii8···--··--ifiii;iii"-·-,-····o.oci25· .. --···-=-o~iii7if·-· ·-··:onfo7-·····-····-:o:oai515·-··----~···-··:a.oo9ii-···---·····-c.ciii34·····1····--:oco.s"J·-·····--·····o.oaii···--···' 
(1..5000) (0.6530) ; (1.1200) (-0.6910) i (03390) (-13000) (-0.8830) (-1.1800) ! (-0.8980) (0.8040) ; (-0.5830) (03160) 
···--··-·····--··_21),~~---··L·--·---··-····· <C_,~~---·L····-·····-·····-·····"1.~1,. ____ ·-·····-·····-······--···-~~21> _____ J ... - .. ····-····--······-··-~..!~s.s> .... _j ___________________ ~..:!!S'~~---
-a.0478 ODS40 - j -OD040 0.0603 •- j -OD046 0.0312 * OD636 -0.0304 ! OD722 -0.021515 ! 0.0918 ** OD046 
(-09&SC) (22700) I (-0.1270) (3.1800) ! (-0.1980) (1.51200) (0.51380) (-1.1700) I (1.41500) (-1.0300) I (2.2600) (03680) 
<.5.1437> •• i <10.1413> ·-: <3.6981• • <13733> ; <1.0.558> : <.5.5.0291> -
···-·-a:ri32··-- ···-· .. oi676--····r·····a.aarr ···-·····-aii4:s--···r····o22aa·····- ··--o:Itioir-·· ·--·-o243i- ··---····-a:iinT···••t···-··a.o3ii3-·····--·····o:4ii97··.;;.;.---r···-·a29iicr--··--·········a·.37s5·••--······· 
(0.1590) (0.9230) i (ODIOB) (1.2400) i (0.2970) (1.11500) (03810) (2.8100) I (0.0699) (2.1SCO) i (0.6170) (2..5400) 
··-a:mi:r--·····...::~~~···-! ··-·-a.2i549 ·····-··---~i:i!:~·-··+-·-···a.2I3o-·····---····· ·~~~-·-·· ·--···::o.l32a·····-··-·~~}~···~-····-·-::o3s72-·····--··-~~~6:c'; --~-+-··-:o·360a·-·······-··~ii.i~~---·· 
(1.4200) (-1.15800) ! (1..5300) (-1.2300) ! (1.0800) (-0.51530) (-0.6970) (1.7900) I (-1.3SCO) (1.1100) ! (-1.1900) (0.7170) 
···--·-··--···-· --"-2-~...:- .. !-.. o.J6S2 ···--·~-~-.......-+--···o:s374 ....... -· .. "oJ.-=-·.....-· ·-·····-··-·--·- ______ :Q;_l_~.t_~_: ___ l··--··a-:-:nsr;;.;;:•--·~4J~~--....-..t··-·-·a.s24:s••··--·~-ii~-....... 
(42300) (4.1400) i c1o90ao, c1o.sooo, i (4.2600) (5.7100) 1 cto.looo) (16.ooaa) 
, c0.3698> i <73632> ••• i <11.1122>- i <.5.51240>-
···--····-·-·····--·--····--·-······- ·····;- ·-·--····---·····- --····-····-- ;-·:r:ma·-.....--·-·-··-:-a:a-:m·•·•· ·-···· -·-·····-·--······-·-······---···-·· ·······-·-r··--·-·····-- ···- ····-······--······---·····~····-·-:o:sorli••·---···::cr:4966-.....-···· 
( -4 .51400) ( -S .SSCO) :
1
; i ( -6 .9700) ( -9 ..5200) 
<3.2822> * I <CDIOS> 
0.1205 OD317 ! 
··· 23if ·· · ······· 414·· r Q4~ 1 0,2;;: o~ j .... o,~:~ oi~8 + .... a~~ o~~~g .... 0.40151 . ···239········ 0.3109 ' 0..5473 . iiiii ! .. ········239···· 
liD._.= a:+ :LP.t:..FS,_., +e,, 
,(•1 
liD._. = a:+ P,_,. i 1 DBF," + :;>; f!,t:..FS, ·'' + e:,_ 
liD.,. = ~+ P,.,;, 1DEF,. + p:, ,DEF. '+ ;r;p AFS,,. + e: 
Tho t-s1alis1ics a111 lid jus11ld for he1emsce dostici!yccnsistent staDdmd mots. lndustrya!ld time dummies were mcluded in tM model ill older 1D contml fbr industry and time eftects but lUl s111tistically s~Dificant em ct was fomui. 
See Table :S2 and Section 53 tbr tl= deimiti:>n of tbo wriebles. Wal:l toot (chi-oqume dis1nbuled wilh I degree of freedom) is llllod fD fmd wMther the differences of the coeff~~:ients between pre- aJid FDsl-crilis periods ore 
s1atisticallysignifil:ant or IIDt. 
•, -.- Sipjfic:ut&tlO'/o, S% azul!% len~ reopectiwly. 
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Tule 5.12 1 Pm.eJ. ~;.of .... &.,; thri- ....a oecoDd-cmler ofliDADdDr; deficit co ..... ntioDal-a..1: P.., • .....J.poot-c.UU periado (continued) 
s· 
r.a-&n (5.7) (5.8) 
Cohuna (I) (2) (3) ( (3) (4) ; ,... v 
p..,.er;.u. -eruu. p..,.c.uu p..,.cn.;. -en.;. : p..,.cn.;. ~- -" ~~-·-
(1.!193 . 1996) (1998. 2001) (1993 • 1996) (1993 . 1996) (1998 . 2081) ! (1993 • 1.!196) 
eo ... a;m ..o.oo04 ..o.0147 : ..o.o04~ ..om11 ; -0.0191 ..o.02SII •• ..o.oo11 o.0298 • , -0.~1 ..o.0249 , o.0373 
t·Jtatistia (..0.0137) (-1.0800) ; (·0.1750) (·1.5300) i (..0.8850) (-2~600) (.0.0126) (1.7200) i (..0.7210) (-1.4900) i (1.1~00) IrA:Nc ·-::oi61ir• aii69a ! · :ai2i4 ·· ······· ·a.D92B"• r · :o:oon ········· ··········· oT3iT• .. · · amos············· ::Oiic69 T ······ alnc · ··iJ:il2iif ·······: :ci".o66o 
t-Jta.liotii:J (-1.6~00) (1.2500) i (-1.4100) (1.7400) i (..0.0987) (3.1100) (0.4870) (..0.0986) i (0.9~) (0.4370) i (-1.1700) 
~~; -.oliii-n-- ~.!~~~~~--:o:aoro- -~£~·~--l-~a.oo31f·- --~~-£~-~·· ·-::omia6·- ···· ~~~- ·i-··::o.o28T•·--·<OJ:~i-·-··!·--·:a.o138-···-··<0a~; .•. 
t-Jta.liotii:J (-0.3320) (-1.1000) i (·0.0781) (0.3470) i (..036~) (0.49~) (.0~~) (..0.4280) i (-1.7000) (1.1300) ; (-1.2~) (1.6800) 
WaldTm <1.2034• I <0.1204• i <02448• <0.1830. ! <247.3990• -·! <2.81~• • 
·-·:uuz-· · ··-.a.or4i!' .................. ii"0492"* .. , .......... :ii"ii2Sf ....... -........ oD4·E .. • .. -: ···-· :oiir54 ............. _ ....... oaffi·•··· ······-a··i·aai··;;;;;;-· .. ·-·ci'ol'i4"*-· ·r·· ... ···atm's- ·····-·· .. -crai26···-· .. :··-····aa2B•r-.. ·---.. ···-cril04T ... _ 
c..o.9s80) (3.8ooo) I c-2.i300) (3.~o) ! c..o.7820) c2.~o) (2.33oo) ,~.6500) 1 c1.2200J c1.63oo) l (2.i4oo) co.rno) 
... _ .. _____ .. ~14.4.289>__~ .. 1·--·-.. ··-·-~'!1·6!131> ~~-.. - .... - .... - ..... -~.o1Q.3.::_;,; , ___ ... _ .. ,_ .. <168,.Q411!>_~_.j_. __ .. _ .. ___ . <2.~.~1·-·-·!·-·-----.. -~1~.~· ~-
..0.1444 ..0.1283 - ' -0.2634 • ..0.0886 * ; -0.1427 ..0.0665 .. 0.1637 .. 0.0153 ! 0.1034 0.0513 * ! 0.0601 -0.0308 
c-1.0100) c-23300) 1 c-1.7900) c-1.7600) i c-1.0100) c-1.7~0) (1.6500) (0.6920) 1 ,~.~) (1.8200) 1 (13900) c.o.189o) 
<5.42512> - • <12.0253> ·-! <3.0726> .. <44.9820. .... ! <3.3057> .. ! <0.6~> 
.. -::o:aooc·...... . .. ::o:oois· .. -- j........ il':il024 ...... ·-.. · ·::o.ooo6 ......... ! ........ a:ati'2.s .. •· ·· ·-.. · ·o:aoYs·· ····· · ..... oii'i2i ....... ·-.. ··::o:oai3··-··r·-· .. ··a·:m- - ···oooa!i··-··l··-·:a.o066-· ··-· .. a.0049 · -
(..0.00~0) (..0.4~50) ; (0.2340) (-0.1970) ; (0.2990) (0.6340) (0.6660) (-1.1700) : (0.3760) (0.1660) ! (-12600) (1.0600) 
,,_, __ ,,_,,_ <0.1_1107~ ... - . .1 .. - ..... _ .... _ ... - .. <0.D:l!e. ....... J ,,_,,, __ , .. _ ... _~.40.1..?~ ..... _ ..... _ ..... _, ...... - .. -~ .. :3.~~.--.. !-..... _ .. ,,,_, .. _,_"E_f!!'/7>_ __ J.-.... - .... - ... - ... :::!:.!.~~~ 
0.0195 0.0123 i 0.0094 0.0125 i 0.0115 0.0103 ..O.ll245 -0.0125 i 0.0468 0.0038 i -0.0017 0.0189 
c124ool (1.4400) 1 co.6640) (1.4~) i (1.03oo) (1.2SIODl c..o.473o) c..o9o20J 1 co.6530J co29w) 1 c..o2440l cu30oJ 
<2.D790> i <2.0947> i <1.6527> <0.8139> ; <0.0846• i <2.3426> 
, ...... -::o.Ti36"* ..... o.ii156 .... - .. i .. -· .. :a~o99ir•· .... --..... l'i'.ii04i ......... -: ..... -~a·mii9·•·· ............... a-:-o232"···- ..... _oli936 .... - ........ - .. ifa2a·i ... - ..... !·-·· .... o.liii9s ....... - ....... o.D494 ..... _.l. __ .. ifOii'6-· .. ·-···a.li475 ·;;;· 
t·Jta.liotia 
WaldT..t 
.M,j B2 
&:;;1..-· 
(-l.noO) (0.4730) ·
1
; (-1.!1000) (0.1280) i (-1.8400) (1.1200) (1.4700) (O..S270) i (0.1130) (13500) i (02340) (I.~OJ 
<15.3722> - <10.4344> - i <20.55D> *** <0.2781> ! <1.8185> I <2.7128> * 
·····-::r:oii97···-.. ······-.. o:ii962···--·j··--·:f3iriif•·· ····- .. ·-il'.l'ii75 .... _ ..'1 ........ -~i:li6ii3·• ................... o ..li432 ............ ···········2:iiri6·;;;;;;······-····a.lsil2 ..... ···: .... - .... T.4i38 ............... _cii'7S4···-····:·-····c4<i'f.i••·--· .. ·-::o:fu~····-· 
(-1.3700) (0~00) I (-1.6700) (0.9~0) I (-19000) (0.2930) (23900) (0~500) i (2.3700) (0.2100) I (43700) (..0.1560) 
<0~2> i <91.7409>-; <104.7240> ••• <37.3766> ·- .,. <139.523>- i <19.9442> ·-
"'o'387i"'*"'"o:482o'"'-·T'-''"o890f• ... -·""oiil4!1 -·~ .... --o·.816i..._ ...... __ ..... o.o'fso..... .. ... 2J.:829a"•· .... -.3'2!1Sii.-.... , ... - ... 'i3.4669-.;;;;;.-....... -il27f .. --··r·-.. ·ii.754T** ... - ..... 35642 ..... 
(1.1700) c1mo0) 1 c2.6!100) (0.2340) i (23200) co.o961) (1.7000) c1.2aoo) 1 (2.7200) c1.oso0) 1 (23800) (1.5300) 
cO.D499> · <3.0697> • . <4.6207> •• <51.7910. - I <12.0410> -• ! <1.8703> 
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It has been suggested that the use of first-differences instead of level terms 
increases standard errors and biases the estimators toward zero (Halov and Heider, 
2005). However, the results confirm the standard signs on the conventional variables in 
a regression. Although the effects are not stable across sample countries for some 
factors, the findings confirm the significance of these traditional factors in explaining 
new debt issues. The coefficient signs are negative on tangibility, growth opportunity, 
and profitability and positive on tangibility, and firm size. Although the additional 
variables can be theoretically related to net debt issues, once controlled for the 
conventional determinants of net debt issues the additional variables do not appear to 
have significant impact on net debt issues in most cases. 
The tangibility coefficient is found to be significant and negative in Thailand as 
predicted by the pecking order theory while a positive relationship is found in other 
sample countries as predicted by the trade-off theory. However, tangibility no longer 
has a significant effect on leverage changes after the crisis as the estimated coefficients 
of tangibility become insignificant implying that, due to higher risk, collateral is no 
longer a main issue when firms borrow and it does not guarantee higher or lower 
leverage after the crisis. The results show that growth opportunity is negatively related 
to debt issue as predicted by the pecking order, trade-off and market timing theories (the 
estimated coefficients are significant only in Thailand and Singapore) suggesting that 
firms with greater growth opportunities are associated with greater financial distress and 
therefore face limited debt capacity. However, taking account of sub-samples, the 
relationship is significant only in Thailand and the magnitude of the coefficient is higher 
after the crisis. Thai firms have less debt capacity after the crisis because the cost of 
financial distress becomes higher. Thus, when growth opportunities arise, the available 
source of finance is equity. On the other hand, growth opportunity has no significant 
effect for either sub-sample in other countries. The results show that firm size is the 
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strongest determinant of leverage changes. Highly significant and positive relationships 
are found. However, when the full sample is divided into sub-samples, the role of firm 
size reduces substantially after the crisis in which large size no longer guarantees easier 
access to the debt market. 
The results show that profitability is negatively related to debt as expected except 
in Australia. The negative relationship favours the pecking order theory over the trade-
off theory that more profitable firms rely more on internal finance; therefore, they have 
less need to issue debt. The negative relationship also represents evidence against the 
trade-off theory. However, when looking into the sub-samples, the results show that the 
significance of profitability reduces substantially after the crisis. Profitability played a 
greater role before the crisis. For Thailand and Singapore, the evidence of the support of 
the pecking order theory is still detected after the crisis. However, for Malaysia and 
Australia, the estimated coefficients are no longer significant. 
In general, firm age does not appear to have any significant effect on debt 
issuance which is not that surprising. Lemmon and Zender (2004) argue that the 
financing policies of young and old firms are different. However, they also find that the 
average use of debt financing is very similar between old and young firms. They 
suggest that it is the equity part that makes the financing policies of young and old firms 
differ from each other. Young firms make extensive use of external equity while old 
firms obtain internal equity. When the full sample is split into pre- and post-crisis 
periods, firm age has no significant effect on leverage change before the crisis. 
However, in Thailand where the crisis originated, old firms could access debt markets 
due to their better reputation than younger firms after the crisis. The opposite pattern is 
found in Malaysia where young firms were able to access debt markets better than older 
firms after the crisis. A negative and significant relationship between level of 
asymmetric information and net debt issues found in Malaysia gives support to the 
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pecking order hypothesis. However, the results from sub-samples show that the 
involvement ofBIG4 auditors does not influence the leverage changes. 
The results show that the coefficients of management involvement are positive 
but insignificant in most cases. However, a positive and significant relationship is found 
for Thai firms for the post-crisis period showing that the control dilution problem is 
more severe when firms face high risk leading them to rely more on debt than equity. 
Giving support to the pecking order theory, the coefficients of adverse selection cost are 
positive for all sample countries. When considering the sub-samples, no significant 
effect is found for the post-crisis period in most cases implying that adverse selection 
costs do not seem to have any effect on leverage. However, the results show that 
trading activity does not have any influence on the net debt issue choice for the full 
sample. When considering sub-samples, there are two different patterns. In developed 
markets, no significant effect on leverage is found for the post-crisis period while in 
developing markets the coefficients are not significant before the crisis but become 
significant afterwards. 
Overall, the results of equation (5.7) show support to both the trade-off theory and 
the pecking order theories. However, there are variations across the sample countries 
partly due to the differences in the institutional structures of each sample country and 
the effect of the financial crisis. The effect of the crisis has been most obvious in 
Thailand where the crisis originated. The crisis has made certain variables, such as 
GROW, AGE and PMGMT, become significant in the expected direction after the 
CriSIS. 
Table 5.11, column (2) for each country, presents the results of the conventional 
model with added first order of financing deficit as in equation (5.8) for the full sample 
while Table 5.12, columns (3) and (4) for each country, presents the results for sub-
samples. lfthe pecking order theory were the main factor of firms' financing behaviour, 
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the effect of financing deficit should wipe out the effects of the conventional variables. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) find that financing deficit is just one factor among many factors 
that firms trade off. 131 Therefore, what is left is a generated version of the trade-off 
theory. However, the results show that financing deficit does have significant effects on 
other conventional variables. Although the effects of other conventional variables are 
not totally wiped out by financing deficit, the significance of the conventional variables 
declines when financing deficit is added into the model. Also, adjusted R2 is 
substantially and significantly increased after adding financing deficit. 
In addition, in contrast to Agca and Mozumdar (2004), including the firm-specific 
variables as explanatory variables in a regression along with the financing deficit does 
materially alter the estimated debt-financing deficit sensitivity coefficient compared 
with the regression where the financing deficit is used alone as the explanatory variable 
(equation (5.4)). The coefficient of financing deficit becomes higher in the nested 
conventional trade-off theory model suggesting that (i) the pecking order theory does 
play some significant role in firms' financing decisions in this region once controlled 
for debt capacity and (ii) firm-specific variables that have been found useful in 
explaining leverage changes in the trade-off theory framework do in fact help to explain 
debt issues better and can also be used to control for debt capacity concern. Therefore, 
the findings give support to the modified pecking order theory with respect to debt 
capacity concern as raised by Lemmon and Zender (2004). Once financing deficit is 
added, there is a pattern of the effect of financial crisis among sample countries. In 
Australia, the coefficient of financing deficit reduces substantially after the crisis, 
confirming the pattern in Figure 5.1 that net equity issue tracks closer to financing 
131 Lemmon and Zender (2004) suggest that the lower explanatory power of financing deficit found by 
Frank and Goyal (2003) might not lead to the conclusion of the evidence against the pecking order theory 
because the power can be lower if other variables are correlated with fmancing deficit even when firms do 
follow the pecking order theory directly. 
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deficit than net debt issue. On the other hand, financing deficit is funded more by net 
debt issues after the crisis for the other sample countries. 
Table 5.11, Column (3) for each country, presents the results of the conventional 
model with added first and second order terms of financing deficit as in equation (5.9) 
for the full sample and Table 5.12, Columns (5) and (6) for each country, presents the 
results for sub-samples. The second-order of financing deficit is added to test the 
concavity function of financing deficit. The results show that the coefficients of the 
second-order term of financing deficit are negative and highly significant for all sample 
countries showing strong support to the pecking order theory. The inclusion of the 
second-order term of financing deficit has substantially altered the debt-financing deficit 
relationship. The estimated coefficients of financing deficit increase dramatically to be 
closer to 1 as predicted by the pecking order theory especially for Thailand. 
The differences in corporate governance across sample countries can help to 
explain why Thai firms tend to move toward more of the predictions of the pecking 
order theory than firms in other sample countries. Investors need to feel protected 
because they are more vulnerable to expropriation than insiders. Therefore, in order for 
them to fund the firms' investments, they need to seek some protection. Without strong 
investor protection, investors are at risk of not being paid back; therefore, this makes it 
more difficult for firms in low investor protection environment to raise external finance. 
As shown in Table 2.5, Thailand has the lowest investor protection level (lowest 
Shareholder rights) which explains why the pecking order theory appears to perform 
better in Thailand. 
Extending the model to include the second-order term of financing deficit leads to 
a significant improvement in the explanatory ability of the model. The introduction of 
financing deficit and its second order has added a large amount of additional 
explanatory power to the trade-off framework; the adjusted R2 is substantially higher for 
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all sample countries. Most importantly, the effect of financing deficit on both first- and 
second-order terms wipes out most of the effects of the conventional variables 
especially in Thailand where all of the estimated coefficients of firm-specific variables 
become insignificant for the full sample. However, when considering the effect of the 
financial crisis, the results show that Thai firms move away from the pecking order 
theory slightly with the evidence of the reduction in the coefficient of financing deficit 
while the coefficients of financing deficit become higher for other sample countries. 
Although the debt-financing deficit relationship is not perfectly I, the evidence shows 
that the pecking order theory is actually the main driving force of financing behaviour 
for firms in this region. 
Table 5.13 presents the results of conventional models with lagged net debt issues 
as in equation (5.10), Column (1), and with added first order terms of financing deficit 
as in equation (5.11), Column (2), and with added second order terms of financing 
deficit as in equation ( 5 .12), Column (3 ), for the full sample and Table 5.14 presents the 
results for sub-samples. The results show that the coefficients on lagged dependent 
variable are statistically significant in most sample countries and especially for the post-
crisis period for Thai and Malaysian firms. However, opposite to the evidence of mean 
reversion found by Frank and Goyal (2003), the results show a positive and significant 
relationship. The inclusion of lagged dependent variables does not affect the sign and 
significance of most of other variables in the regressions. However, once financing 
deficit is added into the model (equation ( 5.11) ), the significance of lagged dependent 
variables reduces and its effect is wiped out by the inclusion of the second-order term of 
financing deficit in most cases suggesting stronger support to the pecking order theory. 
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5.6.1.3 Country-Specific Effects on Internal versus External Financing and Debt 
versus Equity Issues 
Although there is some evidence to support the pecking order theory, there are 
still some variations across the sample countries that cannot be explained by the effect 
of the financial crisis and firm-specific characteristics. Therefore, country-specific 
factors will now be introduced into the main models by adding country dummies which 
are then replaced by country-specific factors one at a time in the following order: (i) 
internal versus external financing model as in equation (5.1) (the results are reported in 
Table 5.15); (ii) basic net debt issue model as in equation (5.4) (the results are presented 
in Table 5.16); (iii) basic net debt issue model with the second order term of financing 
deficit as in equation (5.6) (the results are shown in Table 5.17); and (iv) conventional 
model with the nesting of first- and second-order terms of financing deficit as in 
equation (5.9) (the results are shown in Table 5.18). The estimated coefficients of 
country dummies in all models are highly significant implying that country-specific 
factors do have major influence on how firms follow the pecking order theory. 
Therefore, the nature of this finding is investigated further by replacing country 
dummies with additional country-specific factors one at a time. 
Economic development is found to be a significant factor in determining 
financing sources of firms in this region. The results from Table 5.15 show that 
developed countries have higher financing deficits as expected. This is also supported 
by the descriptive statistics shown in Table 5.4 that firms in developed economies such 
as Singapore and Australia have higher financing deficits than firms in developing 
economies. Also, when there is a choice of external finance of debt and equity, firms in 
developed countries would be able to issue more equity than firms in developing 
countries. This is supported by the results in Tables 5.16 to 5.18. 
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The results from Table 5.15 show that firms in countries with high levels of legal 
enforcement tend to have higher financing deficits or higher need for external 
finance. 132 Tables 5.16 to 5.18 show that the stronger the legal enforcement, the higher 
use of equity or the lower use of debt. Legal protection also plays a significant role in 
determining the source of finance. Table 5.15 shows that when CRR is low, financing 
deficit is high. This is still puzzling because financing deficit should be high when 
creditors are most protected. However, the negative relationship found between CRR 
and financing deficit is consistent with other measures for firms in developed countries 
and in countries with strong legal enforcement. As expected, the coefficient of SHR is 
insignificant. The results from Tables 5.16 to 5.18 show a positive relationship between 
CRR and net debt issues and a negative but insignificant relationship between SHR and 
net debt issues. The results show that the higher creditor rights, the greater use of debt 
issues compared with equity issues. 
As expected, ownership structure is found to be negatively related to financing 
deficits as shown in Table 5.15 suggesting that firms with highly concentrated 
ownership prefer to use internal finance to avoid control dilution. When there is a 
choice between debt and equity, firms with high ownership concentration issue more 
debt to avoid control dilution from issuing equity leading to a positive relationship 
between OWN and net debt issues as shown in Tables 5.16 to 5.18. The results also 
show that accounting and asymmetric information is also a significant factor. Levels 
of asymmetric information and adverse selection costs are lower for firms with high 
involvement of auditors leading these firms to prefer internal to external finance as 
shown in Table 5.15. The results from Tables 5.16 to 5.18 show that AUD is negatively 
related to net debt issues as expected. Tables 5.15 to 5.18 also show that the fewer 
132 This is in exception for EFF whose estimated coefficient is not significant which may be due to the 
fact that the indicators for EFF are quite close among Singapore, Malaysia and Australia; therefore, the 
distinct pattern cannot be detected. 
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information and adverse selection costs leading firms in countries with low rating score 
to rely more on internal finance and if firms have to choose among external finance, 
debt should be preferred to equity. However, the coefficient is not significant for 
external finance regression. Finally, as firms in countries that have higher average 
numbers of analysts (ANA) have higher information asymmetries and adverse selection 
costs because of higher dispersion of opinion, they prefer external to internal finance as 
supported by the results from Table 5.15. The results from Tables 5.16 to 5.18 also 
show that for firms in countries that have high average numbers of analysts, debt is in 
more use than equity. 
In summary, the results show that country-specific factors do play an important 
role in influencing the pattern of firms' financing behaviour in moving away from or 
toward the predictions of the pecking order theory. By focusing on the context that takes 
into account only firm-specific variables, the important key issues of why firms in 
different countries with different institutions do not behave in the same way and why 
there are such variations among sample countries are left out. By adding country-
specific factors to the model, it is found that firms in this region do adhere to the 
pecking order theory to some extent and their deviation from the pecking order theory is 
partly due to the circumstances and settings they are operating in. The results show that 
firms in countries with high legal enforcement, low creditors' legal protection, 
developed economy, high auditors' involvement, and low average number of analysts 
appear to have higher need for external finance and they tend to deviate from the 
pecking order theory by preferring equity to debt when considering the choice of 
external finance. This emphasizes the importance of country-specific factors that have 
not been explored much in the literature in the context of the test of the pecking order 
tHeory.-
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5.6.2 Predictive Logistic Regressions 
There are three main purposes of the use of logistic regression. First, examining 
only equation (5.4) does not give the whole picture of the relationship between firms' 
financing behaviour and the predictions of the pecking order theory because it is 
possible for net debt issues and net equity issues to be in opposite directions which can 
mislead the results. By using logistic regression, this problem is avoided. Second, the 
logistic regressions can be used as an indirect test of the order of financing decisions. 
Previous studies have overlooked the significance of financing hierarchies by focusing 
on the choice between debt and equity issues only. By studying mild and strong 
deviations, the focus of the analysis lies equally between the first tier of pecking order 
(internal versus external finance) and the second tier of pecking order (debt versus 
equity). Finally, logistic regressions can be used as robustness tests to confirm the 
conclusion from the main regression (equation (5.4)) as to whether firms in the Asia 
Pacific region do behave in the manner predicted by the multi-period pecking order 
theory. In particular, when asymmetric information or adverse selection costs are low, 
firms would prefer to deviate from the pecking order theory because they expect 
adverse selection costs to be higher in the future. The logistic results reveal what type of 
factors lead firms to need external finance (mild deviation, DEF > 0) and to go to the 
extent by issuing equity (strong deviation, ~E > 0). 
Tables 5.19 and 5.20 present the results of logistic regressions for the mild and 
strong deviations, respectively. 133 The results from Tables 5.19 and 5.20 show that 
linear analysis results (as in Table 5.6) might be misleading and that logistic regression 
shows a better picture. Linear analysis (from Table 5.6) shows that asset tangibility 
133 Autore and Kovacs (2005) lag all their independent variables due to the predictive nature of estimation. 
.. -- Therefore, the"use ·of lagged independent variables "has also 'been-explored. However;-tliere are no major' ' 
and significant changes of the conventional coefficients between the regressions with lagged or with level 
terms and the additional factors are in some cases more significant with level terms than with lagged 
terms. Therefore, only the results using level terms instead of the lagged terms are reported in order to 
increase the degrees of freedom. 
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(TANG) has no influence on the choice of internal versus external finance. However, 
the results from Tables 5.19 and 5.20 reveal that TANG is one of the main driving 
forces that lead Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean firms to deviate slightly from the 
pecking order theory. On the other hand, TANG is not important enough for these firms 
to strongly deviate from the pecking order by issuing equity. Consistent with Autore 
and Kovacs (2005), firms with more collateral have more debt capacity and are less 
likely to deviate from the pecking order theory in a strong form. 
Consistent with the test of internal versus external finance from Table 5.6 and 
with the predictions of the pecking order theory, logistic results show that Thai and 
Singaporean firms are more likely to deviate from the pecking order when their growth 
opportunity is high. A mild deviation is found for Thai firms while strong deviation is 
found for both Thai and Singaporean firms. When considering sub-samples, the 
coefficient is higher for the post-crisis period. The results from Tables 5.19 and 5.20 
confirm the results in Table 5.6 and Table 5.11 that growth opportunity does not have 
any material effect on firms in other countries. The results from logistic regression 
reveal that firm size is one of the main factors that drive firms to deviate from both the 
mild and strong pecking order theories for firms in this region (a significant relationship 
is not detected for Thailand and Malaysia with linear analysis as shown in Table 5.6). 
Consistent with Autore and Kovacs (2005), large firms have higher debt capacities so 
they tend to deviate more than small firms from the mild pecking order theory. 
However, the results from Tables 5.19 and 5.20 also show that large firms in this region 
go to further lengths by deviating from the pecking order theory in a strong form 
because large firms also have higher access to equity markets. 
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PROP -2..5600 •- -3.2102 -3.1070 - -0.8617 •• -8.6587 ..... 0.0.572 -0.2096 -2..3849 -0.430.5 -0.270.5 1.1!120 -0.2779 
t-statistil:s (-2.6600) (-1.3400) (-2..5700) (-1.!1600) (-5.0600) (0.1020) (-0.2610) (-0.9.510) (-0.4810) (-0.!1580) (0.!1530) (-0.8930) 
·--~~~~--- ···-··············--··-·········-······--····-······-·-··-···~~-~3.:: ... ~ ... ····-··-··············-······-··········-·······················-·······~~~~:.~.?f..!l.>. ... ~ ······-·-········································-·····-··················~0..~_1~.>. ....... -.. ···························-················-···········-············-~:?.~.~.>.-...... , 
AGE -0.2683 • -0.2760 0.3636 -0.3824 •- -0 . .5264 ••• -0.37.53 ••• -0.3376 •- -0.3523 -0.3.506 •• -0.1107 -0.0344 -0.084!1 
t-statistil:s (-1.7500) ( -1.2000) (1.2000) (-5 . .5700) (-32.500) (-4.4000) (-4.0500) (-1.4800) (-3.6400) (-1.6000) (-0.2160) ( -1.0200) 
.... ~:":lrl..I~~ ..... ···-·-·-·····-····-······-··-·····-·-··-···-···········~-~.:~~~~~ ........... ·······-·-·····························-·····-·································~.3..:.1.~~~ ....................................................................................... ~.1..3..~~-~-~---~ ..................................................................................... ~1..:0.~~~---····· 
BIG4 0.14!17 0.1865 0.2!114 -0.2300 •• 0.0731 -0.21!14 • 0.2121 0.4714 0.18.52 -0.1788 -1.2274 -0.1141 
t-statistil:s (09120) (0.6!140) (1.1600) (-22.500) (0..3120) (-1.7.500) (1.1!100) (1.2700) (0.8360) (-0.9230) (-1.3700) (-0..5380) 
Wald Test <1.3.512> <3.0775> • <0.6!1!12> <0.2893> 
-·-······-------··· ···--··············-·--·-············-·-·············---·· .... ·-······-·-.. ················· ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
PMGMT -0.9880 •• -1.88!10 - 0.07!12 -0.14!15 -0.4038 -0.3116 0.3234 1.0707 0.0000 -1.2781 •• -2.2267 -0.8968 
t-statUti<:s (-2.0400) (-2.1400) (0.1140) (-0.3440) (-0.4010) (-0.5840) (0..5370) (0.7140) (0.0000) (-2.3100) (-1.5700) (-1.3800) 
Wald Test <7.!1555> •• <0.3410> <0.0000> <1.!1076> 
................... ~--··· ... -.......................................... -........................... _.,_, ................... -.. .. ...... _ ...................... _ ............................................ --........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ _,,, ............. . 
SIGMA -2.6194 -289!160 19278 2.48!17 18.1780 0.0643 -8.6573 • -13.1621 -6.6861 -0.8263 -30.1520 •• 2.250.5 
t-statisti<:s (-0..5.590) (-1.4600) (0..3750) (0.6460) (1.3200) (0.0141) (-1.7200) (-0.5640) (-1.2100) (-0.2570) (-2.0200) (0.6000) 
---~~ . .!'='..! .... ···--······-······-·-····································-·-·····-····~:.l..~Q.~ .. ---··· ·-······-····-----··--···-······-·····-··-············-·····~O.:.Q~~~----·· ·-·--·········-····--··-······-----·-·····-·---~.!:~~~---· ·-····--····------····-·····-······-···--··-·-::.? .. ~~~~Q~.--~~~1 
TliRN 2.0125 7..3803 -02.513 17.8836 ...... 6.410!1 26.8.518 .... 3.5.3506 ·- 28.3168 .. 40.1646 ...... 339538 -33.0227 44.2272 
t-statistia (0.5440) (0.8640) (-0.0546) (3.1300) (1.0200) (2.3800) (3.3300) (1.6600) (2.!1700) (1.4600) (-0.6710) (1..5200) 
Wald Test <0.0030> <5.6622> - <0.768!1> <:2.3216> 
No. ofobs. 885 31.5 461 2313 .577 1476 104.5 244 6!13 1361 288 !140 
LOG( DEF., > 0) = a+ L 13,, FS,,,~ + e,,, 
;:,-1 
1'hB t-s111tistics are adjusted lbr he1BJDa::edasticity coliSistent slBDdalli emll:s. Industry m:! time dum:mias IWre mcluded in the model in order 1D cont10l for industry m:! time effects but no sfatiltically 
signif~em1 effect was foumi See Tl!ble '·2 and Sectiln 13 for the defurition of the VBril!bles. Wald 1est (chi-squele distribu1Bd with 1 degt1!e of freedom) is used to fmd whether the differe:ru:es of tb.e 
coefti:ienls between pre- m:! post-crisis periods ell! statisticallysipificlll\t or not. 
•, ••, ••• Signi.ficlltll. at 10%, 5% ami 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5.20 : Predia:U... J..gistL: repe .. ion ~is of otronc deviatiDn &om the peckiDc; order theol',l' 
'ThaiLmd Mala;roia Sinc&Po., AuUalia. 
l!quatiDn I Pull Sample Pre-Crisia Pori-Crisil I Pull Sample Pre-Crisil Pon-Crisia I Pull Sample Pre-Crisis Posi-Crisil I Pull Sample Pre-Crisis Posi-Crisil 
(1993- 2001) (1!193- 1!1!16) (1!1!18- 2001) (1!193- 2001) (1!1!13- 1!1!16) (1!1!18- 2001) (1!1!13- 2001) (1!1!13- 1!1!16) (1!1!18- 2001) (1!1!13- 2001) (1!1!13- 1!1!16) (1!1!18- 2011!) 
~;::;I J~~5~~~~~~~c~~?;~~ • ..... c~~~~;~: :lc:~~~~ ·~~J~~~~~~: ~~· .. <:;?~~~ ~~1c:~~?~~~ ··~J:~4~;;~; ~~ J:~~~~;~ :1 P~~~~~ ........ Q~~~~~ ....... Jl~~;; :\ 
TANC I 0.5418 
t-stati:otil:s ( 12700) 
0.3526 
(0.5240) 
02289 
(0.3390) 
-0.1248 
(-0.5730) 
-0.0268 
(-0.0639) 
0.2365 
(0.8150) 
-0.2982 
(-0.9220) 
0.5609 
(0.7820) 
-0.2920 
(-0.7130) 
-09607 ..... -1.7263 .... -0.7092 .... 
(-3.2800) (-2.1500) (-:2.0900) 
Wald Test <0.1150> <0.15644> <0.5090> <8.9579> •••I 
-·--····--- ········-----·-··-····-··-·-·····-·-·---········---·----···--·······- --·-··----····-·-···--·-·-·-·····-····-······--··--·----··- ··-··-··-········-·-···--·······-----········-····--····-·-···-·--······- ····---·-···--···················-····-···-·-·····-········-·······-···--···-···-······-· 
GROW 0~2 ** 0.4145 ** 0.7038- -0.13315 *** -0.015115 -0.1688 0.2131 '"* 0256! 0.50315 *** 0.0353 -0.1713 0.0330 
t-siati:otics (2.0100) (2.5500) (2.2400) (-2.5800) (-1.1500) (-1.41500) (2.0800) (1.4000) (3.0400) (1.3100) (-1.0300) (1.1800) 
-~~-!.~~ ........................................................................... ~:~.?..~~---··-···· .......................................................................... ~E!.~.!~ ........... ·-········--··--·············-···············-······-········-·-·--~'-~-~2.!~.~~*. ······--·-··-·-···-··---··---··········-········-~·!"~~-~2".-....... , 
SIZI! 0.3247 *** 0.1574 0.3221 - 0.4099 ,._ 0.51585 *** 0.34154 ••• 0.2021 *** 0.2907 - 0.1974 ** -0.0047 -0.0873 -0.0177 
t-siatistics (3.7800) (1.0800) (23900) (9.8700) (6.0500) (6.6200) (3.2500) (1.91500) (2.5500) (-0.1420) (-0.8900) (-0.4520) 
Wald Tesi <5.7333> '"* <17 9991> ••• <1.4481> <0.2045> 
, ...... Pilar·· ······~:.i":Sii2i···;;;;····-····=:5.4.93o··;;;;;·············:i·:3667··········· ········a-_609a··················~·i4-73i .. ;.:··················"iiiai···;;;;; ······=a·.i637······-········-····ai15ii····················~a:iiil64··········· ······=a·:74.2a··;;··········:!i":S5ai············-·······:o·:62ii···;;····· 
t-siati:otics (-2.1500) (-19900) (-0.8580) (1.0200) (-2.0800) (2.151500) (-0.2010) (0.1260) (-0.81580) (-2.41500) (-0.4940) (-19500) 
Wald Tesi <6.70150> - c449097> - <0.7539> <3.7872> * 
·····················- ···········-·--········-·-·······-······-······················-·······---·-- ·······-··-·············--··---·-··-····--··········-············ .. ··-···-···--·· ··········-···-·-·-························-··········-········--·····-······················-··· ···················-··-········--·····-·························-··········-···· ... ·-·················' 
BIC4 0.4820 ** 0.1981 1.1388 '"** -02386 ** 0.1567 -0.3531 **'" 0.41507 '"* 02162 0.4882 ** 0.1777 -0.1362 0.1234 
t-statistics (2.3000) (0.6420) (3.1400) (-2.2000) (0.15710) (-2.5900) (2.5100) (0.7370) (2.0600) (0.9410) (-0.1850) (0.5980) 
Wald Tesi <9.8292> -• <15.7015> ••• <4.2238> ** <0.3577> 
, ................... :.:.::. ·····································--················-········-············································ ··········-········-·····························-··-··········-·················-························ ·················································-·····································-·················-· ·····-····-·········································-······--···········-··············-················· 
ACE -0.2191 -0.2719 -0.1457 -0.1859 - -0.4249 *** -0.0124 -0.0491 0.0031 -0.0782 0.09715 0.2737 • 0.0524 
t-stati:otics (-1.1500) (-ID.500) (-0.31530) (-2.15100) (-2.7400) (-0.1350) (-0.5980) (0.0145) (-0.7920) (1.4100) (1.7300) (0.15290) 
Wald Tesi <0.1318> <20.15157> •• <0.15275> <7.0574> ••• 
................... ;"-'- ············-·-·········-··········-·····-························-········--·-···-·-····· ·······-···········-··-··-····-·····-·-·····--··········-···-····----·-···-···--······ ·--···-···········-··························-·-···-········-··-····-·················-··········· ···············-········-········-·························································-················· 
PMCMI -2.1325 *** -0.84415 -4.7011 -• 12035 *** 0.4774 1.0861 * 0.1475 0.15472 -0.3109 -1.9081 *** -3.2414 ** -1.5942 -
t-statistics (-3.0000) (-0.8310) (-3.51500) (2.15800) (0.4890) (19400) (0.2430) (0.47150) (-0.4090) (-3.2100) (-2.0300) (-2.3700) 
Wald Tesi <12.1515150> -• <3.71540> * <0.11574> <5.99153> •• 
10000000-0000H0-000- OOOOOOOOOOMM0000'00000HOOOOOOOOOOOHOOOOO-OHOOOOOOOOMOOOOOOOOM00'000000000000000000000000"0000"00"00000 ""''""'"'"00'00000000000"00'H00'00000000000'00000M00000000000000'000000M0000'000MOOOOOOOO-OOOOOOOOMOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOMO-OOOOOOOOHOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOoOOOooOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOM00000-00000000000 00000-000000000000000000000000000000M-oMooOoooooo""""""""""'"""'""""'"'""'-''''"'"' 
SICMA 2.0310 27.3462 -2.15362 -13.8585 ••• -1.5186 -21.055!8 *** -11.15941 ** 8.3223 -12.21158 •• -7.0294 ** -33.53153 •• -5.6.539 
t-siati:otics (0.3350) (1.2500) (-0.3530) (-3.1100) (-0.1120) (-3.8500) (-2.1600) (0.3650) (-1.9900) (-2.1700) (-2.2200) (-1.5900) 
-~~ .. !.~ ··········-···-········-··-····························-············--~'-~-~-~.>. ............ ······························-········-·······-······----·············-~.!.~:.1!~.~-!l:. ... ~~~ ............................................................................ ~~:.9..~.5..~.>. ... ~~-- ........................................................................ ~~.u.~n.>. ... ~~~l 
TDRN 10.1838 ** -6.3331 13.9129 -• 17.1382 •- .5.3807 153.7301 *** 37.2001 *** 115.3096 42.7897 *** 88.6450 *** 83.1409 107.015150 ***' 
t-siati:otics (2.5000) (-0.15580) (2.15000) (3.5400) (1.0300) (4.8200) (3.7200) (12100) (3.2200) (3.2300) (1.4300) (3D800) 
Wald Tesi <6.7408> - <232409> ** <10.3808> -• <9.4913> *** 
'No. ofolla. 885 315 4151 2313 517 14715 1045 244 15513 1361 288 940 
L OG(6.E , > 0) = a:+ "'J:. p, FS, , + e. 
t-i 
Ths t-s1atistics 811! adjusted for hetemscedasticity COIISis1ent standard. enllls. Inc!.ustzyami time dummies were included in the model in o!rler 1D contml for industry am time eficts but ro s1atistically 
signifil:mt effect was found. See Tllbll= 5.2 ami Sectiln 53 for the defuriticn of the "YBrillbles. Wald test (chi-squme c!.isl!lbu1ec!. with I degree of freedom) is usec!.1D fmc!. whether the differences of !he 
coefficients between pre- ami post-crisis periods 811! s1atisticallysigllifil:mt or not. 
*, ••, -• Significant at 10%, 5% atJd I% lew!, respectively. 
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Consistent with Autore and Kovacs (2005), logistic results show that firms with 
more profitability are less likely to access external finance because they have enough 
financial slack. In particular, more profitable Australian firms tend to deviate from the 
pecking order theory in a strong form, especially for the post-crisis period, suggesting 
that Australian firms' behaviour is moving away from the pecking order. Profitability 
does not seem to have much influence on the probability of Singaporean firms. Firm 
age is also found to influence the deviation from the theory. Young Malaysian firms 
deviate the most from the pecking order theory in both mild and strong forms while 
young Thai and Singaporean firms deviate mildly from the pecking order. The results 
show that young firms are more likely to have high need of external finance because 
they have accumulated less retained earnings. 
Tables 5.19 and 5.20 show that there is variation on how the level of asymmetric 
information influences deviation from the pecking order. Thai and Singaporean firms 
who are involved with good quality auditors tend to issue more equity; therefore, they 
deviate more in a strong form. This is in line with the prediction of the multi-period 
pecking order that equity would be optimal when adverse selection cost is low because 
when level of asymmetric information is low, the adverse selection cost tends to be low. 
However, the opposite pattern is found for Malaysian firms. Malaysian firms without 
good quality auditors tend to deviate in both mild and strong forms. On the other hand, 
BIG4 has no influence on deviation from the pecking order for Australian firms. 
When firms have a high proportion of management vested in the same family 
(management team involvement), they tend to follow more strictly the expectations of 
pecking order theory in order to avoid dilution of control. This is supported by the 
evidence from Tables 5.19 and 5.20 for Thailand and Australia where a negative 
relationship is- found fo~ both mild and strong de~iations. In addftioll-,-consistent witli''tfle- -
multi-period pecking order theory, the results show that firms are more likely to deviate 
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from pecking order when adverse selection costs are low. Adverse selection cost is 
found to play a greater role in strong than in mild deviation. When adverse selection 
cost is low, firms are likely to go for high-risk sources of finance such as equity. 
Trading activity is another main factor that leads firms to deviate from the pecking 
order in both mild and strong forms. The results show that when trading activity is high, 
firms have more access to external finance leading them to have higher probabilities of 
deviating from the pecking order. The coefficients are also more significant for the post-
crisis period. 
As in Section 5.5.4, all observations from each country over the sample period are 
combined and the logistic regressions (equation (5.13) and equation (5.14)) are 
estimated again by adding country dummies which are replaced with other country-
specific factors one at a time. The results are summarized in Tables 5.21 and 5.22 for 
mild and strong deviations, respectively. All country dummies are found to be 
significant for both mild and strong deviations confirming that country-specific factors 
play an important role in steering firms' behaviour away from the predictions of the 
pecking order theory. The results show that country-specific factors are the main driving 
forces that lead firms in each country to deviate from the pecking order theory. In 
particular, these country-specific factors play a greater role for strong deviation than for 
mild deviation as shown by the higher significance levels and larger coefficients for the 
strong deviation regressions. The results show that economic development is a key 
factor that influences deviation from the theory. Firms in developed countries are likely 
to deviate from the pecking order theory in both mild and strong forms because they 
have better access to external finance, especially to equity markets. Also firms in 
developed economies have better growth opportunities leading them to have higher 
neectfor external sources of finance .. 
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telolo 5.21 • Pnclictlwo Jocini<...,.......,. ~of mild-., &o.o. tl>o pockboc ozo~or-.,.wiil> co-...,._;&-.. 
-l 
:oo(DEP_ >0) a a+ ~.0-~ .. -+ P, ... cmmtrp-:;pcefic jtH:IDTH6,_, 
,n, ~s1atiltics ... odjostedfbrhotomscoduticityCOJmistentlltalldm!mom. lllliulbylllll time d1mmUes _, inchldedin tim mcdlli mcmmtc ccntml fbrimillsnymd time elfects but liD llatislioollysigllilicont elfec:1wu foumi 
See Tablo D, Tobb ~JiliiiSt!CiianD fbrilm cle&iticnofilm 'l'llriablmo. 
0
, - .... Sigcilicm:t at 10%, 5% am\1% lewl r011pective1y. 
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~ ·-~a~· ... t ... (~~·-+J~~·--·~~ ........ %~-·--·-·%~ ..... -13r~J ... ---~~-...... ~:67~h···J~~ .. -l·J1;r1--·~.t~~· ... · ... ~~~l····J:~ri;at~ · ~~ott~ J=~mi---~J:?o~· : <:~~D,j!} .• - ... t~~;t ... .~i= .... ---c1l~lrm ...... J=?o~---·~:?a~··.J. .. J:~£JWf· .... 1if-w~ .. -ff·~=--+·<'~~ ... -~&~-k.?&hWi-
!:.ifW <:~D~-t.l:!f:J~~~-.... ..~:%~.!.:2~... <·1a=----<:2&~h·-J:%!~-.. -~<:1~..m ..... -(:.~J~-...,.-l2a~...t<=!a~-...... <=~~1·--J:!£~· .. -
~ -<if~·--1 ~i~---tJ~ ... -<?o~~~~ -· <13~ .... --~---~ .. ~-·~~-....-%~DJ--f .. Jt~t=·tj?6om· ... -¥~ ... -J~r~~-1= J~~--f..!::ft~-+1:l~~~ ..... J:~~~-.... --s~~--(:.~lW? ...... <=~~-.... .J~~-... 1 .. ·~1j;t~,m .... J:.?~l-...t·,~:r~~·-i~fr~ffi ........ w::.gJ ...... .stl~-
·Stolistics 1.3J:l!D) , 1.5.6500) : 1-6.3200) l-3.6300) J-4.8500) 1.3.0600) '-4.1100) 1-4.1100) ·1 '-7.D9nm J-4.52llll) : 1.6.6900) i ,.j.4.l0"' (-5.1200l '-7.9000) 
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1(1~i~~ 
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The results also show that firms in countries with better legal enforcement have 
higher probabilities of deviation in both mild and strong forms. All measures of legal 
enforcement are highly significant showing that firms in these countries have better 
access to external finance especially to equity markets as well as higher growth 
opportunities; therefore, they have higher need for extra funding than for internally 
generated funds and tend to deviate more from the predictions of the pecking order 
theory. In addition, consistent with Table 5.15, legal protection is an important factor. 
The results show that firms in countries with low creditor rights are more likely to use 
more external finance. In particular, when there is choice between debt and equity, firms 
in countries with low creditor rights prefer to issue more equity leading to strong 
deviation from the pecking order theory. The results also show that when shareholder 
rights are high, firms are likely to use more external finance and in particular to use 
more equity leading to the deviation from the pecking order in both mild and strong 
forms. Firms are less concerned about dilution of control; therefore, they can go for 
riskier sources of finance such as equity. 
Firms with widely-held ownership structures tend to deviate from the 
expectations of pecking order theory because they are less concerned with control 
dilution. The results show evidence to support this argument and also show that the 
deviation is more in a strong form than a mild form. Accounting and asymmetric 
information are also found to play a significant role in firms' deviations from the 
pecking order theory. High involvement of good quality auditors (AUD) or more items 
disclosed in firms' financial statement (ACC) lead to lower asymmetric information. 
Therefore, firms with high AUD and ACC indices tend to deviate more from the 
pecking order theory. The results show support to multi-period pecking order in that 
when the asynuneti{c informafic)ii ievel'is low, firms prefer to go for -riskier source~tbf 
finance such as equity because they expect asymmetric information levels to be higher 
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in the future. On the other hand, firms with high numbers of analysts per firm (ANA) 
have higher levels of asymmetric information; therefore, they would prefer to go for the 
safest source of finance and follow the pecking order theory. The results show that 
deviation in both forms is found for firms with low ANA where asymmetric information 
levels are lower. 
In summary, the logistic results show that firms with high tangibility, high growth 
opportunity, larger size, lower profitability, younger age, lower levels of management 
team in the same family and high trading activity have higher need for external finance; 
therefore, they are more likely to deviate in a mild form (DEF>O). On the other hand, 
firms with high growth opportunities, larger size, lower profitability, lower levels of 
management team in the same family, higher level of BIG4, and high trading activity 
are more likely to deviate in a strong form by issuing more equity (~E>O). The evidence 
also shows support for the multi-period pecking order theory in that if information 
asymmetry varies over time, then there might be instances when adverse selection costs 
are low. Therefore, deviating from the financing hierarchy is not as costly. When 
asymmetric information is low, it is not costly for firms to deviate from the pecking 
order theory especially not by issuing equity. Also the results suggest that country-
specific factors do play an important role in shaping firms' financing behaviour. Firms 
in countries with high economic development, strong legal enforcement, low creditor 
protection, high shareholder protection, low levels of ownership concentration, high 
accounting standards and low levels of asymmetric information tend to deviate from the 
pecking order theory. The logistic regressions also help to improve understanding 
derived from the main regression as several of the effects from some variables, such as 
EXP and SHR, cannot be detected from the main regression due to low variation among 
the sample countries. However, the use of logistic regression can help to pick up the 
effect of such variables. 
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5.6.3 Non-Linear Quantile Regressions 
It has been suggested that non-linear quantile regressions or piecewise linear 
models will capture a relationship between financing deficit and net debt issues better 
than normal linear regressions as performed in the previous sections because it takes 
account of different deciles of financing deficit. To provide a comparison of the results, 
equation (5.4) is estimated again using OLS with the sample of positive financing 
deficit and the results are shown in the first column of Table 5.23 for each country. 
Then equation (5.15) is estimated using a piecewise linear model and the results are 
summarized in the second column for each country. For simplicity, only the coefficients 
of financing deficits from 0.0 to 0.2, which are highly significant, and the coefficient of 
financing deficit from 0.2 to 0.3, where the coefficients start to be insignificant as 
comparison, are reported. The coefficients of DEF from the simple linear model in the 
first column are very low for all sample countries. This evidence gives little support to 
the pecking order theory. However, the piecewise linear model in the second column 
shows a completely different picture. Adjusted R2 increased substantially with the use 
of quantile regression. In addition, the results reveal that the relationship between net 
debt issues and financing deficit varies depending on the size of financing deficit. As 
found by Qiu and Smith (2005), the coefficients of DEFi,t (0.0 to 0.1 ), DEFi,t (0.1 to 0.2) 
and DEFi,t (0.2 to 0.3) decrease monotonically. The results suggest that firms are likely 
to use debt to finance their financing deficit when their financing deficit is low. The 
huge differences between the coefficients of financing deficits from the simple linear 
model (model-1) and the coefficients of financing deficits from the piecewise linear 
model (model-2) suggest that, without taking account for the non-linearity in the 
relationship, the effect of financing deficit on net debt issues .when DEF is low is under-
,;;~tiniite'd anct th~eeffect'wl1eil't>E:F'~Is?lligfi' rs over:.esHffiated.~ - · · ·· · ·_,. -·'=-'-=--~~"L:e- ,- -- --
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The results suggest that when DEF is lower than 0.2, firms use debt to cover most 
of their financing deficits. However, when DEF is higher than 0.2, firms choose to issue 
equity instead. The use of equity might be due to the high financial distress that comes 
with large debt issues. Therefore, it can be concluded that firms in this region do not 
behave strictly according to the original pecking order theory but behave more in line 
with the predictions of the modified pecking order model. 
In addition, to confirm these results, the first difference terms of finn-specific 
variables are added to test the effect of conventional and other additional finn-specific 
variables as predicted by the trade-off theory when nested in the pecking order model. 
In order for the predictions of the pecking order theory to be valid, the effect of finn-
specific factors on net debt issues should be wiped out by the effect of financing 
deficits. The results in the third column of Table 5.23 (model-3) show that most 
coefficients of finn-specific variables become insignificant suggesting pecking order 
behaviour does exist for firms in this region. 
Table 5.24 presents the results on the relationship between net debt issues and 
financial surplus with simple OLS linear regression (model-1) and piecewise regression 
(model-2). The results show that when financial surplus is low (financing deficit is 
between 0 to -0.2), most firms use their entire financial surplus to retire debt. However, 
when financial surplus is high (financing deficit is lower than -0.2), apart from repaying 
debt, firms start to repurchase a small proportion of equity. The results show that the 
non-linearity of the relationship between net debt issues and financial surplus is more 
limited than the relationship between net debt issues and financing deficit. In most 
cases, there is nearly a one-to-one relationship between financial surplus and net debt 
issues regardless of the size of financial surplus. As when firms have financing deficits, 
-~ ~-~-~--- finn;.specific variables~do'"not ada 'niuch--sigri.ificant 'Effect 'to tile relittionshii)''berwe~n~----~ 
financial surplus and net debt issues as shown in Table 5.24 (model-3). 
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In conclusion, the results from quantile regressions show that once non-linearity is 
taken into account in the relationship between net debt issues and financing deficit, 
firms in this region behave in the manner predicted by the modified pecking order 
theory where financial distress plays an important role. 
5.7 Summary 
The pecking order theory has been tested on a broad cross-section of non-financial 
listed firms in four countries in the Asia pacific region for the period of 1993 to 2001. 
The results from linear models using OLS show little support to the traditional pecking 
order theory but strong support for the modified pecking order theory. Equity issues are 
quite common and also track financing deficits closer than debt issues which is the 
opposite of the predictions of the pecking order theory. The deviation is the greatest in 
Australia where net equity issues track nearly perfectly to financing deficit. The 
findings also suggest that time-varying adverse selection costs play a crucial role in 
financing decisions and can help to explain why previous studies have found material 
evidence that is in contrast to the original pecking order patterns. The results suggest the 
concavity function of firms choosing debt issues before equity issues. The addition of 
the second order term of financing deficit has improved the performance of all other 
related variables not only with regard to the significance level but also the magnitude of 
each individual factor. The inclusion of this term has shown us new evidence that in fact 
firms do behave in the manner predicted by the pecking order theory. The exclusion of 
this factor can lead to underestimation of the way each factor influences firms' 
behaviour. When nested in conventional regression, financing deficit somewhat 
challenges the role of the conventional factors. The inclusion of financing deficit 
improve-s ctlie 'e}q)lruiatof)Fpower~oftlie 'regres~sicms stibstantiall y~ -Mosr importailtly;-the--· C-~ 
effects of other firm-specific variables are wiped off nearly completely by the first- and 
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second-order terms of financing deficit giving strong support for the pecking order 
theory. 
As the relationship between net debt issues and financing deficit will not be as 
predicted by the pecking order theory when net debt issues and net equity issues have 
opposite signs, the main linear regression might give misleading results. Therefore, 
predictive logistic regressions are suggested to be a more appropriate test of the 
predictions of the pecking order theory and the results reveal several hidden factors that 
can lead firms to deviate from the pecking order theory where some factors might be 
found to be unrelated in the main linear regression. Finally, non-linear quantile 
regression was implemented and the results confirm that there exists a non-linearity 
function between the relationship of financing deficit and net debt issues. Firms also 
behave differently when they have a positive financing deficit from when they have a 
negative financing deficit (financial surplus). The results reveal that the relationship 
between net debt issues and positive financing deficit are significantly different across 
different sizes of financing deficit. Firms do behave in the manner predicted by the 
modified pecking order theory. Firms with low positive financing deficit fund their 
deficit mostly by net debt issues. However, when financing deficit gets higher, there is a 
higher probability of financial distress that comes with high debt level. Therefore, large 
financing deficits are funded by equity. On the other hand, the non-linearity function is 
more limited when firms have financial surplus as firms use surplus to repay debt 
regardless of the size of the surplus. The results are robust to the inclusion of firm-
specific factors whose effects are totally wiped off by financing deficit. 
Financial crisis does play an important role in firms' financing decisions due to 
higher risk and more concern for financial distress problems. Pecking order financing 
·· ----- .~o, .. ~ -~"behaviour is encotiraged "by·the particUlar form· offirtanCiaF'coilstraihts iii Asia: The"'""'-'-'"-- · 
results show that financial constraints induce firms toward pecking order behaviour due 
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to restricted access to capital markets. Also the crisis has a different impact on each 
country depending on the severity of its influence. The findings show that firms that 
face high financial constraints exhibit stronger pecking order behaviour. The results also 
show that firms' behaviour depends on the setting in the country they operate in. The 
degree of encouragement given to firms in each particular institutional setting is an 
important factor. Firms in countries with high economic development, high legal 
enforcement, low legal protection, high involvement of good quality auditors, and high 
dispersion of opinion prefer external finance to internal finance and among external 
finance they prefer equity to debt issues. Therefore, firms in countries with this setting, 
such as Australia, are found to deviate from the pecking order theory while firms in 
countries with the opposite setting are moving towards the pecking order theory. The 
results emphasize that the financing behaviours of firms in this region do not rely solely 
on their own characteristics but also on the environments in which they operate. 
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Chapter 6 
Summary and Conclusion 
6.1 Motivations and Contributions 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) propose the irrelevancy of capital structure decisions 
in the world of a perfect capital market. However, the assumptions of perfect capital 
markets are unrealistic because there are a number of market imperfections such as tax, 
agency costs, bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information that can affect the valuation 
of a firm. Therefore, new theories have been developed taking these factors into 
consideration. A number of researchers have attempted to identify an optimal capital 
structure and to examine factors that explain the observed capital structure patterns 
which cannot fully be explained by any single financing theory because each theory 
provides different predictions based on different market imperfections. On the one hand, 
the trade-off theory predicts that firms trade off benefits of debt (tax deductibility) with 
costs of debt (bankruptcy and agency costs) and proposes that there exists an optimal 
capital structure. On the other hand, the pecking order theory proposes that, due to the 
presence of asymmetric information, firms follow a financing hierarchy of internal 
finance as their first resort followed by debt while equity would be their last choice. 
Although many empirical studies find evidence in support of the trade-off theory, 
a drawback of the trade-off theory is the inverse relationship found between profitability 
and firm leverage which gives support to the pecking order theory. The pecking order 
theory also is not capable of fully explaining the observed patterns of firms' financing 
choices which does not mean that information costs are not important. This suggests 
that financing theories are not mutually exclusive and firms may act according to the 
~~- ·-·------- -~ -=-pre-diCtibiis·-_::·or :more~·than~--:one·,·theory-~when~-they~ -7determine;o-their"O'.financing_:·decisions;~~-o;_ ___ _:.~-- --~·, 
However, there is still some doubt whether the commonly used models can fully reveal 
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the pecking order behaviour of a firm or whether they are designed to favour the 
predictions of the trade-off theory. Therefore, recently a number of researchers have 
started to focus on the models that directly test the predictions of pecking order theory. 
As different theories have multiple, or offsetting, implications for each variable, it is 
difficult to find clear support for one particular theory in firms' financing behaviour. 
One way to test the predictions of the pecking order theory is to add financing deficit 
into the conventional model designed for the trade-off framework and see whether the 
effects of the conventional variables identified by the trade-off theory are wiped off by 
the effects of financing deficit. 
In addition to capital structure decisions, the propositions of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) also imply that debt maturity structure has no effect on the firm's value. 
Research relating to debt maturity structure started as a by-product of capital structure. 
A new line of financing theories was developed into a significant strand of corporate 
finance literature based on the benefits of short-term and long-term debt and shows that 
the choice of debt maturity can affect the firms' value. Short-term debt is expected to be 
used to mitigate agency problems and to signal high quality to the market while long-
term debt is preferable for tax purposes. Studies have put forward a number of factors 
that influence the debt maturity structure decisions of a firm. The natural questions are 
therefore what proportion of long-term debt and short-term debt firms should use to 
maximize their market value and what factors affect this decision. However, similar to 
capital structure study, theoretical and empirical evidence for debt maturity structure is 
also inconclusive. 
Despite the vast literature on corporate financing decisions, there is still a need for 
further empirical analysis because the existing evidence on the above issues has been 
_,.,,~ .c.--~~--- ·':~~ii~((ifld: '~ostly ':focuses-on 'cffiaJ or aevefopeCi ccountriei Flnanclng~dedsion:s-o"t firrll's·~ -"---· --- ,,. 
in developing countries remain relatively unexplored. More importantly, there is a lack 
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of evidence for firms in different institutional settings. The interesting issue is how far 
theories that have been formulated for firms in developed countries can be applied to 
those in other areas such as the Asia Pacific region. Little is known about how, and to 
what extent, the observed differences in corporate governance and institutional 
environment affect firms' financing decisions. Due to the tighter financial constraints 
that resulted from the financing crisis of 1997, financing behaviour of firms in this 
region has changed and this change is likely to depend on how severely the market is hit 
by the crisis and the developments of financial systems as well as legal enforcement in 
each country. 
To this end, this thesis intends to fill these gaps in the current literature and to 
provide empirical evidence on corporate financing decisions of firms in Asia Pacific 
countries, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia. More specifically, it re-
addresses the determinants of capital structure and debt maturity structure and explicitly 
tests the predictions of the pecking order theory. The four sample countries were chosen 
in order to provide a broader set of samples with diversity in institutional settings and 
corporate governance and to provide natural experiments to study the effect of the 1997 
financial crisis on firms' financing behaviour depending on how severely the markets 
were affected by the crisis. The 1997 financial crisis originated in Thailand and the 
effect quickly spread throughout the region. The crisis has generally led to higher risk 
and uncertainty in the market; however, the effects differed across sample countries. To 
investigate the effect of the crisis, the whole sample period was divided into two sub-
periods of pre-crisis and post-crisis periods to examine whether there were any 
significant shifts of the capital structure and debt maturity structure and their 
determinants across two sub-periods. Thailand and Malaysia were severely hit by the 
--~-''---~~-~T997 financial cHsis''"while-~sing·a:pore rutd"'A.U:sframravoided-·tne---effects~'13e2ause .. e'acn~":~~~-"-- . .,.
market has been affected by the cns1s by different degrees, sample countries are 
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categorized into two groups (the first group composes of countries least affected by the 
crisis and countries most affected by the crisis are in the second group) to see whether 
there are any changes in financing behaviour of firms in Thailand and Malaysia where 
the effects of the crisis were more significant relative to the financing behaviour of 
firms in Singapore and Australia where the effects of the crisis were less severe. In this 
sense, the special feature of this thesis is that it examines the sample of firms in 
countries which have been subjected to limited attention. The vulnerability of economic 
conditions, differences in corporate governance and development stages in these 
countries offer an interesting setting to further study the impact of these factors on 
corporate financing choices. 
Overall, this thesis has made several contributions to the literature. 
(i) Unlike most previous studies, this thesis has examined a broader set of sample 
countries that provide diversity in economic conditions, corporate governance and 
institutional settings. There has been a lack of evidence for firms in different 
economic and financial settings. The focus on four sample countries provides new 
evidence of the variations across countries as well as how firms in different 
settings make their financing decisions. 
(ii) This thesis studies the role of country-specific factors in influencing corporate 
financing decisions by using cross-country analysis. Country-specific factors are 
found to play a significant role in financing decisions. 
(iii) This thesis has analysed the effects of the 1997 financial crisis on firms' financing 
decisions and their determinants by using both sub-periods and country grouping 
analysis. 
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6.2 Summary of the Results 
The thesis starts with a review of economic conditions, corporate governance and 
institutional settings of four sample countries in Chapter 2. The review in this chapter 
reveals that in developed countries such as Singapore and Australia, publicly issued 
financial instruments are an important source of external finance. Developing countries 
such as Thailand and Malaysia on the other hand are characterized by much less 
developed financial markets and have a greater reliance on banks or on related financial 
intermediaries that provide most of their external funds. There are variations on several 
aspects of economic development and corporate governance among sample countries 
such as quality of legal enforcement, the level of legal protection, ownership structures, 
etc. As discussed earlier, the sample countries were divided into two groups, countries 
most affected and countries least affected by the crisis. This country grouping is also 
related to the development of financial markets in each country. There is also a unique 
difference in ownership structure in that East Asian firms tend to be family-based and 
have close relationships with banks while Australian firms' shareholders have arms-
length relationships. 
The empirical analysis of the thesis is presented in Chapters 3 through 5. Chapters 
3 and 4 investigate the determinants of capital structure and debt maturity structure, 
respectively. They address several important questions. First, what criteria do firms rely 
on when they determine their capital structure and debt maturity structure or in other 
words to what extent are their capital structure and debt maturity structure driven by 
these factors? Second, whether the financial crisis has any significant impacts on the 
firms' financing behaviour across pre- and post-crisis periods and across country 
groupings? Third, how, and to what extent, do corporate governance and institutional 
settings influence firms' financing decisions? The results are largely consistent with the 
existing empirical evidence from other regions. It is found that firms' characteristics 
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play important roles in determining the capital structure and debt maturity structure of 
firms in the Asia Pacific region. However, firms' capital and debt maturity structures 
and their determinants vary across the sample countries. Therefore, apart from the 
commonly used firm-specific factors, the analysis in these chapters also considers 
market-wide and legal and corporate governance factors. The results show that the 
differences in corporate financing decisions can be explained by differences in 
economic conditions, corporate governance and institutional environment. Overall, the 
results showed that, in addition to a firm's characteristics, the capital structure and debt 
maturity structure of a firm are also significantly affected by economic and financial 
environment in which the firm operates. An investigation of the financial crisis of 1997 
on corporate financing decisions is then conducted. The results from sub-period and 
country grouping analysis show that the financial crisis has had a significant impact on 
both firm-specific and market-wide determinants of capital and debt maturity structures 
especially in Thailand where the crisis originated. 
In particular, the results from Chapter 3 show that among firm-specific 
determinants, tangibility, firm size and earnings volatility are found to be positively 
related to debt while profitability, growth opportunity, non-debt tax shields, liquidity 
and share price performance are found to be inversely related to debt as predicted by the 
trade-off theory, the pecking order theory and the market timing theory. This suggests 
that firms' behaviour can be explained by a combination of capital structure theories not 
any particular single theory when they determine their financing decisions. In addition, 
firm-specific determinants of capital structure are significantly affected by changes in 
economic conditions such as the financial crisis. Firms' reliance on a number of 
variables changed after the crisis due to the increase in risk of bankruptcy and costs of 
financing. The results indicate that the crisis led firms to behave more closely to, or be 
more aware of, the predictions of capital structure theories. 
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The results also reveal that the role of market-wide determinants on firm leverage 
differs depending on country groupings in opposite directions. For example, firms in 
countries least affected by the crisis use higher levels of debt when bank development is 
high. However, high bank development does not guarantee higher borrowing capacity 
for firms in countries most affected by the crisis. Firms in most crisis affected countries 
are more concerned about tax deductibility than the cost of borrowing; therefore, they 
have higher levels of debt when interest rates are high while firms in countries least 
affected by the crisis focus more on the cost of borrowing. Similar to firm-specific 
determinants, the financial crisis also had significant effects on the relationship between 
market-wide factors and firm leverage. In many cases, the crisis changed the direction 
of the impact of market-wide factors. Firms started to consider market-wide factors 
when they determined their capital structure only in the post-crisis period. The country's 
legal and corporate governance factors also significantly affect the way firms finance. 
For example, firms in countries with efficient legal systems prefer to use higher equity 
issues to mitigate agency costs of debt. Also, when creditors are better protected by law 
firms have higher borrowing capacity. Firms with concentrated ownership structures 
tend to have lower levels of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers and 
lower transaction costs. Therefore, they have better access to debt markets. When 
auditors' market share or the number of analysts' coverage is high, firms are likely to 
issue equity because level of asymmetric information is lower. 
In particular the results from Chapter 4 lend some support to the liquidity risk 
hypothesis and to the adverse selection and signalling hypothesis. However, mixed 
support is found for the moral hazard and agency hypothesis. On the one hand, small 
firms use short-term debt to mitigate agency costs of debt and firms also match their 
maturity of assets and liability. On the other hand, the relationship between growth 
opportunity and maturity is mixed across countries. The results suggest that firms also 
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rely on a combination of debt maturity structure theories when they decide their level of 
short-term and long-term debt. In addition, there is also a variation in the determinants 
of debt maturity structure across sample countries and some variations can be explained 
by the concentration of ownership structure and close relationship between firms and 
lenders of firms in this region. The financial crisis is found to significantly affect the 
relationship between debt maturity and some firm-specific determinants especially for 
firms in countries most affected by the crisis. Liquidity risk increased substantially for 
firms in these countries; therefore, they use higher long-term debt to delay the exposure 
to bankruptcy when leverage is high. Tax concern also increased due to the financial 
crisis; therefore, firms in these countries use higher long-term debt when they have high 
profitability. 
The results also reveal an opposite pattern in the relationships between debt 
maturity and bank development, stock market development and the term structure of 
interest rates among two country groupings. On the one hand, banks in developed 
economies are able to take full advantage of their monitoring power; therefore, firms are 
encouraged to issue short-term debt when bank development is high. On the other hand, 
the legal systems are weaker in developing countries; therefore, a larger banking sector 
is associated with longer-maturity debts because creditor's rights are strengthened by 
the size of the banking sector. Due to higher stock market development in countries 
least affected by the crisis, firms in these countries hold shorter maturity because they 
can easily raise long-term finance from equity. Also firms in countries most affected by 
the crisis use more long-term debt when term structure of interest rates has an upward 
slope to take advantage of tax while firms in countries least affected by the crisis adopt 
an optimistic strategy by issuing short-term debt to wait for the decline of long-term 
rates in the future to reduce the overall cost of debt. The results also show that legal and 
corporate governance play important roles in debt maturity structure decisions. Firms in 
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countries with a lower quality of legal enforcement use higher proportions of short-term 
debt financing to take advantage of the monitoring function of short-term debt. The 
ability of firms to use short-term debt is higher when creditors are better protected while 
firms in countries with higher shareholder protection use more long-term debt. 
Chapter 5 explicitly tested the prediction of the pecking order theory. Specifically, 
it addresses the following questions: (i) whether firms in the Asia Pacific region follow 
a pecking order in making financing decisions; (ii) whether the financial crisis has any 
significant effect in the firms' financing behaviour between the two sub-sample periods; 
and (iii) whether corporate governance and institutional environment explain the 
observed financing behaviour. Various methodologies were adopted to address these 
issues. The results show that although equity issues tracked financing deficit closer than 
debt issues which is inconsistent with the predictions of the original pecking order 
theory, firms in the Asia Pacific region do behave according to the predictions of the 
modified pecking order theory and consider the adverse selection costs, bankruptcy and 
debt capacity when making financing decisions. The analysis starts by running basic 
linear regression models using Ordinary Least Square. Several firm-specific factors are 
found to affect the choice between internal and external finance. Small firms, highly 
profitable firms, young firms, firms with high proportion of management in the same 
family, high adverse selection costs, and low trading activity prefer internal to external 
finance as suggested by the pecking order hypothesis. For external financing decisions, 
financing deficit was found to be a significant factor in determining net debt issues as 
predicted by the pecking order theory. To investigate the concavity function of 
financing deficit, a second-order term of financing deficit was added into the basic 
linear regression models. The results show that the concavity function of financing 
deficit is very important in determining the order of sources of finance between debt and 
equity issues. The inclusion of the second-order term of financing deficit has improved 
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the model substantially in terms of goodness-of-fit of the models. When nested in the 
trade-off model with conventional factors, the introduction of the first- and second-order 
terms of financing deficit has added a substantial amount of additional explanatory 
power to the trade-off framework. The effects of conventional factors are almost wiped 
off by the effects of first- and second-order terms of financing deficit. 
Other testing methodologies were also implemented including predictive logistic 
regressions and non-linear quantile regressions. The use of a logistic model avoids the 
problem of net debt issues (~D) and net equity issues (~E) having opposite signs. The 
logistic results reveal what type of factors lead firms to deviate mildly from pecking 
order theory by using external finance (DEF > 0) and to go to the further extent of 
deviating from the pecking order theory in a strong form by issuing equity (~E > 0). 
Firms with high tangibility, high growth opportunities, larger size, lower profitability, 
younger age, lower levels of management team in the same family and high trading 
activity are more likely to deviate in a mild form (DEF>O) while firms with high growth 
opportunities, larger size, lower profitability, lower levels of management team in the 
same family, higher levels of auditor involvement, and high trading activity need more 
funds; therefore, they are more likely to deviate in a strong form by issuing more equity 
(~E>). The results also suggest that when asymmetric information is low, it is not costly 
for firms to deviate from the pecking order theory especially by issuing equity. Country-
specific factors also play an important role in shaping firms' financing behaviour. The 
results emphasize that the financing behaviour of firms in this region do not rely solely 
on their own characteristics but also on the environment in which they operate. Firms in 
countries with high economic development, strong legal enforcement, low creditor 
protection, high shareholder protection, low levels of ownership concentration, high 
accounting standards and low levels of asymmetric information tend to deviate more 
from the predictions of the pecking order theory. 
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The results from non-linear quantile regressions show that the relationship 
between financing deficits and net debt issues is not linear as previously expected. 
Firms treat financing deficits and financing surplus differently and the size of financing 
deficit matters. Specifically when positive financing deficit is low, firms tend to go for 
net debt issues. When financing deficit is higher, equity issues are chosen because net 
debt issues come with bankruptcy and liquidity risks. However, at the high level of 
financing deficit, bankruptcy does not matter anymore; therefore, firms would finance 
their deficit with net debt issues. The results also indicate that financial constraints can 
lead firms to behave more in line with the predictions of the modified pecking order 
theory. Developed and least crisis affected countries with high quality of legal 
enforcement and lower levels of asymmetric information tend to deviate more from the 
pecking order theory. In sum, the results emphasize that the financing behaviour of 
firms in this region do not rely only on their own characteristics but also on the 
environment in which they operate. 
6.3 Implications 
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis has some implications on different 
groups of readers. The implications are related to the differences in economic condition, 
corporate governance and institutional settings across the sample countries. No 
corporate governance system in particular can be considered better than that in other 
countries because firms in each country are operating under different settings. Each 
system has its own advantages and disadvantages. While firms in weak legal 
environments might have a disadvantage in dealing with corruption and transparency 
problems leading to less efficient ways of acquiring external finance, they might have 
advantages in borrowing capacity due to concentrated ownership structures and close 
relationships with creditors. The results in this thesis suggest that different related 
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parties should consider a mixture of firm-specific characteristics, economic conditions 
and corporate governance. 
In particular, different types of users can benefit differently from the evidence 
provided by this thesis as follows. 
Managers 
As this thesis examined the financing behaviour of firms using historical data, it 
gives managers an idea of the type of factors they have considered in the past when they 
made their financing decisions. Managers need to consider their past choices and justify 
whether their choices maximize the firm's value. In order to make sensible and sound 
financing decisions, managers must understand the costs and benefits of different types 
of finance. Before making financing decisions, managers should begin by examining the 
firms' characteristics (such as, what are the maturity of the firms' assets? or how 
sensitive are their assets to inflation and economic condition?). After understanding 
their firms' characteristics, managers can try to match the maturity and interest rate to 
the firms' characteristics. Some factors are suggested by the financing theories to 
influence corporate financing decisions; however, they are not found to significantly 
affect financing choices. In addition, the results show that there is no universal factor 
and no universal financing theory that firms can rely on in determining their capital 
structure and debt maturity structure. Managers cannot make their financing decisions 
based on a particular financing theory because normally firms are subjected to a 
combination of market imperfections suggested by different theories. Managers can try 
to follow a particular financing theory if they are subject to a particular market 
imperfection suggested by that theory. For example, if firms are likely to have higher 
levels of asymmetric information probably because they are young, have highly 
concentrated ownership structure and lower involvement of financial intermediaries but 
369 
they do not have higher risks of bankruptcy, they can try to follow the hierarchy of 
finance suggested by the pecking order theory. 
In addition, managers should not only consider firm-specific factors when they 
make financing decisions but should also consider the environment and other market-
wide factors and corporate governance that affect the firms' performance as a whole. 
For example, tangibility should provide firms with better borrowing capacity due to the 
collateral nature of tangibility. However, if firms already have close relationships with 
banks, or have lower level of asymmetric information due to the involvement of 
auditors, they should not rely too much on tangibility because higher tangibility limits 
growth opportunities. Also firms in weak legal environments can mitigate agency 
problems by employing more reputable auditors as auditors have a substitution role in 
monitoring firms. The results also suggest that managers need to change their financing 
strategies according to changes in economic conditions. For example, if firms suffer 
from the effect of a crisis and have no taxable income at the end of the year, they should 
not concentrate too much on having high non-debt tax shield or on tax deductibility 
because tax should be no longer their concern. On the other hand, they should focus 
more on liquidity risks and adapt their level of financing in order to reduce the risk of 
bankruptcy. 
Shareholders 
Existing shareholders should be aware that managers do not always act in the best 
interests of existing shareholders leading to agency costs of equity. Therefore, if they 
hold shares in firms that have high agency costs of equity, they should try to get 
involved more in the corporate governance or the running of the firm by participating 
more in the shareholder's meetings and try to influence the decisions of managers in 
order to reduce the expropriation of shareholders or they should try to diversify their 
shares by holding shares in different types of firms. 
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Creditors 
In contrast to existing shareholders, creditors should be more aware of agency 
costs of debt and try to mitigate these by issuing more short-term debt to firms that have 
high levels of managerial ownership structure. Banks are the main financing source of 
firms. In particular, they have a monitoring advantage and have more inside information 
than outside investors. Banks could learn from this study that some asymmetric 
information exists. Therefore, they should try to resolve informational problems and 
allocate funds only where they can obtain adequate collateral. 
Investors 
Investors can also benefit from the evidence provided in this thesis. The evidence 
shows that share price performance is inversely related to firm leverage indicating 
support for the market timing theory. This means investors in this region do discount 
stock according to overvalued stocks. Investors should be aware of the firms' financing 
behaviour because it indirectly releases insider information to outsiders. Besides, before 
investing in any firms, investors should consider the firms' characteristics as well as the 
market-wide factors. Also, because the factors influencing firms' capital structure and 
debt maturity structure differ between country groupings, international investors need to 
consider all related characteristics relating to a particular country before making 
decisions. 
Policy Makers 
The results also provide some insights for policy makers. Because several country-
specific factors are found to be significantly related to firms' financing decisions, the 
policy makers can shift the financing decisions to be favourable to the situation of each 
country as a whole. As financial market developments are important factors that 
influence how firms finance their investments, in order to encourage active and 
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profitable investment policy makers should try to develop both debt and equity markets 
or provide easier access for firms so that firms do not forego profitable investments. 
Moreover, in order for small firms to go public and raise equity finance, an 
improvement in the ability of the market to gather and process information effectively is 
required. While weak corporate governance might not have triggered the financial 
crisis, weak corporate governance practices could have made the countries more 
vulnerable to the crisis and could have exacerbated it once it began. Thus, one way to 
prevent another financial crisis is to improve corporate governance systems. In addition, 
excessive use of short-term debt has been suggested to be one of the factors in 
triggering and aggravating the financial crisis. Therefore, in order to prevent such 
unexpected economic instability, policy makers should try to influence the proportion of 
long-term debt and short-term debt by adjusting the term structure of interest rates and 
tax rates. When the cost of long-term borrowing is not too high and the tax benefit from 
using long-term debt is more prominent, firms will shift from excessive use of short-
term debt to long-term debt. In addition, for countries with weak legal enforcement, 
short-term debt is preferable in order to mitigate agency costs of debt. Policy makers in 
such countries should try to enforce stronger laws in order to reduce the firms' need in 
issuing too much short-term debt. Because market-wide factors influence capital 
structure and debt maturity structure of a firm differently between the two country 
groupings, the policies made in each country should also vary. For example, firms in 
countries least affected by the crisis are more aware of tax benefits while firms in 
countries most affected by the crisis are more concerned about the real cost of 
borrowing. Different levels of interest rate adjustment are required in different countries 
in order to reach optimal results. 
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6.4 Possible Future Research 
Despite the contributions mentioned earlier, there are a number of issues that are 
not addressed in this thesis. Further research is still needed in order to fully understand 
firms' financing decisions. Suggestions for further research are: 
(i) Due to the nature of the data and the unavailability of data for the sample 
countries, the proxy of country-specific factors were mostly obtained from 
previous studies. It is evident from the results from all three empirical chapters 
that country-specific factors play a crucial role in determining firms' financing 
decisions in this region. The role of financial systems and market mechanisms 
can be explored in more detail using more accurate proxies and data which will 
provide clearer and better evidence of the role of country-specific factors in 
corporate financing decisions. Future research could concentrate on the role of 
ownership structure, dispersion of investors' opinion, financial and information 
intermediaries and the strength of creditor and shareholder rights. As emerging 
markets are growing and become more integrated both within themselves and 
with the global economy, future research is needed to find out whether corporate 
governance systems in this region will be more matured or not. 
(ii) Like most of the earlier studies, this thesis focuses only on listed firms. It is 
possible that listed firms are neither the majority nor good representations of 
firms in the sample countries. The investigation of private firms would provide 
another aspect of corporate financing decisions because private firms have 
different characteristics (such as ownership structure) and the agency costs of 
these firms should differ from listed firms. 
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(iii) This thesis provides an empirical, quantitative perspective of corporate financing 
decisions. Little is know about managers' opinions. The use of a survey of 
firms' financing behaviour would help to improve understanding of corporate 
financing decisions in practice to improve the theoretical models. 
(iv) There is also a possible scope for further research in the area of forecasting. For 
example, it would be interesting to investigate the role of current firms' 
performance and characteristics, economic conditions and corporate governance 
in forecasting levels of debt and equity issues or short-term and long-term debt. 
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